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2ABSTRACT
The subject of this thesis is the reign of the last Carolingian emperor,
Charles the Fat. Because the reign ended in disaster, with the deposition of the
emperor and the breakup of the empire, historians have generally been content to
write Charles off as a failure, and to interpret his reign as conclusive proof that
Carolingian power was in terminal decline during the second half of the ninth
century. The thesis challenges this conventional wisdom on two grounds. Firstly,
it is conceptually questionable, being largely based on the modern teleological
assumptions that the emergence of France and Germany and the development of
'feudalism' were inevitable features of the tenth century, and hence were
necessarily preceded by a decline of imperial authority in the ninth. Secondly, it
is methodologically unsatisfactory, for, on the one hand, it employs a 'cut and
paste' approach to the sources in which pieces of evidence are selected to fit the
traditional model without due attention to the distinct aims of the authors of each
text, and, on the other, it neglects the evidence of charters which allow different
perspectives to those of authorial constructs.
The thesis argues for an alternative interpretation, considering the reign on
its own terms rather than as the final chapter in a grand narrative of decline and
fall. The methodology is to approach the contours and chronology of
contemporary politics through a reassessment of the sources, principally the
different versions of the chronicle known as the Annals of Fulda, the more
elaborate literary works of Abbo of St-Germain and Notker the Stammerer, and
the plentiful and underused charters. The conclusions are that many of these texts
must be read in a very short-term perspective, relating to developments in
Charles's reign rather than to the overall course of Carolingian history; that
historians have been too pessimistic about the vitality of Carolingian politics in
the late ninth century; and, moreover, that many of the trends thought of as
symptomatic of this period, such as the rise of aristocratic power, were in fact
ever-present features of the early medieval world, whose greater visibility in the
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7PREFACE
Following conventional practice, I have Anglicised and modernised names
of people and places wherever possible. The one exception is Louis the German's
eldest son, to whom I refer in the German spelling as Karlmann in order to
distinguish him from the west Frankish ruler Carloman II. Monasteries are
referred to in the form St-Martin, saints themselves in the form St. Verena.
Due to considerations of space, citations in footnotes are given only in
short-title form: consult the bibliography for full details. For the same reason, the
footnotes are not intended to be comprehensively bibliographical in the German
style. Where the text attempts to characterise the historiography, the reference
given is to a representative or recent example. Charters are cited by edition, rather
than page, number.
I have used the unconventional abbreviations AFC and BC for,
respectively, the Mainz and Bavarian continuations of the Annales Fuldenses.
The reason for this is to highlight the fact that the former is a direct continuation,
by the same author(s), of the 'main body' of the AF, while the latter is to all
intents and purposes a separate chronicle.
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Map 8: Richgards Monastic Empire
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1.1: Themes and approaches
Events developed quickly during the reign of Charles the Fat. Although at
the time of his succession as king of Alemannia in 876 he was but one king among
the several controlling the regna of the Carolingian empire, within a decade he
had become his dynasty's sole ruling representative. A bewildering mixture of
illness and misadventure deprived the Carolingian house of all its other adult
legitimate males, and delivered into the hands of Charles first Italy (879), then
Bavaria, Franconia and Saxony (882), and finally the west Frankish kingdom
(885). From 881 he ruled this comprehensive agglomeration of territories, which
ultimately constituted a revival of the empire of Charlemagne, as emperor.
However, Charles's unparalleled success in the acquisition of Carolingian
kingdoms during his reign has been overshadowed in the eyes of historians by the
abject failure of its conclusion, when, in November 887, he was deposed in a
palace coup by his nephew Arnulf of Carinthia before dying of natural causes a
matter of weeks later. As Charles remained heirless, this event meant that in
practice the empire was split up and parts of it made subject to rule by non-
Carolingians for the first time since 751. Accordingly, there exists a more or less
uniform scholarly consensus that Charles's loss of power reveals him to have been
a failure, an unimaginative and personally weak do-nothing ruler in whose feeble
grip the Carolingian empire, unprotected from internal conflict and external attack,
was allowed to tear itself apart.
As a result of this consensus, the reign has never been considered as
requiring a major study. Charles did not find a biographer among those early
twentieth-century historians who studied other early kings of 'France' such as
Charles the Bald and Charles the Simple, and the handful of articles which have
dealt with the reign since then have almost without exception been focused on the
emperor's deposition.' In view of the wave of reassessment which has in the last
two decades swept over the historiography of ninth-century kingship and
rehabilitated the historical reputations of Louis the Pious and Charles the Bald,
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Roger Collins recently observed that perhaps it is now time for Charles the Fat to
find his defender. 2 To some extent, therefore, this thesis may be viewed as a case
for the defence.
However, this defence does not arise from a desire to put forward a
revisionist argument for its own sake; rather, it seems to me that the issue of how
this reign is interpreted has broader implications. The negative scholarly opinion
which prevails about Charles the Fat is clearly based less on historians' critical
assimilation of all the available evidence than on their presuppositions about the
course of Carolingian political history as a whole. It is a commonplace that royal
power 'declined' in the later ninth century (according to a recent authority this is
'obvious'). 3 This model of historical change is held by many historians to have
been expressed in a number of ways. To summarise it briefly: while the landed
power of the monarchy dwindled, the aristocracy 'rose', assuming ever more
regalian rights, taking over defence against the Vikings and ultimately seizing
power in 887-8 from a Carolingian dynasty which was drained of its economic
and moral authority. This model is still extremely pervasive, yet it relies on quite
antiquated and teleological assumptions about the (inevitable, with hindsight)
emergence of France and Germany, and the necessity for a crisis in 'public'
(royal) power to have preceded the rise of 'private' ('feudal') power. Despite the
fact that recent scholarship has seriously undermined the validity of these
concepts, the paradigm of Carolingian decline remains in place. Moreover,
because Charles's deposition precipitated a fragmentation of the Carolingian
empire that turned out to be permanent, his reign is taken as emblematic of the
triumph of these processes. All this is posited, however, on at best a very partial
reading of the sources from the period. One main aim of this thesis is therefore to
examine the different elements of this traditional model in the light of all the
available evidence, and hence to question the framework within which late
Carolingian political history as a whole is understood.
Among the biographies, see Eckel, Charles; Favre, Eudes; Lot and Haiphen, Règne. The best-
known article is undoubtedly the ubiquitously-cited Keller, 'Sturz', which appeared as long ago as
1966.
2 Collins, 'Carolingians', p.109. On Louis and Charles the Bald see Godman and Collins (edd)
Heir; Nelson, Charles.
Arnold, Germany, pp.34, 82.
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The study of political structures ought not, however, to be divorced from
the study of political events: prior to addressing the wider issues, we must get our
story straight. 4 This thesis therefore also attempts to work out a more nuanced
political narrative for the reign of Charles the Fat than hitherto available, by
reading the evidence in the close context of the specific political circumstances of
the 870s and 880s, rather than in the light of received opinion about the long-term
decline of Carolingian power.
As a consequence of these dual aims, this is not a biography in the strictest
sense, and its structure falls somewhere between a chronological and a thematic
study. Chapter 2 deals with the main narrative sources for the reign, and argues
that historians have been too heavily influenced by the agenda of one particular
author, the Mainz continuator of the Annales Fuldenses. The next chapter
discusses the events surrounding a key moment in the reign, the revolt of Boso in
879, and shows that Charles and his co-rulers used the occasion as an opportunity
to secure mutual cooperation for the future, a conclusion which casts a rather more
positive light on Carolingian authority in the 880s than is usually allowed.
Chapters 4 and 5 are concerned with questions of governance and Charles's
relationship with the high aristocracy, assessing the evidence for the argument that
the period witnessed a decay of the structures of government and a consonant
increase in aristocratic authority. Particular attention is paid to the west Frankish
evidence, which provides an opportunity to reflect on the extent of loyalty to
Charles in the regnum which is often thought to have been most resistant to his
rule. Chapter 6 is an attempt to reconstruct the events of the period of the
emperor's sole rule, between early 885 and late 887, focusing on developments in
the politics of the imperial succession and offering a new hypothesis as to the
circumstances of Charles's deposition. As this attempt is based on a
contextualisation of the changing political positions of the main actors, it
necessarily involves further consideration of some of the broader issues of
governance and political structures throughout the reign. Finally, no thesis on
Charles the Fat would be complete without a discussion of Notker the
Stammerer's Gesta Karoli, which was written for the emperor and is interpreted in
As Reynolds, 'Historiography', p.133 has stressed.
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chapter 7 as an allusive commentary on some of the main political issues
discussed earlier in the thesis. Therefore, aside from historiography and the
construction of a political narrative, the recurring themes of the thesis are,
unsurprisingly, kingship and royal government.
There is a relatively large body of source material available for the reign,
much of it neglected because of a scholarly over-reliance on the evidence of the
Mainz continuator (see chapter 2). Among the alternative narratives, we are well
served up to 882 by Hincmar's Annales Bertiniani, after 882 by the Bavarian
continuator of the Anna/es Fuldenses, and for the whole period by the Annales
Vedastini and Regino of Pt-tim's Chronicon. The more literary material provided
by Notker and Abbo of St-Germain-des-Prés brightly illuminates particular
moments and events. Perhaps the most neglected of all the classes of evidence are
Charles's royal diplomas, of which over 170 are included in Kehr's MGH edition;
this high number of charters from a reign lasting only 11 years makes Charles
perhaps the best-documented of all the Carolingian kings. 5 These charters have
been used extensively in the thesis as sources of crucial detail on a variety of
subjects which remain opaque to historians who content themselves with the more
(apparently) self-explanatory narrative sources. Further points will be elucidated
from lesser chronicles, letters, and non-royal charters. It is hoped, therefore, that
the revised narrative presented in this thesis is based on a more comprehensive
range of evidence than that customarily consulted by historians dealing with this
period, and hence that its findings will have some validity when brought to bear
on broader historiographical issues concerning the collapse of the Carolingian
empire.
1.2: Early life, 839-76
Fuller comments on the source material and the historiography are
incorporated into the main body of the thesis, and hence no further orientation will
be offered here. Instead, by way of a preliminary to the main discussion, it is
worthwhile surveying certain aspects of Charles's early life which will help to
place the events of the reign proper into context. Our earliest information about
Bautier, 'Poids' provides statistics.
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Charles is a report of his birth in the Annales Alamannici for 839.6 It is relatively
unusual for the year of a king's birth to be reported explicitly in a ninth-century
chronicle, and so it is significant that our information comes from a region with
which Charles would have very strong associations throughout his life. About his
upbringing we know nothing for certain. It is, however, probable that he and his
brothers were well-educated at their father's court: 7 Regino describes the eldest,
Karlmann, as 'litteris eruditus', while we know that in later life Charles himself
was a borrower of books from the St-Gall monastic library, and was even reputed
to have been a composer of church song. 8 His nickname was not contemporary,
and seems to have been ascribed to him no earlier than the twelfth century.9
The political position of Louis the German's three sons during his reign
was anomalous by comparison to Carolingian practice elsewhere. Presumably
keeping in mind the trouble which he and his brothers had caused for their own
father in the 83 Os, Louis elected not to have his children recognised as kings
during his lifetime, hoping thus to minimise the possibility that one of them could
usurp his position during a rebellion. Each was, nevertheless, given responsibility
in a particular region, Karlmann in Carinthia, Louis the Younger in Franconia and
Saxony, and Charles the Fat in Alemannia and Alsace. This arrangement was in
place by the end of the 850s, cemented in the early 860s by the sons' marriages
into important aristocratic families in their designated areas, and sealed by public
pronouncement in 865.10 The powers enjoyed by each of the sons were closely
defined: writing in 881, Notker tells us that they were allowed to determine minor
judicial cases, while decisions regarding bishops, monasteries and counts, as well
as the public fisc and all major judgements, were reserved for their father." This
information is corroborated by other sources. The Annales Fuldenses, for
instance, records how Louis and Charles judged cases at BUrstadt in 873, but took
6 AA s.a.839, p.178.
On east Frankish court culture see now Goldberg, 'Kingship'.
Regino, Chronicon, s.a.880, p.116; Lehmann, Bibliothekskataloge, pp.68, 72, 88; Ekkehard,
Casus, c.46, p.104.
9 Nass, Reichskronik, p.49 shows how the reference to the name in the Annalista Saxo, previously
thought to be the earliest, is in fact a late interpolation.




care to leave those they could not resolve to their father.' 2 That Karlmann had
similar responsibilities is evident from diplomatic records of some of his judicial
decisions. '
Despite the apparent restrictiveness of these arrangements, the sons did
exercise powers which were quite appropriate to the dignity of Carolingian
subkings.' 4 Leadership of armies raised from their regna came under their remit,
especially for Louis and Karlmann, who had marcher responsibilities, but also for
Charles, who commanded forces in Moravian territory in 869 and in Italy in 87S.
Indeed, they were probably seen as the principal intermediate authorities in their
regna: Karlmann was referred to as 'praelatus Carantanis' by the author of the
Annales Fuldenses, while Charles was regarded as the 'princeps' or 'rector' of
Alemannia.' 6 In keeping with this point, the sons were also called in by their
father to subscribe those royal charters which pertained to their regions.'7
Accordingly, they seem to have been just as capable of building up networks of
association within the aristocracy as were sons of other Carolingian rulers,
something which Louis the German presumably intended. For example, when
Charles attempted to impose one of his clerics on the vacant see of Lausanne in
877, his choice was partly guided by the hospitality which the candidate had
shown towards him while he was still a 'iuvenculus'.' 8 Likewise, many of the
men who came to populate Charles's court were Alemans who had begun their
careers in the entourage of the future king before 876.' Louis the Younger
enjoyed a similar degree of association with his men: when a fight threatened to
break out between the Franks and Saxons at a royal assembly held in 875 at
Tribur, it was he and not his father who intervened to keep the peace. 2° Evidently,
12 AF s.a.873, p.78.
'3DFrei898.
' As Kasten, Konigssöhne, pp.220-37 has recently emphasised, subkmgship was defined less in
titular/institutional than in familial terms.
' For example, AF s.a.858, p.49; 870, p.70 (Karlmann); AF s.a.854, p44; 869, pp.68-9 (Louis);
AF s.a.869, pp.68-9; AB s.a.875, p.198 (Charles). AB s.a.872, p.186 is instructive, revealing the
significance of Louis's and Charles's armies by their absence.
lb AF s.a.863, p.56; Borgolte, 'Karl', pp.23-35.
' 7 DDLG82-3, 105, 110, 116, 119, 145, 161, 163-5.
' Collectio Sangallensis, no.26.
Fleckenstein, Hojkapelle, pp.1 89-98.
20 AF s.a.875, p.83. See Bowlus, Franks, pp.119-28 for Karlmann and the aristocracy of the south-
west.
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the Sons were already beginning to exert strong influence in their delegated
commands before their father's death. As the eulogistic terminology of a poem
composed for an adventus of Charles the Fat to the monastery of St-Gall reveals,
while the sons may ordinarily have avoided having themselves addressed as kings,
they eschewed few of the other trappings of kingship.2'
Despite the ultimate success of Louis the German's succession plan, which
was put into effect in 876 in a form almost identical to its original conception
some two decades earlier, it did not eradicate the propensity of Carolingian sons to
revolt against their fathers. Before the official promulgation of the project in 865,
Karlmann was the unhappy party, twice rising against his father. 22 Thereafter,
however, the two younger sons were the troublemakers, apparently due to their
suspicion that Karlmann was receiving preferential treatment. 23 Louis the German
may, as Borgolte has suggested, have intended Karlmann to enjoy some sort of
general superiority over his brothers. 24 This may have included the incorporation
of eastern Lotharingia into Karlmann's portion after its annexation to east Francia
in 870, as it is he, rather than Louis the Younger or Charles the Fat, who
intervenes for a royal charter in favour of the key Lotharingian royal monastery of
PrUm in 871 25 If the plan was altered in this way at this time, we would also have
an explanation as to why Louis and Charles went into rebellion in 872 in an
attempt to force their father to reconfirm the 865 promulgation. 26 The success of
Louis the German's family politics was therefore not achieved without a struggle,
and its ultimate implementation was only assured by his willingness to
compromise with his Sons when circumstances demanded it (a flexibility not
always evident in the attitude of Charles the Bald). As will be argued in chapter 6,
in this respect Louis showed more political sagacity than his youngest son, whose
intransigence on the identity of his own successor was ultimately the cause of his
undoing.
' Buist, 'Susceptacula', pp.135-8. Charles had himself commemorated at Remiremont as rex,
probably while in rebellion against his father in 872: Liber memorialis Romaricensis, fol.9r;
Tellenbach, 'Gedenkbücher', pp.396-9.
22 AF s.a.861, p.55; 863, p.56.
23 AF s.a.866, pp.64-5; 871, pp.72-3; 872, p.75; 873, p.T7; 874, pp.81-2.
24 Borgolte, 'Karl', pp.50-4.
25 D LG 141.
26 AF s.a.872, p.75.
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These introductory remarks cannot conclude without some mention of the
most famous event connected with Charles's pre-kingship years, namely the
attempt at worldly renunciation he apparently made in January 873 during a royal
assembly in Frankfurt. This incident, which was reported in detail in no less than
three major contemporary sources, clearly created quite a stir throughout the
empire's political circles. 27 Noticeably, our main witnesses interpret the event
rhetorically to suit their own agendas. For Hincmar, Charles's attempt to
renounce the world (by removing his belt and sword and declaring that he would
abstain from sexual intercourse) was a righteous response to a diabolical attempt
to induce him into revolt; his contrition therefore provided an admirable contrast
to the wilful behaviour of Charles the Bald's rebellious son Carloman. 28 The
author of the Anna/es Fuldenses also read Charles's actions as evidence of his
being under the influence of Satan. For this author as well, Charles was repentant
as he confessed his sins, while the moral of obedience drawn was directed at Louis
the Younger, who was harbouring secret plans to rebel. Despite these differences
in presentation, the sources agree that Charles performed a penance or confession
in public, that he was possessed by the devil, and that he was freed from this in a
religious ceremony in church thanks to clerical intervention. These circumstances
constituted highly unusual behaviour for a member of the royal house to display in
public, and account for the incident's fame. Charles's actions, whether motivated
by remorse or by a true desire for withdrawal, may stand as a sign that, as an
educated layman, he had absorbed the spiritual exhortations of the church to such
an extent that he was having trouble reconciling them with the demands of his
secular role. 29 These tensions were brought to a head by the temptation he felt at
Frankfurt and his conspiracy with Louis the Younger. Perhaps it was this internal
conflict which Notker had in mind when, in terms which echoed the report of
Hincmar, he reminded Charles later in life of 'eis rebus et negociis, sine quibus res
publica terrena non subsistit, coniugio videlicet usuque armorum.'3°
27 AF s.a.873, pp.'77-8; AB s.a.873, pp.190-2; AX s.a.873, pp.31-2.
28 Nelson, 'Tale', pp.121-5.
29 See Nelson, 'Monks', pp.124-5, 13 8-40.
30 Notker, Gesta, 2.10, p.66.
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With all these circumstances in mind, I would suggest that one further
source, this time iconographical, contains a record of the events at the 873 royal
assembly. The so-called Ludwigspsalter was put together in the second quarter of
the ninth century at the monastery of St-Amand, probably as a gift for Louis the
German from his father or brother. 3 ' Sometime in the third quarter of the ninth
century at a scriptorium in Alemannia or Alsace, three of the codex's blank
protective leaves were filled with additions: on folio lv extracts from Boethius's
De consolatione philosophiae, on folios 11 9r- 11 9v in the same hand a prayer
entitled Oratio ante crucem dicenda, and on folio 1 20r a crucifixion scene. In the
latter, Christ hangs from a cross while a man kneels in proskynesis at the base.32
The man is dressed only in a brown tunic and shoes, but has been generally
identified as a king engaged in an act of humility on the grounds that he bears no
clerical marks of office. For some time it was believed by scholars that the figure
represented Charles the Fat, and that the additions to the manuscript were made as
part of formal deposition proceedings in late 887. This theory has now,
however, been terminally weakened on the basis of its proponents' misuse of the
887 evidence and of their problematic interpretative assumptions.34 More
recently, Goldberg has cogently argued that the image actually shows Louis the
German performing a political ritual of humility connected with the public
celebration of a military victory. 35 Such rituals, he maintains, were central to
Louis's understanding of his own kingship, and acted as a focal point for the
political community of the east Frankish kingdom.
Although Goldberg's arguments are, on the whole, persuasive, certain
aspects of his case allow a different interpretation of the Ludwigspsalter to be
forwarded. Goldberg identifies similarities between the codex's ruler image and a
manuscript of Otfrid of Weifienburg's Liber evangeliorum, ingeniously and
convincingly demonstrating that the Otfrid manuscript was the direct model for
the Ludwigspsalter's depiction of royal humility, while the latter's frontispiece
For the following see, most recently, Goldberg, 'Kingship', pp.67-9. The relevant facsimiles are
provided by Jammers, 'Ludwigspsalter'.
32 See Figure 2.
Jammers, 'Ludwigspsalter'.
Bund, Thronsturz, pp.547-9.
Goldberg, 'Kingship', esp. pp.67-72.
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was the key influence on the equivalent page of the Liber. 36 Because the Liber can
be quite firmly dated, by virtue of its dedications, to 863x871, and because the
Ludwigspsalter's additions can be placed in Alemannia or Alsace in the period
850x875, Goldberg assumes that the manuscripts' cross-fertilisation took place at
the Alsatian monastery of WeiBenburg at around the time the Liber was being
completed. Although this dating is a plausible speculation, it is by no means
decisive, for it implies that the WeiBenburg artist who added the ruler portrait to
the psalter did so more or less autonomously as a gift for Louis the German.
However, the bold nature of the additions suggests that they were done in
accordance with a royal commission, or at least for a particular occasion, as
depictions of kings in this period tended to be. The famous events of January 873
therefore come into consideration. 37 Five points support the suggestion that it was
this occasion to which the picture in the psalter referred.
Firstly, the figure seems to have been depicted as quite youthful, and does
not obviously resemble a man in his 60s, as Louis the German was by this time.
Secondly, Charles the Fat's reported actions at that assembly fit the image of the
man in the picture. As we have seen, he performed some kind of public penance
or other act of humility in a religious context, and seems also to have stripped
himself of his badges of status, his sword and belt. Thirdly, there are important
chronological considerations which must be taken into account. Although
Goldberg's arguments for the political importance of the cult of the cross at Louis
the German's court are broadly convincing, his evidence only gains force
cumulatively, and he fails to make a clear distinction, which is important to his
argument, between the use of cross-shaped banners and reliquaries on the one
hand, and on the other the use of relics of the True Cross itself. 38 Rituals centering
on fragments of the True Cross surely had a different (and greater) significance in
court circles than simply the use of cross imagery: it was, after all, a fairly
universal Christian symbol. Moreover, drawn images of the cross were not, as
Goldberg assumes, always interpreted after the fashion of Constantine's vision as
Ibid, p.67 and n.108.
tentatively suggested by Bund, Thronsturz, p.549.
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simple emblems of imperial victory, but could also imply a theophany, a
representation of divinity itself. 39 That the cross before which the humble layman
abases himself in the Ludwigspsalter actually had a figure of Christ on it may
indeed suggest that it was meant to convey more than a sign of triumph, and
indeed referred to the True Cross itself. In view of all this, it is important to note
that the east Frankish court did not receive its relic of the lignum sanctae crucis
until the visit of Byzantine ambassadors in 872, at least a year after the completion
of Otfrid's Liber evangeliorum.4°
Fourthly, the added text Oratio ante crucem dicenda also seems to fit the
circumstances of 873.' The prayer, addressed (unsurprisingly) to Christ, is
concerned with the rejection of 'diabolicae pompae', perhaps of the kind which
Charles was tempted by, and with the renunciation of worldly sins such as
covetousness and avarice, which were central to the issues at stake in the
rebellions of the early 870s. The overall theme of the prayer is the reconciliation
of a sinner with Christ, a reconciliation which is to take place (in support of the
previous point) through the medium of the wood of the True Cross. Fifihly and
finally, a direct connection between the Frankfurt 'penance' of Charles the Fat and
the additions to the Ludwigspsalter is provided in the shape of Archbishop
Liutbert of Mainz. Liutbert, who became archchaplain and archchancellor in 870,
was one of the dedicatees of Otfrid's Liber evangeliorum. Moreover, from 870 at
the earliest, he was also abbot of WeiBenburg, the monastery where, as Goldberg
shows, the addition of the ruler portrait to the psalter, on the model of Otfrid's
Liber, was effected. He is thus a good candidate to consider as the instigator of
the additions. Furthermore, Liutbert was identified by Hincmar as being closely
involved in ridding Charles of his 'possession' in the church at Frankfurt, by
donning his priestly garb and presiding over a mass. 42 In 887 it was Liutbert
whom Charles sent to Arnuif with the east Frankish fragment of the Cross to
38 Goldberg, 'Kingship', pp.61-2 with n.88 for his collection of references, hardly any of which
can be assumed to defmitely refer to actual relics of the Cross; the distinction is muddied by the
argument at p.64.
Frolow, 'NIKA', pp.102-3; Brubaker, Vision, pp.154-7.
4°AF s.a.872, p.75.
Jammers, 'Ludwigspsalter', pp.261-2 for the text.
42 AB s.a.873, p.191. AX s.a.873, p.32 does not mention Liutbert by name but says that Charles
was exorcised by 'orationum suffragiis et coniurationibus diversorum sacerdoturn'.
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remind him of his fidelity to the emperor: might the archbishop, in his capacity as
head of the royal chapel, have been responsible for the relic's custody after its
arrival in 872?
Liutbert is thus a key figure linking together the strands connecting the
Liber evangeliorum which influenced the psalter's additions, the relic of the True
Cross which was depicted in the ruler image, the monastery of WeiBenburg where
the additions were made, and the royal assembly at Frankfurt. It is therefore
possible that the additions to the psalter were made on his orders at the behest of
Louis the German. The theme of the Oratio and of the image is repentance and
reconciliation, a theme shared by our literary representations of Charles's outburst
in 873, which was provoked by remorse over a rebellion plan to which he was
party. A ritual of humility, a public display of contrition, was desirable to both
parties: it allowed Charles to retake his position in the world with a calm
conscience, while for Louis it counted as a symbol of submission and, as the
author of the Mainz-based Annales Fuldenses thought, a sign of his goodness.
The aftermath of the incident was marked by rituals of reconciliation. First,
Charles was sent by his father round the shrines of the martyrs 'to recover his
sanity', and then, presumably in an effort to reassure all concerned that the
previously-agreed succession plan was still in place, Louis and his two rebellious
sons sat together in judgement at Bürstadt, with the Sons publicly deferring to their
father's superior status in certain cases.43 Might not the additions to the
Ludwigspsalter have been made as part of this process of reconciliation, as a
reminder of Charles's contrition and the restoration of peace and harmony
between father and son?
The renewed concord between the two prevailed for the short remainder of
Louis's reign. However, while the king's death in August 876 may have seen his
long-planned succession project actually implemented, a rare mark of distinction
for any early medieval king, the division of the east Frankish kingdom reignited
the potential for discord between his sons. As the next chapter will show, it was
AB s.a.873, p.192, where Hmcmar also says that Louis initially planned to send Charles to
Rome before other matters intervened; these, perhaps, were the judicial hearings mentioned by AF
s.a.873, p.78. The latter example also shows the sons deferring to their father's familial
superiority, in which terms Carolingian political hierarchy was customarily couched.
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to be Liutbert, Charles's protector in 873, whose supervision of the so-called
Annales Fuldenses in the kingdom of Louis the Younger ensured a concerted
attempt was made to blacken the name of Charles the Fat, an attempt which has
succeeded in profoundly influencing the views of almost every historian who has
studied the reign since.
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2: CHARLES THE FAT AND THE ANNALES FULDENSES, 882-7
2.1: A failed king
From the reams of pages which have been devoted by historians to the
practice of Carolingian kingship, perhaps only Charles the Fat has emerged with
the reputation of a 'failed king'.' This judgement is all the more striking in that it
has been postulated in broadly similar tenns by almost every historian who has
ever had occasion to mention him. The uniformity of opinion has proved
remarkably impervious to changes in both time and historiographical genre. Thus
while the tone of Stubbs's judgement, that Charles was 'dangerous and
unmanageable; a diseased, idiotic raving madman.. .who was probably put out of
the way for his own good' could easily be put down to his Victorian sensibilities
and nineteenth-century ideas about the asylum, it is significant that Fried's
judgement of Charles in his monumental history of Germany, published as
recently as 1994, was expressed using the same idiom and vocabulary. 2 Likewise,
specialised articles on the reign are no less likely to comment negatively on
Charles's rule and abilities than textbook summaries of the period.3
This generally-held belief in the personal inadequacy of Charles to fulfil
the office of kingship is frequently expressed in terms of three quite specific major
criticisms which are met again and again in the modern historiography. These are:
firstly, that he was dominated by his advisers, especially his archchancellor
Liutward of Vercelli 4; secondly, that he was incapable in his dealings with the
Vikings5 ; and thirdly, that he was inactive and immobile, a do-nothing king.6
What evidence is there for these claims? In this chapter I will argue that each of
these three main criticisms is drawn almost exclusively from a single source, the
Mainz continuation of the so-called Annales Fuldenses; and, moreover, that this
source must be read with much more scepticism than has generally been allowed
by previous commentators.
'Tellenbach, 'Nobility', p.209; Schieffer, 'Karl', p.134.
2 Stubbs, Germany, p.65; Fried, Weg, p.423.
Cf., for instance, Dunbabm, France, p.15; Riché, Carolingians, p.217; Schieffer, 'Karl', p.134.
Eg. Keller, 'Sturz', p.338.
Eg. Wormald, 'Studies', p.140.
6 Eg. Bowlus, Franks, p.209.
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The continuing uniformity of opinion is in large part simply a result of the
fact that Charles the Fat has been much less studied than most other Carolingian
kings: the lack of new research arguing the contrary case means that historians
tend to simply accept and repeat the prevailing historiographical opinion. It is
also, however, testimony to the influence which convenient historical paradigms
can persistently exert over scholars generations after they were first conceived.
The purpose of this chapter is therefore not simply to rehabilitate the historical
reputation of Charles the Fat, although that will emerge as one aspect of my
argument. As outlined in chapter 1, there is also a broader issue at stake. The
judgement of Charles as a failure rests in part on a teleological assumption: the
fact that his reign ended in his own deposition and the collapse of the Carolingian
empire is taken to demonstrate that he was a weak king. This in turn feeds into
and supports the longstanding historiographical models which underpin the
conventional negative interpretation of the late Carolingian Empire as a whole:
most notably, that the aristocracy 'rose', that France and Germany 'emerged', and
that murderous conflict within the royal house escalated. The existence of these
processes is easier to assert if it is assumed that Charles the Fat, the man who was
ultimately their victim, was personally weak, and thus powerless to resist the
inevitable tide of history: his reign was the acid test, its 'failure' the final proof of
Carolingian decline. Each of these 'trends' will be addressed in subsequent
chapters, where it is argued that they rest more on teleological assumptions than
on firm contemporary evidence.7 By first critiquing the received view of
Charles's personal weakness, therefore, I hope to remove one of the blocks on
which the conventional understanding of the collapse of the Carolingian Empire
rests, and to begin to assess the evidence in its short-term, contemporary, context,
rather than as part of the traditional grand narrative of early medieval
historiography.
2.2: The Annales Fuldenses
The text known to historians as the Annales Fuldenses is our principal
source for east Frankish history in the second half of the ninth century, and as such
' See below, chapters 3 (family conflict), 4 (aristocracy), 5 (nations).
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necessarily provides the framework for all discussions of east Frankish politics in
the period. Although the textual history of the Anna/es remains shrouded in
doubt, we can say for certain that it is independent of other known sources from
the 830s onwards, and that from about the mid-860s the version we have was
being written up contemporaneously in the circle of Archbishop Liutbert of Mainz
(86389) . 8
 The manuscripts diverge in 882: the version in MS 2 which went on
until the year 887 was a direct continuation of the Mainz annals, likewise
produced under the supervision of Liutbert; while that in the manuscripts of group
3, which extends to 901, provides an alternative perspective clearly written from a
Bavarian viewpoint. 9 Both continuations appear to have been written more or less
contemporaneously. 10
Liutbert was archchaplain and archchancellor at the court of Louis the
German from 870 until 876, and retained his position under Louis the Younger
(876-82), in whose kingdom Mainz lay. Accordingly, the text up until 882 is
partisan to those rulers, vilifying or suppressing mention of their main rivals
(including, in the case of Louis the Younger, Charles the Fat) while promoting
their own aspirations." However, the work was not strictly speaking a 'court' or
'official' record; rather, it reflected the viewpoint of the archbishop himself. In its
consistent opposition to the divorce plans of Lothar II in the 860s, for example, it
sometimes diverged from the attitude of Louis the German, which fluctuated in
accordance with that king's attempts to position himself to achieve maximum
political benefit.'2
This is an important point to bear in mind when considering the annals
composed by the Mainz continuator in 882-7. On the death of Louis the Younger
S Reuter, Annals, pp.1-14 is the best guide to the detailed debates concerning the AF's origins and
authorship.
To distinguish these texts I will employ the following abbreviations throughout this thesis: AF
refers to the text before the manuscripts diverge in 882; AFC (Annales Fuldenses continuation)
denotes the Mainz continuation; and BC is used for the Bavarian continuation. I assume, for
convenience and on the basis of probability, that the authors were male.
tO This will be assumed except where indicated.
An example is provided by Charles the Fat's involvement in the politics of the succession to
Louis II (AB s.a.871, p.183; 874, pp.196-7; 875, p.198; Andreas, Historia, p.230) which is
completely ignored by the Annales Fuldenses.
12 Carroll, 'Archbishops', pp.5-6. Nelson, 'Annals', shows that similar conclusions can drawn
about the relationship between Hincmar of Rheims and Charles the Bald from the former's
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in January 882, his brother Charles the Fat inherited his Franconian-Bavarian
kingdom and, because he already had an archchancellor in Bishop Liutward of
Vercelli, Liutbert lost the high position at court which he had enjoyed for so long.
We know that Liutbert was extremely unhappy at this development and was
reluctant to accept his demotion: a charter drafted in November 882 in the
monastery of Weil3enburg, where he was abbot, insisted on referring to him as
'archicapellanus', an epithet which belonged to Liutward under the new regime.'3
This bitterness heavily informs the standpoint of the Mainz annalist in all his
reports between 882 and mid-887, which are consistently and pointedly hostile
towards both Liutward and Charles.
The Bavarian continuator, on the other hand, displays all the traits one
would expect from a medieval provincial chronicler. His annals concentrate on
Bavarian matters, and he has no obvious axe to grind either way in his reports
about goings-on at court: this text is no more a court history along the lines of the
Annales Regni Francorum than is its Mainz counterpart. Indeed, Charles the Fat
himself tends to vanish from sight when he is not in Bavaria or nearby in the east
Frankish kingdom. The viewpoints of both sources change in the middle of 887,
at which point the emperor deposed Liutward and replaced him with Liutbert.'4
As a result, the Mainz annalist is for the short remainder of his work sympathetic
to Charles (although not, of course, to the disgraced Liutward), while the Bavarian
continuator suddenly becomes parti pris and turns hostile to justif'
(retrospectively) the coup of Arnulf of Carinthia.'5
Although all these circumstances are well enough known to historians,
they are in fact rarely incorporated into accounts of the period. Despite the fact
that the Mainz continuator's version is, for the bulk of the reign, clearly the more
driven by a specific political agenda (opposition to Liutbert's exclusion from
court), it has been generally accepted by scholars as the more reliable source, and
even as an objective record of events. Historians frequently interpret the Mainz
annalist as reflecting a general contemporary disquiet with Charles's reign, while
Annales Bertiniani; cf. eadem, 'History-writing'. On Louis the German, Charles the Bald and
Lothar's divorce, see now Airlie, 'Bodies'.
' D CIII 63.
' On which see c.6.6.
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adjudging the less critical Bavarian continuator to be an apologist for the
emperor.' 6 Another common approach, as used in two standard textbook accounts
of the reign, is to follow the hostile Mainz author until the deposition of Liutward
in mid-887, and then to switch to the Bavarian annalist's justification of Arnulf's
coup, in which the extent and nature of the opposition to Charles is exaggerated
for polemical reasons.' 7 Evidence from different sources is therefore juxtaposed
without discussion or even acknowledgement of the different agendas of the
authors. Similarly, Fried, in the most recent authoritative treatment of the period,
follows the critical section of the Mainz annals religiously, taking it as evidence
for general disquiet with Charles and neglecting totally to acknowledge the
existence of alternative versions of events (from the Bavarian annalist as well as
from Abbo of St-Germain-des-Prés, Regino of Prüm and Notker the Stammerer).'8
In other words, the sources are usually read selectively to fit the
established interpretation of the reign, rather than the received narrative being
assessed in light of the sources. Inconvenient differences in contemporary opinion
are thus suppressed in order to provide an evidential basis for the conventional
paradigm of a decline in royal power in the late ninth century.' 9 It is a principal
contention of this thesis that by taking all the sources from the reign together and
reading them in their contemporary context, one can draw a quite different picture.
As a prelude to this endeavour, therefore, the rest of this chapter is an attempt to
remove the Mainz continuation of the Annales Fuldenses from the privileged
position it enjoys in the eyes of historians of the period, hence putting it back in its
place as simply one source among many, and to show that it does not always
deserve to be prioritised over the account of the Bavarian annalist. An
examination of the rhetorical strategies of the Mainz annalist in relation to some of
' Bowlus, 'Early History', p.557 is a good exposition of the change in tone of both authors.
6 Keller, 'Sturz', after acknowledging the respective positions of the annalists, ultimately follows
the Mainz author. Collins, Europe, p.288 asserts that the Mainz text was written by a partisan of
Charles the Fat. BUhrer-Thierry, 'Conseiller', p.112 describes it as 'official'. Wallace-Hadrill,
Church, p.330, characterises the Mainz annals as unpolitical. These authors imply that even
Charles's allies lamented his alleged incompetence.
'' McKitterick, Kingdoms, p.262; Riché, Carolingians, pp.1 17-9. Neither author mentions the
existence of the Bavarian continuation.
Fried, 'Kingdoms', pp.158-60. See below, cc. 4.2.2 (Abbo), 6.1 (Regino), 7 (Notker).
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his major set-pieces will reveal that his work's polemic is much more pointed and
carefully constructed than has been hitherto appreciated, and that it is the central
source for the negative image of Charles in the modern historiography.2°
2.2.1: Charles and Liutward
This image has, as mentioned above, three main parts. Firstly, was
Charles dominated by his advisers? There are only two pieces of evidence for
this. One is that Liutward was mentioned more than any other individual as
intervenor in the texts of royal charters. Certainly, this shows us that he was
exceptionally influential at court, but this is no more than we would expect from a
man who was both archchaplain and archchancellor, the two most prominent court
positions. 2 ' It only acquires the sinister quality of domination when considered in
the light of the long set piece on Liutward by the Mainz aimalist in his entry for
887, on the occasion of the archchancellor's deposition. 22 This invective includes
a number of charges: low birth, heresy, attacking the king's relative Berengar of
Friuli, and usurpation of royal rights. Liutward, we are told, surpassed even the
Old Testament villain Haman because he was 'prior imperatori et plus quam
imperator ab omnibus honorabatur et timebatur.' In addition, he was depicted as
the emperor's only counsellor. 23 Almost all these accusations are unique to this
source:24 the fact that bitterness towards Liutward was one of its raisons d'être
should immediately arouse our suspicion. In any case, the claims are mostly
demonstrably false. Liutward was not of low birth, but belonged to a significant
Alemannic family associated with the royal monastery of Reichenau which had
enjoyed Konigsnahe at least since Charles the Fat's installation in the region in the
late 85 Os.25 Nor was he a heretic: in fact the Christological deviation of which he
19 The key text is the Bavarian contmuator's tendentious 887 annal, which justifies Arnuif's coup
by speaking of a realm-wide conspiracy against Charles the Fat: see below, cc.6. 1 and 6.7 for
further discussion.
20 That the text was polemical is acknowledged by Reuter, 'Plunder', p.75.
21 The intervention evidence is discussed fully below, c.6.6.2.
22 AFC s.a.887, pp.105-6.
This is implicit in the 887 annal, and explicit in AFC s.a.882, p.98.
24 The allegation that Liutward was Charles's 'unique counsellor' is the exception, having been
made also by Regino, Chronicon, s.a.887, p.127. However, Regino also had an axe to grind with
Liutward, and this stock accusation was an obvious way of expressing it: see below, c.6.6.2.
25 Fleckenstein, HoJkapelle, pp.190-I.
39
is accused (belief in Christ as one in unity of substance with God, but not in
person) is garbled, and corresponds to no known early medieval theology,
orthodox or otherwise. Likewise, despite his high position, he was far from being
the emperor's only counsellor, and we can identify many more such men. 26 The
feud with Berengar was based on the allegation that Liutward had kidnapped the
marchio's niece from the major imperial nunnery of St-Salvatore in Brescia in
order to marry her off to one of his relatives. However, this version of events may
well be an invention of the Mainz annalist: it is quite likely that Liutward here
acted not in spite of imperial authority, but rather with Charles's permission and
even with the acquiescence of the nuns. Berengar, and not Liutward, was the
aggressor.27
This last complaint is adduced by the Mainz author as the evidence for his
assertion that Liutward was the real power behind the throne: if he could dictate
noble marriages to further his own interests, and do so at the expense of a relative
of the emperor and of an important imperial nunnery, by implication there was
nothing he could not do. The fact that the annalist distorts the course of the feud
in order to make this polemical accusation should alert us to the fact that his
narrative is politically charged.
This becomes even clearer when it is recognised that all the attacks on
Liutward are couched in heavily stereotyped terms, stock themes drawn from
Carolingian history and biblical models. Each stereotype, however, achieves its
specific impact only in the context of the dispute between Liutward and Liutbert.
Low birth was a standard criticism (equated as it was with moral poverty), used
most famously as the most potent accusation of which Thegan could think to
belittle Ebo of Rheims in his Gesta Hiudowici Imperatoris.2R As a heretic,
moreover, Liutward was unfit to lead the royal chapel as archchaplain: the
allegation was carefully chosen to imply that he was unfit to do his job (which
Liutbert coveted). 29	The 'unique counsellor' was a classic Carolingian
26 Several of whom are discussed in cc.4, 5 and 6.6.2.
27 This is the impression given by BC s.a.886, p.114 and s.a.887, p.115, whose author had no
vested interest in the matter. See also Schmid, 'Liutbert', pp.42-8.
28 Theg Gesta, c.44, p.232.
29 Bilhrer-Thierry, 'Conseiller', pp.118-9. The same message comes from AFC s.a.882, p.98,
where Liutward is referred to as 'pseudoepiscopus'.
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demonisation applied to kings' favourites by their enemies. 3° It was a notion
which inverted the norms of Carolingian political culture, the rhetoric (if not
always the reality) of which was based on ideas of broad discussion and
consensus, ideas supported by biblical precedent. 3 ' In Liutward's case, he was
given to influence the emperor 'caeteris consiliariis, qui patri imperatoris assistere
solebant, ignorantibus.' 32 This last comment we may read as a direct reference to
Liutbert and his circle: if Liutward was the antithesis of consensus, the archbishop
and his associates were its personification. Finally, as Buhrer-Thierry has
stressed, there are significant affinities between the Mainz annalist's
characterisation of Liutward and the book of Esther. The annalist makes an
explicit reference to this text when he states that Liutward 'Aman, cuius mentio
facta est in libro Hester, et nomine et dignitate praecelleret. Ille enim post regem
Assuerum erat secundus, iste vero prior imperatori et plus quam imperator ab
omnibus honorabatur et timebatur.' To the educated ninth-century reader or
listener, the parallels would have been striking: Haman was not only his king's
second-in-command, he also carried his seal ring, a possible reference to
Liutward's position as archchancellor. Haman, moreover, ultimately overreached
his position and was replaced, with God's help, by his arch-enemy Mordechai.33
If Liutward was Haman, then Liutbert, of course, was Mordechai.
All this demonstrates that, far from being a reliable description of the
relationship between Liutward of Vercelli and Charles the Fat, the Mainz annal for
887 is an extremely pointed and polemical piece of writing. It deploys standard
and well-known themes to show how Liutward, as opposed to Liutbert, was unfit
to be archchaplain and archchancellor on a number of carefully chosen grounds: it
is a portrait of an archetypally bad adviser tailored to fit contemporary
conventions, and not, as historians have read it, a dispassionate history of his
career. It is, in short, a collage of stereotypes. It is important to stress, moreover,
that the context within which all its accusations acquire meaning is the rivalry
between Liutward and the annalist's patron, Liutbert of Mainz: this is at the centre
° Btihrer-Thierry, 'Conseiller', pp.1 19-2 1.
' On consensus see Nelson, 'Kingship and Empire'.
32 AFC s.a.882, p.98.
Buhrer-Thierry, 'Conseiller', pp.1 16-7.
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of each of its claims and allusions. The fact that this political rivalry so clearly
informs the Mainz annalist's depiction of Liutward therefore seriously undermines
its value as evidence for the archchancellor's domination of the emperor.
2.2.2: The siege of Asselt
The same rhetorical device, the setting up of archetypes, is employed by
the Mainz armalist in his discussion of Charles's dealings with the Vikings, which
constitute the second major element of the emperor's negative reputation. In this
case, although other texts discussing the subject are available, it is the Mainz
continuator's depiction of the siege of Asselt in 882 which dominates historians'
accounts and colours their representation of the other sources. 34 The full text is
worth reproducing here, broken up into sections to make the subsequent argument
easier to follow:
1. 'Statuto itaque et condicto inter eos tempore convenerunt de diversis
provintiis yin innumerabiles et omnibus hostibus formidandi, si ducem habuissent
idoneum sibique consentientem, hoc est Franci, Norici, Alamanni, Thuringii atque
Saxones; parique intentione profecti sunt contra Nordmannos pugnare cupientes.
Quo cum pervenissent, munitionem illorum, quae vocatur Ascioha, obsederunt.
2. Cumque iam expugnanda esset munitio et hi, qui intus erant, timore
perculsi mortem se evadere posse desperassent,
3. quidam ex consiliariis augusti nomine Liutwartus pseudoepiscopus
caetenis consiliariis, qui patni imperatoris assistere solebant, ignorantibus iuncto
sibi Wigberto comite fraudulentissimo imperatorem adiit et ab expugnatione
hostium pecunia corruptus deduxit, atque Gotafridum ducem illorum imperatori
praesentavit;
4. quem imperator more Achabico quasi amicum suscepit et cum eo pacem
fecit, datis ex utraque parte obsidibus.
5. Quod Nordmanni acceperunt pro omine; et Ut pax Ct illorum parte rata
non dubitaretur, clipeum iuxta morem suum in sublime suspenderunt et portas
munitionis aperuerunt. Nostrates autem calliditatis illorum expertes eandem
Fried, 'Kingdoms', p.159 is typical in giving priority to the Mainz account of this encounter to
the exclusion of any mention of the quite neutral Bavarian annalist.
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munitionem ingressi sunt, alii quidem causa negotiandi, alii vero pro loci firmitate
consideranda. At Nordmanni ad consuetam calliditatem conversi clipeum pacis
deponunt, portas claudunt et omnis ex nostris intus inventos aut occiderunt aut
catenis ferreis ligatos ad redimendum servaverunt.
6. Sed imperator tantam contumeliam exercitui suo illatam flocci pendens
praedictum Gotafridum de fonte baptismatis levavit et, quem maximum inimicum
et desertorem regni sui habuerat, consortem regni constituit. Nam comitatus et
beneficia, quae Rorich Nordmannus Francorum regibus fidelis in Kinnin tenuerat,
eidem hosti suisque hominibus ad inhabitandum delegavit;
7. et quod maioris est criminis, a quo obsides accipere et tributa exigere
debuit, huic pravorum usus consilio contra consuetudinem parentum suorum,
regum videlicet Francorum, tributa solvere non erubuit. Nam thesauros
aecciesiarum, qui propter metum hostium absconditi fuerant, abstulit et auri
purissimi atque argenti ad confusionem sui totiusque exercitus, qui ilium
sequebatur, libras 2,412 eisdem dedit inimicis.
8. Praeterea, quisquis de suo exercitu in defensione sanctae aecclesiae zelo
Dei commotus aliquem de Nordmannis, qui castra invadere temptabant, occidit,
aut eum iugulare aut ei oculos eruere praecepit.
9. Unde exercitus valde contristatus dolebat super se talem venisse
principem, qui hostibus favit et eis victoriam de hostibus subtraxit;
10. nimiumque confusi redierunt in sua.
11. Nordmanni vero de thesauris et numero captivorum 200 naves onustas
miserunt in patriam; ipsi in loco tuto se continent, iterum tempus oportunum
praedandi opperientes.'35
The annalist's literary strategy here is more subtle than it appears at first
sight. His criticism of Charles is not simply the one commonly levelled against
kings by the ecclesiastical authors of the ninth century, that the outcome of the
siege was disastrous because there was no outright military victory and tribute had
to be paid. His objection is much more pointed than that: it is that this is exactly
the opposite of what Charles should have done.
AFC, s.a.882, pp.98-9.
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Indeed, the whole report of the siege is carefully constructed as a series of
norms and oppositions. This is clear from a comparison of sections 1 and 2. The
Frankish army is described as 'omnibus hostibus formidandi, si ducem habuissent
idoneum sibique consentientem... parique intentione profecti sunt contra
Nordmannos pugnare cupientes.' Heavy stress is laid, therefore, on the size,
capacity to inspire fear, and eagerness of the army. However, the deal for peace
made by the emperor 'cumque iam expugnanda esset munitio et hi, qui intus erant,
timore perculsi mortem se evadere posse desperassent.' Peace was agreed, in
other words, just as the army was poised to fulfil its function: it should be feared,
and it was; it wanted to fight, and it was guaranteed of victory. Inspiring fear, a
willingness to fight and performing as a good leader are here presented as criteria
for judging royal behaviour: the norms are established in section 1, then shown
unfulfilled in section 2. The outcome (section 9) was the regret of the army and
their dissatisfaction with Charles, who was personally to blame for snatching
defeat from the jaws of victory.36
The same device is evident in the descriptions of the terms of the treaty
struck by Charles with the Vikings. In sponsoring the baptism of their leader
Godafrid (section 6), he made a man who had been the kingdom's 'maximus
inimicus' into the 'consors regni', a term normally only applied to members of the
royal family. Godafrid was raised from one extreme to the other. Moreover
(section 7), Charles paid tribute and gave hostages to a man from whom he ought
to have taken them: this was done against Frankish royal tradition. The tribute he
paid to Godafrid was church treasure which had previously been hidden to prevent
exactly this eventuality. Charles's behaviour was not simply wrong: it was both
un-kingly and un-Frankish.37
If his actions therefore inverted those which were normally expected of a
Frankish king, the Mainz annalist also made it clear that they were a direct breach
of the will of God. In section 4 Charles is compared to Ahab, the Old Testament
ruler who had made peace against the manifest wishes of God. 38 In section 8 it is
36 The inspiration of fear as a kingly quality was also stressed by Notker, Gesta, 1.5, p.8; 1.18,
p.25; 2.15, pp.79-80; 2.17, p.84.
See also Reuter, 'Plunder', p.75.
3 Kings 20-22.
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reported how he then went further, ordering his men not to kill any Northmen on
fear of death, even though they might be 'in defensione sanctae aecclesiae zelo
Del commotus.'
Ahab was also, however, a king deceived by false prophets, and the Mainz
annalist is not slow to identify to whom he was referring at the siege of Asselt.
Section 3 relates how the deal for peace was brokered by 'Liutwartus
pseudoepiscopus caeteris consiliariis, qui patri imperatoris assistere solebant,
ignorantibus'. This is another oppositional passage, and one which provides the
key for understanding the account as a whole. Liutward, acting only with the
consent of the 'comes fraudulentissimus' Wigbert, is contrasted to the multiple
counsellors who ought to have been consulted; as noted above, this was contrary
to the principles propounded by the idealised rhetoric of Carolingian consensus.
He is also, however, set off against the former counsellors of Louis the German: in
other words, Liutbert of Mainz and his associates. Everything that took place at
Asselt was exactly as it should not be, but this was the most important. The
implication is that if Liutward had not been in a position to act as a false prophet
to Charles the Fat, and the emperor had had Liutbert at his side instead, the
outcome would have been much different. Once again, the specific political gripe
of the Mainz annals can be located right at the heart of one of its major set pieces.
The Mainz annalist's version of the siege of Asselt is therefore built
around a number of carefully chosen themes of normal and appropriate behaviour,
which constitute a pointed attack on the emperor for doing just what he ought not
to have done. Like an anti-king, against the will of his army and of God, he
allowed defeat when victory was all but achieved and reached a peace which
broke all the norms which should govern the actions of a Frankish king. It was
quite normal for Carolingian authors to stereotype and stylise the behaviour their
enemies, especially the Vikings. 39 The Mainz author, however, applies this
technique to the actions of Charles the Fat and Liutward of Vercelli in 882 as well,
See, for instance, Coupland, 'Rod'. The 882 Mainz annal also makes archetypes of the
Northmen. Section 5 reads like a microcosm of the historiographical debate about whether the
Vikings were traders or raiders: they do exactly the opposite of what they seem to be doing when
they drop theii trading flag and slaughter the Franks. The annalist's use of the terms 'ad
consuetam calliditatem' and 'iuxta morem suum' reveals that he has clear and categorical notions
as to what constitutes normal Viking behaviour (this is essentially reduced to a desire for plunder).
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presenting us with a looking-glass world in which everything is out of place and
nothing is as it ought to be. This is explicit in his conclusion: the army, forced to
return home without a victory, did so 'nimium confusi [in the sense of
'confused'].'4°
The political agenda of this account is therefore amplified by the pointed
rhetorical strategies its author uses; it is more an ideological commentary on
kingship than reportage. It is hence suspect as a priority source for the actual
course of events at Asselt, and even more so as a passive barometer of
contemporary opinion. A useful corrective is, however, available in the shape of
the Bavarian annalist's report. This text, which, as noted above, is usually
dismissed by historians as a pro-Charles polemic, in fact shows every sign of
being a more objective version of events than that of the Mainz author. The
Bavarian account, which is approximately the same length as that of its Mainz
counterpart, begins with a detailed description of the army's advance up the
Rhine, split into two contingents. 4 ' Treachery foiled an attempt at a surprise
attack, necessitating a siege. The account of the siege takes up the bulk of the
report, before a brief summary of the terms of the peace treaty.
Several points must be stressed about this source. Its information on the
arrangement of the army and the siege is detailed and convincing. The division of
the army into two contingents either side of the Rhine is consistent with what is
known about other Carolingian campaigns which often moved in a pincer
movement (and along river banks) towards their goals. Arnuif and Henry are
depicted as leading the Bavarian and Frankish contingents in the advance party.
Not only were these leaders appropriate to armies from these regna, but the
sending ahead of an advance party under Henry was a tactic used by Charles on at
least one other occasion.42 There is also a wealth of incidental detail about the
siege included in the report. Precise dates, times of day, lengths of time and
distances pepper the text, and we are given a vivid description of the unpleasant
° For another example of the polemical accusation of 'un-Frankish' behaviour, see AF s.a.876,
p.86, which ridicules Charles the Bald's imperial stylings: 'Omnem enim consuetudinem regum
Francorum contemnens Grecas glorias optimas arbitrabatur.' The polemical nature of this passage
is usually recognised by historians, in contrast to the report of the siege of Asselt.
Citations will be from BC s.a.882, pp.107-9.
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physical conditions of the siege and of the weather. Moreover, no fewer than four
Viking leaders are identified by name.
This detail serves no obvious purpose within the logic of the text: it is not,
for instance, in any way marshalled to provide a coherent apologia for the emperor
or for the inconclusive outcome of the conflict. The account is also anomalous
within the Bavarian continuation as a whole: most Viking raids, including all
those of 883-5, went completely unmentioned by the author, and even the siege of
Paris in 885-6 roused him to barely more than passing comment.43 It is quite
possible, therefore, either that the author of this work was present at the siege of
Asselt, or that he had access to an eyewitness report. In light of this suggestion it
is worth noting the frequent use of the first person plural in the text, such as
'nostri' (our men), 'datis ex nostra parte obsidibus' (hostages having been given
by us), 'remissis nostris obsidibus' (our hostages having been sent back); and,
moreover, that the annals only continue properly 'redeuntibus Baiowariis domum'
(after the Bavarians had returned home).
The incidental detail of the Bavarian account is even more striking when
compared with the dearth of similar material in the Mainz version which, despite
its length, moves directly from the gathering of the army to the circumstances and
terms of the peace treaty, the events which had the most importance for its
author's polemical purpose. In other words, it is the Bavarian continuator who
appears to be by far the more reliable witness to the actual events of the 882 siege.
With this in mind, two main conclusions may be drawn. Firstly, some
central elements of the Mainz account can be regarded as highly suspect. The
accusation of treachery which is levelled against Liutward by the Mainz author
looks unlikely. The Bavarian annalist blames treachery for the failure of the
surprise attack, not for a premature decision on the emperor's part to come to
terms with the enemy. Moreover, he is clear that the fault lay in the advance
party, 'cx parte Francorum': Liutward was not a Frank but an Aleman with an
Italian bishopric, and in any case, as archchancellor, would presumably have been
42 AV s.a.886, p.61; AFC s.a.886, p.105. Cf. Louis the Younger's use of Henry in this capacity
against Boso in AV s.a.880, p.47.
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with Charles in the main body of the army. The Bavarian annalist (or his source)
must have known what he was talking about, since the Bavarian contingent had
been together with the Frankish 'proditores' in the advance party. Similarly, the
Mainz author's assertion that the terms of the peace deal were contrary to Frankish
custom is demonstrably false: the policy of paying off invaders and setting them to
defend lands at river mouths was by no means a new or untested measure.45
Secondly, the tone of the Bavarian account is instructive. It is by no
means particularly pro-Charles: his initial attack is a failure, and the ensuing siege
is long, nasty and inconclusive. However, it is significant that the annalist does
not particularly criticise the emperor for this. The coming to terms is attributed
primarily to the illness spreading through both camps as a result of the summer
heat and the number of corpses lying around unburied. Moreover, the annalist's
sigh of relief is almost audible when he ends his account with the report that
Charles 'cuncto exercitui amabilem licentiam redeundi concessit.' The generally
neutral attitude of the Bavarian continuator is largely shared by other
contemporary sources. The annalist of St-Vaast, ever-interested in the doings of
the Northmen, enumerated their depredations before concluding with palpable
satisfaction that Charles 'Nortmannos e suo regno abire fecit'.46 Hincmar and
Regino, our other sources, offer more negative readings, but nevertheless nothing
beyond the usual inclination of ecclesiastical authors to berate kings who used
church resources to buy off their enemies and to read the attacks of the Vikings as
manifestations of God's disapproval. 47 Indeed, it is instructive that the author
closest to the siege itself, the Bavarian continuator, is also the most sympathetic to
the emperor. It is no coincidence that exactly the same phenomenon is discernible
in the accounts of the siege of Paris, where the only eyewitness report, that of
Abbo of St-Germain-des-Prés, is also the sole text to actually praise the actions of
BC s.a.886, p.114. Cf. AFC s.a.883-5, pp.100-3. Some of these raids were in Saxony, but the
Bavarian continuator was certainly aware of events in that region: eg. BC s.a.882, p.109; 883,
p.110.
This is probably why he recorded the names of the leaders of only these two groups.
' See now Coupland, 'Poachers'; idem, 'Vikings', p.198 shows that tribute was often an effective
solution. Nor were the Mainz annals necessarily always hostile to such measures: cf. AF s.a.850,
pp.39-40; 873, pp.80-1.
AV s.a.882, pp.5 I-2.
AB s.a.882, pp.248-9; Regino, Chronicon, s.a.882, p.119. On ecclesiastical attitudes see
Coupland, 'Rod'.
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the emperor.48 It is quite probably the case that only writers more distant from
events, as Hincmar and Regino were in 882, were detached enough to manipulate
them in order to make points of personal import to them; such as (in Hincmar's
case) the condemnation of royal use of ecclesiastical lands and (in Regino's) the
interpretation of Viking attacks as evidence for God's displeasure at the sins of the
Franks.
In the context of these sources, the polemic of the Mainz annalist stands
alone at one extreme of the spectrum of opinion. Its account of the siege of Asselt
is anomalous, not representative. Historians have been wrong, therefore, to take
the Mainz text as the key source for the events of 882 and to conclude, as did
Pierre Riché, that the ending of the siege was 'to the disappointment of all' its
extreme polemic is to be explained by its political agenda concerning Charles's
exclusion of Liutbert from court. This type of misrepresentation (or at least
exaggeration) is common enough in Carolingian historical writing. Hincmar's
depiction of Louis III's celebrated victory over the Vikings at Saucourt in 881 as a
defeat, for instance, was motivated by the archbishop's dissatisfaction at being left
out of high position at the young king's court. 5° In this sense it is a very similar
text to the Mainz version of the siege of Asselt. However, while historians rightly
take Hincmar's view of Saucourt with more than a pinch of salt, they accept
wholesale the Mainz continuator's view of Asselt. The idea of Charles the Fat as
a king peculiarly unable in his dealings with Vikings is largely drawn from this
text: once the text is read in its context, this idea loses its main source and Charles
appears no better or worse than any other king in the way contemporaries
perceived his attempts to deal with the invaders.
2.2.3: Activity and inactivity
The third element of Charles the Fat's reputation as a failed king is that he
was immobile and inactive, a roi fainéant. For this idea, too, historians have
drawn almost exclusively on the Mainz continuator of the Annales Fuldenses.
See below, c.4.2.2.
49 Riché, Carolingians, p.217; Coupland, 'Poachers', p.109.
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One subtle but telling way in which the author attempts to induce his audience to
draw this conclusion is by his sparse reporting of the emperor's itinerary on major
liturgical feast days. In the five full years of his reign when he is the sole royal
subject of the annals, the Mainz author reports Charles's whereabouts only twice:
the Purification of the Virgin in 884 and Christmas in 885. By contrast, the
Bavarian continuation gives us Christmas of 882, 884 and 885, Easter in 883, 886
and 887, and epiphany in 885. Similarly, in the Mainz annals between 870 and
881 we are told the location of Louis the German and then Louis the Younger on
no less than 20 major festivals. In particular, from 872, with only one exception
(876, the year in which Louis's three Sons succeeded him), all the reported royal
itineraries contain references to Christmas or Easter, or both. The Mainz
continuator is therefore anomalous. This pattern is no accident. The mentioning
of the king's whereabouts on feast days was not a simple matter of generic
convention: as the Carolingians saw it, it was part of the grand narrative of
medieval Christian historiography. The Carolingian king was thought of (at least
by himself and his friends) as vicarius dei, the representative of God on earth. His
progress round the kingdom was intrinsically linked to the circular progress of the
liturgical year and the ceremonies associated with it in both literature and reality.
His presence at major churches on major festivals was a reflection of the
relationship between God and the legitimate ruler. The omission of this
information by the Mainz continuator, which has the effect of producing an image
of an inactive ruler, is glaring.
In addition to this, the text juxtaposes Charles's inactivity with the vigour
of its own heroes, whom it portrays also in a stereotyped way carrying out
functions which should have been the king's. A report in the annal for 883 is
instructive here: 'Nordmanni per alveum Rheni fluminis ascendentes plurima loca
nuper restaurata succenderunt, preadam inde capientes non modicam. Quibus
Liutbertus Mogontiensis archiepiscopus cum paucis occurrit; sed non paucos cx
eis prostravit et praedam excussit. Agripina Colonia absque aeclesiis et
5° AB s.a.881, pp.244-5; Cf. AV s.a.881, p.50; AF s.a.881, p.96; for comments see Fouracre,
'Context'. Nelson, 'Annals', pp.37-8 discusses how Hincmar's reports of kings' dealings with
Vikings were conditioned by the state of his relationship with the ruler in question.
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monasteriis reaedificata et muri eius cum portis et vectibus et seris instaurati.'5'
This is a pallindromic entry: Liutbert has 'paucis', but he kills 'non paucos'. He
takes back the plunder seized by the raiders, and their work of destruction is
undone by the rebuilding of Cologne. In other words, the actions of Liutbert
negate those of the Vikings exactly. The subtext is that this is correct behaviour:
in 882, by contrast, Charles the Fat did not negate the aims of the Northmen, but
actually facilitated the realisation of their aims.
It is striking that throughout the Mainz continuation the same criteria of
judgement are deployed by the author as had been used in the account of Asselt:
inspiration of fear in the enemy, prevention of plunder, and evidence of God's
favour, everything that had marked Charles out as a failure in 882. Liutbert's
victory of 883, therefore, was measured partly by his success in retaking the
attackers' booty. In 884, two victories of the dux Henry over the Northmen, one
achieved while Charles sat talking with his men at Colmar, were explict evidence
of God's favour. Moreover, Henry's success is specifically in preventing the
enemy's plundering (he kills them 'ubicumque praedatum ire volebant'), and in
creating fear in the minds of the Danes. 52 The Vikings who had been harrying the
kingdom of Carloman II overwintered in the Hesbaye in 884-5, 'quasi nullo
resistente'. Henry and Liutbert surprised them and showed them the error of their
ways, killing some and, crucially, removing what they had foraged (plunder):
again, the enemy was frightened and fled by night. 53 Godafrid was next to
demonstrate a (in the Mainz author's view) typically Viking lack of faith,
attempting to move up the Rhine until stopped by Henry, with God's help. After
retreating they were beaten again by Saxons and Frisians, collectively and
pointedly referred to as 'christiani', who also recovered their plunder with
interest. 54 As a final example, the siege of Paris in 885-6 is also assessed on these
criteria. The Vikings here were, quite properly, scared of the Frankish army until
the death of its local leaders, Hugh the Abbot and Gauzlin of St-Denis, upon
which they emerged and 'venationes et varios ludos nullo prohibente
SI AFC s.a.883, p.100.
$2 AFC s.a.884, pp.100-i.
" AFC s.a.885, p.102.
AFC s.a.885, pp.102-3.
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exercebant'. 55 Charles's failure (in the eyes of this annalist) at Paris is summed up
in exactly these terms: after Henry was also killed, the emperor was actually
scared himself, he endorsed plundering and he paid tribute.56
The opposition between the inactivity of Charles and the vigour of other
leaders (especially Henry and Liutbert himself) is thus a firmly established and
consistent substratum in the Mainz text. Again, however, despite the dominance
of this idea in the historiography, the Mainz author is an anomalous witness. The
siege of Paris will be discussed more fully in a later chapter, but even a cursory
reading of Abbo's Bella Parisiacae Urbis reveals a judgement of the emperor's
actions which is diametrically opposed to the image given by the Mainz annals.57
Moreover, in reality Charles's itinerary distinguishes him as one of the most
mobile Carolingians of them all. Despite a short reign, he made six visits to Italy
and two to the west Frankish kingdom, to say nothing of his journeys to the
Rhineland, Lotharingia, Bavaria and the eastern marches. The evidence for this is
principally his royal charters. It comes, therefore, as little surprise that Charles's
unusual mobility has been recognised only by those historians who have worked
on these charters. 58 For the majority of historians, who rely for their information
on the Mainz annalist, he remains a lazy and inactive ruler.
2.3: Conclusion
In its consistent categorisation of the activities of the king and the
magnates who populate its pages, the Mainz continuation of the Annales
Fuldenses constitutes not a dispassionate description of events, but rather a
political commentary on them. Its schematisation of political behaviour into
distinct types revealit, to some extent, as a dialogue between good and bad, right
and wrong. The attributions of fear, treachery, divine favour and so on can be
seen as literary motifs deployed to create particular images. For instance, plunder,
taken or prevented, provided a ready-made and stable metaphor with which to
define victory and judge the outcome of battles. The consistent use of these
' AFC s.a.886, p.1 04. Note the interesting equation made here between hunting and lordship




motifs, moreover, is especially conspicuous given that they rarely figure in earlier
sections of the Mainz annals. Tribute and plunder, for example, are only
intermittently associated with Viking objectives and defeats in the annals before
882. Similarly, divine favour or wrath is only invoked twice in the annals
between 840 and 882 in relation to Viking raids, of which approximately 17 are
recorded. 6° The picture is very much the same with regard to the numerous reports
of battles and campaigns against the Sla ys, the enemies par excellence of the
eastern Franks: on only four of these occasions had God's will been read into the
outcome.6 ' It is quite otherwise with the Mainz continuation after 882 which, as
described, frequently mobilises divine judgement as a gloss on the outcome of
encounters with Vikings, negatively in the case of Charles, positively in the case
of every other Frankish combatant. This is another very clear indication of the
degree of care and artifice which went into the construction of the image of the
emperor presented by the Mainz annalist.
The author does not purely invent- Charles the Fat did besiege the Vikings
at Asselt, Liutbert of Mainz did defeat them after the sack of Cologne- but he does
attempt to interpret those events on his audience's behalf according to his own
agenda. Therefore, this work does not simply tell us that Charles the Fat was rex
inutilis, as Einhard tells us of Childeric III: it shows us the effects of bad kingship
in action. The author presented very clear criteria for assessing good kingship,
and then showed Charles failing to fulfil each one in turn. His representation, in
other words, was not of a 'bad king' per se, but of a ruler who had by definition
failed in the practice of Frankish kingship. The account is systematic, an
exposition of Charles as the archetypally failed king (in contrast to the vigorous
activities of Henry and Liutbert). This text is a commentary on political ideas: we
may describe it as almost a parody or caricature of kingship.62
Eg. Kehr, Kanzlei, pp.5-6.
AF s.a.873, pp.80-I; 876, p.86 are exceptional. Cf. Nelson, 'Annals', pp.37-8 on the
inconsistency of even the highly-opinionated Hincmar on such matters as tribute in relation to his
judgements on Charles the Bald.
60 AF s.a.854, pp.44-5 (actually a Danish civil war); 873, pp.80-1 (a Frisian victory). Even Louis
III's famous victory at Saucourt did not inspire a divine interpretation: AF s.a.881, p.96; similarly
AV s.a.881, pp.50-i.
6) AF s.a.844, p.35; 870, p.70; 872, p.'76; 880, pp.94-5.
62 On this subject in general see now Nelson, 'Bad Kingship'.
53
Clearly, this has been the main source for historians' judgements on
Charles the Fat's abilities: they have taken on board the tone of the Mainz author
as well as the information he provides. 63 However, at every juncture of the
continuation we encounter the antagonism between Liutward and Liutbert.
Liutward is the archetypally bad archchancellor and he is culpable in the outcome
of the siege of Asselt; while Liutbert vigorously fills the role against the Vikings
which should have been Charles's responsibility. This agenda informs the whole
text and motivates its criticisms. The text is best interpreted as a 'private history',
a justificatory manifesto for the opposition of Liutbert of Mainz, his circle and his
supporters to the regime of Charles the Fat, based as it was outside their sphere of
influence. It contained more than the frank critical opinion which kings might
occasionally expect to hear from their close advisers; 65 it was surely meant only
for the eyes of the archbishop and his entourage.
As comparison with other contemporary sources shows, however, the text
is certainly not to be accepted wholesale. The fact that historians have usually
been keen to do just that reveals the authority which the 'decline and fall'
paradigm of Carolingian history still exerts over the historiography. The Mainz
continuation and the conventional historiographical view of the late Carolingian
empire are mutually reinforcing. The text's weak king, beset by Vikings and
propped up by the vigour of the high aristocracy, fits perfectly with the modern
belief in a dwindling of royal power in the years leading up to 888. Moreover,
that very belief encourages its proponents to prioritise the Mainz annals as the key
source for this process. Historians' eagerness to read late ninth-century chronicles
such as this one as continuations of the tradition of 'official' Carolingian histories
begun by the Anna/es Regni Francorum must also be questioned. The Mainz and
Bavarian annals reflect the diffusion of historiography away from the court in the
post-Charlemagne period, and the emergence of writers whose agendas were
63 A clear parallel with Aetheired II of England, whose reign is traditionally assessed exclusively
using the hostile Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, suggests itself. On Aetheired, see Keynes, 'Tale'.
limes and McKittenck, 'Writing', p.203 discuss polemic as a self-justifying genre.
65 As Charles the Bald may have been intended to read or hear some of the critical sections of the
Annales Bertiniani: Nelson, 'History-writing', pp.441-2.
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personal, and could easily bring them into conflict with kings. 66 Once the
'officialness' and veracity of the Mainz text are called into question, the source-
base for the traditional view of Charles's reign is seriously undermined. In short,
the Mainz continuation is not a good enough source to prove either that Charles
the Fat was a 'failed king', or that he ultimately fell victim to an inevitable decline
in royal authority propelled by the invisible forces of some hypothetical 'historical
process'. This is not to say that he was a 'great' ruler, but to judge him properly
the slate must be wiped clean. To assess exactly what was happening in Charles's
reign, all the sources, including the Mainz annals, must be considered in the light
of each other, and it is to this analysis that the rest of this thesis is devoted.
Arguments which help dissolve the distinction between 'private' monastic and 'official' dynastic
history are offered by Aithoff, 'Gandersheim'.
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3: CAROLINGIAN FAMILY POLITICS AND THE REVOLT OF BOSO
OF VIENNE, 879-884
3.1: The Carolingian family
The maintenance of good relationships within the royal family was one of
the most crucial tasks which faced an early medieval ruler. The father-son
relationship was arguably the most important dynamic of Carolingian politics
from the very beginning, and success or failure in its management often
determined the ultimate success or failure of a reign. The aspirations of kings'
Sons jostling for position in pursuit of the succession terms they desired could all
too easily combine with the interests of one aristocratic constituency or another
and ignite into open and dangerous rebellion, a situation to which, most famously,
Louis the Pious fell victim.' The significance of the politics of the family was not
lost on contemporary commentators, who identified the royal household as the
figurative centre of the kingdom. As Sedulius Scottus put it in his handbook for
kingship Liber de rectoribus Christianis: 'Rex pius et sapiens tribus modis
regendi ministerium gent. Nam primo se ipsum...; secundo uxorem propriam et
liberos suosque domesticos; tertio populum sibi commissum rationali et gloriso
moderamine regere debet.'2
The situation was, if anything, even more delicate after the division of the
empire in 843. From this point sons who decided to rebel against their fathers
could not only call on aristocratic support, but also had the potential of help from
their uncles or cousins. Therefore Louis the Younger and Charles the Fat,
apparently aggrieved that their father was favouring their older brother, got
Charles the Bald to intervene on their behalf with Louis the German in 871;
Charles, perhaps seeing an opportunity to gain some leverage over the east
Frankish king, readily agreed.3 Of course, a lack of sons could be an equally
serious threat. Much of the political controversy of the 860s focused on the
attempts of Lothar II to have his marriage dissolved, in part so that his son Hugh
could be recognised as heir, and the counter-attempts of his uncles Charles the
Bald and Louis the German to foil his plans and render his kingdom vulnerable to
'On these issues see now Kasten, KOnigssohne.
2 Sedulius, Liber, c.5, col.300.
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their ambitions.4 The politics of succession was thus complicated in the post-
Verdun empire by the appearance of these new factors, adding what might be
called a 'diplomatic' dimension to the situation.
The problems facing kings in the period 875-888 were more akin to those
which troubled Lothar II than to those which threatened to engulf Louis the Pious.
In the western kingdom, the descent line of Charles the Bald came to an abrupt
halt in 884 with the death of his heirless grandson Carloman ii. In the east, none
of Louis the German's three sons had legitimate heirs who survived infancy, and
Karlmann of Bavaria and Louis the Younger were in any case dead by 882. After
Lothar II's kingdom was split between east and west Francia by the Treaty of
Meersen in 870, the death of his brother, the Emperor Louis II of Italy, in 875
marked the end of the direct Lotharingian line, for Louis was also without an heir.
One effect of this proliferation of generational cul-de-sacs was that the numerous
successions of this period had to be contested 'horizontally', between uncles,
nephews and cousins, rather than between fathers and sons. A second was that a
power vacuum opened up in the most affected regna, namely those of the middle
Frankish realm, whose constituent aristocracies (those of Lotharingia, Provence
and Italy) were accustomed to having kings of their own close at hand. These
regions were no negligible prize for the Carolingians, who fought hard among
themselves for control of them. Lotharingia in particular was a very significant
regnum both geo-politically and symbolically as the site of many major royal
churches, palaces and estates, including Aachen.
These tensions centering on the lingering uncertainty over the long-term
future of the kingdoms of Lothar II and Louis II were brought to the boil by the
events of the year 879. The death of the west Frankish king Louis lithe
Stammerer on 10 April sparked off a divisive scramble for power between two
rival aristocratic factions fighting for control of the Stammerer's two young Sons.
One party pushed for the sole succession of the dead king's eldest son Louis III,
while the other attempted to ensure a wider distribution of Konigsnahe by
AB s.a.871, p.18!; AF s.a.87!, p.74.
On the divorce case, see now Airlie, 'Bodies'.
Charles the Simple was considered too young to become king at this stage, and indeed in 888:
Flodoard, Historia, IV.5, p.563.
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effecting a division of the kingdom between both Louis and his younger brother
Carloman II. Ultimately the division party won the day by enlisting the military
help of the seasoned east Frankish ruler Louis the Younger (876-82), but,
inevitably, there was a price to pay. Louis's condition for retreat was the
concession of the western half of Lotharingia, a demand to which the two young
kings of west Francia were finally compelled to acquiesce in February 880 by the
Treaty of Ribemont.6
By the time the dust thrown up by this long quarrel had settled, however, a
new and unforeseen threat to stability had already emerged in the south of the
kingdom. Boso, count of Vienne and in-law of the late emperors Louis II and
Charles the Bald, took advantage of the power vacuum created by the disputed
succession to Louis the Stammerer to have himself proclaimed king at a synod in
Provence in October 879. His revolt thus arose out of a conjunction of some of
the classic problems of late ninth-century succession politics: the aristocratic need
for certainty about the identity of their future ruler, the 'horizontal' rivalry
between heirless kings for each other's territories, and the disputed status of the
middle kingdom. It is the argument of this chapter that the implications of these
circumstances, which are typically seen by historians as disastrous for the dynasty,
were in fact recognised and dealt with by the surviving Carolingians, who made
plans for cooperation between them which was intend to guarantee the long-term
future of the empire.
3.2: The significance of Boso
Ultimately Boso was to fail. As four royal armies swept down on his
stronghold at Vienne in the late summer of 880, most of his supporters lost their
nerve and defected to the Carolingians. The usurper held out for another two
campaigning seasons but by 882 he was effectively beaten, and when he
eventually died in early 887 it was as a fugitive in the hills of Provence.
Nevertheless, the audacity of his very attempt was unprecedented and its
6 Werner, 'Gauzlm', passim.
Convent us Mantalensis. The most comprehensive accounts of Boso's career are Airlie,
'Behaviour', pp.195-304 and Poupardm, Provence, pp.41-14!. See also Bautier, 'Origines'; Staab,
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significance must be emphasised. Never before had a man from outside the ruling
dynasty dared to ascend a throne during the period of the Carolingian monopoly of
legitimate royal power, which endured from 751 until 888.8 His rising was
therefore extraordinary, and amounted to a challenge to the exclusive right of the
Carolingians to call themselves kings.9
Historians, observing this unhappy conjuncture of intra-familial conflict
and extra-familial opposition which threatened to undermine the dominance of the
Carolingian house around the years 879-80, have tended Lnterpret it as the
beginning of the end for the dynasty. The period running from this point up to the
deposition of Charles the Fat in November 887, during which a rapid succession
of kings met usually premature, often bizarre and, most importantly, always
heirless, deaths, is often viewed negatively and seen as a dimly lit endtime, a
discrete coda to Carolingian political history proper. In order to explain the
complicated political events of the period c.877-887, historians have resorted to
models characterising them as chaotic and riven by bitter in-house rivalries.' 0 The
new type of threat posed by Boso along with the deaths of the long-lived rulers
Louis II of Italy, Louis the German and Charles the Bald, in whose wake it arose,
are thus seen as emblematic of a terminal shattering of confidence in Carolingian
rule. The final crisis of 887-8, the idea goes, was now inevitable."
This is an attractive thesis, and one which finds some vivid support in
contemporary sources. Most notably, Notker the Stammerer's Gesta Karoli,
ostensibly a collection of idealised anecdotes about its eponymous hero, also
contains portentous musings on the imminent demise of the legitimate Carolingian
'Jugement'. Boso's monarchical claim was not expressed in territorial terms, but it is generally
accepted that the west Frankish throne was his ultimate aim.
S For the nature and significance of this monopoly see Airlie, 'Semper'. Boso did lay heavy stress
on his strong royal links (his father-in-law and brother-in-law had both been emperors), but the
fact that he was not born a legitimate Carolingian was of paramount importance to contemporaries
(especially his opponents), and marked him out as a 'tyrant'.
Ibid.
'° McKitterick, Kingdoms, p.262; Halphen, Charlemagne, p.315; Auzias, L 'Aquitaine, pp.409-20;
Collins, 'Wifred', p.178; Fried, Ludwig, pp.17-S.
" As argued most recently by: Reuter, Germany, p.117 (stressing 876 as the turning point);
Nelson, Charles, pp.258-63 (speaking of a decay of political structures after 877); Airlie,
'Semper', p.139 (emphasising the significance of Boso). By the 'crisis' of 887-8 I refer not to the
final extinguishing of the Carolingian line, which exercised intermittent control over some areas
well into the tenth century, but, as noted, to the loss of its monopoly on royal legitimacy.
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male line.' 2 This work was, however, composed at a time (885-6) when the
Carolingian family tree had been whittled away to its last legitimate scion, the
heirless Charles the Fat, whose desperate and unrealistic schemes to sort out the
succession were coming to seem increasingly futile to observers like Notker.' 3 If,
on the other hand, we look a few years earlier for readings of the political
atmosphere in the immediate aftermath of Boso's revolt, we can detect an
altogether more positive attitude. Surveying the plentiful configuration of kings
ruling the various parts of the empire in 881, Notker himself had been relatively
optimistic: Louis III and Carloman II were, he concluded, 'spes Europae', while
Charles the Fat was 'clementissimus Carolus magnum imperatorem at avum
suum, Carolum, omni sapientia et industria et bellorum successibus coaequans,
tranquillitate vero pacis et rerum prosperitate superans' •14 Archbishop Hincmar of
Rheims translated his own confidence into action, promoting a plan to have one of
the two young west Frankish kings adopted by the heirless Charles the Fat, thus
assuring both halves of the empire a long dynastic future.' 5 His hopes for the
abilities of Carloman in particular inspired him in 882 to revise the didactic tract
De Ordine Palatii, which was intended to guide the young king's government. At
around the same time the anonymous author of the heroic poem the Ludwigslied
affirmed that he saw in Carloman's brother Louis a king of great potential, clearly
high in God's favour after his defeat of the Vikings at Saucourt in 881, and
destined for a long reign; these sentiments were echoed, in 881, by the annalist of
St-Vaast in Arras.' 6 The pessimism that tinged Notker's view of the Carolingians'
future in 885-6 cannot therefore be backdated to the earlier 880s: to authors
writing in 88 1-2, the dynasty was by no means a spent force. How can we account
for this change in outlook among contemporary commentators? The answer,
which requires a clarification and nuancing- if not an abandonment- of the
accepted narrative of the last decade of Carolingian hegemony, lies in a
consideration of the interaction between the four remaining kings (Louis III and
12 Airlie, 'After Empire', p.159.
' See c.7.5.
' 4 Notker, Continuatio, pp.329-30.
Flodoard, Historia, p.537.
16 AV s.a.881, pp.50-i.
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Carloman II in the west, Louis the Younger and Charles the Fat in the east) as they
faced up to the implications of Boso's rising in the year 880.
3.3: An overlooked Carolingian succession plan of 880
To begin exploring this interaction we must return to Lotharingia, the
central Carolingian kingdom which had been split down the middle after the death
of Lothar II in 869 without legitimate heir, and shared out between the kingdoms
of east and west Francia.' 7 It was subsequently reunited when western Lotharingia
was ceded to the east Frankish king Louis the Younger at Ribemont in February
880. The governance of this region was, as noted earlier, regarded as very
significant, and accordingly the Carolingians appear to have made special
provisions to control it. In the principal west Frankish chronicle of the period, the
Anna/es Bertiniani, Hincmar of Rheims reported Louis's death in January 882
along with the following information: 'Venientes autem primores partis illius
regni quae ipsi Hludouuico in locarium data fuerat, quatenus quae pater at avus
illorum hebuerunt eis consentiret, voluerunt se illi commendare. Sed consilio
primorum suorum propter sacramenta quae inter eum et Karolum facta fuerunt,
non eos in commendationem suscepit, sed scaram hostilem, cui praefecit
Theodericum comitem, quasi in adiutorium illorum contra Nortmannos
disposuit." 8 This passage tells us a number of interesting things. Louis the
Younger had given his namesake cousin part of his kingdom on some sort of
lease-back arrangement; and the object of the deal must have been Louis's recent
acquisition western Lotharingia, as it is here in 881 that we find Louis III building
a fort against the Vikings, at Etrun.' 9 The terms of the lease were seemingly based
on a delegation of military responsibility in the area; hence the fort, hence the
assigning of a squadron of troops to the Lotharingians by Louis III, and hence the
term 'in locarium' to define the lease, which carried overtones (in Hincmar's
usages) of a price paid for military support. 2° The motivations lying behind the
' AB s.a.870, pp.172-4 gives lists of the territories pertaining to each half. See Map 2.
IS AB s.a.882, pp.245-6.
AB s.a.881, p.245, with n.l for the geographical observation; AV s.a.881, p.51.
20 Niermeyer, Lexicon, p.618 gathers the evidence; Coupland, 'Poachers', pp.101 -2 shows that
Hincmar also understood the term to be connected with mercenary service and sometimes
associated it with Viking tributes; this hints at disapproval of the arrangement on his part, due
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deal contracted between the two kings are not hard to deduce. As well as the need
to coordinate defence against the Viking Great Army, which had been harrying the
northern coasts and river valleys of all the Frankish kingdoms since 879, Louis the
Younger was probably only too glad to delegate the problem of Lothar II's bastard
son Hugh of Lotharingia (born c.855), who had just begun agitating against his
Carolingian kinsmen in pursuit of the crown of his paternal kingdom. Louis's east
Frankish forces had already had to carry out one uncomfortable campaign against
Hugh over the winter of 879-80, and its inconclusive outcome may have been
enough to convince him that his resources were being overstretched.2'
If supervision of west Lotharingian military matters was thus devolved
into the hands of Louis III, it would appear that Louis the Younger chose to retain
control over the distribution of honores (offices), a central element in the exercise
of royal authority. 22 It was he who decided to grant the important west
Lotharingian royal monastery of Lobbes to Hugh in late 880 or 881 in an attempt
to placate the rebel. 23 Our quotation from Hincmar reveals another limit to Louis
III's position, showing that the west Lotharingian magnates were not commended
to him.24 Aristocratic commendation was nonetheless an essential element of
Carolingian division agreements: presumably, therefore, they remained
commended to Louis the Younger alone after Ribemont. Finally, and most
importantly for our purposes, we should note that even when Louis the Younger
died, Louis III refused to accept these magnates as his commended men because
of oaths exchanged with Charles the Fat: the implication of this is that by these
oaths it had been prearranged that Charles should inherit his brother's end of the
probably to his dislike of both Louis III and Louis the Younger and the fact that the separation of
west Lotharingia from west Francia divided the lands of Rheims.
21 AF s.a.879, pp.93-4. Louis the Younger and Louis III collaborated against Hugh in 880 and
881; see below. These arrangements freed Louis the Younger to pursue his political ambitions in
Bavaria and Italy. For his part, Louis Ill must have welcomed the opportunity to defend a distant
frontier which gave him a better chance of keeping the Northmen out of his core west Frankish
kingdom, always their main focus of attention. Hugh, as a tyrannus, was a threat to Carolingian
authority regardless of where he was active.
22 On honores see Airlie, 'Aristocracy', pp.443-7.
23 AL s.a.873 and 880, p.1 5 shows that Louis the Younger took control of Lobbes personally
before passing it onto Hugh in late 880 or early 881; see also Dierkens, Abbayes, pp.109-12, 129-
30. Neither Louis III nor Carloman II issued any charters for west Lotharingian recipients. In
contrast Charles the Fat, who succeeded his brother in his lease deal, also retained control of
honores there: DD CIII 94, 104 and 105.
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lease deal if he died, and Louis III was sticking to this agreement. The
significance of this is driven home when it is remembered that in the Anna/es
Bertiniani Hincmar habitually stressed the importance of aristocratic opinion in
king-making: 25 his description of Louis III overruling this opinion in 882 is
therefore to be taken very seriously.26
This new arrangement did not, however, last long. Only a few months
later in August 882, Louis III himself met a premature end as a consequence of an
amorous attempt to pursue a girl through a low doorway, with youthful disregard
for the fact that he was on horseback at the time.27 With his report of this death,
Hincmar recorded further information relevant to the west Lotharingian lease deal.
Carloman II, who had become king of the whole western kingdom as a result of
his brother's death, sent legates to an assembly held by Charles the Fat, who was
now the only Carolingian ruling in the eastern kingdom: their request was 'partis
regni quam frater suus Hludouuicus in locarium acceperat, ut, sicut ipse Karolus
ohm promiserat, Karlomanno restitueret.' 28 At some prior point, then, Charles had
also made a promise to Carloman that he would receive western Lotharingia
should his brother die, and now he wanted to cash in. Therefore, while in January
the lease had changed hands automatically, now the tenancy was supposed to do
the same thing.
Put together, these two passages point to the conclusion that sometime
before 882 the four surviving Carolingian rulers, Louis III and Carloman II in the
west, Louis the Younger and Charles the Fat in the east, had made a complex
agreement which envisaged the possible early death of one or more of their
number, and made provision for succession between the remainder. Peacefully,
and without further negotiation, Louis III had kept his lease deal under Charles the
Fat after Louis the Younger died 'propter sacramenta quae inter eum et Karolum
facta fuerunt'; and on Louis III's own subsequent demise, Carloman claimed
western Lotharingia in locarium 'sicut ipse Karolus ohm promiserat.' The
24 Note also AF s.a.881, p.96 which describes some locations in western Lotharingia as 'in regione
regis nostri [i.e. Louis the Younger].'
25 Nelson 'Hincmar'.
26 This emphasis may imply further disapproval on the part of Hincmar for Louis III's actions. Cf.
n.20 above.
27 AV s.a.882, p.52.
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protagonists had no way of knowing in which order they would die, and so this
agreement must have been designed to take in a number of unknown variables and
provisional situations.
Hincmar is clear that the agreement was founded on oaths: when had they
been made? The most likely answer is that they were the 'quaedam sacramenta
utrimque' sworn by the Carolingian kings besieging the usurper Boso inside the
walls of Vienne in 880 as they broke off campaigning for the winter. 29 The
Vienne campaign, prosecuted by all four Carolingian armies and three kings
(illness prevented Louis the Younger's personal attendance), represented an
unprecedented show of Carolingian unity against a common foe, a fact which was
not missed by any of the major contemporary writers. 30 Both aristocratic rebels
and external foes like the Vikings and Sla ys had been part of the currency of
Carolingian politics from the beginning, more often than not finding themselves
recruited by one member of the dynasty in pursuit of their internal agendas against
another. This approach, which acted as a kind of lightning conductor absorbing
and minimising threats against the ruling house while allowing conflict within it,
was not, significantly, considered appropriate for dealing with Boso. The
Carolingians' eagerness to cooperate against him demonstrates their recognition of
the danger that he posed to all of them: they understood clearly that his rising
could not be seen to succeed if confidence in their royal monopoly was to be
maintained. The initial success of the combined military effort in the face of
which Boso's support melted away and defected across the lines in a veritable
28 AB s.a.882, p.249.
29 AB s.a.880, p.243. The oath references are often supposed to refer back to the meeting between
Charles the Fat, Carloman II and Louis III at Orbe reported in AB s.a.879, p.240; eg. AB p.246,
n.l; Hlawitschka, Lotharingien. p.234; Nelson, Annals, pp.219, n.20, 223, nn.2-3. However,
Hincmar makes no mention of oaths sworn on this occasion, stating only that the kings 'held
talks'. Presumably these concerned the actions of the usurpers Hugh and Boso and began to lay
the groundwork for the joint military campaigns of 880.
30 Details are given by AB s.a.880, pp.242-3; AF s.a.880, p.95; AV s.a.880, pp.47-8. Regino,
Chronicon, s.a.879, pp.114-5 offers a perspective favourable to Boso. Hugh was also attacked as
part of the same campaign.
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flood3 ' thus provided an ideal occasion on which to swear oaths sealing a
reorganisation of the Carolingian family settlement.32
The oaths exchanged before the walls of Vienne, preparatory negotiations
for which had probably been ongoing for several months 33, were, however,
intended to regulate much more than simply the fate of western Lotharingia.
Indeed, we may see them as encapsulating nothing less than a mutually guaranteed
succession plan. In marked contrast to the events of the period 875-80, when the
deaths of each of five kings invariably inspired a desperate scramble for their
successions,34 the period 880-4, which saw the deaths of three, witnessed not a
single hostile attempt by a ruling king to take over a recently-vacated kingdom.
Where the designated succession arrangements of the dead king were frequently
ignored before 880, we have already seen that the oaths of Vienne were explicitly
cited as the determining factor in both the peaceful successions in 882. 880 was
an especially propitious time to come to a new agreement on the Carolingian
family settlement, which required clarification afler the high number of royal
deaths since 875. Indeed, such an agreement was probably considered essential at
' The main evidence for this, gathered by Bautier, 'Origines', pp.56-7, is the sudden appearance
of Boso's erstwhile supporters as recipients of Carloman's charters.
32 Louis the Younger's illness-enforced absence from the campaign, on which he was represented
by his main general Henry, does not mean he was not party to the agreement sealed there: he was
fully involved in the preparatory negotiations (see next note), and the details of the associated
territorial and political settlement confirm that his influence on the plan was prominent (see next
section).
" Since Boso's rebellion, the meetings at Orbe (Charles the Fat, Louis III and Carloman II, late
879), Ravenna (Charles the Fat and representatives of Louis the Younger, Jan.880), Ribemont
(Louis the Younger, Louis III and Carloman II, Feb.880) and Gondreville (Charles the Fat, Louis
III, Carloman II and representatives of Louis the Younger, June 880), constituted a series of
negotiations which must have concerned the projected campaigns against Boso and Hugh and laid
the groundwork for the territorial division described below. AB s.a.880, p.241 records that the
Gondreville meeting was planned at Ribemont, which shows that the summits were connected.
875: Charles the Bald and Karlmann of Bavaria dispute Italy on death of Louis II; 876: Charles
the Bald invades east Francia on death of Louis the German; 879-80: Louis the Younger and
Arnuif of Carinthia dispute Bavaria; and Louis the Younger and Charles the Fat dispute Italy on
illness and death of Karlmann of Bavaria; Louis the Younger invades west Francia on death of
Louis the Stammerer. Even the succession of Louis the Stammerer in 877 was not in full
accordance with the plans of his father, although he was Charles the Bald's only surviving son: see
now Kasten, Konigssohne, pp.461-6. The struggle for Lotharingia in 869-70 should also be
remembered here.
" I.e. Charles the Fat to Louis the Younger, Carloman II to Louis III. Before 880, the initial
succession plans of Charles the Bald, Louis the Stammerer and Karlmann of Bavaria were
overruled.
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this time due to the crucial fact that each of the four survivors lacked legitimate
male offspring.36
Moreover, there are strong indications that the four remaining Carolingians
continued to cooperate politically in the years following Boso's rising. Four main
pieces of evidence support this interpretation. Firstly, the Annales Fuldenses
report a 'congruum colloquium' held in mid-881 between Louis the Younger and
Louis III at Gondreville. 37 This royal centre lay on the borderline which had
divided Lotharingia into eastern and western halves since 870, and the meeting
thus fits with the idea described above of the eastern king dealing with his cousin
as a sort of client ruler in the western portion. Our source is not specific about the
nature of any discussions, but close attention to its context in the anna! can fill this
gap for us. The immediately preceding section runs thus: 'Rex [i.e. Louis the
Younger] post pascha in Galliam profectus Hugonem Hlotharii cx Waidrata filium
ad se venientem in suum suscepit dominium et ei abbatias et comitatus in
beneficium dedit, ut ei fidem servaret. Sed ille pravorum usus consilio fidem
mentitus regi molestus efficitur; quapropter regis exercitus illum persecutus in
Burgundiam fugere compulit.' 38 The clear implication is that it was these events
which made the Gondreville meeting 'congruum', 'fitting' or 'corresponding': it
was convened by Louis the Younger in response to the rebellion and flight of
Hugh. We may conclude, therefore, that the purpose of the summit was for Louis
to pass over responsibility and instructions, and perhaps troops, for the pursuit of
Hugh to his younger cousin while he himself went off to spend the summer in
Bavaria. 39 Interestingly, we know the identity of one of the monasteries which had
been given to Hugh 'in beneficium' as the price for his faith. The west
Lotharingian royal abbey of Lobbes, which had for several decades been
36 This factor would have been thrown into sharper focus by the recent deaths of both Louis the
Younger's sons, the infant Louis in late 879 (domestic accident), and the illegitimate Hugh in early
880 (fighting the Vikings): Regino, Chronicon, s.a.882, p.119 and AF s.a.880, p.94 respectively.
After around 18 years of childless marriage, Charles the Fat's prospects of producing an heir
cannot have appeared bright.
AF s.a.88l, p.96.
Ibid.
This was not a new experience for Louis: he and Carloman had led the forces of the bed-ridden
Louis the Younger on a campaign against Hugh which set out the previous summer, also from
Gondreville: AB s.a.880, p.242. AF s.a.880, p.95 shows the east Frankish general Henry was also
involved in leading this army.
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controlled directly by members of the Carolingian dynasty and their close allies,
was given to Hugh by Louis at exactly this time. 4° He was subsequently deprived
of his lay-abbacy, most probably also in 881, in favour of Bishop Franco of
Liege. 4 ' This event has sometimes been interpreted as a symptom of the supposed
general stagnation of Carolingian kingship in the 880s, an emblem of the
dynasty's inability to control even its most important royal monasteries in the face
of a vigorous and powerful local aristocracy and episcopate. 42 However, had this
been so, we would expect Lobbes to have fallen into the clutches of the bishop of
Cambrai, in whose diocese it lay. In view of the context just outlined, it is more
plausible that Franco was a deliberate choice by Louis the Younger, who also
wanted to build up the bishop of Liege as a counterweight to Rothad of Cambrai,
who had been appointed bishop by Louis's opponent Hincmar of Rheims in 879
without deference to royal authority. 43 Franco was a safe pair of hands who could
be trusted to take over and hold the monastery from the rebellious Hugh, thus
depriving him of its considerable resources as a base for his latest uprising. The
transfer was probably effected by Louis III in summer 881, on the authorisation of
Louis the Younger, the absent overlord of the region.
A second key piece of evidence is an unusual confirmation charter issued
by Charles the Fat for margrave Guy of Spoleto and Otbert, a canon of Langres, in
November 882. While Guy was afidelis ( faithful man) of Charles in his capacity
as king of Italy, Otbert, as a holder of honores in west Francia, must have been
considered the fidelis of Carloman II. Interestingly, then, from the point of view
of cooperative politics, the charter seems to have been enhanced at a later date by
4° See above, n.23. Louis may have hoped to encourage Hugh to use Lobbes as a base from which
to fight the Vikings. He appears commanding forces against the Northmen in this region in AV
s.a.879, p.45.
' Wanchez, Lobbes, pp.40-2 gives a convincing argument for this date.
42 Dc Jong, 'Monasticism', pp.627 and 651.
Helvetius, 'L'Abbatiat', pp.293-4. Helvetius shows that the kind of distribution of royal
monasteries represented by the granting of Lobbes to Franco was absolutely typical of Carolingian
monastic policy in this region throughout the second half of the ninth century.
"A decade earlier another rebel, Charles the Bald's son Carloman, had used Lobbes for precisely
that purpose. See Dierkens, Abbayes, pp.109-il for comments on the great wealth of the
monastery and how this was organised to strengthen the positions of its secular proprietors.
Franco had been bishop since before 859 and was celebrated for his exploits against the Vikings:
Duchesne, Fastes, vol.3, p.193. He remained in high favour under Charles the Fat, as shown by
DD CIII 104 (issued to Franco in 884 as the 'deserved reward for his fidelity') and 105. He was
also related to the Carolingians: Werner, 'Nachkommen', p.4 ii.
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the addition of Carloman's seal.46 Thirdly, a contemporary exchange of letters
shows that Charles the Fat, on being asked by Pope John VIII to release the
Empress Engelberga from captivity in Alemannia (she had been taken there to
prevent her from helping the rebellion of Boso, her son-in-law), responded that he
would only do so if Louis III and Carloman II agreed. 47 Finally, after Boso had
been effectively defeated in late 880 and was at large in the kingdom of Carloman,
it was Charles the Fat who sent men from Italy to help clean up the vestiges of his
support.48
Incongruously, this last point has been taken by modern historians as a
demonstration of hostility between Charles and Carloman. 49 However, what it
really shows, along with the other evidence, is that the cooperation of the
Carolingians against Boso on the military campaign of late 880 was no mere flash
in the pan. They certainly continued to pool their resources, particularly when it
came to dealing with Boso and Hugh who, as usurpers, posed a common threat to
the authority of all of them. Most of our examples have shown the elder east
Frankish kings Louis the Younger and Charles the Fat holding sway over their
younger cousins, and not just in matters directly concerning the west Lotharingian
lease. We may well infer from this that they were recognised as having a form of
generational seniority in the new family settlement, while the junior parties were
content to bide their time until they could inherit the eastern kingdom. 5° In view
of this it is significant that a later charter of Charles refers to Carloman as his
DCIII 61.
46 See Kehr's introduction and notes to this charter. Carloman's envoys, including his main adviser
Hugh the Abbot, were present at the assembly where the charter was enacted: AB s.a.882, p.249.
' Registrurn, no.268 (March 881), in which John also promised to send her back to the
Carolingian kings if she again tried to aid Boso or any other anti-royal forces.
AV s.a.882, p.52: 'Berardus quoque quidam ab Italia veniens Bosonem tyrannum non sinebat
quietum esse.' Berardus was a man of Charles the Fat, as king of Italy; see Hlawitschka,
Oberitalien, pp.l4'1-8. In the context of family solidarity, note also the prayer clauses in two
charters of Carloman II from 881, which, in requesting prayers to be said 'pro omni genens nostri
prosapia', may have referred to the whole Carolingian family, rather than, as would have been
more usual, just his branch of it: D CII 51 and 55; Ewig, 'Gebetsdienst', pp.61-2. Collectio
Sangallensis, no.31 is a directive from this period issued in concord by unnamed kings (including,
presumably, Charles the Fat) for the organisation of military litanies and fasts. See McCormick,
'Liturgy'.
Eg. Bautier, 'Origines', p.50.
5° Seniority by age, and especially by generation, was an established principle in Carolingian
politics, featuring as an element in the divisiones of 806, 817 and 878. As we saw in c.1.2,
Karlmann may have been intended to enjoy a degree of seniority over his younger brothers.
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'adopticius fihius'. 5 ' Seen from the perspective of the early 880s, therefore, the
oaths of Vienne were clearly intended to guarantee the long-term future of the
Carolingian dynasty.
3.4: An overlooked Carolingian division plan of 880
In addition to providing the occasion for a renegotiation of the Carolingian
family settlement, Boso's temporarily successful attempt to carve out a kingdom
for himself in Burgundy and Provence also created territorial confusion which had
to be resolved, because he seized lands belonging to more than one kingdom. A
brief overview of some of the evidence for the political geography of the empire
can enrich our appreciation of the new political equilibrium and indeed confirm
the view that the year 880, rather than ushering in a final age of chaos and conflict,
actually saw the settlement of a number of outstanding territorial ambiguities and
disputes. Four examples will suffice.52
Firstly, the Lyonnais and Viennois, the heartlands of Boso's kingdom and
the ground chosen for his defiant last stand, belonged after 880 to Carloman II, as
revealed by the dating clauses of a series of local charters. 53 The young king must
have received these not, as is sometimes claimed, from Charles the Fat, but rather
from Louis the Younger, since they were attached to the western half of
Lotharingia which the latter had received at Ribemont in February 880. Secondly,
' D CIII 145. I would attach no legalistic or institutional significance to this term, which was
often used in descriptions of Frankish peacemaking; see below, c.6.5. Charles's seniority is also
attested by three charters from the Aquitanian monastery of St-Julien de Brioude from 881-2,
which are dated after the imperial rule of Charles the Fat: DD Bri 197, 260 and 263. This dating
formula contrasts strikingly with those which recognise Charles's kingship in the area after
Carloman II's death in 884 (DD 13, 34, 131, 175, 200, 219, 223, 240, 271 and 289). Brioude's
proprietor, Bernard of the Auvergne, was a close political ally of the emperor (see below c.4.3),
and so these charters can be taken to show his appreciation of Charles's general seniority to
Carloman in the new family settlement, rather than (as does Auzias, L 'Aquitaine, p.41 7) confusion
in Aquitaine as to who the actual king was. See also ibid, pp.541-8.
52 Historians writing about this period have noted changes in the political geography of the
Frankish kingdoms in the late 870s and early 880s, but have usually done so only in passing and
have tended to see them as evidence of confusion and conflict in the royal house: eg. Poupardin,
Provence, pp.115-7.
Lyon: D Say 27; DD Cluny 24-5, 27-8. Vienne: DD SMV 89, 108 and Appendix A. Here I
accept the detailed arguments of Hlawitschka, Lotharingien, p.90, n. 104, who anticipates and
clears up the objections raised by Bautier, 'Ongines', p.63 and n.87. Hlawitschka shows that all
these charters can be taken to demonstrate a general recognition of Carloman's authority in this
region between 880 and 884, although Boso's stronghold of Vienne continued to recognise the
usurper's authority until the fall of the town in 882 (D Cluny 26).
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Provence proper also went to Carioman, as demonstrated by a charter he issued for
the bishop of Marseilles and coins which were minted in his name at Aries.54
Provence had been at least theoretically attached to the kingdom of Italy since the
860s, and so Carloman's possession of it must have been conceded by Charles the
Fat, who had been king of Italy since 879. The bulk of Boso's kingdom, which
had been largely made up of Provence plus the Lyon-Vienne area, was therefore
transferred to the west Frankish kingdom by the two east Frankish kings, who
thereby left Carloman II to get on with the job of imposing his authority in these
newly-acquired territories during the campaigning seasons of 881 and 882 (as we
saw, with some help from Charles). 56 All this cleared up a previously ambiguous
situation in which the status of Provence (which a contemporary observer
described as 'semper inter hos et iilos fluctuasse dignoscitur') was unclear because
of its changing of hands between west and east Frankish rulers in 875 and 877.
A third case, that of the region of modem Switzerland known to historians
as Transjurane Burgundy, is worth focusing on a little more closely. The area
basically comprised the dioceses of Lausanne, Geneva and Sion, and was of the
highest strategic importance as the gateway from the west Frankish kingdom to
Italy across the Mons lovis pass. In 859, Lothar II had granted it to his brother
Louis II of Italy in the hope of receiving support in an early twist of his protracted
divorce case. 58 Louis never established a conspicuous presence there, and over the
next two decades various kings attempted to impose their influence in the region
with varying degrees of success. 59 This situation meant that the area's political
position was ambiguous; but until Louis's death (875), it nevertheless remained at
least nominally part of the Italian kingdom. The text of the Treaty of Fouron,
D C2 72; Poly, Provence, pp.233-4; Metcalf, 'Sketch', p.79.
" Ado, Chronicon, pp.322-3 for Provence's attachment to Italy, which was still recognised in the
division treaties of 870 and 880.
See Bautier, 'Origines', pp.57-61 on these campaigns.
Notker, Continuatio, p.329.
AB s.a.859, p.82 gives details. The region was perceived by contemporaries as a coherent unit:
see Castelnuovo, 'Elites', pp.384-7.
Charles the Bald attempted to get a foothold by trying to grant Boso a claim to transjurane
honores in 869; AB s.a.869, p.167. D AC 64 mentions help given by Karlmann of Bavaria to
Hubert of St-Maurice d'Agaune in his acquisition of Lobbes in 864. Historians (eg. Dierkens,
Abbayes, p.113 n.181) have been puzzled by the link between the two men, but it makes sense if
Karlmann and his father were attempting to make inroads into Hubert's other power base at this
time, Transjurane Burgundy.
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which was agreed between Louis the Stammerer of West Francia and Louis the
Younger of East Francia in 878, contains some territorial clauses which are of
interest here.6° One main concern of the two kings who met at Fouron was the
succession to the heirless Louis II, which both considered to remain unsettled, and
each of them stated an explicit claim to the kingdom of Italy. In addition to this,
however, they proclaimed: 'De regno vero quod Hludouuicus imperator Italiae
habuit, quia necdum ex jIb aliqua divisio facta est, quicumque modo illud tenet
ita teneat, donec Domino volente iterum simul venientes cum communibus
fidelibus nostris inveniamus et diffiniamus quid ex hoc melius et iustius nobis
visum fuerit.' This declaration cannot refer to Italy itself, since that is dealt with
specifically in the next clause. Nor is Provence likely to have been a matter of
pressing concern at Fouron: Louis the Younger, certainly, had no logical reason to
have designs on that individual region. 6 ' The clause ought nonetheless to be read
in the context of the two kings' stated interest in the Italian crown, and so must
relate to Transjurane Burgundy, the gateway to Italy and Louis II's only other
regnum north of the Alps. That the transjurane territory was the object of dispute
between the Carolingians at this time is emphasised by a charter issued in the
same year by the marchio Rudolf, who had emerged as the main secular authority
there during the earlier 870s. This charter was dated in unusual fashion after the
regnal years of all three east Frankish kings (Karlmann of Bavaria, Louis the
Younger and Charles the Fat). 62 The circumspection of this formula reflects
Rudolf's perception of the insecurity of the situation in Transjurane Burgundy.
He himself had been a key figure in the support of the successful Italian campaign
of Charles the Bald in 875, and his charter's recipient was none other than Louis
II's widow the Empress Engelberga.63 The fact that two such important power-
brokers in transalpine Carolingian politics chose to hedge their bets publicly in
60 The text is reproduced by Hincmar in AB s.a.878, pp.230-4.
o' Louis the Stammerer may in any case have considered Provence to be in his sphere of influence,
inheriting his claim from his father Charles the Bald.
62DRB1.
63 AB s.a. 875, p.198 for Charles's use of Rudolf's hospitality at St-Maurice d'Agaune.
71
this fashion should encourage us to take most seriously the evidence for rivalry
between kings around the Jura in 878.
Karlmann of Bavaria, as king of Italy, was the man technically in control
of the area at the time, but there are nevertheless signs that the angry reference to
'quicumque modo illud tenet' in the text of Fouron is in fact an allusion to Charles
the Fat, and that he was the object of Louis the Younger's and Louis the
Stammerer's concerted action. 65 This is the clear implication of a letter sent in 877
by Charles to the archbishop of Besancon, informing him that he was placing a
court cleric into the vacant transjurane see of Lausanne. 66 The same conclusion
can be drawn from a letter of Pope John VIII to Charles in 878, warning the king
not to infringe on the interests of the pontiff's then-protégé Boso. 67 These
interests cannot have been located in Italy, where Karlmann was still the
recognised ruler, but must rather have lain in the Lake Geneva area, where Boso
also had properties and claims. 68 It may well be that Charles's authority here can
be back-dated to 871 when, in reaction to a false rumour that Louis II had been
killed in southern Italy, he was sent by his father to Transjurane Burgundy 'Ut
quos posset sacramento ad eius fidelitatem constringeret, sicut et fecit.' 69 During
Collectio Sangallensis, no.39, a letter of Bishop Anthony of Brescia to Bishop Salomon of
Constance in early 878, is a good expression of a similar unease in the political community after
the death of Charles the Bald: Anthony was anxious to know which of the three east Frankish
kings or Louis the Stammerer would be the new claimant in Italy. Ibid, no.40, Salomon's reply,
attempts to assuage Anthony's fears, but rather hedges the issue by talking in general tenns of
goodwill between kings and concluding that the peaceful settlement would be observed by Louis
the Stammerer 'quamdiu domnum Karlomannum spirare noverit.' When it is remembered that
Karlmann was not a well man (AB s.a.877, p.218 says that he was close to death at this time), this
statement can be seen as implying the continued insecurity of the situation and showing that the
Italian claims of the other Carolingians remained very much alive. John VIfl's favoured imperial
candidate at this point was Louis the Stammerer (Fried, 'Boso', pp.1 93-208), after whose death he
went on to court both Charles the Fat and Louis the Younger (see below).
65 Collectio San gallensis, no.27, a letter sent by Louis the Younger to Louis the Stammerer shortly
after Fouron to confu-m their agreed solidarity, should also be noted as evidence for their joint
determination to stand up against an unnamed third party.
Ibid. no.26. A letter of John VIII (Registrum, no. 252) supports this evidence with its
(disapproving) reference to agents of Charles making unwelcome use of properties pertaining to
the archiepiscopal see of Besançon, in which Lausanne lay.
67 Registrum, no.110 (Nov. 878).
68 Fried, 'Boso', pp.198-9; D BV 19; doubts over this document assuaged by Airlie, 'Behaviour',
pp.202-4. See also Poupardin, Provence, pp.110-i; Castelnuovo, 'Elites', p.404 with n.82.
69 AB s.a.87 1, p.1 83. Charles was thus entrusted by his father with custody of east Frankish
interests in the region, which had a bearing on the Italian succession, perhaps to compensate him
for the greater say Karlmann was now acquiring in Lotharingian politics. East Frankish ties with
the area were also strengthened around this time by the emergence of the margrave Conrad
(Rudolf s father), who had controlling interests in both Transjurane Burgundy and Rbaetia:
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the 870s, therefore, Charles the Fat seems to have been operating with de facto
authority in the region, an authority which was hotly disputed by Louis the
Younger and Louis the Stammerer, both enviously assessing it as a stepping stone
to Italy.7°
From 880 onwards, however, Charles's position in Transjurane Burgundy
had been recognised by all parties. This is clearly shown by a series of three
letters sent by John VIII to Charles, his archchancellor Liutward and the
archbishop of Besancon in the middle of that year. The letters discuss the position
of Bishop Jerome of Lausarine, who had been deposed by Charles on account of
his support for Boso, and had travelled to Rome to plead his case. 7 ' The episode
not only provides further proof of Charles's effective authority across the Jura, but
shows that this authority was now perceived as legitimate by Rome: although he
disapproved of the king's actions, John's stated wish was 'ut Deo auxiliante ipsa
ecciesia proprio nunc recepto pastore sub vestrae clementiae tutamine pacifica iam
et quieta consistat.' 72 John and Jerome had clearly agreed to toe the imperial line.
The same image emerges from another set of papal correspondence, this time
concerning the see of Geneva in 882. Here Charles was the complainant,
protesting that the incumbent bishop had been removed unjustly from his see by
his metropolitan for failing to declare for Boso in 879 (Archbishop Otramnus of
Vienne had been one of Boso's main allies). This time Pope John, having
meanwhile deserted the cause of the erstwhile usurper, wholeheartedly agreed. In
both these cases, it should be stressed that it was the usurpation of Boso which
was the root cause of the dispute and the main obstacle to its solution, and that
Charles stood firm to prevail in the diplomatic disruption with Rome which the
rebellion had created. On a lower level, charters from the Vaud, around Lausanne,
Schinid, 'Hunfrid', pp.182-7. Interestingly, AA s.a.871, p.180 states that Charles received Rhaetia
in 871.
70 Louis the Younger's claim to Italy in 879 is further demonstrated by AF s.a.879, p.93, where
disapproval is expressed that Charles the Fat had been allowed to take over from Karlmann there;
and by Registrum, nos.l68 (April 879) and 205 (June 879) which show John VIII courting both
Charles and Louis as potential protectors of Rome.
' Registrum, nos.252-4 (all June 880).
72 Thid, no.252. See Duchesne, Fastes, vol.3, pp.221-2 for the chronology of events in the see of
Lausanne at this time.
Registrum, nos.292, 299, 303, 306. Charles probably issued far-reaching privileges for the
church of Geneva in 881: introduction to D RB 5.
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were dated from this point on after Charles's regnal years alone.74 His de facto
rulership in Transjurane Burgundy had become an acknowledged right.
In part, no doubt, this was because Louis the Younger had given up his
designs on our fourth example, Italy. Early in 880 he sent a contingent of bishops
along with his archchancellor Liutbert of Mainz to attend Charles's official
coronation in Ravenna as king of Italy. 75 Not only did Louis thus make a public
gesture of renunciation, but evidence from the Liber Vitae of Brescia shows that
the two parties proceeded in tandem to beat a premature retreat out of Italy in
order to begin preparations for the joint campaign against Boso later that year.76
This agreement, which probably also involved a counter-recognition by Charles of
Louis's rights in Lotharingia, needed to be presented to and confirmed by the
young west Frankish kings (who may have inherited hopes of Italy from their
father Louis the Stammerer) in order to become totally credible. It is likely that
their acquiescence was confirmed by the Vienne oaths of winter 880, when the
reallocation of Provence and the Viennois-Lyonnais was also agreed.
It is significant that Louis and Charles buried the hatchet in their dispute
over Italy as they prepared to cooperate against Boso on the military campaigns of
the year 880. It was Boso's usurpation of large tracts of Provence and Burgundy
which had brought the ambiguous statuses of various regions into focus, inspiring
the four kings to bring these disputes to a conclusion. The political settlement
expressed by the oaths of Vienne was thus underpinned by a territorial agreement
which carved up Boso's short-lived kingdom and brought its parts back into the
Carolingian orbit, setting the seal on the fractious intra-dynastic quarrels of the
later 870s with a mutual recognition of a series of claims to territory. Political
cooperation would be easier to achieve, it was obviously recognised, if there were
fewer outstanding territorial issues to fight about.
3.5: Conclusion: The Carolingian response
D Laus 433 (28 Feb. 881, dated to the first year of Charles's reign). Collectio Sangallensis,
additamenta no.2 is a model charter from 881 dated to the second year of Charles's reign 'in
Burgundia'. This formula never entered the official chancery repertoire. D CIII 108 from Sept.
884 also concerns transjurane properties.
Notker, Continuatio, p.329.
76 Schrnid, 'Liutbert', pp.41-60.
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What I hope to have shown in this chapter is that two important and viable
plans were made in 880 tackling the two key issues of Carolingian dynastic
politics, succession and territorial division. These plans were implemented not
simply according to some idealised principle of dynastic or imperial unity (after
all, other family members like Louis and Carloman's infant half-brother Charles
the Simple and the Empress Engelberga were most definitely excluded), but also
as a response to the specific circumstances brought about by the revolt of Boso
and the lack of available heirs. The agreement was designed to ensure that several
pressing political problems were dealt with. The establishment of a distant
frontier protected the core east and west Frankish kingdoms from the direct threat
of Viking attack, and responsibility for defence of the middle kingdom was
delegated to the young western kings. Meanwhile, the concession of Lobbes to
Franco of Liege also reveals some measure of reorganisation of Viking defence on
the ground in Lotharingia. The cooperation over the Lotharingian question was
clearly also intended to deal with the continuing unrest fomented by Hugh, whose
activities were thus undermined on two fronts: not only were his outright
rebellions put down more effectively, but also his appeal in the eyes of the
Lotharingian aristocracy was diluted by their getting what they certainly wanted, a
more conspicuous and accessible royal presence. The decisive neutralising of
Boso must have helped here by providing clear evidence of the kings'
determination to effectively assert their authority in the middle kingdom.
Moreover, the succession problem was solved, at least for the time being: it was
surely expected that Carloman and Louis would be able to take on the empire after
the deaths of their eastern cousins, and moreover produce heirs of their own. The
unusual spirit and practice of cooperation generated between the four kings, while
it may have been communicated to contemporary observers as an expression of
idealised family solidarity, was thus also hard-nosed Realpolitik, a careful and
considered reaction to a particularly uncomfortable conjunction of events.77
Nonetheless, one would be entitled to ask why this seemingly important
new division and succession plan was skated over so lightly by our principal
narrative sources. This objection can be met with reference to the extreme
" See Schneider, Brudergemeine on the standard unity-rhetoric of Carolmgian treaties.
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partiality of our two main informants, both of whom had reasons for suppressing
direct reports of Carolingian solidarity. Hincmar, our main source, was very much
an interested party in 880-2, still publicly furious with Louis III for freezing him
out of the position at court which he believed to be rightfully his, and with Louis
the Younger for his invasions of west Francia in 879. Consequently these two
kings, the immediate architects of the west Lotharingian deal, receive short shrift
in the Annales Bertiniani.78 Their east Frankish equivalent, the Anna/es
Fuldenses, are heavily slanted in the other direction. The annalist, a cleric of
Mainz and zealous partisan of Louis the Younger, made a systematic attempt to
write Charles the Fat out of history, partly in an attempt to emphasise his own
king's claims to Italy. 79 The concept of all-Carolingian solidarity clearly had less
attraction for these writers, who represented events differently according to their
own agendas, than for their kings. This is why we can only get a comprehensive
picture of Carolingian politics at this time by reading both these sets of annals in
conjunction with each other and with other types of source.
It would be wrong to infer that the outcome of the royal deal struck in 880
was an unqualified success. Certainly, the success it did have was partly due to
the fact that it did not have to stand the test of time. While, as we have seen, the
agreement survived the deaths of Louis the Younger and Louis III intact, the fact
that Carloman II followed them into an early grave soon afterwards, leaving
Charles the Fat in sole charge, meant that it did not have to outlive its honeymoon
period. Indeed, the first rumblings of discord could already be heard in late 882,
when Charles had been initially reluctant to hand over the west Lotharingian lease
to Carloman, perhaps as a result of the latter's failure to join him on campaign
against the Meuse Vikings earlier in the year. 8° Had the situation been radically
For examples, see Hincmar's negative report of Louis III's victory at the battle of Saucourt (AB
s.a.881, p.244) and his damning obituary of Louis the Younger (AB s.a.882, p.245). Cf. nn.20 and
26 above. AV s.a.880, pp.47-8 also puts a negative gloss on Charles the Fat's departure from the
siege of Vienne, although ending a campaign as winter approached was standard Frankish
practice.
This is clear from a cursory comparison between the Mainz annals' silence on Charles's
involvement in Italian politics during the 870s, which Hincmar reveals as quite conspicuous: see
above, c.2, n. 11.
° AB s.a.882, p.249 for Charles's reluctance; unfortunately the annals' chronological details are
not precise enough to be sure if it actually was Carloman's failure to bring military aid against the
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altered by the birth of a new son, or by the coming of age of Charles the Simple, it
might have descended into confusion and conflict once again; at any rate, this was
the pattern of the on-off fraternal pacts of supposedly everlasting peace agreed
between members of the previous generation of Carolingian kings.81
Nevertheless, despite all the potential for failure it undoubtedly concealed,
the Carolingian response to Boso's rising cannot but be seen as a positive one.
Not only were questions of territory brought into sharp focus by the usurpation,
but so too were political issues. 82 Boso confronted the Carolingians with the
possibility that kings could be made from outside their family, as the first example
of such since 751. They therefore faced serious consequences for the status of
their monopoly on legitimate royal power and the maintenance of the political
myth that only they could be kings. 83 The Carolingians were not, as is usually
thought, swept along by the force of events, but confronted these threats in
resolute and concerted fashion. These people were self-conscious political actors,
eminently capable of improvisation, and clearly not as tightly bound by
contemporary political norms as is sometimes implies by modern scholarship:
they were not imprisoned by their circumstances, but were able to engage with
them. The result of their action was an immediate closing of ranks and provision
for continuing solidarity, intended to prevent a repeat of the kind of succession
dispute which had opened the door for Boso in the first place. The threat posed by
Boso's kingship was indeed novel and highly dangerous to Carolingian
hegemony. However, the Carolingian response was also novel, an imaginative
and constructive attempt to shore up royal authority and circumvent its traditional
weaknesses. Internecine struggle was never a feature of Carolingian politics in the
early 880s. We can now understand, in this context, the optimism of Notker the
Stammerer and his contemporaries for the future of the Carolingians in 881.
By the time Notker's optimism had soured, as he began his Gesta Karoli in
late 885, the issues had changed. Boso of Vienne and Hugh of Lotharingia, the
Vikings which had upset him. The context of the other evidence presented above implies that the
transfer of the lease to Carloman did eventually take place.
' The fact that Louis the Younger was first to die conveniently removed the only party to the
agreement who had not actually been present at the formal oath-swearing.
82 f should be stressed that Louis III was unaffected by the territorial consequences of Boso's
actions, yet took a large part in the new family settlement.
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'tyranni' against whom Notker had anxiously warned in his earlier work, the
Continuatio, were out of the picture, the former a fugitive in the hills of Provence
deprived of his support, landed base and credibility, the latter blinded and
confined to a monastery. 84 The doubts Notker expressed in the Gesta for the
continuation of the dynasty were not, therefore, a response to the activities of
Boso and Hugh. Rather, the problem was that premature death had claimed all the
ruling Carolingians of 880 except Charles the Fat, who remained heirless; the
Vienne settlement had completely unravelled itself and the future of the dynasty
now hung by the slenderest of threads.
Notker realised that the events of 885 were a mixed blessing for the
emperor. While the death of Carloman II allowed Charles to acquire control of
the entire Carolingian empire, a position which he expressed in a newly confident
ideology of imperial rulership, 85 the succession problem had to be dealt with yet
again. Charles's solution, a Lothar 11-style attempt to have his bastard son
Bernard legitimised, was on the rocks before the year was out, and the emperor
seemed determined to exclude the only other viable claimant, Arnulf of Carinthia:
Notker's pessimism was in large part a comment on this situation. 86 Moreover,
Charles was faced with the question of how to make his presence felt across the
multiple regna now under his rule. This was no small matter, for it was the
absence of easily accessible royal authority in the middle kingdom after the death
of Lothar II which had enabled the revolts of Hugh and Boso to attract such large
followings in the first place. Throughout the rest of his reign Charles had to
wrestle with these two interlinked problems, the succession and the governance of
the empire, to varying degrees of success. Accordingly, it is with these issues that
the following chapters are primarily concerned.
83 I borrow these terms and ideas from Airlie's work; see especially 'Semper.'
Notker, Continuatio, p.330. See Bautier, 'Origines', pp.61-8 on Boso's fate; Regmo,




4: EMPEROR, EMPIRE AND ARISTOCRACY
4.1: Kings and aristocrats
One of the main factors which inspired the agreement of Vienne in 880
was to make the Carolingian rulers more accessible to the nobility of Lotharingia.
In this it was broadly similar to most other Carolingian family settlements: the aim
of subkingship was not only to keep junior members of the royal house happy by
allowing them a tangible share in power, but also to give the provincial aristocracy
their 'own' king. A nearby royal court was less a hindrance than a potential
source of opportunity for high aristocrats, for whom the acquisition of honores
was of primary importance:' the court 'operated like a great railway junction
shunting personnel all over the realm'.2 Equally, the Carolingians, who by no
means wielded absolute power, needed members of the aristocracy to act as
mediums to transmit their authority from the palace to the localities. In other
words, Carolingian kingship was, from the very beginning, predicated on a close
alliance between royal and aristocratic power: the relationship between the two
was symbiotic.3
These commonplace observations are, however, frequently disregarded by
historians when trying to explain the events leading up to the collapse of the
empire in 888, especially in reference to the political problems of Charles the Fat.
Here, the king-aristocracy relationship is characterised as oppositional: Charles
ruled not with, but rather in spite of the high nobility, who ultimately rose up and
seized power for themselves. The reguli who became kings in 888 were members
of the high aristocracy: therefore, the reasoning goes, any evidence for their
activities prior to this date should be read as revealing stages in their 'rise' to
kingship. This line of argument is not only teleological, but also rather circular.
Because historians assume that the aristocracy 'rose' at the expense of royal power
in the later ninth century, the emergence of the tenth-century duchies and
territorial principalities is usually studied backwards, with the ninth-century
evidence being interpreted from the point of view of the known outcome.
Expositions of this supposed process therefore tend not only to presume
'See Airlie, 'Aristocracy', pp.443-7.
2 Airlie, 'Palace'.
As stressed many years ago by Werner: 'Untersuchungen I' and 'Families' are fundamental.
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aristocratic strength and royal weakness, but also end up 'proving' the significance
of these phenomena.
This type of thinking still lies submerged in many of the standard works on
the period: the 'rise of the aristocracy' has become an accepted and largely
unquestioned historical reference point which is invoked to explain other
phenomena of the late ninth century.4 The principal reason for this is
historiographical: the model fits very neatly into the traditional grand narrative of
medieval European history. In particular, it is still often assumed that to explain
the appearance of 'feudalism', 'France' and 'Germany' in the tenth century, it is
necessary to postulate a crisis of state power developing throughout the late ninth
century and facilitating the shift from 'public' (royal) to 'private' (aristocratic)
authority. 5 The work of Dhondt, whose 1948 book Etudes sur la Naissance des
Principautés en France is the classic account of the 'rise' thesis, and perhaps still
the most coherent attempt to expound it systematically on the basis of analysis of
the contemporary sources, may be mentioned here as an influential example of
this approach. Dhondt' s argument was essentially that the ninth century saw a
centrifugal redistribution of resources, and by implication power, from the
Carolingian kings to a grasping aristocracy, speeded up by the exigencies of
defence against the Vikings. His thesis remains hugely influential, and sits
embedded in many of the more recent standard narratives of the period.6
Nevertheless, Dhondt's use of the sources was, as Martindale has
convincingly demonstrated, flawed: he paid too little attention to the relative
quality of grants made by the Carolingians to the aristocracy, and to the fact that
very few charters were actually issued for representatives of its higher echelons.7
Moreover, his thesis is founded on the economistic concept that the most
important, or even the only important, historically significant way that aristocrats
relate to kings is materially. This model tends to ascribe to the aristocracy an
Eg. Hlawitschka, Lotharingien, pp.48-SO; Keller, 'Strukturen', passim; Buhrer-Thierry,
'Conseiller', p.120; Kasten, Konigssohne, pp.478-9; Lauranson-Rosaz, 'Roi', pp.422-3, 434.
The importance of regionalism in explaining the collapse of the empire is stressed by
Hlawitschka, Lotharingien, pp.23-4 and Fried, 'Kingdoms', p.1 58. For apposite comments on the
historiographical issues, see Barthélemy, 'Debate', p.199; idem, 'Chevalerie', p.168; Reynolds,
'Historiography', pp.124-5; Reuter, 'Sonderweg', pp.21 0-1.
6 For examples see Dutton, Politics; James, Origins, p.175; McKitterick, Kingdoms, pp.235-6.
Martindale, 'Kingdom'; see also Nelson, Charles, pp.54-5, 233.
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anachronistic unity of purpose and over-simplistically suggests that royal power is
only as enduring as its capacity to distribute material resources, thus underrating
its less tangible charismatic elements. 8 The weakness of the king and the landed
strength of the noble houses are thus held to be opposite sides of the same coin.
As well as these methodological problems, the evidential base for the
thesis is frail. Recent research has deepened our understanding of the royal-
aristocratic relationship, and as a result some of the main monuments of the 'rise'
thesis, such as the Treaty of Coulaines (843) and the Capitulary of Quierzy (877),
no longer seem as significant as they once did. 9 Moreover, the key narrative
source held to support the traditional view is the Bavarian continuator's account of
the overthrow of Charles the Fat, which ascribes the coup to a magnate
conspiracy.'° However, this text ought to be read in a very narrow political
context, as a retrospective justification of Arnuif's rising, rather than as an
objective assessment of general aristocratic might."
In other words, the case for the thesis that the Carolingian aristocracy
'rose' against the weakened dynasty and seized royal power remains a largely
unproven assumption. In order to assess the model further, this chapter will
reconsider the evidence for the nature of the king's relationship with the high
aristocracy under Charles the Fat. His reign can be seen as a litmus test for the
'rise of the aristocracy' theory; not only is he the ruler who is held to have
succumbed to the process, but the nobles he had to deal with were the future reguli
themselves. This exercise will also, therefore, allow us to reflect on the oft-
repeated opinion that the reunification of the empire was an anachronism and
doomed to failure. Historians who have studied this material previously have
usually claimed it in support of the traditional paradigm. My argument will be
that if their prior assumptions are discarded, a quite different picture can be drawn.
Wickham, 'Transition', esp. pp.27-9; Fried, Weg, p.447. Fleming, Kings, esp.c.7 is an
application of the same idea to eleventh-century English politics. Useful critiques of this approach
are given by Rosenwein, 'Politics', p.249; Wickham and Reuter, 'Introduction'.
9 Nelson, 'Intellectual'; eadem, Charles, pp.248-51; Airlie, 'Aristocracy', p.444.
'°BC s.a.887, pp.115-6.
"Bowlus, 'Early History', p.557. See also c.6.l.
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4.2: Odo of Paris and control of Neustria
4.2.1: The 'rise of Odo'
Among the most celebrated and best documented of the post-888 reguli is
Odo, count of Paris and son of the Capetian progenitor Robert the Strong. The
relative profusion of texts associated with his earlier career shows him to have
been a man of considerable influence in western Francia before the death of
Charles the Fat. Olivier Guillot, in a closely-argued and otherwise illuminating
article, has recently taken this observation a stage further, claiming that Odo was
exercising royal prerogatives in Neustria during 886 and 887.12 This is a
suggestion with remarkable implications and one of the boldest restatements of
Dhondtian views about the late ninth century, and so Guillot's arguments are
worth examining in detail.
Firstly he contests that a late ninth-century Neustrian letter collection,
which is mostly concerned with the ecclesiastical affairs of the church of Orleans,
reveals a support network centred on Odo and extending from western Neustria to
as far away as Sens, and that this is politically significant.' 3 The crucial text for
this view is a letter, probably written in 887, from the widow of the lay abbot of
St-Symphorien, Orleans, to Archbishop Walter of Sens, complaining that 'Odo
comes et consanguineus noster', along with Count Hucbald of Senlis, has usurped
some of her land.' 4 However, it is clear that the properties seized by Odo, and
hence in his sphere of influence, are in the Orléannais rather than in the environs
of Sens.' 5 In fact, their seizure seems to have been directly connected by the
widow with the imperial gift to Odo in 886 of the honores of his father in
Neustria, specifically the county of Orleans: she complains that Odo committed
the offence 'posteaquam illam, quam scitis, nostris in partibus adeptus est
sublimitatem.' 16 The appeal to archbishop Walter as a patron was relevant rather
because his uncle was Bishop Walter of Orleans, in whose diocese the lands lay.
Certainly, Walter of Sens was a political ally of Odo in 888, when he crowned him
king, but this is not a particularly strong piece of evidence on its own for a claim
12 Guillot, 'Etapes', p.203.
13 Ibid, pp.203-4.
Bischoff, Anecdota, pp.13 I-2.
Ibid. p.131 n.1.
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that Odo had authority in the Sens area in 887. There is of course absolutely
nothing unusual in a noble like Odo, a member of the Reichsaristokratie, having
associations with others in regions as relatively close to Paris as Sens or Senlis.
The real value of this letter is the rare glimpse it affords the reader of the situation
under the surface of a change of authority in a region, showing, unsurprisingly,
that there were losers as well as winners. We should not have to think that such
flaunting of newly acquired powers was unusual or a politically significant
challenge to royal authority, simply because it does not quite tally with the
impression of smooth handovers of honores as reported by narrative sources.
Indeed, the fact that the widow associated Odo's actions with his assumption of
the countship in Orleans shows that he was able to carry out these acts exactly
because of the commission he received on royal authority, and not in spite of it.
This is also the impression given by the imperial charters issued for the
count. In 886 Odo handed over lands to the canons of St-Martin Tours, whose lay
abbot he had just become, and this gift was included in two general charters of
confirmation issued by Charles the Fat.' 7 Odo also brought Charles's attention to
and acquired approval for a precarial grant in the Orléannais made by Archbishop
Adalald of Tours and Bishop Raino of Angers to Abbot Hugh of St-Aignan.' 8 In
these charters we see Odo seeking imperial support and approval for activities and
transactions being carried out right at the heart of his personal and geographical
networks in Neustria.
Secondly, Guillot makes a case for the exercise of royal power by
members of the Neustrian aristocracy based on epithets given them in these
letters.' 9 He stresses in particular an introductory note written by Walter of
Orleans for a monk en route to Italy, which asks the reader to offer prayers for a
list of dead seniores, emperors, kings and various churchmen. 2° Guillot claims
that Hugh the Abbot, Odo's predecessor in Neustria, is listed among the kings, but
the wording is ambiguous enough to permit serious doubt on this. The text reads:
'Karoli scilicet imperatoris augusti, Hludovici ac Hiudovici et Karlomanni regum,
16 thid, p.132. AV s.a.886, p.62 for Charles's grant to Odo.
' DD CIII 139, 146.
' 8 DCIII 143.
Guillot, 'Etapes' p.204.
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Hugonis excellentissimi abbatis adiugentes his Ottranni quondam Viennensis
archiepiscopi, Evrardi Sennonensis, Gauzlini Parisiaci necnon Airbaldi...' 2 ' The
phrase 'adiugentes his' could easily refer to all those, including Hugh, listed after
the closing word 'regum'. In addition, according to Guillot, the word
'excellentissimus' used for Hugh here, and 'sublimatus' applied to Odo
elsewhere,22 are indications of their holding 'a quasi-royal preeminence.' 23 Here,
however, these terms are being used in untechnical and subjective contexts,
designed to show a degree of humility appropriate in the composition of a request
for patronage. In any case, it can further be argued that such laudatory epithets
were entirely appropriate for application to lay abbots in the later ninth century,
and were by no means a sign of a usurpation of a royal prerogative.24
Thirdly and most strikingly, Guillot suggests that Odo can be shown to
have been regally distributing honores in the west while Charles the Fat still
theoretically ruled.25 A letter directed to the church of Auxerre by Walter of
Orleans, urges the clergy to ignore the imperial candidate for the episcopal
vacancy, one Teutbertus, and to choose instead a good man who will not act as a
compliant bureaucrat. 26 They appear to have taken heed: Charles's attempted
appointment, which flouted a concession of free election made to Auxerre by
Carloman 11,27 seems, on the evidence of the Gesta Pontificum Autissiodorensium,
to have been obstructed, since that text lists a man called Herifridus as the
successor to the late Bishop Wibaldus. 28 The Gesta relates all this as having taken
place during the reign of an emperor Charles, but also says that it was a king (rex)
who sent Herifridus to be invested after taking consilium. 29 Guillot's case, then, is
that since Charles the Fat, imperator, had tried to impose Teutbertus, Herifridus
must have been selected by Odo, who is to be identified with the rex of the Gesta.
Obviously, such an epithet would be highly significant for our view of the politics




24 Koziol, Begging, pp.27-8, 38-9.
25 Guillot, 'Etapes', pp.204-6.
26 Bischoff, Anecdota, pp.129-30.
27 D C2 71.
2S Gesta Poni flcum Autissiodorensium, p.360.
29 Ibid, pp.360-I.
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of the 880s if it can be assumed to apply to Odo of Paris. Herifridus was a relative
of Walter of Orleans and Walter of Sens (who invested him), and hence plugged
into Odo's network of connections in the Neustrian aristocracy, but Guillot's
argument relies too heavily on a literal reading of the Gesta, which may be
unreliable. In the first place, doubt is cast on the distinction he makes between
Charles imperator and Odo rex by the various chronological and terminological
inaccuracies of the text, which is consistently vague on events outside Auxerre
and its properties. For example, Bishop Heribald (d.857) is wrongly referred to as
archchaplain. 3° In any case, the section of the work concerning events after 872
was not composed until the mid-930s, almost half a century after our case; a
possible retrospective attribution of the royal title to Odo, if that is who is meant,
is from this perspective totally understandable as a result of hindsight.31
Moreover, the Gesta does not explicitly mention any dispute over the
appointment, so Guillot's case rests solely on this use of the word rex and the
Orleans letter. In view of this, the logic of the text does not seem to bear him out,
because it says that on the death of the old bishop, news was immediately sent to
the rex. If, as our letter seems to show, Walter/Odo's attempt to impose an
alternative candidate was in response to Charles's initial proposal of Teutbertus,
then surely this implies that Charles had been the first recipient of the news, the
first recourse for the consilium of the clergy, and hence the rex of the Gesta.
Charles was, of course, a king as well as an emperor.
In short, the Gesta is too rickety a foundation on which to build as precise
an argument as Guillot's for the use of the word rex applying to Odo of Paris in
the 880s. This leaves us with the fact that Charles's attempted appointment of
Teutbertus was opposed, and that Herifridus, a man with connections to the
Neustrian circle of Odo, seems to have succeeded. However, the significance of
this observation depends very much on the assumptions with which the observer
approaches it. Guillot's point of view is, of course, explicitly an account of 'Les
étapes de l'accession d'Eudes au pouvoir royale', and this apparently leads him to
characterise Odo's relationship with Charles as oppositional. Odo, we know, was
° Wattenbach, Levison, Lowe, Geschichtsquellen, Vol. 5, pp.569-70.
For further observations on the work's sources and inaccuracies, see Janin, 'Heiric'.
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shortly to become king, and hence the power which he is seen to exercise is
considered to be at the expense of Charles's. But there is, conversely, nothing
here to suggest that Odo was not exerting authority at the emperor's delegation,
and in this non-sinister sense it could be legitimately termed 'quasi-royal'. If he
did intervene along with bishop Walter to influence the episcopal appointment this
may well have been expected behaviour in terms of his delegated authority.32
Beyond this, all that the evidence explicitly reveals is a senior bishop
objecting to royal interference in an election which one of the king's predecessors
had promised would be free, and urging the clergy to re-stage it. In the big
picture, this is at most a slight blurring round the fringes of royal power.
Narrative sources and royal charters alike present a smooth surface covering
transfers of royal authority, and we do well to remember that there must always
have been winners and losers, like the lay abbot of St-Symphorien's widow or the
bishop-elect Teutbertus. We can sometimes only observe such disputes by
reading between the lines: from recent history, Louis III had capitulated very
publicly over the filling of the episcopal vacancy of Beauvais in 88l. Each royal
charter, apparently self-explanatory and complete, potentially conceals a conflict,
and conflict may conceivably have been the norm. 34 It is only because of a
coincidence of the available sources that this can be seen more clearly than usual
in the Auxerre case, showing how the king was only in touch with one of the
involved factions. In any case, we do not know how this dispute was eventually
resolved; there is no hint in any source of anything comparable to Louis III's
humiliating promise to Hincmar to perform penance for daring to interfere in
ecclesiastical affairs. In fact, given that Bishop Wibaldus had expired on 12 May
887 and Herifridus was invested on 29 August, it is surely eminently possible that
the solution was reached amicably when Odo, clearly still in favour, appeared at
the imperial court in mid-June.35
32 Werner, 'Duchés', p.38.
B Devisse, Hincmar, pp.985-7; Bund, Thronsturz, pp.501-3. Cf. Louis the Younger's failure to
influence an appointment to the see of Cambrai: see above, c.3, n.43.
See Merta, 'Recht', who stresses that royal charters were often produced precisely in order ro
paper over such disputes.
" DD CIII 160, 161. D 145 shows Charles the Fat was recognised in Auxerre in late 886.
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4.2.2: The evidence of Abbo of St-Germain-des-Prés
There is a broader problem lying behind the interpretation of this case, that
of prioritising types of historical proof. Both sides are arguably based on
ambiguous evidence. Is it possible for Guillot to demonstrate Odo's regnal
authority in the 880s by citing this episcopal dispute, and equally is it valid to
consider him disproven by reference to precedents and parallels? In the wider
perspective, is the 'failure' of Charles the Fat and the 'success' of Odo of Paris
demonstrated by the cataloguing of incidents such as the Viking truces of Asselt
and Paris, or the deposition of 887? To transpose what Walter Goffart
persuasively argued with reference to historians of the fall of another empire:
'Events, when treated seriatim, with due attention to the very limited
consequences of each one, neither explain the growth nor the decline of empires...
In investigating questions such as the rise and fall of empires, the subject of
inquiry should be what contemporaries thought, not only what they did.' 36 In view
of the ambiguity of some of the evidence used by Guillot, this observation seems
especially relevant to the issue of the relationship between Odo and Charles.
To address the question of contemporary perceptions, we are fortunate to
have the poem Bella Parisiacae Urbis written by Abbo, a prolix monk of St-
Germain-des-Prés and eye-witness of the sieges of 885-6. This is a somewhat
unusual text written apparently in two phases (the first, longer, draft c.890, with
additions made in the mid-890s), at its author's claim both as a scholarly exercise
and as a warning to others who would in future face Viking attack. 38 Some
historians have been keen to see in Abbo's verse an exposition of the great
courage and bravery of Odo, and hence explanation for his rise and for west
Frankish disillusionment with Charles the Fat.39
Certainly, given that Abbo wrote shortly after Odo's ascent to kingship
this would not be surprising, and the new king clearly occupies centre stage. He
is, for instance, distinguished by Abbo not simply due to his actions, but according
to his superior moral rank, when he repeatedly refers to him as the 'future king',
36 Goffart, 'Zosimus', p.107.
37 Abbo, Bella, p.14 for his own place in events.
38 Ibid, p.4. Wattenbach, Levison, Lowe, Geschichtsquellen, vol.5, pp.581 -2 for the dating.
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such as on his first appearance in the poem: 'Hic consul venerabatur, rex atque
futurus. Urbis erat tutor, regni venturus et altor.' 4° The poet spells out in his
introduction that the main players in his tale will be Odo and St. Germanus, 4 ' and
at one point he lists the names of the defenders of the town with the observation
that 'sed nobilior fuit Odo.' 42 When he concludes his work it is 'although' Odo
still lives, implying that the natural endpoint would in fact be the king's death.43
And although other men, notably Bishop Gauzlin, Abbot Ebolus and Bishop
Askericus come to the forefront to receive Abbo's praise, these men were not just
Odo's brothers-in-arms but his later political allies in the time of the poem's
composition, the latter two both serving as archchancellor under him. It is a
tempting and plausible thought that Abbo started writing as a commission from
Odo in the early years of his reign, or at least that the king read or heard the poem,
given the close manuscript links between texts associated with his elevation to the
kingship and writings surrounding the cult of St. Germanus. 45 With this in mind it
is revealing that the poem does make an implicit point about the elevation of Odo,
ignoring or smoothing over some of the conspicuous political opposition he faced
in 888 and beyond, and stressing his place as immediate successor to the deceased
Charles the Fat.46
In stressing this 'official' view of Odo and of his succession, Abbo comes
to us something like the new king's Einhard. His view of Odo may not be as
skilful or as charged with polemic as Einhard's of Charlemagne, but he remains a
politically correct apologist for a new dynasty. He writes with enthusiasm for
Odo's qualities in the earliest section, to be dated during the period of the first
realisation of the new king's authority. 47 His disappointment in the final few
pages, which are part of the later second draft, serves only to heighten our sense of
Most recently Dutton, Civilization, pp.483-5, note especially the selective translation. A
conspicuous exception to the prevailing reading is Wallace-Hadrill, 'Franks', p.208.
° Abbo, Bella, p.18; also pp.22-4, 34, 78.
Ibid, pp.4-6.
42 Ibid, p.34.
4° Ibid, p.1 12.
For Gauzlin see Werner, 'Gauzlin'; for Ebolus and Askericus see Bautier's introduction to DD
op, pp.xxi-xxix.
4° Werner, 'Gauzlin', p.459,n.214.
4° Abbo, Bella, pp.98-100; Guillot, 'Etapes', p.218.
4° Wattenbach, Levison, Lowe, Geschichtsquellen, Vol.5, p.581.
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Abbo's earlier belief in Odo's king-worthiness. His representation of Odo's
relationship with the man he replaced as king is therefore of great interest.
Charles the Fat comes into his picture in control as the legitimate emperor.
Where Odo is simply 'rex futurus', Abbo makes Gauzlin say: 'Urbs mandata fuit
Karolo nobis basileo, imperio cuius regitur totus prope kosmus post Dominum,
regem dominatoremque potentum.' 48 The emperor is here described in the highest
terms, given his orthodox Carolingian place behind God in the rulership of the
world and, explicitly, as the man from whom Gauzlin, Odo and their colleagues
claim to derive their own authority. When things got uncomfortable, it was to
Charles, 'basileus Francorum', that Odo went for reinforcements. 49 However,
even more than a clear view of this order of precedence, Abbo's sentiment
matches the exalted terms he uses. In the first passage cited above, Gauzlin goes
on to stress that the power of the basileus is effective power. He is not just king,
but also 'dominator'. 50 There is no hint of reproach for Charles's late arrival on
the scene; he came when he was asked and the arrival of his troops was greeted
with profound happiness in Paris. 5 ' His army reflects the extent of his authority-
he arrives 'circumdatus armis omnigenis... comitatus opimo, diverso populo labii'-
and it immediately inflicts a heavy defeat on the enemy. 52 Finally, Abbo did not
see the deal struck by Charles allowing the Vikings to stay in Burgundy until
spring as a compromise. Without any disapproval for the king, the poet instead
turns on the Burgundians, who he considers thus well repaid for their failure to
provide military aid for Paris. 53 This distaste for the people of both Burgundy and
Aquitaine is a feature of Abbo's work, and presumably springs partly from the
resistance of factions in those regions to Odo's rule at the start of his reign. 54 He




' Ibid, p.80; Odo is not mentioned again until Charles's death at p.99.
52 Ibid, p.90.
n thid, pp.90-2. Similarly, at pp.1 00-2 he does not criticise Odo for buying off the Vikings in 889.
Wattenbach, Levison, Lowe, Geschichtsquellen, Vol.5, p.582.
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Henry. 55 In practical terms, it also appears from the witness of this text that the
Vikings in fact observed the deal struck to keep them out of Paris.56
Another striking contrast in the later stages of the Bella is between the
author's approving references to Charles the basileus and his admonitory address
to Francia, for its pride and in misusing the purple 'to keep warm'. 57 By the time
of writing this section, it is the present which lacks glory and honour for Abbo, the
fading abilities of king Odo, not the good old days of the 880s. Such is the
strength of this sentiment in the text that Edouard Favre was moved to suggest
implausibly that these sections must have been composed before Charles's death,
that is to say he thought only this could explain why Abbo would have been so
favourable to the emperor, with the passages referring to Odo as future king
interpolated later. 58 If we free ourselves from Favre's assumptions, it is clear that
he was more hindered in his analysis by teleology thaAAbbo was. 59 It is not so
surprising that Abbo expressed grief at the death of Charles the Fat. 6° On this
point, then, the depiction of the dynastic predecessor of his king, Abbo clearly
parts company with Einhard. Abbo's Charles III is anything but Einhard's
Childeric III, rex inutilis; if anything, Abbo's Odo is Louis the Pious to Charles
the Fat, his Charlemagne. It might not be pushing the metaphor too far to say that
Odo's Einhard, his real apologist, is less Abbo than modern historians like
Dhondt, Favre or Dutton.
4.2.3: The charter evidence
Brunner has used diplomatic evidence to make substantially the same case
as Guillot, claiming that the evidence of two comital charters reveals that Odo in
" On him, Abbo, Bella, p.66.
The broken treaty mentioned in the poem seems to me to refer not to Charles's deal but to a
second agreement made by the inhabitants of Paris to prevent them ravaging the Meaux area,
where Odo and Askencus both had interests (ibid, pp.96-8). The troubles incurred in Paris when
the invaders passed through must have been on the way south, as part of Charles's treaty, rather
than en route north in violation of it, since Askencus, who is mentioned by Abbo, would have
been at the unperial court in May 887: ibid, pp.94-6; AV s.a.887, pp.63-4. Bearing in mind the
chronological confusion of the latter part of Abbo's work, I would suggest that it is the report of
the largely peaceful encampment which refers to the Viking return down the Seine; Abbo, Bella,
pp.92-4. Cf. Asser, De Rebus, c.84, p.71.
" Ibid, p.112.
58 Favre, Eudes, p.vi.
Ibid, p.40; cf. Schneidmüller, Tradition, p.107; Dutton, Civilization, p.483.
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the 880s had a perception of his own position which went well beyond his comital
or abbatial roles.6 ' In particular he refers to charters in which Odo employed the
episcopal epithet 'humillimus', arguing that this reflects the count's aspiration to a
legitimate royal 'Herrschaftsanspruch' 62 However, Bautier has shown that one of
these charters is a forgery, while the other is an 1 lth-l2th century copy full of
verbal anachronisms. 63 Brunner further claims that the reason for Odo's not
appearing as marchio in any charter of Charles the Fat is that he rejected royal
authority. This idea is patently unconvincing, as it begs the question of why then
Charles would continue to issue charters in favour of Odo as count and abbot.
It is rendered even more unconvincing by an examination of two further
charters from 887, one issued each by the scribes of Odo and Charles. The
Charles the Fat document, a June 887 confirmation of St-Martin's Italian holdings,
confirms a return to the community of properties, which had presumably become
absorbed into the abbatial holdings over the decades, in Odo's charter of two
months previously, which he had issued as count and abbot. Interestingly, only
parts of the Odo text are reused in the royal diploma. There are no direct verbal
borrowings, since the chancery's main model was a charter of Louis the
Stammerer, and even the list of properties does not tally exactly, the imperial
charter repeating a tradition of interpolations found in series of royal
confirmations from Charlemagne to Otto 111.65 Significantly, the shared elements
are in the prayer clauses. Charles confirmed the grant for the sake of the souls of
Odo and his parents, specifically Robert the Strong. This is an almost unique
provision in any known charter of Charles the Fat, in which living magnates are
not usually associated, even as here indirectly, with the spiritual benefits of the
confirmation or grant. The archchancellor Liutward, another court figure whose
power has been seen as eclipsing that of the emperor, is the only parallel. 66 In
allowing this sentiment to be formalised, the chancery thus associated Odo's name
with a position normally reserved for the royal family, and which was intimately
60 Abbo, Bella, p.98.
61 Brunner, 'Fürstentitel', pp.274-6.
62 Thid, p.276.
63 DD OP 57 and 58, with Bautier's commentaly.
These are D OP 55 and D CIII 160, both of which are modem copies of originals.
65 See Bautier's commentary on D OP 55.
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bound up with prayers for the longevity of the dynasty and the stabilitas regni.67
This and the extraordinarily high value of the penalty clause (600 lbs. of gold)
testify to Odo's closeness to Charles at this point.
If Charles was keen to endorse such pious actions performed by Odo, the
fact that Odo came all the way from Tours to Kirchen to obtain this confirmation
is also significant. His self-perception as revealed in the Tours charter backs this
up. He returns the properties not only for the good of his own soul and that of his
father, but also, and firstly, for the eternal life of Charles the Fat, 'a Deo electum
imperatorem, domnum et seniorem nostrum.' Masses are to be said for Charles in
which 'participem volumus adesse', and only then for Odo himself ('deindeque
nos'). It is not surprising to find such politically correct sentiments in public
documents like these. The surprise is that historians have felt the need to try to
find a way round them, to make them say the opposite of what they seem to say.68
The charters, Abbo and the Neustrian letters, the formal and informal texts from
both sides, project the same image of Odo. He was a powerful magnate,
obviously with considerable freedom of movement in his Neustrian command,
peculiarly close to the king, and, by his own and his supporters' testimony,
conspicuously subordinate to him.
4.3: The aristocracy and the empire
As the foregoing discussion should have shown, the power of the 'rise of
the aristocracy' theory still casts a long shadow over some modern historians, who
often seem to bring his assumptions with them to their evaluations of the
contemporary sources. Aristocratic landed power is still seen, in the post-Charles
the Bald period at least, as existing in opposition to the king. Undeniably, men
like Odo were from families of considerable landed wealth and political influence.
How best, then, to characterise the relationship between these 'local' power bases
and the royal court in the 880s?
D CIII 92. Cf. D 145 mentioning Hugh the Abbot, but posthumously. On Liutward, see c.6.6.2.
67 Cf. D CIII 146, in which Odo is associated very closely with the emperor's gift: 'deprecante
Odone comite in nostra elemosina ac sua'. For comments on the analogous position of Boso in
some of Charles the Bald's charters, see Airlie, 'Behaviour', pp.220-2.
68 Favre, Eudes, p.73 thought that Odo's apparent deference to Charles must have been sarcastic.
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Firstly, the case of Odo shows that his rise was certainly not based
exclusively on a concentration of family properties. The last thing Charles did
before leaving Paris in 886 was to distribute honores to those who had impressed
him: 'Episcopo quoque in ipsa civitate delegato, Askricho nomine, et terram patris
sui Rothberti Odoni comiti concessam.' 69 While this sentence implies that Odo
was Robert's direct successor 20 years after his death, it is in fact not so self-
explanatory. Robert's properties were not as cohesive as implied by Regino's
anachronistic description of them as 'ducatus inter Ligerim et Sequanam.' 7° His
career under Charles the Bald was actually a typically unstable one, including an
extended period of rebellion and a significant amount of time during which he
ceded his Neustrian power base to the subkingship of Louis the Stammerer. 7 ' The
career of Hugh the Abbot, Robert's replacement in the Breton march, was
similarly patchy, including a spell out of Charles the Bald's patronage in the
Middle Kingdom as would-be archbishop of Cologne. 72 The point is that, despite
the presence of certain key honores in the possession of Robert, Hugh and Odo at
various points in their lives, the Neustrian offices do not constitute a continuous
core in the build-up of an entrenched territorial power. For example, Odo was
count of Paris, Robert was not. Robert was count of Blois, unlike either Odo or
Hugh.73 Under Charles the Bald it was the will of the king that sent Robert from
Neustria to Burgundy, and likewise transferred his honores to Hugh the Abbot,
member of a family sometimes supposed to have been politically opposed to the
Robertians. 74 If Charles the Bald created territorial commands, he also unmade
them and reallocated them. Likewise, in 886 it was the king, Charles the Fat, who
decided that Hugh's position should revert to Robert's son Odo. This, rather than
continuity in honores or properties, is the overriding link between the political
careers of Robert, Hugh and Odo. Continuity of holding does not in any case say
anything about how a magnate might choose to use such power; Hugh, for
69 AV s.a. 886, p.62.
° Regino, Chronicon, s.a.861, p.79; for the anachronism see Nelson, Charles, pp.166-7; cf.
Werner, 'Robertiens', p.19.
' See Favre, Eudes, pp.1-6; Nelson, Charles, pp.l83-'7, 194-7.
72 On various aspects of his career, see Favre, Eudes, pp.7-il; Werner, 'Gauzlin', passim; Nelson,
Charles, pp.1T7-9, 190-1; Sassier, Recherches, pp.3-9.
Favre, Eudes, pp.12-4.
Eg. Werner, 'Gauzlin', pp.4 17-22; Favre, Eudes, p.12; Brunner, 'Furstentitel', p.274.
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instance, spent many of his later years away from Neustria at the side of Carloman
II in his BurgundianlAquitainian kingdom. Odo's rise in 886, then, was not as
neatly in succession to his father as the Annales Vedastini's terse report implies,
but rather a direct result of his closeness to the emperor Charles. 75 Any account
which neglects this dimension of his career must be inadequate.
Even if men like Odo, imperial aristocrats, expected office, it was
evidently still the king's to distribute. The political significance of this, especially
in the years 885-7, can be discussed by reference to the other, less well
documented, of the big men of Europe in Charles's reign. Rudolf of Burgundy,
another of the reguli of 888, is also one of only three men named as marchio in the
charters of Charles the Fat. 76 As is well known, by the later ninth century, and
from the 880s onwards in particular, this term referred to an official holding
delegated royal authority over a plurality of counts in one area, a count over
counts. 77 That it was no longer a designation appropriate to the holder of a frontier
marcher command is self-evident from the location of Rudolf's sphere of
influence in Transjurane Burgundy. Rudolf had become the main aristocratic
player in this region during the earlier 870s, in succession to his father Conrad: as
we saw in the previous chapter, he had very probably become a close ally of
Charles after the latter began to exert authority in the area, perhaps as early as
871.78 If Charles was not officially recognised as king in Transjurane Burgundy
until 880, we ought not to be surprised when we find Rudolf in attendance at the
Lotharingian accession ceremony of Charles in 885, and again at the Metz war
council on the way to relieve the siege of Paris in 886. We also meet the
marchio's fidelis Vodelgis, and by implication possibly Rudolf himself, in the
imperial entourage in Italy in February 885, facilitating Charles's journey to
assume the west Frankish kingship. 8° Monks from Moutier-Grandval and Count
Liutfrid, representative of a powerful transjurane family associated with the
" DD CIII 143 and 161 show that Odo acknowledged Hugh as a predecessor as well as Robert.
76 D CIII 112.
"Werner, 'Missus', pp.213-8; Brunner, 'Furstentitel', pp.207-il.
See c.3.4. On Rudolf's rise see the introduction to DD RB, pp.5-8.
DD CIII 116, 137; AFC s.a.886, p.105 for the assembly. See c.5.2 for identification of Rudolf
and discussion of the Lotharingian ceremony.
80 D CIII 112; see c.5.2.
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monastery, were also present at the outset of this Italian expedition. 8 ' The
presence of Liutfrid as petitioner on behalf of the abbey suggests that, contrary to
what Poupardin thought, his family retained its connections to Moutier-Grandval
under Rudolf and that he was one of the counts subordinate to the marchio. 82 The
outlines of Charles's authority in the region can therefore be discerned: he
championed the position of the relative newcomer Rudolf over that of more
established local families such as that of Liutfrid, who nevertheless continued to
obey the imperial summons. Rudolf may have been calling the shots in local
affairs, but he did so with royal support and approval: moreover, the position of
Liutfrid shows that the marchio's men were also the king's men.
Rudolf himself depicted his own position in exactly the same terms used
for him by the king in the royal charters. When he underwrote the gift of lands
north of Lake Geneva to the church of Lausanne by his man Reginold later in 885,
he did so as Charles's comes and marchio. 83 This royal connection can only have
strengthened his local authority. And as a supporter of Charles, it was presumably
Rudolf who prevented the bishops of Geneva and Sion from participating in the
election of Boso at Mantaille, and cooperated in dealing with the collaborator who
had sat in the see of Lausanne. 84 Therefore, whereas the rise of the family of
Conrad and Rudolf in Transjurane Burgundy was a result of their grasping of the
opportunities available in the confused politics of the Middle Kingdom in the
860s, and despite the probable role of Louis II as the most important royal
authority in this,85 the clear implication is that in the 880s Charles the Fat used the
existing configuration of their power to establish his own effective delegated
authority by making Rudolf a marchio supervising other royal officials in the area.
He was able to do this because of his personal relationship with Rudolf, not with
the wide-reaching landed might of his clan. The respective positions of king and
marchio relied on each other, and both put down deeper roots because of this, not
' D ClU 108. Most of the goods confirmed are in the heart of the Swiss Jura. This family is
known to historians as the Etichonids.
82 Poupardm, Bourgogne, p.79; cf. BUttner, 'Studien', pp.319-2!.
D RB 19 ('Signum Rodulfi gloriosi comitis... imperante donno nostro Karolo tercio'), and 2
('Rodulfus comes nec non etiam inclitus marchius').
Poupardin, Provence, pp.109-10.
85 Eg. ibid, pp.57-8.
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in spite of it. Rudolf, like Odo, almost certainly waited until his lord was dead
before proclaiming his own kingship in 888.86
The second of Charles's marchiones, Bernard Plantevelue, did not become
one of the reguli, but did found a famous Aquitainian ducal line; Dhondt and
Auzias considered him a smart operator, exercising all the practical authority of a
king without assuming a hollow title which would bring Carolingian anger down
on him. 87 Brunner likewise discussed his career in terms of the 'rise' of his house,
but again this approach seems to me to be too much governed by hindsight to
provide a useful way of observing the politics of the 880s. 88 Like Rudolf, his
involvement in the high politics of the 860s and 870s was the key to his building
up of a large block of lands and honores, in eastern Aquitaine and the Auvergne.89
Despite the lack of narrative source evidence for Bernard in the 880s, there is
enough to suggest that, like Rudolf and Odo, he was a representative of Charles, in
command of royal officials in a territory based around his own power base in
southern France. He was also a conspicuous participator on the Carolingian side
in the Vienne campaigns, and his proprietary monastery of St-Julien, Brioude,
dated charters according to Charles the Fat's regnal years even after his own and
the king's death. 9° It was in this region that he intervened as marchio on behalf of
the church of Lyon in June 885 along with the archchancellor Liutward, an
association which must place him at the heart of the newly-expanded imperial
court. 9 ' Presumably it was his support for the Carolingians in 879-80 which had
allowed him to extend his authority into some of the areas which had previously
been Boso's domain.
Finally, the case of the third marchio, Berengar of Friuli, can help us cast a
clearer light on the way these big men operated in their localities in relation to the
Poupardin, Bourgogne, p.10 n.1; DD RB, Introduction, p.6 n.4.
87 Dhondt, Etudes, pp.241-2; Auzias, L 'Aquitaine, p.4T23; D CIII 123 for Bernard as 'illustrissimus
rnarchio', one of only two uses of this superlative by Charles's chancery. He only ever issued
charters as comes; Brunner, 'Fürstentitel', p.226.
88 Brunner, 'FUrstentitel', pp.225-7.
89 Auzias, L 'Aquitaine, pp.389-99; see also Lauranson-Rosaz, 'Roi', pp.418-21.
9° Auzias, L 'Aquitaine, pp.418, 541-8; AB s.a. 880, p.243; Nelson, Annals, p.221 n.9. See also
c.3.3, n.51.
' D CIII 123.
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king.92 In northern Italian political terminology, the term marchio had an even
longer history as an appellation for a leading royal representative than it did north
of the Alps.93 There is ample evidence to make concrete this connection between
Berengar and the king. He is to be found at the side of Charles in Italy as early as
875, when Louis the German sent his son across the Alps to secure the succession
to Louis II against Charles the Bald,94 and was the instrument of his attempts to
establish his rule in Spoleto.95 He is listed immediately after the king in a
catalogue of witnesses and adjudicators to a royal judgement in 881, he was in a
position to obtain royal favours for his followers, and he was closely associated
with Liutward early in 882.96 The strong links forged between Berengar and the
kingdoms of the north, which were to stand him in good stead later on in his
struggle with Guy of Spoleto, can only have been made stronger by his
connections with Charles the Fat, and vice versa. 97 The evidence of this, and a
demonstration of how king, marchiones, and comites related to each other before
and after 888 is provided by a glance at the careers of certain Lombard aristocrats
in the 880s, the period during which they fell under Berengar's influence, first as
marchio and then as king. The count Berardus, for example, who came from Italy
to help Charles the Fat and his Carolingian allies clean up the aftermath of the
rebellion of Boso in 882 seems to have been also a man of Berengar, later
supplying him with 300 men in the struggle with Wido. 98 Berengar's brother-in-
law and ally count Adalgisus II of Piacenza was a comital appointee of Charles the
Fat. Charles's missus count Adairoch was listed among the fideles of Berengar's
father and predecessor Eberhard of Friuli.'°° Count Erardus was in Charles's
entourage in 881, and in Berengar's in 888.'°' The celebrated Suppo II,
Adalgisus's father, also had well-documented links to both king and marchio
92 DD CIII 31 and 48 call him 'marchio'. D 37 calls him 'Berengarius dux et affmitate nobis
coniunctum.' All three charters date from 881-2.
Brunner, 'FUrstentitel', p.324.
Andreas, Historia, pp.229-30.
° BC s.a.883, p.110; cf. below, c.6.6.2. BC s.a.887 p.115 implies he was out of favour for a short
time at the start of that year.
DD CIII 31, 37, 48.
Hlawitschka, Oberitalien, esp. pp.77-8.
AV s.a. 882, p.52; Gesta Berengarii Imperatoris, p.376; Hlawitschka, Oberitalien, pp.147-8.
Hlawitschka, Oberitalien, p.112 and n.4.
'°° D CIII 25; Schramm and Mutherich, Denkmale, pp.93-4; Hlawitschka, Oberitalien, p.1 13.
'°' D CIII 35; Gesta Berengarii Imperatoris, p.3'79; Hlawitschka, Oberitalien, pp.1 75-6.
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before he died in 883.102 Finally, Count Waltfred of Verona was a major supporter
of Berengar before 896, his 'summus consiliarius' and successor in Friuli.'° 3 In
the 880s, this connection was already clear, as was his place in the high favour of
emperor Charles, who called him and Berengar his 'dilecti fideles et consiliarii."°4
These pieces of evidence give some more substance to the notion of the
marchio as a royal representative governing a multiplicity of lesser counts. In
Berengar's case we can name several of these counts, observe their allegiance and
value to both marchio and king, and take note of the fact that some of them are
reported to have led large numbers of men, in the case of Adalgisus 1500, into
battle on their lord's behalf. The fact that these men remained consistently loyal
to Berengar after 888 is surely testament partly to the strength of the bonds he
established with them as a result of being named marchio by Charles in the 880s.
Certainly we should envisage command of similarly clustered and numerous
counts being delegated to the other marchiones Bernard and Rudolf, although the
evidence is sparser. As well as Liutfrid, Turimbert and Manasses were counts in
the following of Rudolf of Burgundy,'° 5 and there seems to have been something
like a vicecomital dynasty in the service of Bernard Plantevelue's family.'°6 In the
case of Odo it can be speculated with some confidence that he was never given
this epithet not because, as Brunner suggested, he rejected royal authority,' 07 but
on the contrary because he held multiple counties personally rather than being
placed at the head of a series of others'.'° 8 It could also be argued in support of
this argument that by this point the military core of the Neustrian march was not in
fact any particular county but the holdings of the monastery of St-Martin Tours, of
which Odo was of course lay abbot.'°9 In military terms he was probably
appointed by Charles in response to the leadership vacuum created by the fall of
Hugh the Abbot and then the Saxon dux Henry, who both died in 886. Henry,
formerly the leading general of Louis the Younger, seems to have held some sort
102 Eg. D CIII 25; Hlawitschka, Oberitalien, pp.269-72.
103 DD BF 4, 6, 8; Hlawitschka, Oberitalien, pp. 279-8 1.
104 D CIII 32; see also D 31.
DD RB 2, 7.
106 Poly, Provence, p.19 and n.70.
'° Brunner, 'Fürstentitel', p.276.
108 See Favre, Eudes, pp.1 2-6. He was certainly count of Paris, Angers, Tours and Orleans.
109 Werner, 'Robertiens', pp.22-3.
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of general responsibility for defence against the Vikings in Charles's empire,
including Neustria."° It was only on his fall that the emperor came to relieve and
reorganise Paris in person, and his death was recorded with the observation that he
was 'marchensi Francorum, qui in id tempus Niustriam tenuit." 1 There are no
east Frankish royal charters at all mentioning Henry with which to check his status
in the eyes of the court, but his designation here as marchio seems to imply again
a command over counts, although this time on a mobile and military basis rather
than in the sense of a more territorial command. It was partly to fill Henry's boots
that Odo received his grant in 886.
Here, then, is one answer to the question of how Charles the Fat tried to
govern this sprawling accumulation of regna, especially after 885. We should see
these four imperial aristocrats, Odo, Rudolf, Bernard and Berengar, as his
appointed representatives in various coherent regions of the empire, in a role
perhaps analogous to non-royal subkings. Yes, the chosen men were already
members of families with land and power in these areas, and the centres of their
authority were traditional, the heartlands of areas defined by geography and the
outcome of more or less recent political history; Friuli, St-Martin Tours, St-
Maurice d'Agaune, Lyon and the Auvergne. But what mattered was their personal
relationship with the emperor: if the aristocracy as a whole was not a monolith,
then equally nor were individual families like the Welfs or Unruochings. The
marchiones did not somehow 'represent' these families as elements of a 'rising
aristocracy'. Indeed, their power under Charles was legitimate and perceived by
all parties as delegated. This is what they received from the king; there are less
tangible but equally important ways than in terms of material wealth for aristocrats
to relate to kings. A Dhondtian description of the growth of their families' lands
throughout the eighth and ninth centuries is insufficient to explain the nature of
their position in the 880s. Staring straight at the localities, at Odo's Neustrian
connections for example, must give only a blurred image, which can only be seen
clearly by observing it through the filter of the court. 'Power' should not be
° Ibid, p.21; Bnmner, 'Fürstentitel', pp.Z75, 305-6, 309.
" BC s.a. 886, p.114; military role also implied by AV s.a.886, p.59, 'dux Austrasiorum'; and
Regino, Chronicon, s.a.887, p.126 who records his literary epitaph, 'Saxonibus, Francis,
Fresonibus ille triarchos prefuit.'
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though of as a single and finite commodity competed for by mutually antagonistic
groups. Royal and 'local' power formed parts of a coherent whole, and their
mutual reliance is not diminished by the kind of latitude we have observed in its
exercise in the case of Odo, who was not afraid to step on the toes of lesser
aristocratic figures in his area. The emperor did not, could not, regularly intervene
directly below the level of the high aristocracy. His claim to authority over the
marchiones was nevertheless important, as it not only mediated his authority to
the localities, but also created a bond of mutual reliance between him and them:
and they did, as we have seen, travel long distances to appear at court and
contribute to imperial ceremonies and campaigns throughout the reign. They were
part of a political structure which, in the face of the problems of governing a huge
territory beset by Viking, Slav and Saracen raids, was expedient and tailored to the
circumstances of the 880s. This was an attempted solution to the problem of
ruling the supposedly anachronistic empire of Charlemagne from bases in
Alemannia and Italy.
It would be misleading to suggest that Charles attempted to neatly blanket
his empire with a patchwork of territorial lordships, but it would seem likely that
there were probably other magnates for whom a similar role was envisaged. One
was Arnulf, who was placed in control of the Carinthian/Pannonian march." 2 We
can only assume that William the Pious filled the shoes of his father Bernard
Plantevelue. The house monastery of St-Julien, Brioude, continued to date
charters according to the rule of the emperor after the latter's death, and although a
royal charter calling him marchio is a forgery, the appellation may recall a
position he actually filled." 3 Julia Smith has argued that Charles the Fat also
made a very typical Carolingian contract of subordination with Alan I of Brittany
at the farthest extreme of his empire." 4 Alan's self-styling 'rex' implies that his
position was that of a royal client, and the king in question is hinted at by a
diploma of 897X900 which was issued by Alan in part for the salvation of a
112 See c.6.3.
" Auzias, LAquitaine, pp.418, 541-8; D CIII 186. Bishop Geilo of Langres may also have been
active in this area after 886: see c.5.3.3.
Smith, Province, pp.192-3.
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Karolus." 5 Smith's argument that this is more likely to refer back to Charles the
Fat than Charles the Simple is convincing, since the latter had little or no influence
in Neustrian politics, and the former is reported to have had sympathetic dealings
with important figures in eastern Brittany." 6 This can be viewed, as Smith points
out, not simply as reflecting Charles's wish to be seen as acting in the political
traditions of west Frankish kingship, but as a display of hegemony appropriate to
an emperor. A final example of a subordinate ruler acting as a local representative
within the empire is provided by the Viking dux Godafrid. He was set up in Frisia
with a Carolingian bride as a buffer against further invasions in 882, and remained
loyal for three years until he lost his life thanks to the failure of the 885 rebellion
in which he participated with Hugh of Lotharingia."7
Charles the Fat therefore elected to tackle the problems of ruling an
extended realm by establishing personal relationships with selected 'big men' who
were then expected to take over certain provinces on the emperor's behalf and
administer them more or less without direct royal intervention. This method of
transmitting Carolingian authority was by no means new or anomalous. Charles
the Bald, as is well known, governed the west Frankish kingdom by establishing a
similar type of territorial magnate commands to those we have been discussing."8
Charles the Simple, in turn, did the same." 9 Charles the Fat's own youth, during
which he and his brothers were set up as the principal intermediate figures
representing the king in defined regna, may also have provided inspiration. It is
perhaps valid to think of Charles's measures as formalising the marchiones'
position: it may be no coincidence that the first use of the term in an east Frankish
narrative source dates from his reign.' 2° This setup ought not, however, to be
interpreted in terms of royal concessions to 'the aristocracy', but should rather be
seen as practical solutions to the problems imposed by the limited logistics of
governing Europe in the ninth century. In some ways, the Frankish empire lent
115DAng12.
116 La Chronique de Nantes, c.21, pp.66-7. He provided refuge for the bishop of Nantes.
' AFC s.a.882, 883, pp.98-100, p.98 stating that Charles 'Gotafridum...consortem regni
constituit'; Regino, Chronicon, s.a.882 pp.119-20.
" Airlie, 'Aristocracy', pp.448-9.
" Ehiers, 'Anfange', pp.22-3; Werner, 'Westfranken-Frankreich', pp.738-40.
120 AFC s.a.886, p.114 (referring to Henry); see Werner, 'Missus', p.216, n.96.
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itself to this sort of structuring, as a more or less loose agglomeration of regna.'2'
To give but one clear example, the Breton march, although its focus did change
over time, formed a quite coherent body of honores which could easily be
assigned to a single overseer, a position filled at various times in the second half
of the ninth century by Robert the Strong, Louis the Stammerer, Hugh the Abbot
and Odo of Paris. Indeed, the evidence for the governmental practices of earlier
kings such as Charlemagne and Louis the Pious points in a similar direction: these
rulers usually preferred to deal directly with only one or two important counts in a
locality, or with a missus dominicus, who would then pass on orders and
information to their fellows and subordinates.' 22 The position of the marchio
Gerold in the 790s is instructive: he was simultaneously Charlemagne's appointed
representative in Bavaria and a leading member of the Agilolfing dynasty which
had controlled that regnum during the eighth century.' 23 There was no
contradiction here: the interplay of local influence and central appointment was
crucial to the effectiveness of men like Gerold, and central to the structures of
early medieval politics in general.'24
In other words, Carolingian kings and emperors had always been
accustomed to dealing with powerful aristocratic individuals, and not with the
'aristocracy' as a monolithic entity. While these people's status may have derived
from the powerful position of their families, these families did not form corporate
groups which had to be negotiated with en masse. As Werner demonstrated for
ninth-century Neustria, the substrata of local aristocracies could remain
substantially stable over relatively long periods of time.' 25 The key role of kings
in this regard was thus to appoint men they thought they could trust to govern
these regions in the name of Carolingian authority. In this sense, the dynasty's
authority had always had a 'supervisory', rather than bureaucratic, character.'26
The real strength of Carolingian power was the dynasty's construction and
121 The work of Werner is important here: see most recently 'Völker'.
122 Innes, 'Processes', pp.260, 296.
123 Werner, 'Families', p.166.
124 A similar process is evident in tenth-century England under Atheistan, who reduced the number
of ealdormen and enlarged their territorial responsibilities as a response to the challenges of ruling
a newly-expanded realm: see, for instance, Campbell, Anglo-Saxons, p.! 72.
Werner, 'Untersuchungen IV'; Airlie, 'Aristocracy', p.435.
126 Rosenwein, 'Politics', p.249.
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maintenance of the 'political myth' that they alone could be kings:' 27 this idea
could only be strengthened by the exercise of power in the localities by men who
claimed to be wielding it in the name of the king. As we have seen, if men like
Odo did make self-interested decisions on affairs in the localities which did not
refer to direct royal orders, we should not assume that kings like Charles were
worried. As long as Odo and his ilk brought forces to help on campaigns and kept
appearing at court, which they clearly did, then the Carolingian system was still
working.
In these ways the political structures of the reign of Charles the Fat sit
quite firmly within the traditions of Carolingian kingship. This observation also
stands true for some of the more familiar agencies of ninth-century government.
The standard accounts of Carolingian administration are focused very strongly on
the earlier period, and peter out in the 860s, if not earlier, as the supply of
capitularies dries up.' 28 This imbalance can give the misleading impression that
the empire was all but ungoverned in the later part of the century. Nevertheless,
there are other signs that traditional forms of Carolingian government did not
completely die out after the reign of Charles the Bald. While no east Frankish
capitularies survive from the ninth century, we know from references in the annals
that both Louis the German and Charles the Fat did issue them.' 29 In addition, the
earlier capitularies which had provided for the establishment and maintenance of
the Carolingian programme were still being copied and read in the late ninth
century: their pronouncements were not intended to be relevant only to the
specific circumstances of their original Royal missi were
certainly active throughout the empire in the 880s, sometimes on missions we are
able to define quite accurately.' 3 ' The fact that this is rarely acknowledged by
127 Airlie, 'Semper'.
128 Eg. Werner, 'Missus'. Most studies are concerned almost exclusively with Charlemagne and
Louis the Pious: Halphen, Charlemagne, book I c.6; McKitterick, Kingdoms, c.4; Riché,
Carolingians, part II c.5
' 29 AF s.a.852, pp.42-3 (on which see Reuter, Germany, pp.84-6); AFC s.a.882, p.99.
'° Mordek, Bibliotheca, p.714 is one of many examples of early-ninth century capitularies
preserved in late-ninth century manuscripts. Copies of some of Charlemagne's and of Louis the
Pious's capitularies were present in the St-Gall library in the 880s: Lehmann, Bibliothekskataloge,
p.79.
131 DD CIII 1, 17, 23a, 25, 75, 158, Anhang 1. D 75 is a good example of a specific mission
carried out by presumably local men, D 23a of a more representative mission given to higher
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historians of Carolingian government is in part due to their emphasis on the
paucity of surviving late-ninth century prescriptive sources; in fact, the charter
evidence shows that the supposed absence of traditional forms of rule in this
period is at least in part more apparent than real, a trick of the evidential light.
If Charles the Fat ought therefore to be seen tackling the challenge of
governing the empire in largely the same way as his predecessors, this is not to say
that the outcome was an unqualified success. His main problem stemmed from
the succession situation. With the proliferation of kings after about 875, when a
new and populous generation of Carolingians began to take on the task of ruling
the empire, the regna became much more intensively governed than previously.
With smaller areas of responsibility, kings were able to intervene more directly in
the local patronage networks which ran through the aristocracy. For the
aristocrats, this was an opportunity to enhance their standing by making best use
of this new Konigsnahe. However, as the Carolingians of this generation one by
one met their early deaths and the kingdoms of the empire fell into the hands of
Charles the Fat, this situation was reversed, and once more access to the royal ear
became limited, available only to those with the favour of an often distant
emperor.' 32 The dilution of Konigsnahe was exacerbated by Charles's lack of a
legitimate heir whom he could set up as a subking. The position of the
marchiones therefore became especially significant in representing imperial
authority. This state of affairs did not undermine Charles's position per se, but it
did mean that the resolution of the succession issue came to be of paramount
importance. As long as the identity of the empire's next ruler remained uncertain,
anxiety would develop in the minds of the members of the aristocratic community,
who needed reassurances as to where the source of Konigsnahe would lie in
future. Ultimately, it was this conjunction of circumstances which gave Arnulf his
constituency for support in the coup of 887.
These matters will be discussed at greater length in chapter 6. However, it
is important to stress in conclusion to this chapter that the reign of Charles the Fat
clearly did not witness a definitive shift in the balance of power away from the
magnates. These are just the references in the royal charters: other missi are attested in the local
charters and in the formulary evidence. See also below, c.6.6.4.
132 limes, State, pp.223-4.
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king and in favour of the aristocracy. Even rebellious aristocrats were not
attempting to opt out of the Carolingian system, but rather to acquire more
Konigsnahe. All the evidence points to the fact that the relationship between the
two remained cast in a mould which had been more or less the same throughout
the ninth centuly. In reality, the so-called 'territorial aristocracy' did not 'rise': it
had always been a powerful force in Frankish politics which rulers had always
taken account of. Charles the Fat's authority may not have been absolute or
omnipresent, but then neither had Charles the Great's.
After we have registered their existence, how can we assess the success of
Charles the Fat's delegated commands? We cannot really say if they would have
become heritable, Dhondt's yardstick, as the emperor died before that could be
tested. However, neither Odo nor Bernard Plantevelue had genuinely inherited
their respective bases from their fathers. Charles the Fat had organised something
on the basis of expediency. It was only his premature downfall at a time when
there was no adult male Carolingian to assume his position that crystallised this
contingent organisation, not the inevitable build up of aristocratic house properties
over a hundred or more years. The key factor was not a long process, but a single
event. In fact, a measure of the king's success lies exactly in the fact that these
property accumulations formed the cores of the post-888 regna within the
territorial extent of the empire, Dhondt's criterion of failure. Rudolf of Burgundy,
for example, was not, as Regino thought, drawn from the bowels of his
kingdom.' 33 He was a relative newcomer who only became established in the
transjurane area in the 870s, the very period in which Charles the Fat himself was
beginning to exert influence in the region. Capetian royal power, when it
eventually emerged, would be based on the foundations of Paris and Neustria
which had been united in their hands by Charles's 886 grant to Odo. The careers
of Odo, Rudolf and all the other reguli were either created, endorsed or
strengthened by Charles, and their post-888 position can only be explained fully in
light of their pre-888 relationship to the emperor. The underlying structures of his
empire endured, and under the same men.' 34 In this sense, even more than that of
133 Regmo, Chronicon, s.a. 888, p.129.
134 See also Werner, 'Genèse'; Airlie, 'Aristocracy', p.449.
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Louis the Younger, it was the court of Charles the Fat which propelled the
dynastic lines of Rudolf, Berengar, Bernard, Odo and Henry towards their royal
and ducal destinies.'35
135 For Louis, see Fried, Ludwig, pp.12-3.
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5: CHARLES THE FAT AND THE WEST FRANKISH KINGDOM, 885-8
5.1: 'A forgotten king'
The succession of Charles the Fat to the west Frankish kingdom of
Carloman II in 885 was a significant event in contemporary eyes, reuniting as it
did Charlemagne's empire to its full territorial extent and giving substance to the
Carolingian conception of a unity articulated by the relationship between members
of the dynastic family.' The coincidence of this territory and the emperor's name
and status were certainly too much for the likes of Notker the Stammerer to resist,
and the affinity between Charlemagne and his great-grandson is one of the clearest
underlying themes of his Gesta Karoli, written around this time at the monastery
of St-Gall.2 But whatever symbolic weight Charles's succession may have carried
for contemporaries in the year 885, modern historiography has tended to see
Notker's positive connection as a negative one, and has generally condemned the
reunification as anachronistic, the imposition of a false unity on regna which had
been growing apart for decades, and a pointless delay of the emergence of the
nascent kingdoms of France and Germany. 3 'Everything fell into his lap': 4 the
reunified empire was an accident, not an achievement. The implication, of course,
is that it was ungovernable and doomed to failure from the outset.5
Perhaps as a result of this, Charles the Fat has been largely ignored as a
king of France. Significantly, he is not usually numbered in the series of King
Charleses of that country: Charles the Bald and Charles the Simple are,
respectively, Charles II and III. For a further impression of this neglect, one can
look at recent studies of particular regions in west Francia. McKitterick's article
on the Carolingians and the church of Rheims between 882 and 987 mentions
neither the Visio Karoli, probably produced under the supervision of archbishop
Fulk in 890, nor the diplomatic evidence for Charles's patronage of the see.6
Similarly, Sassier declines to take his examination of ninth-century royal relations
'See in general Wallace-Hadrill, 'Prince', pp.178-9; Penndorf, Problem.
2 See below, c.7.
The 'rise of France and Germany' argument is much more common in the French and
Anglophone literature than in the German.
Reuter, Germany, p.117.
Eg. Bruhl, Fodrum, pp.35-6 ('a mere intermezzo'); McKitterick, Kingdoms, p.262 ('a temporary
cobbling together').
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with the church of Auxerre beyond the death of Charles the Bald, maintaining
without substantiation that from that point on Carolingian influence waned and
local power was allowed to develop unchecked. 7 In fact, Charles the Fat did issue
charters for Auxerre, and Hugh 'the Abbot' of St-Germain was prominent in his
military following in the 880s.8
For modern historians, therefore, Charles the Fat is very much 'un roi de
France oublié.' 9 However, as we saw in the previous chapter, his authority was
recognised in the western kingdom. Moreover, his reunification of the empire was
actually greeted with some optimism by contemporaries. Regino, for instance,
thought Charles to have been a 'christianissimus princeps', whose place in heaven
was signalled partly by the very fact 'ut omnia regna Francorum, quae
predecessores sui non sine sanguinis effusione cum magno labore adquisierant,
ipse perfacile in brevi temporum spatio sine conflictu, nullo contradicente,
possidenda perceperit."° The empire had not, in Regino's view, fallen into
Charles's lap: rather, his acquisition of the west and the other regna had been a
clever move, achieved peacefully and without the spilling of blood. Significantly,
the annalist of St-Vaast, the only major contemporary western chronicler still
writing at the time of his death, believed, like Regino, that the emperor had taken
up a place in heaven."
This chapter will seek to assess in what ways Charles sought to articulate
his authority in the western kingdom, and to what extent these were a success.
West Francia provides a useful case study with which to cast further light on some
of the same issues as were discussed in the previous chapter, partly because of the
quantity and quality of the evidence which survives from Charles's two and a half
year reign there, and partly because it is often assumed to be the regnum where the
emperor's authority was least heeded. This study will discuss the circumstances
of his succession and reign in the west, and ask whether his attempts to rule it
were as anachronistic and doomed to failure as has been asserted, or whether the
6 McKitterick, 'Carolingian Kings', esp. p.229 with n.8. D CIII 106 was issued for the church of
Rheims. On the Visio see below, cc.6.5 and 8.
' Sassier, 'Carolingiens', esp. p.34.
D CIII 145. See c.5.3.1 on Hugh the Abbot.
Werner, 'Robertiens', p.20. Werner is an exception; as is Theis, Heritage, pp.117-20.
'° Regino, Chronicon, s.a.888, pp.128-9.
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approval voiced by Regino and the annalist of St-Vaast was more than a mere
rhetorical flourish.
5.2: The succession of 885
On 6 December 884 the king of west Francia Carloman II was killed whilst
hunting in the forêt de Lyons.' 2 His accidental death (opinion was divided as to
whether the fatal injury had been caused by an irate boar or a misplaced sword)'3
at the tender age of 18 was just the latest in a series of grave misfortunes to strike
at the top of the Carolingian house after 875. The demise in successive years of
the elder statesmen Louis II of Italy, Louis the German and Charles the Bald
opened the door to what must have seemed to be the start of a new generation of
kings at the head of European affairs; this generation, however, was very soon all
but wiped out by a bewildering mixture of illness and misadventure. From Louis
the Stammerer in 879 to Carloman in 884, five Carolingian kings met premature
deaths, and left no legitimate male heirs to succeed them. The mood of optimism
which had inspired the author of the poem Ludwigslied to enthuse about the
bellicose qualities of the vigorous Louis III must have turned to disbelief when the
heroic king met a bizarre death after attempting to chase a girl into a house,
apparently forgetting that he was on horseback at the time.' 4 And to anyone who
had shared the renewed hope of Hincmar of Rheims in the promise of Carloman
II, a hope which inspired the archbishop to revise for him the famous De Ordine
Palatii, the outcome of the royal hunt in winter 884 must have been extremely
dispiriting. Although no source goes so far as to read the dynasty's bad luck as an
expression of divine judgement, the thought must have passed through some
minds as the renewed Viking onslaught battered the shores of northern Europe and
the descent line of Charles the Bald started grinding to an abrupt and unexpected
halt.
Whether or not such gloomy uncertainties were entertained in the minds of
contemporaries, at the end of 884 Charles the Fat was, as the only adult male
"AV s.a.887, p.64.
12 Confusion over date and place resolved by Bautier in the introduction to DD C2, pp.liv-lvi.
' AV s.a.884, p.55; AFC s.a.884, p.101; Regino, Chronicon, s.a.884, pp.121-2.
' AV s.a.882, p.52
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legitimate Carolingian still alive, the obvious candidate to succeed Carloman.
In addition, despite entering middle age (he was 45) and
himself still lacking a legitimate male heir, Charles had by this time proven
himself to be a mobile and experienced king and emperor. He had been involved
in west Frankish politics since the early 870s, and had had a close political
relationship with both Louis III and Carloman II following the Vienne campaign
of 880. As well as this, his selection as king ahead of the Louis the Stammerer's
third son Charles the Simple was a reflection of the state of west Frankish politics
in 884-5. The main factor in the overlooking of Charles the Simple must have
been his youth (he was 5), which rendered him unsuitable to lead armies against
the Northmen: in 888 Fulk of Rheims would explicitly give this as the reason why
the young Charles was passed over for a second time.' 5 Effective royal leadership
of multi-regnal armies was often most significant by its absence; in 872, for
example, the Thuringians and Saxons had quarrelled and fled in disarray before
the Moravians because Louis the German was not there.' 6 Kings who were
ascending the throne for the first time in this period frequently made a virtue out
of the necessity of defence against the Vikings as a factor in their own election.'7
And although minors had succeeded in such circumstances before (Louis III and
Carloman II themselves) and would do so again (Louis of Provence), the situation
was especially serious in 884-5. As the price for their retreat, the Vikings at
Amiens had already extracted a phenomenal 12,000 pounds of gold and silver
from Carloman, and were now claiming that the king's death released them from
their part of the bargain. The new king, whoever he might be, would have to
renew the tribute.' 8 In the winter of 884-5, then, the uneasy aristocratic
communities of the west Frankish kingdom required a leader with the military and
political resources to meet this immediate threat. Charles the Fat, of course, had
faced an almost exactly similar situation some two years previously, when he had
used a mixture of force and diplomacy to see off the Danish armies from their
encampment at Asselt. Moreover, the west Frankish problem was now also
15 Flodoard, Historia, IV.5, p.563.
16 AF s.a.872, p.75-6
' Boso: Convent us Mantalensis; Louis of Provence: Hiudowicus Regis Arelatensis Electio.
' Regino, Chronicon, s.a.884, p.122; AV s.a.884, p.55; AFC s.a.884, pp.101-2.
110
Charles's, because the Danes had retreated to Leuven in Lotharingia, within the
boundaries of his own realm.
Our best source for the west Frankish reaction to Carloman's death is the
contemporary and local annalist of St-Vaast. The 'Franci', says the annalist, after
'capiunt consilium', sent Count Theoderic of Vermandois to Italy to invite Charles
to come to Francia.' 9 Theoderic represented an influential group of magnates from
the Paris area ('Francia' proper) who had been close to Carloman II, and had been
in a position to orchestrate the dead king's funeral at St-Denis.2° As a result, they
had access to the west Frankish regalia, the clothing, crown, sceptre and sword
with which Charles the Bald had passed on the regnum to Louis the Stammerer,
and which in turn became the property of Louis III and, presumably, Carloman
11.21 This gear had evidently become a necessary accoutrement to legitimate
kingship in the western kingdom, and so was probably passed on by Theoderic to
Charles the Fat.
On the strength of the report in the Annales Vedastini, it appears that the
invitation was sent out immediately after Carloman's death, and indeed probably
before the end of 884. Charles seems, moreover, to have received Theoderic, or at
least his message, by February 885 at the latest, for it is on the 15th of that month
that we find him issuing an interesting charter in favour of Vodelgis, fidelis of the
marchio Rudolf.22 This document was probably issued at Pavia, and can hence be
connected with the emperor's preparations to cross the main route over the Mons
lovis pass from Pavia to Transjurane Burgundy, where Vodelgis and Rudolf had
their influence, and then on to the west. The gift concerns the transfer of
considerable properties in the tranjurane area in proprietatem. It is quite likely
that Vodelgis was to be in charge of provisioning the imperial entourage as it
crossed the Alps and the Jura, and that the properties granted, which were
19 AV s.a.884, p.56. For the identification of this Theoderic see Werner, 'Untersuchungen V',
p.102 with n.59; idem, 'Gauzlin', p.446, n.150a.
20 Bautier's introduction to DD C2, pp. lv-lvi, lxiv; and his comments at D 79.
21 AB s.a.877, pp.218-9; 879, pp.234-5.
22 D CIII 112. Vodelgis later passed on the gift to the church of Lausanne: D RB 7.
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clustered round Yverdon by the main route northwest to Langres via Orbe, were
intended to help him do so.23
Charles was therefore preparing to make his way west already in February
885. Nevertheless, he did not actually enter the western kingdom itself until mid-
June, when he received the submissions of the west Frankish aristocracy at
Ponthion.24 Already prior to this, however, he was issuing charters as 'rex in
Gallia'. In other words, the 'constitutive' act of Charles's accession to the west in
the eyes of the court was neither his reception of the aristocrats' invitation in early
885, nor his reception of their formal submission in June, but rather some other
event in between. What may that event have been?
The first charters issued by Charles as 'rex in Gallia' were enacted at
Grand in Lotharingia on 20 May 885, and there are no fewer than three of them.25
This is an unusually high number of charters to be enacted on one day by Charles,
or indeed by any Carolingian, and they reveal the presence of several members of
the high aristocracy, including Askericus, bishop-elect of Paris, the marchio
Rudolf, and Wibod, bishop of Parma. 26 A large and important assembly was
clearly in progress. The circumstances suggest that it may well have been a
consecration ceremony. Consecration, on which Carolingian kingship had always
been predicated, had by this time become an established component of king-
making ceremonies west of the Rhine. Moreover, 20 May 885 was the feast of the
Ascension, an eminently appropriate day and quite in keeping with Carolingian
use of the sacred calendar to make political statements. 27 Grand itself was also a
symbolic venue. It was one of the biggest Roman amphitheatres anywhere in the
former empire, as well as an important late-Roman religious site. 28 Equally
interesting is the fact that two of the three charters were issued on the intervention
23 For Charles's speedy journey west across Lombardy, see DD CIII 110-5; AFC s.a.884, p.101;
BC s.a.884, 885, p.113. Charles may well have sent his invitation to the pope to come and
legitimise Bernard during this stay at Pavia.
24 AV s.a.885, p.56. D CIII 122 was issued at Ponthion on June 16; D 121 at Toul on June 12.
25 DD CIII 116-8. For the place, convincingly refuting Kehr's tentative identification of Granges,
see Bautier, 'Diplômes', p.220 with n.39.
26 Askericus: D CIII 116. The presence of Wibod is made probable by his reception of D 115
(issued at Pavia in April) and D 126 (issued at Etrepy in June). Rudolf: D 116. Although Rudolf
is not called marchio here, the tenn was used inconsistently in royal charters and often substituted
with comes, as Ehiers, 'Anffinge', pp.22-3 shows.
27 Sierck, Festtag, p.95.
28 Billoret, 'Grand'.
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of Bishop Geilo of Langres, in whose diocese Grand lay. Intervention formulas
are a good indicator of who was 'in' and 'out' at court at any given point: Geilo
was, therefore, already enjoying privileged proximity to his new king's ear, and
was mediating royal access on this very occasion. The bishop was no stranger to
the procedures of kingmaking: in 879 he had participated in the assembly at
Mantaille which had elevated Boso of Vienne to royal status, and in 888 he would
consecrate Guy of Spoleto to the west Frankish kingdom, again in the diocese of
Langres.29 Moreover, Geilo and his diocese would go on to dominate the
provision of commemoration of Charles's consecration which was established at
the behest of the court later in 885.° It seems likely, taking all these factors into
account, that Geilo anointed Charles as king at Grand on 20 May 885. This would
explain why Charles began to style himself 'rex in Gallia' at this point, rather than
before or afterwards.
From Charles's point of view Grand was a location chiming with imperial
echoes, an ideal forum for the parading of some newly-acquired regalia and for
stressing the legitimacy of his rule. However, we must further ask ourselves for
whose eyes this performance was intended. The primary audience must have been
Lotharingian. The annalist of St-Vaast, when describing the people who came to
subject themselves to the new king at Ponthion in June, uses the phrase 'omnes
qui fuerant in regno Karlomanni.' 3 ' This annalist was very sensitive to what might
be called the 'regnality' of the Frankish empire, that is to say that he usually took
care to distinguish between different regna.32 In particular he consistently drew a
distinction between the 'regnum Karlomanni' and the 'regnum Hlotharii',
something on which he was perhaps particularly qualified to talk about since
Arras, where St-Vaast was, had been put in a peculiar position after the treaty of
Verdun, as an island of Lotharingian control in the kingdom of Charles the Bald.
The political identity of the middle kingdom under Lothar I and his namesake son
had solidified at least enough to leave this residue in the language of political
geography, and in 885 the 'regnum Hlotharii' was once again united under a
29 Conventus Mantalensis, p.369.
30 DD CIII 129, 147 and 153. See below, c.6.4.
AV s.a.885, p.56.
32 Ehiers, 'Anfange', pp.27-8.
113
single ruler, something the annalist may have wished to emphasise. Indeed, he
reports Charles's first command at Ponthion as the new king in exactly these
terms; 'praecipiens eos qui erant ex regno quondam Hlotharii et regno Karlomanni
pergere Luvanio contra Nortmannos.' 33 But it was only the men of the 'regnum
Karlomanni' who had come to Ponthion in order to 'Se subsidere.' Charles must,
therefore, have already talked to and received the commendations of the
representatives of the 'regnum Hlotharii', and in a different place from those of
the 'regnum Karlomanni'.34
Grand lay right on the line which divided Lotharingia into east and west,
and was hence an ideal place for the gathering of those Lotharingians who
mattered. By virtue of this fact, it also emphasised Charles's assumption of direct
control of Lotharingia. As discussed in chapter 3, the emperor had an established
claim to the regnum's eastern half, but had delegated control of the western
portion to Louis III and then to Carloman II. While he did retain the right to
distribute honores there, there is no sign that he formally took the magnates of
Lotharingia into his commendation, or that he even visited the western region at
all before 885. There may therefore have been a degree of ambiguity in the eyes
of the aristocracy about the exact nature of his rule in Lotharingia up to this point,
an ambiguity which the consecration of 20 May was meant to eradicate. It is
possible that even more specific considerations influenced the choice of venue.
Hugh, the illegitimate son of Lothar II, had been an intermittent thorn in the
Carolingians' side since the 870s as he attempted to acquire his paternal kingdom,
and he had proved capable of attracting the support in this venture of a number of
significant Lotharingian magnates. 35 In 885, moreover, Hugh's latest revolt was
gathering momentum, set off by the opening of new opportunities to him caused
" AV s.a.885, p.56; similar references at 879, p.45; 882, p.52; 884, p.55; 895, p.75. 896, p.77 for a
distinction between 'Francia' and the land 'supra Mosellam'.
This hypothesis is given indirect support by Regino, Chronicon, s.a. 884, p.1 22, who states that
Charles's reception of the magnates took place at Gondreville in Lotharingia, rather than at
Ponthion; this backs up the idea that there were two assemblies (Regino is more interested in the
one which took place in Lotharingia, the annalist of St-Vaast in the west Frankish one).
Gondreville is only about 20 miles from Grand; Regino may have referred to the palace in which
Charles stayed at the time of his consecration, rather to the actual site of the consecration itself
DD CIII 119 and 120 seem to place Charles at Gondreville shortly after the assembly at Grand, but
the documents are probably later forgeries: Bautier, 'Diplômes', p.220, n.39.
On his supporters see Parisot, Lorraine, pp.478-9; Hlawitschka, Lotharingien, pp.! 64-7.
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by the death of Carloman 11.36 Grand lay in the heartlands of Hugh's support.
After his rebellion failed, he himself was captured at Gondreville, the Carolingian
palace which lay only about 20 miles from the amphitheatre.37 The assembly at
Grand was therefore probably intended to make a statement about Charles's
authority to Hugh's supporters in particular, as well as to the Lotharingian
aristocracy as a whole.
The choice of date (the feast of Ascension) suggests that this ceremony
was very carefully worked out in advance. The diplomatic evidence backs this up,
as it shows that Geilo had the Grand charters drawn up by his scribes before the
emperor arrived in his diocese. 38 This hypothesis also helps explain why Charles
was keen to make peace with the rebel Guy of Spoleto before leaving the Italian
kingdom for the west: Guy had strong political links in the Langres area, and the
reestablishment of good relations with him was probably thought to be a wise
prelude to the meeting with Geilo. 3° For all that consecration was by this point a
more or less necessary ritual to undergo to make good a claim to west Frankish
kingship, we can appreciate that Charles took great care to achieve the maximum
political impact with the ceremony at Grand.
If the proceedings of this assembly were carefully orchestrated to make an
impression on the Lotharingian nobility, it would appear that the consecration
which took place there was intended to apply to Charles's west Frankish kingship
as well. The term 'Gallia', which is used in Charles's charters to express his new
position, could be taken in this period to refer to any one of a variety of political
units. The fact that Charles issued charters for west Frankish as well as
Lotharingian beneficiaries in the weeks before the assembly at Ponthion suggests
that he used it to mean everything west of the Rhine. 40 What took place at
Ponthion itself must therefore have been simply the formal submission of the west
See below, c.6.4 for a full discussion.
Regmo, Chronicon, s.a.885, p.125.
Bautier, 'Diplômes', p.220.
For the reconciliation see AFC s.a.884, p.101; BC s.a.885, p.113. For Guy and Langres see D
CIII 61. He was made king by Geilo in 888: AV s.a.888, p.64.
4° DD CIII 117 and 118 are for monasteries in Dijon. For an analogy, the 848 consecration of
Charles the Bald springs to mind: while this ceremony was designed to bolster the king's authority
in Aquitaine, it also stood as Charles's anointing to the whole western kingdom; see Nelson,
Charles, p.155.
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Frankish nobles to the new king: the 'constitutive' act of his claim to direct rule of
everything west of the Rhine was the anointing at Grand.
From here, some of the Lotharingians may have accompanied Charles to
Ponthion, whence, as mentioned above, he despatched the two groups to deal with
the Vikings encamped at Leuven. It is significant that this should have been the
new king's first act, as indeed it had been when he succeeded Louis the Younger
in 882 and set off to attack Asselt; the Viking threat, and specifically that posed by
these particular Vikings, had been the reason for the invitation to him to assume
the kingship in 885. In addition, it is notable that the army was multi-regnal, as
had been the one led to Asselt in 882. As also in 884, when the Bavarians were
sent off to attack the rebellious Guy in Italy, or in 886 at the siege of Paris, 4 ' we
can see the emperor able to deploy men from one part of his empire to go and deal
with problems in another. This belies the idea that regnal boundaries were
becoming fixed into national barriers at this time, and allows us to conceive of
Charles the Fat's kingdoms as constituting a true 'empire' which could act with
some cohesion in times of crisis.42 As 'rex in Gallia', then, Charles's first move
was to send the men of Gallia on a joint venture together to defend against
invaders who were threatening both their regna.
5.3: Charles's west Frankish supporters
The emperor was not a total newcomer in the west; his role there in the
various toings and froings of the tense dynastic diplomacy of the 870s, and more
recently his superior authority in western Lotharingia, ensured that he was by no
means without contacts west of the Rhine. However, the germane criticism has
been made that Charles was 'lacking a personal network of support in western
Francia.' 43 This is an important point: Charles was in some ways a novelty among
west Frankish rulers, a king who had come to rule the regnum of his cousins from
unfamiliar heartlands across the Rhine and the Alps. Having considered the
circumstances of Charles's succession, therefore, the next question to ask concerns
' BC s.a.884, p.110; Abbo, Bella, p.90 for the scope of the Paris army.
42 The 'national' model is powerfully critiqued by Werner, 'Volker'; Arnold, Germany, pp.1-12.
The evidence for manuscript circulation around the empire under Charles the Fat may also suggest
a dissolution of boundaries after 885: Carroll, 'Archbishops', pp.111-3.
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the nature and extent of his support in the west, a kingdom which he chose to rule,
to all intents and purposes, as an absentee king. Who might actually have been
present at Ponthion, and in what ways did they help him to assert his authority
over his new kingdom?
Contemporary authors were somewhat more optimistic than modern
historians on the question of Charles's supporters in the west. As we saw above,
the Annales Vedastini said that he was attended at Ponthion by 'omnes qui fuerant
in regno Karlomanni.' Across the water from the monastery of St-Vaast, the
royal biographer Asser, informed as ever on continental affairs, believed that
Charles had taken over 'voluntario omnium consensu.' 45 On the face of it, it looks
as if the monk of St-Vaast and the bishop of Sherborne probably exaggerated in
order to promote an idealised image of a united community of aristocracy and
ruler. Although Charles may have had good reasons for the brevity of his stay in
the west on the occasion of his accession, it is conspicuous that the range of
beneficiaries of imperial charters around this time is limited, confined to recipients
in the eastern part of the regnum Karlomanni.
On the other hand, the negative opinion of modern historiography is
pitched too far towards the other extreme; as we have seen, Regino's positive
judgement of Charles's reunification was no mere literary ornament, since he was
on occasion able to get parties from all regna to support and follow him in dealing
with problems on an empire-wide scale. Moreover, there is no evidence for a west
Frankish desire to secede in 885. By way of background, some other observations
are worth making here. For one thing, an astonishing 30 of the 64 surviving
original charters of Charles went to western recipients, a number out of all
proportion with the length of his reign there.46 Even allowing for accidents of
survival, this shows that western institutions were eager to obtain and careful to
preserve the memory of his favour, and while Charles only travelled west twice,
the willingness of west Frankish magnates to visit the court in the east is well
Nelson, Charles, p.256; eadem, 'King', p.65.
AV s.a.885, p.56.
Asser, De Rebus, c.70, p.52.
Werner, Origines, p.420; idem 'Robertiens', p.21
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attested on a number of occasions.47 He was, after all, an emperor, and held that
position while west Frankish king longer than anyone else since Louis the Pious.
The geographical extent of the charters he issued was broad, and they were
particularly numerous for recipients in Neustria, Francia proper and Burgundy.
Although no recipients from Provence proper are recorded, Charles did grant
properties in that regnum, and a striking number of coins bearing his name have
been unearthed from mints at Marseille and Arles. 48 The only area which does not
figure in Kehr's MGH edition of the royal charters is the bulk of Aquitaine, south
of a line between the Loire and Nevers, and west of the Rhône. This, however,
may be in part due to the vagaries of survival, since we do know from a later
charter of Odo that Charles provided a confirmation at some point for the canons
of the church of Clermont.49
As well as noting that most of the major ecclesiastical institutions of the
kingdom benefitted in this way from Charles's reign, it is also worth observing
that his actual itinerary in west Francia on both visits was very limited, confined to
the east in 885 and the north in 886, showing that church representatives came
vast distances to access his ear. This is especially noticeable during the campaign
to relieve Paris from Viking siege in the second half of 886. The run of charters
issued here, which must partly be seen as rewards to those who had brought help,
give us a glimpse into the composition of the army before the city after the arrival
of the emperor. This martial element is reflected in the unusual references to
charters being issued 'cum consilio principum nostrorum'. 5° Contingents from
Nevers, Tours, Auxerre, Orleans, Langres and Troyes were certainly present.5'
Certain individual fideles, possibly military leaders, were rewarded in Bar,
Chartres and Sens. 52 Most far-travelled was the company of bishop Teotarius of
Gerona. He clearly thought it worth the journey to obtain a detailed imperial
confirmation, which ordered the people on the church's lands to obey the bishop
Eg. DD CIII 160 and 161, issued at Kirchen for Odo of Paris.
D CIII 162; 13 of 20 coins found from Aries and Marseille from the period between 840 and
900 were of Charles the Fat (1 Charles the Bald, 4 Carloman II, 2 Louis of Provence); see Poly,
Provence, pp.233-4. D CIII 123 was issued for the church of Lyon, which had been politically
connected to Provence proper since Boso's revolt, if not before.
49D0P49.
5° DD CIII 145, 147. Cf. DD 137a, 138.
' DD CIII 138, 139, 143, 145-147.
118
as if he were a comes of the emperor. 53 This was not the first time Gerona had
sent a contingent to help the Carolingians; the bishop had also helped Carloman II
besiege Vienne in the summer of 881
This evidence shows that Charles did have a political network of support
from which, whether or not it can be characterised as 'personal', he was able to
benefit on this occasion. The royal court, we can see, was still a pivotal institution
for forming and maintaining such networks. In addition to revealing this broad
picture, the sources allow us to focus in closer on some of the details of the
aristocratic groups of the west in 885-7, how they related to each other and how
they operated, and perhaps to place them in a context of royal service throughout
the 880s. This will be the subject of the remainder of this chapter, which seeks to
establish the nature of Charles's influence in west Francia and to assess its
effectiveness. It will become apparent that the answer to this question lies
somewhere in between the two polarised opinions of contemporaries (that
Charles's support was extensive) and historians (that it was negligible).
5.3.1: Theoderic of Vermandois, Gauzlin of St-Denis, Hugh the Abbot and
Aletramnus of Beauvais
As the St-Vaast annalist tells us, it was a count Theoderic who was sent to
Italy to invite Charles to the west on behalf of the Franci. This man, who is often
confused in the secondary literature with his namesake 'the Chamberlain', count
of Autun, has been convincingly identified by Werner as the count of Vermandois,
who was also lay abbot of the monasteries of St-Quentin and Morienval. 55 Some
background is necessary in order to put his position in the reign of Charles the Fat
into context. Theoderic was one of the most influential men at the court of Louis
III, along with Gauzlin of St-Denis, and as such Werner has discussed this pair as
the centre of the most important group of aristocrats in northern France in the
early 880s. 56 This group had become distinguished from another network led by
52 DD CIII 137, 142, 144.
D CIII 148.
Bautier, 'Origmes', p.60; D C2 63.
" Werner, 'Untersuchungen V', p.102 with n.59; idem, 'Gauzlm', p.446 with n.150a. Theoderic
the Chamberlain was already dead at this point. For the following see Map 3.
Werner, 'Gauzlin', pp.441-50.
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Hugh the Abbot in the complex and antagonistic political manouevrings following
the death of Louis the Stammerer. The eventual outcome had been that Gauzlin's
supporters had forced a division of the kingdom with the help of Louis the
Younger, and had then attached themselves to Louis III's court in Francia and
Neustria, leaving Hugh the Abbot's influence confined to the court of Carloman II
in Burgundy and Aquitaine. 57 Theoderic had been one of Louis's military
commanders against the Vikings and was also heavily involved in the dispute over
the episcopal vacancy at Noyon, which was the central place of his county. 58 He
clearly maintained a high position at the court of Carloman after Louis's death in
882, since it was on his advice that the king reorganised defence of the bridge at
Châlons-sur-Marne to help defend the kingdom 'from the infestation of the
pagans.' 59 Theoderic may well have been influential in persuading the king to
return Gauzlin to the fullness of royal favour after the troubles of 879-80, which
he did in 883 as bishop of Paris.6°
It was this group which was on the spot in December 884 to take the
initiative. As Bautier has shown, it was Gauzlin who was on hand to orchestrate
the burial of the young king next to his unfortunate brother at St-Denis, and he
who attended to his last wishes.6 ' From here it is likely, as argued above, that he
and Theoderic gained access to the regalia to send out to Charles the Fat. In terms
of the invitation to Charles it is also of interest that Gauzlin already had some
political links to the eastern branch of the Carolingian family. He had been held
hostage at the court of Louis the Younger after the battle of Andernach in 876 and
had made friendly contacts there. 62 These were doubtless put to good use during
the negotiations with Louis preceding the treaty of Fouron in 878, in which
Gauzlin was heavily involved, and during the troubles of 879, when he invited
Louis to intervene in the west.63 Gauzlin's subsequent importance in the reign of
Ibid, passim.
$8 AB s.a.882, p.246; D L3 46; Werner, 'Gauzlm', pp.445-6.
D C2 76.
60 D C2 90 shows Theodenc's connections to the bishopric of Paris and the court in general.
61 Bautier's introduction to DD C2, pp.lv-lvi, lxiv; also D 79 and comments there.
62 AB s.a.879, pp.235-6.
63 Note also that these eastern links may have gone back through several decades: in 854, Louis the
Younger had been invited to invade by a group, the 'cognatio Gauzberti', who may have been
Gauzlin's close relations. AF s.a.854, p.44; Werner, 'Adelsfamilien', pp.138-9.
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Charles the Fat is well attested in the sources. At the siege of Paris he was
prominent, and in the poem of the monk Abbo it is he who is given the most
striking speech concerning the emperor's qualities. TM The dux Ragnoldus who rose
to prominence with a short-lived stint as the main military commander in the west
after the apparent retirement of Hugh the Abbot may have been a relative of
Gauzlin. 65 In addition, just before leaving Paris in 886, Charles issued a charter
for the monastery of St-Maur-des-Fossés, which included such extensive
privileges as free election of abbots, empire-wide toll freedom for the monks,
exemption from military service and confirmation of possession of the cell of
Glanfeuil, where the community had been established, where Gauzlin had been an
oblate and where its founder Roric, Gauzlin's father, was buried. The charter also
requested prayers to be said for Charles, his family and the stabilitas regni. This
unusually generous privilege, essentially an imperial grant of immunity, to the
main monastery of the Rorgonid family, an Eigenkloster par excellence, can
perhaps be seen as a sign of the gratitude which the emperor felt towards the late
Gauzlin, who had been one of his chief commanders in the siege of Paris.66
In his attempt to destroy an older historiographical tradition which
ascribed to Hugh the Abbot total dominance of Carolingian politics between 877
and 886, Werner perhaps goes too far by suggesting that the latter was eclipsed by
Gauzlin towards the end of his life. 67 One reason for this view is the repeated
insistence in his work, and indeed in much of the other literature, that the Welfs
(the family to which Hugh belonged) were implacably opposed to the Rorgonids
(Gauzlin's family) and the Robertians (Odo's). 68 However, in the light of more
recent research, this now appears to be a potentially misleading method of
characterising aristocratic relationships. It is clear, for example, that political
circumstances could easily supersede family loyalties, and that the two things
were far from identical. An obvious example is the political alliance of the Weif
64 Abbo, Bella, p.18.
65 AV s.a.885, p.57; Werner, 'Adeisfamilien', p.142; idem, 'Gauzlin', pp.457-9.
D CIII 149; note that at the same time Charles may have made a concession to St-Germain-des-
Prés, another house closely connected to Gauzlin. Gauzlin and other members of his family were
also commemorated at Reichenau, with which Charles had close links; see Oexle, 'Ebrom',
pp.168-8!.
61 Eg. Werner, 'Gauzlin', p.455; idem 'Les Robertiens', p.20.
68 Werner, 'Adeisfamilien', p.140; idem, 'Gauzlm', pp.417-22.
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Conrad with Gauzlin in the struggles of 879. There is thus no obstacle to our
seeing Hugh, a man with important and extensive political connections in the
west, as an ally of Gauzlin and high servant of Charles after 885. If Gauzlin had
been on hand at St-Denis to organise the burial of Carloman and the invitation to
Charles, it was Hugh who had led the negotiations with the Vikings in the
meantime. 69 As we have seen, Hugh's nephew Rudolf was an important imperial
marchio and had been involved in facilitating the journey of Charles to assume the
west Frankish crown in 885. Hugh appears posthumously in a number of Charles
the Fat's charters, on one occasion even in terms of his gift getting an imperial
confirmation, something which cannot be said of Gauzlin. 7° And when they died
within weeks of each other in the spring of 886, it was an east Frankish author
who described both Hugh and Gauzlin together as 'duces praecipui Galliae
regionis, in quibus omnis spes Gallorum contra Nordmannos posita erat.' 7 ' If by
the time Carolman was laid to rest the scars of 879 were beginning to heal and
some sort of equilibrium had been achieved between the interests of the Gauzlin-
Theoderic party and the supporters of Hugh the Abbot,72 the west Frankish reign
of Charles the Fat helped the old antagonisms to be forgotten almost completely.
Theoderic of Vermandois can also be shown to have figured highly in the
active service of Charles the Fat. We know he was still lay abbot of St-Quentin
during the reign, since a chronicle fragment records that he improved the
monastery walls in 886. While Charles probably did not appoint him, this was
an important post in Carolingian politics; it had been held by as distinguished a
figure as Louis the Pious's brother Hugh, it had been given special consideration
in the Treaty of Verdun in being allowed to stay in Charles the Bald's kingdom,
and more recently it (and presumably its abbot, Theoderic) had hosted the
definitive negotiations between Gauzlin, Hugh and Louis the Younger in 88O.
Theoderic also interceded with Carloman II for his proprietary monastery of
69 Regino, Chronicon, s.a.884, p.122.
° DD CIII 143, 145, 161.
AFC s.a.886, p.104.




Morienval: the fact that he did so as 'comes et abba' suggests that he also
controlled the county of Valois, in which that monastery lay.75
Theoderic also formed a key part of Charles the Fat's defence against the
Vikings, as he had Louis III's. Werner credits King Odo with the creation of a
new defensive alignment north of Paris along the Oise, what he calls the Oiselinie,
an innovation whose efficacy stretched well into the tenth century. He places the
origins of this in 890, and says that its first defenders were the counts Herbert I
and Herbert II, who controlled the county of Vermandois and the abbey of St-
Quentin from 896 as part of a large and important block of territory blanketing the
whole region to the north and east of Paris after Theoderic's son had become a
casualty of the expansionism of Baldwin of Flanders. 76 Werner's evidence comes,
however, from a long period stretching well into the tenth century: the presence of
this whole block of lands in the hands of Herbert and his relatives as early as the
890s is therefore impossible to prove. Moreover, there are grounds for seeing a
degree of continuity between Carolingian arrangements in the area and Odo's
supposed innovation.
In 885 we find a certain Aletramnus being entrusted with command of a
fortification over the Oise at Pontoise, constructed just as Paris itself was being
made ready to withstand assault. 77 Aletramnus, however, was unable to carry out
his job successfully; Pontoise was surrounded, the occupants surrendered and
hostages were exchanged. After this Aletramnus retreated 'cum suis' to
Beauvais.78 Beauvais is identified by Werner as one of the key civitates held north
of Paris by Herbert early in Odo's reign and a crucial piece in the jigsaw of
properties held by that family as part of their allegedly newly-conceived defence
of the Oise in the 890s. 79 There is no direct evidence, however, to show that either
Herbert I or his brother Pippin were counts at all before the very end of 889.° The
high profile of Aletramnus in the annalist of St-Vaast's account of the Viking
" D C2 90; Grierson, 'L'Origme', pp.89-91.
76 Werner, 'Untersuchungen V', pp.97-8 with n.40, there citing AV s.a 890, p.68; 'Odo vero rex
adunato exercitu super littora Hisae fluminis resedit, ne regnum libere devastarent [i.e. the
Vikings]'; AV s.a.895, p.77 for the ousting of Theoderic's son.
" AV s.a.885, p.57.
78 AV s.a.885, p.58.
Werner, 'Untersuchungen V', p.98.
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defence and the fact that he retreated to Beauvais in defeat may instead suggest
that he held this county in 885. This assumption is strengthened by the fact that in
around 893 a count Aletramnus was threatened with excommunication by bishop
Honorius of Beauvais after joining the supporters of Charles the Simple against
Odo. 8 ' As well as being count of Beauvais, it seems likely on the evidence of a
generous gift of Louis the Stammerer in the Laonnais that Aletramnus also held
that county, 82 and it has been plausibly suggested, based on his control of
Pontoise, that he was count of Vexin as well. 83 Who was he?
Lot identified him with a count of Troyes, Aletramnus II, active from 868
onwards, whom he thought was brought in by Charles the Fat in 885 as an
experienced commander to help the defence of Paris. 84 While the connection
between a count of Beauvais/Laon and a count of Troyes is possible, the question
of the family descent of this figure, which primarily interested Lot, will not be
discussed here; it is the context of the politics of the Paris area which is of more
immediate significance. Our best source for this is again the poet Abbo. In the
course of the siege, he tells us, a notable victory was won against the enemy,
3,000 of whom were killed by only 600 defenders: 'Namque triumphantes fratrum
promsit geminorum, Fama fuisse Teoderici procerum ast Aledramni.' 85 This, it
seems likely, is a reference to the same Aletramnus and none other than Theoderic
of Vermandois, who we know figured highly among the proceres of Charles the
Fat. Theoderic's Eigenkloster, Morienval, passed into the hands of Odo's family
after his death in the 890s. 86 It is therefore surely no coincidence that the
properties of Aletramnus ended up in the control of the same family after his death
in the first decade of the tenth century, and it has been plausibly suggested that he
was in some way related to them. 87 It is also interesting that if Aletramnus was
80 Ibid, p.93; the evidence is D OP 16, although even here the reference is only to Herbert as one
of the 'proceres', not as 'comes'.
81 Flodoard, Historia, IV.6, p.57!. Cf. Favre, Eudes, p.19; Gnerson, 'L'Origine', pp.87-8; Lot,
'Notes', p.15!. My interpretation differs from those of these authors.
82DLS28.
83 Lot, 'Notes', p.151; Grierson, 'L'Origine', p.87. Pontoise was Vexm's central place.
Lot, 'Notes', pp.149-53; idem, 'Aleran' and 'Aleran II'.
85 Abbo, Bella, p.90.
86 D CS 105. This charter, issued for Odo's brother Robert in 920, is also noteworthy for its list of
extensive properties pertaining to Morienval since Theoderic's days.
87 Lot, 'Notes', p.153 and n.2.
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count of Vexin, he would have been the successor of Nibelung III; and the
families of Nibelung and Theoderic of Vermandois were related. 88 All this
strengthens the suspicion that the two figures we have been discussing were
related by blood, and indeed were the very brothers mentioned by Abbo.
Aletramnus himself had the expected political connections in the Paris
region which place him at the heart of the group around Gauzlin. His brother
Theoderic seems to have been involved in the dispute over the episcopal vacancy
in his county of Beauvais during the reign of Louis 111.89 Aletramnus was a
companion of Gauzlin as prisoner in the east following the battle of Andernach, a
visit on which, as we saw, Gauzlin is said to have formed useful alliances.90
Already in 868 he is found underwriting a judgement in favour of St-Denis, and in
879, when Gauzlin was abbot, he returned everything that Louis the Stammerer
had just given him in the Laonnois to the same monastery.9'
The fame of the two brothers did not only leave an impression on
contemporaries. An eleventh-century book of miracula preserves a memory of
their hunting activities in the Ardennes and describes them thus: 'Comitatum
Arduennensem agebat Theodericus, cuius frater Alerannus partes quabat
eiusdem comitatus.' 92 This author, probably a monk of Stavelot, is of course not
to be relied on blindly for information about the ninth century. However, his
description of the sharing of power by the brothers is useful, especially if we
understand 'comitatus' not as a single county but in the more general sense of a
command or responsibility. This idea elucidates the report of Abbo, who strongly
implies that the 600 soldiers commanded by the brothers were the same 600
imperial troops who had just been sent to Paris by Charles the Fat. 93 This shows
not only the two counts' closeness to the king, but also suggests, along with our
information about Aletramnus's abortive attempt to defend Pontoise and about
Theoderic leading the forces of Louis III into battle and advising Carloman II on
88 Werner, 'Untersuchungen V', pp.101-6. Nibelung had a son called Theoderic. However, the
general family relationship helps explain the exchange of names and properties, so there would be
no need to insist that Nibelung III was the father of Aletramnus and Theoderic.
89DL346.
9°AB s.a.876, p.209.
' D CB 314 for 868; for 879, Doublet, Histoire, p.783, and Lot, 'Notes', p.150.
92 Miraculorum S. Huberti, 11.15, p.825.
Abbo, Bella, pp.88-90.
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the defence of the bridge over the Marne, that they were designated as
commanders of imperial defence against the Vikings in the same way as Herbert
and his kin would be later. Abbo's account also shows that the brothers must have
been outside the city when they arrived with the men from Charles; perhaps
Aletramnus had come from Beauvais or Laon, Theoderic from Noyon or St-
Quentin. Here then, already in the mid-880s, we have two brothers operating as
defenders of Francia directly at the behest of the emperor, and from exactly that
concentrated base around Paris which Werner identified as crucial to the
Herbertine accumulation of power and their defence of the Oiselinie in the 890s
and beyond; Beauvais, Laon, Vermandois, Noyon, St-Quentin, Vexin, Valois. In
this constellation of honores lay the shared comitatus of Theoderic and
Aletramnus.
So, this is evidence for Charles the Fat putting his trust in the northern
French aristocratic group which had invited him to assume the west Frankish
kingship in the first place. It also clearly shows at least the kernel of Odo's later
defensive policy operating already in the 880s. Odo, of course, was there in 885
to see for himself what the emperor was doing. Far from being a novelty of the
890s, then, we can see how Charles's policy reaches forward into the reign of king
Odo. So do the personnel carrying it out; Theoderic and his son remained in
possession of Vermandois and St-Quentin until 895, and although Aletramnus
defected to Charles the Simple in 893, there is no evidence that his county of
Beauvais had become attached to the Herbertine agglomeration before 936.
If Odo was not the innovator in this regard that he is made out to be, then it
must also be admitted that neither was his predecessor. As well as prefiguring the
890s, Charles's arrangements also reach backwards into the reigns of Louis III and
Carloman II. Both of Louis the Stammerer's Sons were alert to the necessity of
defending the Oise against raids, and several references in the Annales Vedastini
betray the fact that the river was seen as a definitive defensive boundary in the
earlier 880s.95 Moreover, Louis III had gone up against heavy ecclesiastical
opposition in order to ensure he got the men he wanted in the vacant sees of
AV s.a.895, p.T7; Werner, 'Untersuchungen V', p.93 n.20.
AV s.a.881, p.50; 881, p.51; 882, p.53; 883, p.54. Cf. 890, p.68; 899, p.81.
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Beauvais and Noyon: the filling of such sees had strategic and political importance
as well as implications for church hierarchy. 96 It was Fulk of Rheims who
famously pointed out to Charles the extreme importance of defending the nodal
point of Paris against capture, and his words have been taken by historians to be
somewhat prophetic in the light of subsequent events. 97 However, Charles was
clearly neither the first nor the last king to ensure that measures were taken to
prevent such a defeat. Moreover, despite frequent claims to the contrary by
historians, Charles's failure to defeat the Paris Vikings outright is attested
nowhere as a factor in his deposition. 98 For all the much-admired bluster of the
archbishop of Rheims, it was surely the likes of Gauzlin, Theoderic, Hugh and
Aletramnus who were giving Charles the best advice on how to deal with the
Viking menace at the sharp end, and hence we see him coping with exactly the
problem he had been invited into the west to contain.
Behind these very prominent figures, some other members of the group
around Gauzlin and Theoderic can be discerned. Herbert I himself, future
incumbent of the county of Vermandois, may have begun his steep rise to
prominence under Charles the Fat. Having been an important member of the court
of Charles the Bald without receiving any recorded honores, Herbert is then
known to have become count of Soissons and lay abbot of St-Crépin sometime
between October 886 and 898: as Werner has pointed out it is likely that he held
these positions before the time of Charles the Simple's rising in 893, and that a
plausible occasion was Charles the Fat's stop at Soissons late in 886 when he
'terram inter Francos dispertiit'.'°° Theoderic and Herbert, successive military
leaders on the Oise, may therefore have been political associates. In fact, Werner
has shown that the families of the two men were related, and while it is misleading
to build up too schematic a correlation between family relationships and political
positions, the overall concept is convincing, and it helps give substance to our
sense of the network of supporters lying behind big players like Theoderic in the
D L3 44-7 are the key texts; they are illuminated by Werner, 'Gauzim', pp.440-9. The politico-
military aspects of these disputes are nevertheless usually overlooked in the historiography, which
tends to discuss them purely in the context of canon law: eg. Devisse, Hincmar, pp.984-9.
Flodoard, Historia, IV.5, p.563.
Reuter, Germany, p.120; MacLean, 'Charles'.
AB s.a.877, p.215.
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west Frankish kingdom of Charles the Fat.'°' The control by members of this
group of many of the key honores of northern Francia throughout the ninth
century provides a kind of political continuum into which the reign of Charles the
Fat can be inserted. The membership of this group of the descendants of king
Bernard of Italy, the Herbertines, can only serve to further impress us of the
significance of its material and political resources.
5.3.2: Askericus of Paris
Another member of this group of imperial supporters who was of special
political significance is Askericus, who became bishop of Paris in autumn 886
after Gauzlin's death on 16 April. He was already well-connected in the Paris area
before this, since his brother Tetbert was the count of Meaux killed fighting the
Vikings in 888, and they were probably also related to the Herbertines and the rest
of the extended family group identified by Werner.' 02 Askericus also leads us
back to the reception of the emperor by the nobles in 885; in Charles's first
diploma issued at Grand as king in Ga/ha, he intervened along with the marchio
Rudolf and his son for the emperor's fidelis Dodo.'°3 Those named, as petitioners
for third parties in royal charters, may be regarded as 'in' at court. Askericus's
association with the marchio Rudolf, another key supporter of the emperor,
highlights his closeness to the throne.'°4
In any case, his position in the May 885 charter from Grand shows that
Askericus was already high in Charles's favour, and his connections to the Paris
area and its main comital families suggest that he was intimately involved in
Theoderic's mission to receive the new king. Given the paucity of direct evidence
for identifying the north Frankish nobles who actually participated at Grand and
Ponthion, Askericus in turn helps link the events and people at those two
assemblies back to the party of Theoderic and Gauzlin. This impression is made
even stronger by the description of Askericus in the charter for Dodo as 'vocatus
episcopus'. This term reflects the high regard in which Charles held Askericus,
'°°AV s.a.886, p.62; Werner, 'Untersuchungen V', pp.99-100.
'°' Werner, 'Untersuchungen V', esp. pp.92-106.
102 Abbo, Bella, p.100; AV s.a.888, p.66; Werner, 'Untersuchungen V', pp.96-7.
' °3 DC	 116.
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and that he was regarded as the natural candidate for the next available episcopal
vacancy, perhaps specifically for Paris. Indeed, Abbo gives us to believe that his
appointment as bishop was among Charles's first acts upon entering Paris in 886,
and it is possible that the bishopric had been held open for him since Gauzlin's
death in April.' 05 This scenario certainly gives the lie to Werner's assertion that
Askericus was made bishop 'completely according to the wishes of Odo' and
suggests that Charles was still very much in control of appointments in the west.'°6
The bishop-elect himself presumably arrived there in the imperial entourage, as
there is no reference to him during the siege itself, and he may have spent the
previous 18 months attached to the court. Askericus clearly remained in favour.
In 887 it was he who went to the imperial court to collect the ransom owed to the
Paris Vikings.' 07 It is suggestive (but no more than that) that while he was there,
Charles the Fat tried to impose a man named Teutbertus (which was also the name
of Askericus's brother) on the vacant see of Auxerre.'°8
5.3.3: Geilo of Langres
If Askericus helps give more width to the group of north Frankish
aristocrats standing behind the simple reference of the annalist of St-Vaast to the
mission of count Theoderic, he also brings us further south into Burgundy and
back to the bishop of Langres; the charter issued for the fidelis Dodo at the request
of Askericus, Rudolf and Pippin was composed by scribes from the Langres
scriptorium. Shortly afterwards Dodo concluded a precarial agreement with
Geilo, ensuring that his properties, including the villa of Montigny-sur-Aube
which he had received from Charles, would go to the church of Langres after his
death.'°9 Askericus and Geilo certainly knew each other personally, as they must
have met at Grand and Paris, and possibly also Kirchen in 887. However, if
Askericus had spent some time travelling round with the imperial entourage, it is
' °4 DD CIII 116 and 137.
'° Abbo, Bella, p.90; also AV s.a.886, p.62.
106 Werner, 'Untersuchungen V', p.95; by stressing the importance of Gauzlin in Paris in the 880s,
Werner (eg. 'Gauzim', pp.454-5) perhaps underrates the royal power of appointment.
'° AV s.a.887, p.63.
'° See above, c.4.2.1.
109 DCIII 154.
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Geilo who emerges most spectacularly as a court figure after 885, and indeed in
late Carolingian politics generally.
Bautier has studied his career and his church's privileges in great detail,
and so only one or two points need be made here."° Bautier sees Geilo as a
sinister figure, and casts his rise in terms of a progressive and sustained attempt to
acquire as many temporal rights as possible from the Carolingians in order to
increase his authority in northern Burgundy. He appears first as abbot of Tournus
in the later years of Charles the Bald's reign before moving on to participate at
Boso's king-making ceremony at Mantaille in 879, an act which won him the
diocese of Langres. Then he joined the flood of erstwhile Boso partisans rushing
to defect to the Carolingians in 880, and became one of Carloman II's steadiest
supporters, certainly remaining with him at various stages of the siege of Vienne.
As already discussed, he was involved in the inception of Charles the Fat's
western rule, and he was unusually prominent in the surviving records of
Charles's patronage." After the emperor's death he switched to the party of Guy
of Spoleto, whom he crowned in 888 before his own death later that year.
This fast-changing career under several masters, and the fact that the great
number of his gifts allow him to be characterised as the grasping aristocrat, a
classic historiographical villain, seems to have been what led Bautier to see in
Geilo something of a chancer, a man 'd'une personnalité moralement plus que
discutable', who displayed 'un total manque de scruples." 2 This judgement of his
actions (his actual personality is, of course, obscure) seems rather anachronistic.
Geilo's service of several masters in turn was far from unusual; the unusual thing
is that we are able to chart it so closely. Aristocrats had to make choices on their
feet when the configuration of power in the ruling house altered, and when a king
turned up at one's doorstep, as they did on Geilo's in 879, 880, 885 and 888, the
choice was not really a free one. Likewise, it cannot be simply assumed that any
magnate who was conspicuously successful in obtaining royal patronage was a
malignant leech.
110 Bautier, 'Diplomes', pp.216-30.
DD CIII 117, 118, 129, 147, 152-154, 155a, 162. His scribes connect him to DD 116, 137,
155.
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If we discard this idea as a starting point, there is no real evidence that
Geilo's relationship with Charles the Fat was anything but cooperative. Charles
had already had some dealings with the church of Langres before 885; in 882 he
had confirmed a precarial deal agreed between Guy of Spoleto and the praepositus
Otbert." 3 Langres was also endowed with properties in Transjurane Burgundy,
where Charles the Fat had had influence since the early 870s." 4 As already
argued, Geilo was heavily involved in Charles's first movements in the west in
885, and his church was a focus for commemoration of the emperor. In addition,
the bishop was present with the court in the east on a number of occasions, notably
at Lorsch on 28 August 885, where a ceremony was held to commemorate the
death of Louis the German, who had died on the same day nine years earlier and
whose body lay in that monastely."5
Bautier's negative view of Geilo's moral shortcomings also colours the
way he looks at the events of 887. The most important point came when the
bishop received several significant charters on the same day, 15 January 887, at
the royal palatium of Schlettstadt in Alsace. 6 Bautier, this time citing with
admiration Geilo's political sagacity, claimed that at this point the bishop realised
that the tide was turning against the ailing Charles, and that he now sidled off to
Chalon-sur-Saône to a meeting with the most important of the Provençal
ecclesiastical nobility. The text of the meeting, which took place on 18 May in the
church of St-Marcel-lès-Chalon, reveals only discussion about the peace of the
church and the confirmation of various property transactions, but it is reasonable
to suppose that political matters were also on the agenda. Bautier suggests that
these matters were an expression of intent to persuade the weak-willed and dying
Charles to adopt Louis of Provence as his successor; and that the gifts made at
Schlettstadt were a (clearly ill-judged) sign of gratitude from the happy king that
Geilo was remaining loyal as others considered jumping ship. 117 He presents no
evidence, however, that anyone else was thinking about deserting the king in
January 887, and in fact some of the men who supported Guy of Spoleto in 888
DCIII 61.
114 D L2 12; see above, c.3.4.
' D CIII 129; see c.6.2
116 DDCIII 152-154,probablyD 155a.
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are found at exactly this time still in favour with Charles, and even accepting a
diminution of their comital holdings." He also presents the assembly at Chalon
as a sinister double of Mantaille, significantly coming shortly after Boso's death in
January. In fact, the attendance at the 887 synod was rather less impressive than at
the 879 one, and confined mostly to representatives from the northern part of
Provence. The archbishops of Tarentaise, Vienne and Lyon and the bishops of
Autun, Chalon, Macon, Belley and Valence kept Geilo company this time, and
there is no de facto reason to be overtly suspicious about such a group of
ecclesiastics getting together to discuss matters of mutual concern." 9 Admittedly,
these were men who knew all about raising non-Carolingians to the throne;' 2° but
they also knew all about the consequences. Many of them had been among the
first to realise the futility of the situation in 880 as the armies of Charles the Fat
and his cousins and brother closed in on Vienne.
Bautier's case, then, remains conjectural and unconvincing. Moreover, an
alternative reconstruction can be put forward against it. The timing of the gifts to
Geilo in early 887 is significant, as they were issued exactly four days after the
death of Boso on 11 January. As will be argued in chapter 6.5, it was at this point,
as the news reached Schlettstadt, that Charles the Fat and his advisers decided to
make some sort of acconmiodation with Boso's young son Louis, to expunge from
the record the usurping activities of his father, and hence to neutralise any threat
he might pose by reincorporating him into the legitimate Carolingian family.'2'
Geilo was present when the news arrived, and he knew exactly what the emperor
planned. The empress Engelberga became involved in negotiations in early
February, which shows how quickly Charles must have moved after hearing of
Boso's death, and the young prince was received at Kirchen in the summer. If we
take away from Geilo some of the great ability for predicting the future with
which Bautier credits him, and from Charles some of the crippling illness and
susceptibility to manipulation which is attributed to him,' 22 then the bishop can
Bautier, 'Diplômes', pp.22 I-2.
" D CIII 155. Bizarrely, Bautier seems to acknowledge this himself; 'Diplomes', p.222 and n.52.
119 DCIII 155a; Bautier, 'Diplômes', p.22!.
120 As observed by Airlie, 'Semper', p.142.
121 For the following, see further below, c.6.5.
122 See c.6.1.
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instead be seen as a royal agent at Chalon, sent to explain and negotiate the new
status of Louis with the proceres of his father's former kingdom, and hence to
keep them involved at the centre of imperial politics. Geilo was there not to
conspire to force Louis on the emperor, but rather to mediate the imperial decision
to adopt Louis with the nobles of Provence. The council at Chalon was held on 18
May. This fits comfortably with the timing of the Kirchen assembly, which was
almost definitely held in June or July.' 23 Kirchen must have hosted an elaborate
and carefully staged ceremony at which the Carolingian element of Louis's and
Charles's relationship was emphasised, and the very highest of the
Reichsaristokratie were present, including Odo and Berengar. Geilo was also
there.' 24 Was it perhaps he who had escorted Louis with his mother Irmingarde
from Chalon to Kirchen and into the open arms of his benevolent uncle Charles?
The chronology of this hypothesis is more logical than that of Bautier, who
starts with the knowledge of Charles's deposition and works backwards through
events; he sees the supposed illness and incapacity of Charles as the key to
understanding events, and underplays the significance of the timing of Boso's
death. The connection between the grants to Geilo and the council of Chalon is
strong; one of the items definitely discussed there was exactly this imperial
aggrandisement of the position of the bishop of Langres.' 25 If, then, it was the
news of the death of Boso that inspired Charles and his advisers to begin
negotiations with Engelberga and the high churchmen of Provence to bring about
a reconciliation with young Louis, and to choose Geilo as the agent for part of
these negotiations, why the lavish grants at the same time?
The charters in question amount to a strong confirmation of Geilo's own
position. The first of them speaks in exalted terms about how he had been
entrusted with his civitas by God in order to protect its inhabitants and its church.
He had, it goes on, built up the walls of his town without the help of any comes or
iudex, thus fulfilling the terms of his trust. He is, therefore, granted all the ex
officio comital holdings in and around Langres, significant extensions to fiscal
123 D CIII 158 issued at Waiblmgen on 7 May; DD 159-163 issued at Kirchen, 30 May-23 June; D




rights (including minting), and most of the income from regular markets held in
Dijon and Langres.' 26 This, although it in part reflects a situation which the
charter's narratio tells us had already developed, is an imperial approval for the
bishop of Langres to become the main secular authority in the diocese, which was
one of the six principal sees of the kingdom. He was confirmed as the preeminent
spiritual and secular power in Langres, Dijon and Tonnerre, and he also held
notable churches and properties in Atuyer, Troyes, Lassois and Solignac. By
contrast, Charles was happy to diminish the holdings of the local counts on behalf
of Geilo's subordinates, like the praepositus Otbert.' 27 While this development,
the eclipsing of comital power at the expense of episcopal, was a phenomenon
common to several regions in the spine of the west Frankish and Lotharingian
kingdoms in the late ninth and tenth centuries,' 28 this evidence seems to indicate
that, certainly by the start of 887 if not before, Charles the Fat was deliberately
promoting the process in the Langres area. This preference for delegating
authority into the hands of a select group of favoured men was a policy pursued by
Charles in various regions of his huge empire.' 29 To have a man like Geilo, a
highly prized fidelis, dominating northern Burgundy, in a region which was also
on the main road between Italy and west Francia, was not only a benefit for the
bishop; it aided the smooth flow of authority from court to locality. Geilo already
had political connections with the main players in Provence, forged not least
during the days of King Boso. On 15 January 887, though, after Boso was gone
once and for all, he was also granted greater material wherewithal to back this up,
and a solid position from which to negotiate with the leaders of the Provençal
political community on behalf of the emperor.
Such a position was there to be filled all the more obviously since the
death of the marchio Bernard Plantevelue, who had been responsible for the Lyon
area, in 886.'° That the gifts came hot on the heels of Boso's death is rendered
even more suggestive by the fact that the latter had held extensive lands in the
126 D CIII 152; for comments see Bautier, 'Diplômes', pp.224-5. DD 153, 154, 155a are similarly
impressive enhancements.
127 DCIII 155.




diocese of Langres.' 3 ' Were some of these now confirmed by Charles in Geilo's
possession? This is extremely hard to prove. Perhaps a hint that Geilo had in a
sense succeeded Boso in some of his old capacities comes from the bishop's
success in intervening on behalf of his old community at Tournus to get Charles to
concede the abbey of Donzère on the Rhône in Provence.' 32 Almost exactly a
decade earlier this same monastery had been given to the church of St-Vincent in
Viviers by Charles the Bald at the request of Boso.' 33 Their relationships with the
grant were thus analogous; and in fact it had also been Boso who had intervened
with Charles to give Geilo the abbey of Tournus in the first place.' 34 The idea that
he had been 'replaced', like the reconciliation with Louis, would be another way
of closing the book on Boso. If this were true, it might also explain why the synod
of Chalon felt the need to confirm the imperial grant; it is noticeable that it
distinguishes the general holdings of the church of Langres and the properties
'quas ipse [ii. Geilo] suo tempore per praecepta apud eiusdem domnum et
gloriosissimum imperatorem adquisivit."35
5.3.4 Odo of Paris
Finally, Odo himself is easily located within the group of Charles's
stalwarts in the western kingdom. The exact nature of his personal relationship
with Charles after 886 has already been discussed.' 36 Here it will simply be
necessary to point out his connections with other members of the Seine-Oise
aristocracy in the 880s. Odo's family was closely connected politically to
Gauzlin's, and it is possible that his own wife was a Rorgonid who brought
important lands to her husband.' 37 Gauzlin, by this time returned to the heights of
royal favour, and with a number of important honores in Paris, including St-Denis,
may have been influential in securing Odo's appointment as count there in late
131 Bautier, 'Diplômes', p.219; idem, 'Origines', pp.52-4.
132 DCIII 162.
'"D CB 443. Might Boso's death explain why the king now felt that the church was back in his
gift?
134 D CB 378. See also D 419 for links between Boso and Dijon.
'"D CIII 155a. DD C2 49-55 may reveal, as Bautier, 'Origines', pp.58-9 argues, the confiscation
of a block of Boso's properties in Berry.
136 See c.4.2.
'' Favre, Eudes, p.13; Werner, 'Adelsfamilien', p.140 n.15.
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882 or early 883.' This appointment was also smoothed by Odo's probable
family link through his mother to the kin of counts Bego and Adaihard, which had
been closely associated with the Parisian comital office and the monastery of St-
Denis on and off since the eighth century. This family, which lost its primacy in
the Paris area after defecting to Lothar in 840, was also related to the Rorgonids,
and had been the proprietary clan of the monastery of Fossés before the Rorgonids
made it their Eigenkloster in 868.' Gauzlin's closeness to Odo at the siege of
Paris is apparent from the report of Abbo, whose evidence is particularly
noteworthy since he was related to the former and wrote for the latter.' 4° His work
casts them together as defenders of Paris, one as 'consul', the other as 'praesul' of
the city.' 4 ' It is also worth observing that the key honores of Gauzlin (St-Amand,
St-Germain-des-Prés, St-Denis), as well as those of Theoderic of Vermandois,
ended up in the hands of Odo's family and provided an important foundation for
their kingship.' 42 Theoderic himself also had influential connections in Paris,
shown for example in his association with bishop Ingeiwin when they intervened
together for the church of Châlons-sur-Marne,' 43 and if he mediated the return of
Gauzlin he may also have influenced the appointment of Odo. Finally Hucbald,
count of Senlis and another notable figure in the Seine-Oise area, was a political
ally of Odo: a contemporary letter implies that after taking over Neustria the latter
allowed Hucbald to use for himself some of the lands of St-Symphorien, Orleans,
in his own area.'
Odo's political links with Gauzlin and Theoderic are enough to suggest
that he too was one of the 'Franci' who sent out the invitation to Charles the Fat in
December 884. Like Gauzlin's, his family were well-connected in east
Carolingian political circles, and Odo himself had been at Lorsch in 876 to make a
donation.' 45 His brother Robert was already a count in Namur on the line splitting
138 Werner, 'Robertiens', p.20.
Brown, 'Politics', esp. pp.l63-'7, 177-203; 200-1 for Odo's relationship.
'4° On Abbo and the Rorgonids see Oexle, 'Ebroin', p.207, n.354; on Abbo and Odo see c.4.2.2.
141 Abbo, Be/la, esp. pp.1 6-8 for the sense ofjoint responsibility.
142 Werner, 'Gauzlin', p.46! and n.220.
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Lotharingia, and had been at Metz in 884 to seek the emperor's patronage. 146 The
esteem in which Charles held Robert is emphasised both by the terms used by the
charter to describe him, 'vir nobilis comes fidelissimus',' 47 and his success in
getting a clearly valuable villa held by him in beneficio handed over to his fidelis
Sanctio, the father of the tenth-century refonner St. Gerard of Brogne, in
proprietatem.'48 Indeed, Odo himself occupies an unusually prominent position in
imperial charters even before being put in charge of Neustria after the siege of
Paris, a position which also implies a close relationship with Charles.'49
5.4: Conclusion
In these men we can see the most conspicuous members of a coherent
aristocratic group supporting Charles the Fat in west Francia. Can it be described
as a 'personal network'? Charles was a largely absentee ruler for this regnum, and
these people had not been children with him at the court of Louis the German, nor
had they been at his side during his apprenticeship for royal office in Alemannia.
Still, there are hints in the evidence at least for Gauzlin, Odo and Geilo of a
peculiar trust which could be characterised as personal. Was it a network? This
can by no means be simply assumed from the demonstration of familial links, for
instance between Werner's so-called Theoderici and Childebrand-Nivelung clans,
to which most of the figures we have been discussing belonged. However,
although only some of the very top players are revealed by the evidence, they
must represent broad substrata of men and resources,' 5° and although the details
are often blurry the overall picture is clear. The group based around Paris and
Neustria which the sources allow us to glimpse can be linked into a network by
our perception of them actually acting together under the authority of the emperor.
This was not, or not merely, a 'personal' or a 'familial' network, it was first and
foremost a political network. Those who invited Charles in also served him and
were rewarded by him; Odo, Gauzlin, Theoderic, Aletramnus and others are seen
D CIII 105; see Wollasch, 'Klostergrundung', p.63; idem, 'Reformmonchtum', pp. 224-5.
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doing just that. Further south, although the sources are not so revealing, the
responsibilities bestowed upon the likes of Geilo of Langres and Bernard
Plantevelue show that it was not just this Paris group who supported Charles,
although it can be seen in action most clearly. A huge number of western
institutions sought out his patronage and took care to preserve its memory. In
other words, although his reign in the kingdom of his cousins lasted only two and
a half years, and hence cannot really be 'judged' in comparison to those of some
of his longer-lasting forbears, we can see that Charles the Fat had the resources
and made the effort not simply to reign there, but also to rule. If there was a mood
of gloom about the run of bad luck striking the Carolingian family in the earlier
880s, in Abbo of St-Germain-des-Prés there can be discerned an unmistakable
optimism in the power of the new king who had freed Paris from danger. His rule
was respected by his western supporters; they did not break from the eastern
kingdom in 885 or even in November 887, but waited until Charles the Fat was
dead before choosing a new king.
When they finally did so it was from among their own number, and the
opening of Odo's reign shows a continuity from that of his predecessor. While he
faced more opposition in Aquitaine and Burgundy, sections of whose nobility took
the opportunity provided by the absence of a Carolingian king to build up their
own positions, in Francia he kept his friends. Most strikingly, the Annales
Vedastini tell us that exactly the same man who had represented those inviting
Charles in 884 now repeated the favour for Odo in 888: Count Theoderic, whom
the annalist describes as predominant in the new king's following1 proceeded to
negotiate on Odo's behalf with Arnulf of Carinthia.' 5 ' The same political group
acted for Odo at the start of 888 as had acted for Charles at the end of 884.
Theoderic's son took over from him shortly afterwards before falling foul of the
grand designs of the count of Flanders.' 52 In the meantime, the defence of the
Oiselinie remained concentrated. Robert became marchio of Neustria in the role
created for Odo by Charles the Fat in 886. Askericus went on to take charge of
the royal chancery. Archbishop Walter of Sens, who crowned Odo, was appointed
'' AV s.a.888, pp.64-5.
AV s.a.895, p.77.
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in Charles's reign. It was from this core of support that Odo gradually extended
his authority over the regnum during the following year or so. Therefore in terms
of personnel as well as political structures, the reign of Charles the Fat leads us
forward to the start of that of Odo.
Some of these men, like Odo himself or Askericus, were put in place by
Charles the Fat. As should be clear, others, like Gauzlin, Theoderic, Aletramnus
and Geilo, take us back to the heart of the court circles of Louis III and Carloman
il.' 53 There are clues, however, which allow us to speculate about the origins of
this continuity even further back in time. It is generally acknowledged by
historians that the Capitulary of Quierzy, in which Charles the Bald spelled out the
arrangements for governing the western kingdom while he set off for Italy in 877,
reflects a subtle change in the political configuration of the high aristocracy.
While the most famous primores, Hugh the Abbot, Bernard Plantevelue, Boso,
were given prominent positions in the kingdom, they had been absent from the
key negotiations and were not granted any role in the temporary court of Louis the
Stammerer, probably because Charles hoped to call on them to aid him in Italy
should the occasion arise.' 54 Those who were given the best access to court were
lesser men, from outside the ranks of the 'supermagnates' whom Charles had been
building up throughout the 870s, and towards whom the smaller aristocrats may
have felt some resentment.' 55 Those designated at Quierzy as Louis's advisers
were connected to each other politically through the court, but also
geographically; the core were all, unlike any of the supermagnates, from Francia
proper. They were counts Adalelm of Laon, Adalard count of the palace, Baldwin
of Flanders, Conrad of Sens (later Paris), Theoderic of Vermandois; the bishops of
Paris, Toumai, Beauvais and Soissons; and abbots Welf of St-Colombe in Sens
(Conrad's brother), Gauzlin of St-Denis and Fulk of St-Berlin. The
supermagnates feared that the provisions in Quierzy concerning this group, which
Charles bolstered in the latter years of his reign,' 56 would become crystallised if
the emperor died in Italy, and they broke into revolt in an attempt to draw him
" Note also the Germundus in D CIII 142, perhaps the same man whose daughter had been
involved in the bizarre death of Louis III; AV s.a.882, p.52.
' Conventus Carisiacensis; Nelson, Charles, pp.246-52.
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back across the Alps. They were too late, and after their worst nightmare had
proceeded to come true these two groups, the supermagnates and the north
Frankish nobles, remained visibly distinct through the reign of Louis the
Stammerer.' 57 Indeed, the attempt of Gau.zlin and Conrad and their unnamed
accomplices (was Theoderic involved? St-Quentin did hold some of the
negotiations...) to divide the kingdom in 879-80 was in the main an attempt to
wrest influence back from the likes of Hugh, Bernard and Boso, who looked set to
benefit exclusively from proximity to the Alleinherrschafi of Louis III. This
struggle in particular, with the impending threat of Louis the Younger always
looming on the horizon, must have lived long in the memory. The capitulary of
877, then, left a strong imprint on the political alignments of the following years.
The document itself even served as the model for the royal promissiones of Louis
the Stammerer, Carloman and Odo.' 58 If by 885 the scars were healing, we can
still make out a distinct group of magnates whose interests were focused in
Francia proper.
While Charles the Bald was building up these men in the last years of his
life, we can catch occasional glimpses of how this might have contributed to their
formation of a political network. In 870 Charles's negotiating team prior to the
divisio of Meersen was led by Adalelm of Laon, Theoderic of Vermandois and
bishop Odo of Beauvais, along with the chamberlain Engeiram and another
Adalelm.' 59 Adalelm, Engelram, Gauzlin and Conrad were likewise involved
together in the rising of Charles the Bald's son Carloman as a letter of Hincmar in
871 shows.' 6° Adalelm himself was a relative of Odo, possibly through marriage
to the sister of Robert the Strong.' 6 ' Adalard count of the palace was another who
had been taken prisoner at Andernach with Gauzlin and Aletramnus.'62
Of course, political alliances could change in the blink of an eye. The
point of this is simply to show that there is a context for the development of a
156 Nelson, Charles, pp.246-7.
'"Ibid, p.255.
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political network among the members of the north Frankish aristocracy during the
870s, certainly by 877. Geography here coincided with politics and occasionally
family; Charles the Bald clearly considered them a unit by the time of the
assembly at Quierzy. This network was significant in many of the events from
877 to 888 and beyond.
Finally, did what looks from the outside like a political network have such
a consciousness of its own position? This is always a difficult question, but there
are signs that in this case the answer is yes.' 63 A lost set of annals from
Theoderic's monastery of St-Quentin recorded in 882: 'post cuius [ie.Louis III]
obitum Franci regem constituerunt Karlomannum.IM It was, of course, the
'Franci' who were also said to have sent the invitation out to Charles the Fat after
Carloman's death.' 65 These are views from the inside. An even more telling
example is the diploma of Carloman from 884 issued for the church of Châlons-
sur-Mame.' 66 The charter is unusual because it is dated 'anno II regni Karlomanni
regis in Frantia.' This is unique in dating the reign only to Carloman's succession
to Louis III in Neustria and Francia, and not in total regnal years back to 879,
which was the normal practice of Carloman's chancery.' 67 For some people, this
implies, it was rule of Francia proper which really counted. It is of special
interest, then, that the document was drafted by scribes from outside the chancery,
and that one of the men named as intervening for its production is none other than
count Theoderic, the representative of the Franci in 884 and the lay-abbot of St-
Quentin whence came the lost annals.' 68 This sort of sentiment fits well with the
impression of 'regnal awareness' we get from the literary sources, especially from
Gauzlin's relation Abbo, who was given to lambasting the character of
Burgundians and Aquitanians while passionately praising the Franks and
163 As also argued by Werner, 'Gauzlin', p.453.
Sermo, p.272. My emphasis.
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Neustrians, and also from the annalist of St-Vaast. 169 There was thus a
contemporary self-awareness of the significance of the geo-political groupings
which had coalesced during the last years of Charles the Bald.
The importance of this group based 'in Francia' successively to Charles
the Bald, Louis the Stammerer, Louis III, Carloman II, Charles the Fat and Odo
must be recognised. Although it does not do to schematise such ideas too much,
there is enough evidence to show a continuum in this network and its main figures
from the 870s to the 890s, figures whose political identities were given coherence
by their common experience of royal service and defence against the Vikings.
This sort of continuity is hardly surprising, but it is rarely if ever stressed, and in
fact is often assumed to be absent. In this continuum the reign of Charles the Fat
is not to be seen as a 'blosses Intermezzo'.' 70 He used the same tools as had been
at the disposal of his predecessors and would be to his successor. Although his
reign was in some ways anomalous and was too short to be put to a sustained test
of strength it is overly pessimistic to concluded that 877 saw the collapse of west
Frankish political institutions.' 7 ' Rather, the reign of Charles the Fat can be seen
as a keystone of the bridge cormecting the last years of Charles the Bald with the
first years of King Odo.
Thereafter, however, the situation began to fragment. As king, Odo
enjoyed only moderate success outside Francia proper. One reason for this was
that the arrival in the west Frankish kingdom of Guy of Spoleto later in 888 saw
the severing of links between the most important Frankish and Burgundian
supporters of Charles the Fat: Geilo of Langres threw in his lot with the new
claimant against Odo, and Rudolf had himself proclaimed king in Transjurane
Burgundy. Moreover, the rising of Charles the Simple in 893 saw more cracks
opening even within the aristocracy of Francia proper itself. The overarching
authority of Charles the Fat had provided a focus for the loyalties of these
geographically disparate aristocracies, and bound them together into the single
political structure of the reunified Carolingian empire. After his death, however,
the appearance of several kings competing for legitimacy and support divided the
' 69 0n Abbo see above, c.4.2.2; on the St-Vaast annals see Ehiers, 'Anfänge', pp.27-8.
' 70 Brühl, Fodrum, pp.35-6.
'' As does Nelson, Charles, pp.258-63.
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loyalties of these men and forced them to make choices which necessarily pitted
them against each other. Now, not even the notional unity which had been
articulated by the rule of multiple members of the Carolingian family held sway.
Here we can see the political map of Europe beginning to metamorphosise into its
tenth-century shape during the reign of Odo, not during that of Charles: the
geographical fragmentation of royal power was a phenomenon of the period after
888, not after 877.172
Having said all that, it must be stressed again that in many ways it is not
surprising to discover that the west Frankish kingdom was governed by Charles
the Fat in much the same way as by his predecessors. His most pressing political
problems were, as has already been emphasised, not those related to the
institutional logistics of government. The absence of easily-accessible
KOnigsnahe, which characterised the emperor's control of the various regna, and
stood in sharp contrast to the situation under the multiple kingdoms of the late
870s, was Charles's real problem. He did not have any legitimate sons to send out
into the regna as kings and diffuse access to the dynasty: this, and not newly-
emergent aristocratic authority, the view that the reunification was 'anachronistic',
or the desire of the regna to secede, was the crucial difference between his empire
and that of Charlemagne and Louis the Pious. The problem was not that the
nobility wanted to shake off Carolingian rule: it was that that they could not get
enough of it. To ease the pressure, the emperor needed above all to resolve the
doubts over the imperial succession, and hence find a way to make Konigsnahe a
more readily-available commodity. The empire was too big for one man, but then
it always had been. Obedience to the Carolingians had never been blind, and the
longer Charles's reign continued without such a solution, the more stress would be
placed upon his position. Charles himself was well aware of this state of affairs,




6: THE POLITICS OF SUCCESSION AND THE DEPOSITION OF
CHARLES THE FAT, 885-7
6.1: Three explanations: Verfassungsgeschichte, unity theory and the emperor's
illness
The final three years of the reign of Charles the Fat witnessed one of the
most spectacular changes of fortune in Carolingian political history. In spring 885
Charles had been able to give territorial substance to his imperial dignity with the
undisputed succession to the realm of Carloman II, and later that same year he and
his supporters dealt quickly and efficiently with the would-be usurper Hugh of
Lotharingia and his Viking ally Godafrid, putting both out of the picture
permanently: his confidence was, at this point, high.' Nonetheless, Charles's
succession plans remained shrouded in doubt as long as he failed to produce an
indisputably acceptable heir. Despite continuing to demonstrate the effectiveness
of his own rule in various parts of the empire, for example in the conclusion of the
siege of Paris in 886, this political problem lurked in the background as an ever-
increasing threat to his credibility. Finally, after a series of efforts to resolve the
issue (including the adoption of Louis of Provence and the divorce of the Empress
Richgard), in November 887 he was deposed and replaced in the east by his
brother's illegitimate son Arnuif of Carinthia. 2 Regino of Prüm, reflecting several
years later on the course of events, could still hardly believe how quickly power
had slithered from the hands of Charles the Fat: 'Erat res spectaculo digna et
aestimatione sortis humanae rerum varietate miranda.'3
Regino, diligent historian that he was, also had an opinion on the long-
term significance of what had occurred. His famous analysis of the subsequent
conflicts amongst the reguli shows that he was aware of how the events of 8 87-8
had shattered the monolith of Carolingian legitimacy once and for all; the new
kings were too equal in authority for any one of them to dominate the rest and
prevent wars between them. 4 For Regino there was of course a moral to the story
(it served as a demonstration of how God-givenfortuna could be all too easily lost
'See below, c.6.4.
2 See below, c.6.6.l(divorce); c.6.5 (adoption); c.6.7 (deposition).
Regino, Chronicon, s.a.887, p.128.
Ibid, s.a.888, p.129; for discussion see Airlie, 'Semper', pp.129-30.
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thanks to the tragic intervention of human frailty), but his assessment of the wide-
reaching outcome of the strife of 887-8 was essentially a political one. 5 Events
had brought it about: at Tribur in November 887 the magnates had decided that
Charles was too ill to rule and summoned Arnuif, and, even more importantly for
Regino, Charles had then died. However, the abbot of Prum's clarity of
explanation has not always been matched in more recent accounts of the end of the
Carolingian empire, which have often tended to over-schematise things. Here, by
way of introduction to this chapter, it is worth pondering for a moment on the
main forms that this tendency has taken.
German historians of the twentieth century have, like Regino, entered the
debate over the significance of the year 888 for medieval Verfassungsgeschichte,
but, unlike him, have sometimes tacitly removed politics and events from their
explanations. The best example of this is the well-known exchange between
Tellenbach and Schlesinger and some others in the 1930s, 40s and 50s. While
Tellenbach took the view that Arnulf's revolt was essentially just another military
coup of a type common enough in the brutal world of Frankish politics,
Schlesinger insisted that his rise represented the establishment of a new kind of
elective kingship brought about by the development of an increasingly
independent and class conscious aristocracy which began to impose institutional
checks on the power of the monarchy.6 The matters at stake were essentially
whether or not 887-8 saw the creation of a kingdom of Germany, and whether
king or Vol/c held the whip hand within it. The main reason for the spectacular
divergence of views lies in the fact that the two continuations of the Annales
Fuldenses, which perhaps inevitably exert great influence on the structure of
modern accounts, present diametrically opposing versions of the events of 887.
The Bavarian continuator, anxious to justify Arnulrs actions, stressed the role of a
wide-reaching magnate conspiracy against Charles the Fat, while the Mainz
annalist, now back on the emperor's side after the restoration of Archbishop
Liutbert to court, presented Arnuif as a rebel, seizing power by (implicitly
For Regino's idea offortuna see now Kortum, 'Weltgeschichte'.
6 Most of the contributions are collected in Kampf, Entstehung, and Hlawitschka, Konigswahl.
For useful commentaries see Freed, 'Reflections', p.555; Bowlus, 'Early History', pp.554-7, 573.
Reuter, 'Nobility', p.1 85, n.28 notes a methodological aspect to the dispute.
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illegitimate) force alone. 7 The disputants were thus readily able to find in the
contemporary texts exactly what they wanted to find, and to construct
contradictory hypotheses accordingly. Whichever side, if any, one favours, this
approach is methodologically suspect, as it involves generalising from texts which
were written in particular contexts and with specific political aims in mind.
Despite this problem, and despite the fact that the concerns debated by
Tellenbach and Schlesinger are no longer such hot issues as they were in 1 940s
Germany, the terms of the discussion about the balance between Adel and Kaiser
established the paradigms for many further discussions of the rising of Arnuif and
the end of the Carolingian empire. As argued in chapter 2, historians are still
inclined to sidestep the thorny problem of how to reconcile the contrasting sources
by selecting somewhat indiscriminately from each of them to create a new
political narrative. The accepted history of the 880s has become a catalogue of
disasters: individual events are taken out of context from different sources in order
to affirm an image of events running out of control. This cut-and-paste method
has produced, for example, the misleading juxtaposition of the strong aristocracy
of the Bavarian annalist's entry for 887 and the Mainz continuator's polemic about
the weak emperor 5 years earlier. 8 This amounts to a tacit declaration by posterity
of Schlesinger as the victor in the debate over German Verfassungsgeschichte: the
crisis of 8 87-8 is commonly held to be the outcome of momentous but nebulous
historical processes, such as the 'rise of the aristocracy' and the 'decline of royal
authority', which the course of contemporary events and politics passively reveals,
but does not affect.9
At a slightly lower level of abstraction, the end of the reign of Charles the
Fat has also been frequently explained in terms of contemporary ideology. In
particular, the adoption of Louis of Provence by the emperor in the early summer
of 887 is nearly always glossed as a policy designed by the archchancellor
Liutward, supposedly acting as the representative of a faction with a principled
belief in the divisibility of the empire. His subsequent ejection from court and
replacement by Liutbert of Mainz is accordingly thought to represent the victory
' Bowlus, 'Early History', p.557.
8 Eg. Fried, 'Kingdoms', p.159.
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of a 'unity' party bent on retaining the territorial integrity of the realm. On the
strength of the Mainz annalist's invective against Liutward in his 887 report,
where the fallen archchancellor is said to have conspired with Arnulf to bring
down Charles, this ideological disagreement is brought to bear as a key factor in
the deposition of the emperor.'° However, it would not be an exaggeration to say
that the principle of imperial unity has been more appealing to historians of the
twentieth century than to contemporaries." Indeed, one has the impression that
the idea of unity was never really a fixed principle in Carolingian government
(although Louis the Pious did try, unsuccessfully, to reach such a formulation), but
was a rhetorical position which could be adopted in the course of rather more
specific political circumstances.' 2 For example, Florus of Lyons' lament on the
division of the empire, the locus classicus of Carolingian unity theory, is often
read by historians as representative of a general clerical response to the projected
divisio of 843. In reality, Florus was a partisan author, and his work had the
specific aim of re-emphasising the imperial claims of Lothar in the runup to the
Verdun negotiations. 13 There is no source to back up this supposed ideological
divide as an explanation for Charles's deposition; the circumstances of Liutward's
expulsion from court are obscure, and even the veracity of the report that he
helped Arnulf come to power is questionable.' 4 What we know of the thoughts of
Liutbert of Mainz gives no clue that he believed unchangingly in the maintenance
of Frankish territorial coherence,' 5 and we know nothing reliable about the
personality or views of Liutward beyond what we choose to deduce from his
actions; the circularity of that approach is obvious. In other words, historians have
sometimes interpreted the key political events of the year 887 as the result of a
clash between factions representing two momentous ideologies; ideologies which
Schlesinger, 'Auflosung', is a classic statement; cf. Fried, Weg, pp.109,447-8.
'° Keller, 'Sturz', pp.Y79-8'4; Tellenbach, 'Grundlagen', p.230; BUhrer-Thierry, 'Conseiller',
p.112; Fried, Weg, pp.428-9.
"It is a particularly strong theme in Haiphen, Charlemagne, which was written as Europe fell into
conflict in the 1930s and 40s.
12 Penndorf, Problem, generally succeeds in demystifying the concept of Carolingian
Reichseinheitsidee.
' Nelson, 'Search', pp.101-2; cf. the discussions of the Visio Karoli below, cc.6.5 and 8.
' Buhrer-Thierry, 'Evêques', p.41. See below, c.6.6.
' For some of what we do know see Büttner, 'Liutbert', pp.104-IS; Hartmann, Konzil, pp.56, 68,
93-9, 105-6.
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we cannot prove to have even existed, never mind to have been at the forefront of
the minds of the protagonists.' 6 As with the scholarly preoccupation with the
verfassungsgeschichtliche significance of the deposition of the emperor, this
approach has minimised the role of events and politics in historical explanation by
reducing human actors to little more than passive vectors of great ideas and
processes. More particularly, Charles himself has been removed almost
completely from the explanation of his own fate, made an unthinking cipher
totally at the mercy of the powerful men in his court and kingdom and their
shadowy 'factions'.
That this has been possible is partly due to the third and last theme which
dominates accounts of the reign, that of the emperor's illness. With this we are
much closer to the level of everyday politics, as a sick king was vulnerable to
opposition on the grounds of being unfit to rule. Charles the Fat is often
characterised negatively in the historiography as 'weak' and 'sick' as an
individual, not to mention 'unpleasant and gauche', 'high strung' and 'raving
mad'.' 7 As already commented, such ascriptions of personality traits to most
figures in the early middle ages are dubious, as they are usually inferred from the
same events and actions which they are then used to explain. In Charles's case
they do stem in part from the evidence of illness which peppers his reign. This
amounts to the widely-reported 'fit' he suffered at Frankfurt in 87318; Hincmar's
description of him as 'infirmus' in 876'; a charter of 883 in which the emperor
made a gift to the church of Bergamo in thanks to St. Alexander, 'ad cuius limina
confugimus cuiusque intercessionibus a gravi infirmitate corporis nos dominus
restituit sanitati' 20; two annalistic references reporting a sickness in the winter of
886721 ; and the Bavarian continuator's account that in 887 Charles 'pro dolore
16 It is telling that some historians (such as Schieffer, 'Karl', p.148) swap the positions supposedly
held by Liutbert and Liutward: the 'unity' hypothesis is not being proven here, but simply used as
a convenient explanation for obscure events.
' Respectively: Borgolte, 'Karl', p.21; Lowe, 'Karlsbuch', p.139; Kantorowicz, 'Carolingian
King', p.92; Dutton, Politics, p.2Z7; Fried, Weg, p.423. These traits are often used as an




21 AFC s.a.886, p.105; BC s.a.887, p.115.
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capitis incisionem accepit.' 22 The most striking piece of evidence, the latter, has
been taken to mean that Charles was trepanned in order to cure a tumour, epilepsy
or some form of mental illness. However, Hans Oesterle has rightly pointed out
that the text is best read as signifying a letting of blood to cure a headache, not an
incision of the head itself, and that standard ninth-century medical wisdom would
not have advised a trepanning for either head pains or for epilepsy. 23 Moreover if,
as Oesterle plausibly argues, Carolingian medical knowledge incorporated the
eighth-century tract 'De minutione sanguinis sive de phleotomia' attributed to
Bede, it is highly significant that this text advises the opening of the 'vena
cephalica' to relieve head pains on the nones of April, as we know that Charles
was at Bodman, where the operation was carried out, in March and April. 24 In
other words, the blood-letting was carried out at this point not because of the
mounting gravity of Charles's illness, as the Bavarian annalist, anxious to justify
Arnuif's usurpation, would like us to believe, but rather in accordance with the
specifications of received medical wisdom.
The contexts of the other references allow us to play down their
significance also. The spasm of 873 bears the hallmarks more of a literary set-
piece than of a dispassionate medical report; and in any case Louis the German
allowed Charles to take charge of important diplomatic and judicial hearings
immediately afterwards. 25 Hincmar's 876 reference is isolated, and precedes by a
matter of days the formal divisio of the eastern kingdom agreed to by Charles's
brothers, a political event of the highest importance. The reference to the cure by
St. Alexander was presumably of the same disease which affected many people in
Italy in the summer of 883, and had a habit of laying low visiting Franks from
north of the Alps throughout the ninth century and later. 26 Although it hindered
Berengar's mission to oust Guy of Spoleto on Charles's orders, there is no
evidence that this fever was any more than a one-off illness. Likewise, the
22 BC s.a.887, p.115.
23 Oesterle, 'Kopfoperation'.
24 D CIII 157 shows him at Rottweil in mid-February, and BC s.a.887, p.115 has him at Bodman
before leaving for an assembly at Waiblingen after Easter, which fell on April 16. The first
diploma issued at Waiblingen was D 158 of May 7, but we know that Pope Stephen was invited to
the assembly for April 30; Fragmenta, no.14.
25 See c.1.2.
26 BC s.a.883, p.110.
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affliction of winter 886-7 was followed by intense diplomatic activity on Charles's
part aimed largely at resolving the succession issue. 27 None of this evidence,
therefore, permits the conclusion that Charles, one of the most mobile of the
Carolingian kings, was politically incapacitated by illness at any point in his reign.
Nor, by the same token, is it justifiable to string these examples together to
support a claim that he was in general a 'weak' or 'sickly' individual.
This is, however, exactly what modern historiography has done in order to
deprive the emperor of agency and to put him at the mercy of the supposedly
momentous and inexorable historical trends of the late ninth century. Regino was
not so dismissive. He thought that Charles's illness had only become politically
significant at the very last minute, when his men had turned up at the November
assembly in Tribur to find that 'non modo vires corporis, verum etiam animi
sensus ab eo diffugere.' 28 Now, he says, and only now, they acted and called for
Arnuif. This report is more convincing as evidence of a politically-significant
illness, as we know that Charles's resistance crumbled and that he was dead from
natural causes in a matter of weeks. Regino has, like any historian, an angle, but
he is careful here to put the events of 887 into some kind of context, while modern
authors have been content to fall back on long-held assumptions about the rise of
the aristocracy, the struggle for imperial unity and the weakness of the emperor.
Regino does not write Charles the Fat out of the history of his own reign, as others
have been inclined to do; this is why he could be so stunned at the speed with
which things turned sour for the Carolingians in the late 880s, while an additional
1100 years of hindsight have made it all look to others somewhat inevitable. The
rest of this chapter, then, is an attempt to go against the grain of what I have
argued is the prevalent historiographical view, and to explain the events of the
years 885-7 as facets of contemporary politics rather than as the visible fragments
of some rumbling subterranean process of long-term historical change. Because
the authors of the main contemporary annalistic sources were all interested parties
in one way or another, their narrative frameworks are untrustworthy when adopted
alone. The approach here will therefore be to attempt to contextualise the political
27 On which see below, c.6.5.
28 Regino, Chronicon, s.a.887, p.197.
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positions of the main actors in the drama (the imperial couple Charles and
Richgard, the rival archchancellors Liutbert and Liutward, the usurpers Hugh and
Arnuif, and the would-be kings Bernard and Louis) in order to propose a
hypothesis tying together the course of events over these three crucial years. From
this, the key issue which will emerge is that staple problem of early medieval
dynastic politics, the ordering of the royal succession.
6.2: The attempted legitimation of Bernard, August-October 885
885 marked a high point in the reign of Charles the Fat, whose acquisition
of the west Frankish throne in that year reunited the empire under a single ruler for
the first time since the death of Louis the Pious. However, the same
circumstances which had brought him this dignity with minimal effort, namely the
chance deaths of every other adult male legitimate Carolingian, posed anew the
problem which had been thought solved by the mutual agreement of 880: how to
settle the succession? After the death of Carloman II no legitimate adult male
Carolingians remained who could be expected to succeed in the long term, while
Charles's own marriage had been barren for over 20 years and hence looked to be
an unlikely source of a solution. The claims of three surviving illegitimate sons of
kings, Hugh of Lotharingia, Arnuif of Carinthia and Charles's own son Bernard,
thus came seriously into consideration for the first time.
Charles's first attempt at a solution was to have his bastard son legitimised
so that he could be designated as an heir. Our only direct narrative source for this
is the vitriolic pen of the Mainz annalist, who records that Charles 'Voluit enim, ut
fama vulgabat, quosdam episcopos inrationabiliter deponere et Bernhartum filium
suum ex concubina haeredem regni post se constituere; et hoc, quia per se posse
fieri dubitavit, per pontificem Romanum quasi apostolica auctoritate perficere
disposuit'. 29 The reference to the rumour of deposing bishops is probably
principally a reflection of the opposition to the plan of the annalist's patron
Liutbert of Mainz, fearful of a perpetuation of his exclusion from court. 3° It is
nonetheless also a clear demonstration of how illegitimacy of birth could be used
29 AFC s.a. 885, p.103.
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as grounds for opposition to a royal designation. This, an idea successfully used
by the Carolingians to limit the number of royal claimants, came in the end to be
Charles's greatest weakness.
We can speculate on what role Charles had in mind for Bernard for the
immediate future. We know that the meeting with the pope was scheduled for
Worms in October, and that, at this assembly, Charles held talks 'cum episcopis et
comitibus Gallianim.' 3 ' It was highly unusual for the emperor to convene such an
assembly for a specific group of magnates in a regnum outside their own.32 He
must therefore have had a special reason for demanding that they travel to Worms,
and given the purpose of the assembly it seems highly likely that this reason was
the acquisition of their consent to the legitimation of Bernard prior to his being set
up over them as subking. Who exactly were these bishops and counts? The
authors of the Annales Fuldenses and its continuations employ no consistent usage
for the geographical term 'Gaul'; sometimes it refers to Charles the Bald's
kingdom, sometimes to everything west of the Rhine. It could, however, also be
used to imply Lotharingia alone, especially when it was being referred to as a
political unit. Therefore the Mainz annalist reported in 879 that Hugh of
Lotharingia was 'tyrannidem in Gallia exercebat' while Zwentibald's Lotharingian
kingdom is described by the Bavarian annalist in 900 as 'Gallicanum regnum'.33
With this in mind it is interesting to note that the only delegation we can definitely
say was present at Worms was from the east Lotharingian monastery of St-
Maximian at Trier. 34 This foundation was, to judge from the struggles focused on
it during the subsequent decade, the main honor which had to be controlled by any
30 The attempted deposition of bishops was also the main grounds for Liutbert's opposition to the
divorce of Lothar II (and the associated legitimation of Hugh): Carroll, 'Archbishops', pp.13 1-5.
BC s.a. 885, p.113 for the assembly; AFC s.a. 885, p.103 for the Gauls. The AFC claim that
Charles only sent envoys to the pope from his assembly at Frankfurt in September is implausible:
since Hadrian died en route to east Francia in August or September (Davis, Lives, p.297, n.3),
there would not have been time for the imperial envoys to reach Rome with their invitation. The
BC account, which specifies Worms as the place of the meeting, and implies that it had been
planned before Charles's return from the west, is therefore preferrable. The emperor presumably
sent envoys to the pope while he waited to cross the Alps to Grand. D CIII 133 shows he was at
Worms by 1 October.
32 Hlawitschka, Lotharingien, p.24.
B AF s.a. 879, p.93; BC s.a. 900, p.134.
D CIII 133.
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prospective ruler of Lotharingia. 35 It is, therefore, a plausible suggestion that
Charles invited these primores to the papal assembly at Worms because he hoped
to establish Bernard with the consent of all present as subking of Lotharingia,
presumably when he had come of age. If this was the case it would explain the
cryptic comment of Notker in the Gesta Karoli, a text shot through with
observations on Charles the Fat's succession arrangements, when referring to the
sacking of Lotharingia's other principal royal monastery, Prum, by the Vikings:
'quam [PrUm's destruction] antea non absolvam quam Bernhardulum vestrum
spata femur accinctum conspiciam.' 36 In this measure, as in the motivations
behind the Vienne agreement of 880, we can see again that control of Lotharingia,
a regnum rich in royal estates and political prestige, was perceived as a key
priority by the rulers of the late Carolingian empire.
A further insight into the whole affair is provided by a charter issued on 28
August 885 at the monastery of Lorsch in favour of the church of Langres.37
Among the conditions of the grant were that the bishop was to hold an annual
feast to commemorate the emperor and his consecration, the first charter of an east
Frankish king to make such a specification. He was also to ensure the
performance of regular prayers for Charles, his wife, his antecessores, his
offspring ('proles nostra') and the stability of the whole empire. Significantly, the
provision of prayers for the royal progeny, while a staple element of Carolingian
prayer formulas, was only formally introduced into Charles's charters in the year
885, after the death of Carloman II and the consequent inception of the plan to
legitimise Bernard.38 This particular charter, moreover, was the first one in
" limes, State, pp.226-7.
36 Notker, Gesta, 2.12, p.74. Interestingly, Karlmann's sub-regnal authority in Lotharingia around
870 was partly expressed by his petitioning of a charter for Prum: D LG 141; see above, c.1.2.
D CIII 129.
DD CHI 111, 117, 123, 129 (all 885), 135, 147, 149 (all 886), 153 (887). 'Proles' provisions do
appear in three charters from before 885, DD 28, 35 and 62, but all are literal copies of earlier
models from the reigns of Louis the Pious and Karlmann of Bavaria. Their significance is offset
by DD 37 and 102, which are also literal copies of earlier charters but which programmatically
exclude the word 'proles' which did feature in their models; see Ewig, 'Gebetsdienst', p.75.
Evidently there was a will in the chancery to keep the word out, even if supervision was not strict
enough to stop over-zealous scribes sometimes copying it back in. Equally, after 885, the
conscious effort to include the word is clear, as shown by D 135 for the church of Passau. Its
formulas were a literal repeat of those in D 134, issued only three days earlier for the same
institution, in which the word 'prolis' in the prayer clause was the only new addition: clearly the
scribe had mistakenly left it out in the earlier document and smartly corrected himself in the latter.
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Charles's reign to link prayers for his antecessores to those for his pro/es. It thus
has a uniquely dynastic feel. This is made even more obvious when one
remembers that 28 August was the anniversary of Louis the German's death, and
that Lorsch was the site of his tomb. Behind this document, therefore, probably
lies some sort of ceremony held by the emperor in which he tried to connect the
unquestionable legitimacy of the past generations of his dead family to his son
Bernard, emphasising a dynastic continuity.39
The cloisters of Lorsch rang with several other even more recent dynastic
associations which enhanced its suitability as the venue for this performance.
Louis the Younger had had his father laid to rest there in 876 and it seems he
began to promote it as a family mausoleum for the east Frankish line, providing a
focus of Carolingian legitimacy in the heart of his own kingdom. 4° He interred his
son Hugh (d.880) there, and constructed a new entrance hall which may have
served as a triumphal arch on the procession route to the tombs themselves. 4' In
882 Louis the Younger himself found his final resting place at the monastery.42
Moreover, the Lorsch calendar records liturgical commemoration of both Louis
the German's death and Louis the Younger's subsequent victory over Charles the
Bald at the battle of Andernach. 43 Already in June 884 Charles the Fat had begun
to tap into this rich seam of east Frankish dynastic legitimacy by ordering an
eternal flame to be maintained at the tombs of his father and brother for the good
of all their souls.'
This promotion of legitimacy was highlighted further in the 885 charter for
Langres by the narrative section's detailing of how the properties involved had
been usurped by 'quorundam principum tyrannica sacrilegaque'. This phrase
provides a direct contrast between the legitimate ruler, restoring the properties to
the wronged church in return for dynastic commemoration, and the illegitimate
This kind of artificial emphasising of a particular dynastic lineage for political reasons is a
feature of several late Carolingian charters: cf., for instance, D CIII 27 for Louis il's burial church;
D AC 70 for Lorsch; D K 4, which mentions Louis II, Charles the Bald and Louis the German.
For comments see Ewig, 'Gebetsdienst', pp.53, 73, 76 and passim; Schieffer, 'Väter', pp.162-4.
° Fried, Ludwig, p.13; see also limes, 'Kings', pp.318-9.
41 Jacobsen, 'Torhalle'.
42 AF s.a. 882, p.97.
4° McCormick. Victoiy, pp.36 I-2.
M DCIII 103.
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tyrannus, who had removed the lands by force in the first place. The location of
Langres on the edge of Lotharingia and the date of late summer 885 make an
identification of this 'tyrant' with the recently captured usurper Hugh of
Lotharingia very tempting. The chronology of his rebellion, which will be
discussed in section 6.4, allows the suspicion that he may have been forced to
attend the Lorsch ceremony prior to his trial at Frankfurt. This charter may thus
stand as witness to an attempt by Charles the Fat to not only assert and emphasise
the dynastic legitimacy of his son Bernard, but to contrast it with the tyrannical
illegitimacy of his cousin Hugh.
These ideological messages were intended to prime their audience for the
formal legitimising of Bernard by the pope at Worms in October. Every resource
was being tapped in support of a move which lacked a better precedent than that
of Lothar II, and was by no means guaranteed to succeed. Unfortunately for him,
the effectiveness of Charles's pro-Bernard propaganda did not have a chance to be
tested: Pope Hadrian III died on the road before even making it out of Italy.45
Before considering the consequences of this turn of events for Charles, however,
we must examine the positions of the other potential claimants to the throne at this
pregnant moment in the politics of the imperial succession, namely Hugh of
Lotharingia and, firstly, ArnulfofCarinthia.
6.3: The position of Arnulf, 876-85
After tracing the descent line of the Carolingian dynasty from 840 down to
881 in his continuation of the chronicle of Erchanbert, Notker the Stammerer
surveyed the configuration of rulers in his own time with something approaching
optimism. In the west he was glad to see the line of Charles the Bald culminate in
the young and vigorous kings Louis III and Carloman II, to whom he referred as
'spes Europae'. In his own eastern kingdom, meanwhile, Notker's appreciation of
the regal qualities of both Louis the Younger and Charles the Fat was tempered by
nagging doubts over their lack of heirs. For the long-term survival of the line of
Louis the German, he chose to place his hopes on the shoulders of the late
AFC s.a.885, p.103.
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Karlmann's illegitimate son Arnulf: '0! Utinam vivat, ne extinguatur lucerna
magni Ludovici de domno Domini!'46
The monk of St-Gall backed up this hope by trying to counteract the
memory of Arnulf's illegitimate birth (c.850) with a heavy stress on the nobility of
his mother Liutswind.47 Indeed, his status as an honorary full Carolingian may
have originally been pushed forward by Karlmann, who lacked other sons and
probably initially intended Amulf to succeed him in Bavaria at least. 48 This
intention is perhaps reflected in a Regensburg charter from Karlmarm's reign,
which gives Arnulf the designation 'filius regalis'. 49 This unusual epithet seems to
emphasise the son's regality in a more independent way than the customary 'filius
regis'. However, Karlmann's plans for his son were hampered by the stroke the
king suffered in early 879.° Louis the Younger took advantage by trying to
extract the allegiance of as many of the Bavarian leading men as he could, but the
situation remained uncertain, as revealed by a Regensburg charter from 879 which
is dated by the reigns of all three sons of Louis the German: the drafter clearly had
doubts as to who his next king would be. 5 ' This uneasy situation prevailed after
Louis left Bavaria before Easter, when Arnulf seems to have taken over as king in
all but name, assuming responsibility for relieving some prominent counts, who
were in disagreement with him and his father, of their honores. At about the same
time, with all parties staking their claims and illness forcing Karlmann to try to
regulate his succession definitively, the king started to include Arnulf in the prayer
provisions of his charters, probably reflecting an attempt to bolster his son's
position further. 52 However, the aggrieved counts appealed to Louis, who duly
moved east in November and started to rule by returning their offices. Clearly,
there were differences of opinion among the Bavarians as to who should succeed
which divided the nobles there as long as Karlinann remained as a lame duck
Notker, Conrinuatio, p.330.
Ibid: 'nobilissima femina.' On her, see Schieffer, 'Karl', pp.135-6. Cf. Regino, Chronicon,
s.a.880, p.116, who also appeals to the nobility of Arnulf's mother, along with the resonances of
his name, to bridge the legitimacy gap.
48 Schieffer, 'Karl', p.137.
49DReg86.
5° AF s.a.879, p.92.
D Reg 92.
52 D K 27 from August; see Ewig, 'Gebetsdienst', p.73 with n.274.
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ruler. Ultimately, however, these differences were resolved when the latter, too ill
to oppose his brother, formally abdicated in Louis's favour, commending Arnulf
to him along with the kingdom.53
Although deprived by Louis of the regnal authority which he had enjoyed
in the summer and autumn of 879, Arnulf still occupied the position he had earlier
filled while Karlmann ruled actively: Regino specifies this as control of
Carinthia. 54 We can supplement the abbot of Prtim's report with that of the
Bavarian continuator for 884, where it is stated that Arnulf 'Parmoniam tenuit'.55
However, certainly by 884 parts of Pannonia were controlled by the Frankish
client dux Brazlavo (between the Sava and Drava rivers) and the margrave Arbo
(along the Danube), so this evidence requires some refining. A charter dating
from between 876 and 880 may allow us to be more specific concerning Arnulf's
territory. It records a transaction as part of which the deacon Gundbato handed
over to St-Emmeram in Regensburg his property at Quartinaha in Pannonia,
'domino suo Arnolfo fihio regali permittente, a quo earn in possessionem
accepit.' 56 We know from the De Conversione Bagoariorum et Carantanorum
Libel/us (c.871) that Quartinaha had previously been in the possession of the Slav
dux Kocel (or Chezil). 57 Kocel, and before him his father Pribina, were client
princes of the Carolingians whose power base lay in Lower Pannonia, focused on
the fortress of Moosburg just west of Lake Balaton, where many of their
properties, including Quartinaha, were concentrated. 58 This evidence therefore
provides a hint that Arnulf had been installed in this extended Lower Pannonian
realm, which retained both its cohesion and its importance through to his reign
" AF s.a.879, pp.92-3 for the above events. AB s.a.879, p.238 and AS s.a.878, p.742 also record
aspects of the fracas. D LY 13 is the proof that Louis was in Regensburg in November. Whatever
the original cause of the dispute with the counts, it demonstrates an opposition to the succession of
Arnuif, which was clearly feared to be realistic at the time.
' Regino, Chronicon, s.a.880, p.117: 'Concessit autem idem rex [Louis] Arnulfo Carantanum,
quod ei pater jam pridem concesserat.'
" BC s.a.884, p.112. Bertels, 'Carantania', pp.1 65-8, speculates that Regino implicitly included
Pannonia in his use of the unusual term 'Carantanum'. For the following, see Map 4.
DReg86.
" De conversione, p.14.
Moosburg is at modem Zalavãr in Hungary, and is not to be confused with the fortress of the
same name in Carinthia. On the establishment of Pnbina and Kocel's lordship see De
Conversione, pp.11 -4 and Bowlus, Franks, pp.1 04-7.
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proper, in succession to Kocel, who probably died in 875. The immediate
benefit of this arrangement had been that it provided protection on the east side for
Karlmann's expeditions into Italy, some of which were launched from Carinthia.6°
We can also appreciate from the Gundbato charter that Arnulfs authority in
Pannonia under Karlmann and probably Louis was quite considerable, and
extended to the (royal) prerogative of distribution of significant properties.
A renewal and slight enhancement of Gundbato's charter in the 880s
confirms that Arnuif retained control of this strategically important lordship under
Charles the Fat, whose succession to Bavaria in 882 he does not seem to have
objected to. 61 This document was promulgated in Pannonia itself before legates of
the bishop of Regensburg and 'in presentia Arnulfi ducis'. The use of the
designation 'dux' here tallies with the epithet 'princeps' applied to Arnuif by the
Bavarian annalist in his account of the Asselt campaign led by Charles in 882.62
Both these words imply a kind of military responsibility which is commensurate
with his control of the south eastern marches as well as with the statement of the
Bavarian annalist (who, it was argued in chapter 2, may well have been a
participant and was thus in a position to know) that he commanded the whole
Bavarian army on the Asselt campaign. Therefore, although the charter of
confirmation does not, like the original, highlight Arnulf's association with full
royal authority with a term like 'filius regalis', his initial position under Charles
the Fat was powerful and important, at least militarily.63
Wolfram, Geburt, p.290 with n.2 for Kocel's death date. The enduring cohesion of the
Pazuionian command focused on Moosburg is demonstrated by BC s.a. 896, p.130, where we learn
that Arnuif placed it temporarily in the hands of the Slavic dux Braziavo to defend it from the
escalating effects of the struggle between the Magyars and Bulgars. Arnulf often stayed at
Moosburg in the early years of his reign: see Bowlus, 'Early History' for exegesis of his itinerary.
D Reg 86 also reveals that Kocel had had properties as far north and west as the Raba river,
properties which now came into the hands of Arnulfs man Gundbato. If the Raba marked the
boundary of Kocel/Arnulfs reahn, it would explain why it was the terminal point for the ravages
of his enemy Zwentibald in the war of 882-4: BC s.a. 884, p.113.
60 Bowlus, Franks, p.201.
61 D Reg 102.
62 BC s.a. 882, p.107.
63 The Annales Fuldenses and its continuations are silent about events on the eastern frontier
during the 880s (with the exception of the Wilhelminer war): this may be a sign that Charles had
been happy to delegate management of the region to Arnulf.
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However, we should not, as did Tellenbach, take this to mean that Arnulf
was the dominant figure in the politics of the whole Bavarian regnum.TM Recent
research by Buhrer-Thierry has drawn attention to the fact that the 11 charters of
Charles the Fat for Bavarian recipients, a not inconsiderable number in view of the
length of his reign there, all share the anomaly of having been promulgated
without mention of intercessors. 65 She argues convincingly on the basis of this
evidence that Charles dealt directly with Bavaria's high ecclesiastics, who were
the charters' chief beneficiaries and who formed a self-contained group which
rarely influenced events in other regna. The emperor, moreover, proved more
than capable of intervening decisively in this episcopal circle, as shown in 884
when he installed the royal notary Waldo in the see of Freising, a position
normally monopolised by a powerful local aristocratic family. 67 In these
substantial relationships between the emperor and influential churches and
individuals in the Bavarian heartland, which constituted a continuation of Louis
the German's practices of ruling this region, Arnulf seems to have played no part
whatsoever. 68 By contrast, many of these churches controlled extensive estates in
Carinthia and Pannonia which were crucial to Carolingian control of those regions
and the support of passing royal armies.69
Nonetheless, if Arnuif was not the only political force in Bavaria and the
marches, his position early in Charles's reign there looks significant when
compared with that of his father before 876. Karlmann was also regarded as a dux
in the south-eastern marches, but his authority did not, unlike Arnulf's, transcend
the boundaries of Carinthia. 7° Karlmann, like his brothers and later son, was not
designated with a royal title, and was also confined by and large to military
responsibility for his regnum. 7 ' Because before 884 Louis III and Carloman II
' Tellenbach, 'Geschichte', pp.231-3.
65 Buhrer-Thierry, 'Evêques', pp.Y1-4O, where she lists only ten charters, omitting D CIII 59 for
the monastery of Metten, although this does not negatively affect her argument.
D CIII 113, the only one for a layman, fits the theory since its recipient Witagowo had been a
partisan of Charles during the Wilhelminer war of 882-4: see Bowlus, Franks, pp.292-3, 298.
67 BUhrer-Thierry, 'Evéques', pp.39-40.
68 On Louis's relationship with the Bavarian episcopate, see Fried, 'Kingdoms', pp.148-9.
69 Most notable was Freising: Bowlus, Franks, pp.139, 170, 185, 329.
° AF s.a. 863, p.56 says he was 'praelatus Carantanis'; see also above, c.1.2.
71 Titles like dux and princeps used for Arnulf were also applied to Louis the German's Sons
before 876; see c.l.2.
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remained ahead of him in the queue for the throne, Arnuif, and presumably his
admirers like Notker, cannot have been dissatisfied with the role assigned to him
by his uncle.
The honeymoon period was not to last long. Arnuif's relationship with
Charles was terminally damaged by the so-called Wilhelminer war, a long account
of which dominates the Bavarian continuator's anna! for 884.72 The roots of the
trouble reached back to 871, when Louis the German had appointed a certain Arbo
to the command of a key part of the eastern frontier on the Danube, stretching
from the Traungau along to the Vienna basin, then south-east to Szombathely and
the Raba river. 73 The sons of the previous incumbents, the celebrated margraves
William and Engelschalk, took exception to this state of affairs, and in the reign of
Charles the Fat began a campaign to eject Arbo, which met with initial success.
Arbo appealed for, and received, help from both the Moravian dux Zwentibald and
the emperor, who reinstalled him in his command. Zwentibald then escalated the
scale of the conflict by invading Pannonia and mutilating one of the sons, revenge,
the annalist tells us, both for the harm done to Arbo and for the injuries done to
the Moravians by the late margraves William and Engelschalk. This caused the
remaining sons to withdraw from the authority of Charles the Fat in order to
become the men of Arnuif. Arnuif refused to swear oaths of peace with
Zwentibald, or to hand over the sons, to which the Moravians responded with
further invasions. Finally, after the conflict had taken up the best part of two and a
half years, the emperor himself turned up in late 884 and received Zwentibald as
his man at the Kaumberg near Tulin, receiving promises of peace and fidelity.74
The Slavic dux Braziavo was also received as Charles's man on this occasion.75
Peace was not sealed between Arnuif and the Moravians until the latter part of the
following year.76
Some important points concerning Charles's relationship with Arnuif
emerge from this protracted feud. Firstly, the emperor's will concerning eastern
72 BC s.a. 884, pp.110-3. For commentary see Bowlus, Franks, pp.208-16.
Ibid. p.208; Wolfram, Geburt, p.289.
BC s.a. 884, p.1 13: 'Veniens Zwentibaldus dux cum principibus suis, homo, sicut mos est, per
manus imperatons efficitur'.
See Wolfram, Geburt, pp.355-7 on him.
76 BC s.a. 885, p.1 14.
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frontier comital appointments prevailed: Arnuif, as in the Bavarian episcopate, had
no rights as far as redistributing honores went. Admittedly, the cost was
unusually high, but then dispossessing the scions of an established margrave
family was an unusually bold decision, considering that more normal Carolingian
tactics would have been to rubber stamp the status quo. Moreover, despite his
obvious distress at the whole affair, and his particular hatred for the Moravians,
who acted on behalf of Arbo and eventually Charles, the Bavarian annalist
ultimately blamed the sons, stating that the tragedy had come about 'per
antefactum puerile consilium.' 77 Secondly, it is clear that Arnulf made a
conscious decision to stand against Charles when he received the sons as his men
after they withdrew from the emperor's commendation. Opposition to the
appointment of Arbo and all that stemmed from it was an act of rebellion, a
situation which was publicly recognised when Charles formally acknowledged
Zwentibald as his man in 884 at the Kaumberg, which, pointedly, was a key
stronghold in Arbo's lordship. 78 The Moravian dux was (politically and
geographically) a natural ally for the emperor against Arnulf, who posed the
additional threat of being a potential usurper: the meeting at the Kaumberg did not
humble Zwentibald, but rather established him as a Frankish client. 79 As he and
Arnuif were still at war, this also implicitly sanctioned the continuation of the
conflict. This display of force and unity must not only have demoralised Arnuif,
but also set the seal on the major territorial gains which Zwentibald had made and
retained in Lower Paimonia. 8° The course of the Wilhelminer war is a classic
example of the interplay between aristocratic rivalries, royal authority and external
peoples which frequently determined the course of events on the Carolingian
frontiers. 8 ' However, its outcome was not, as has been claimed, damaging to
Charles the Fat's authority; rather, his positive intervention ensured that it was a
"BC s.a. 884, P.112. This could also be rendered: 'through the puerile plan made beforehand',
but the general point still stands.
78 A clue to Arnulf's motives in his vehement opposition to Arbo may be given by the latter's close
family links to Pribina and Kocel: Bowlus, Franks, pp.202-8. This may have given him a claim to
influence in the Lower Pannonian lordship which threatened Arnulf.
Bowlus, Franks, p.214 rightly stresses.
° Ibid. p.292; Wolfram, Geburt, p.292; Notker, Gesta, 2.14, p.78 refers to Amulf's lands as
'angustiae.'
' Reuter, Germany, pp.124-5.
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major political setback for his nephew. 82 The point was emphatically driven home
by the route of the emperor's subsequent journey to Italy, on which he pointedly
conducted his army through Arnuif's heartland in Carinthia.83
The whole episode demonstrated to Arnulf the practical limits of his
authority, much as had the resolutions of similar conflicts between Louis the
German and his sons. A crucial difference, however, was that Arnuif was not the
ruler's son, nor was he of legitimate birth, and hence he could have no automatic
expectation of a share in the governance of the empire. Failure to remain in the
emperor's good books was potentially very damaging to any hopes he might have
had of succeeding to a throne, and there are some indications that, once the
Wilhelminer war brought him to his knees, Charles wanted to keep him there.
These are provided by a charter issued by the emperor in favour of the church of
Otting on 25 August 885.84 This document records a rather substantial gift of
fiscal rights in no fewer than 19 royal curtes, in addition to a share of the tolls at
two. The estates named are all in eastern Bavaria and Upper Austria, primarily in
the complex of royal properties in the Inn-Salzach region. This area had been the
springboard for many a campaign into Carinthia and Pannonia in the reigns of
Louis the German and, especially, Karlmann, and some of these very estates were
regularly involved in provisioning such excursions. 85 Three of the first four
centres named in the charter, Ranshofen, Mattighofen and Atterhofen, were
absolutely essential to Carolingian logistical structures on the way to Salzburg and
the middle Enns passes. 86 Others, such as Dingolfing and Loiching on the Isar,
were used as staging points on the way from Regensburg down to the Inn-Salzach
complex. By giving these rights to the royal chapel at Otting, the favoured
82 Smith, 'Fines', p.182: 'a devastating blow to Charles the Fat'; cf. Reuter, Germany, p.116. We
should also note here that by turning against Zwentibald, Arnulf saw a decline in the influence
over the Moravian church of his ally bishop Wiching of Nitra, and a consonant increase in the
authority of Wiching's rival Methodius, who was present at the Kaumberg with Zwentibald and
Charles: Bowlus, Franks, pp.214-5. This severing of ecclesiastical links between Arnulf and
Zwentibald must have isolated him even more. Methodius may have had a previous meeting with
Charles on the Danube in 882: Róna-Tas, Hungarians, p.286.
83 BC s.a. 884, p.113; Bowlus, 'Early History', p.561 with n.22.
D CIII 128 enacted at Waiblingen. See Map 5.
Bowlus, Franks, pp.197-201 offers observations on the region under Karlmann, and see ibid,
pp.30-2 on the methodology of deducing campaign routes from royal charters.
86 Ibid, p.84. The other one of the four, Wels, was connected to Mattighofen by road, and was also
a key supply point on the route to Carinthia; ibid, p.231.
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residence and later tomb of King Karlmann, Charles was reinforcing this extensive
logistical network and securing its readiness to support a royal army passing
through the region.
What makes this gift even more striking is that throughout the previous
part of his reign Charles had showed absolutely no interest in the Inn-Salzach area,
preferring instead to bolster the properties and privileges of churches on the other
major route east, from Regensburg downstream along the Danube and through
Arbo's lordship. 87 This was the path he had taken on his only previous visit to the
marches as king, en route to meet Zwentibald in 884 at the Kaumberg, which itself
lay on property administered by the church of Regensburg. 88 The Otting charter
also stands out among Charles's Bavarian diplomas by having been issued in
Alemannia: he normally patronised Bavarian institutions only when in that
regnum. 89 We may assume, therefore, that his sudden interest in the Otting
network as he passed through Alemannia in August 885 had a particular reason,
and the most likely explanation is that he was planning a campaign of some sort
across the passes into Carinthia.9°
Two circumstances allow us to furnish Charles with a motive for deciding
at this point to impress Arnuif with another show of force. Firstly, in August 885
Arnulf had still not made peace with the Moravians, and so remained the one
volatile element in the configuration of the south-eastern marches: Arbo to his
north, Brazlavo to his south, and Zwentibald to his east (between Lake Balaton
and the Danube) all stood in confirmed loyalty to the emperor. Secondly, the
Otting charter was enacted only three days before the ceremony held at Lorsch to
pave the way for the designation of Bernard as the emperor's heir. 9 ' The projected
campaign which lies behind the Otting document was thus a product of a time in
81 DD CIII 59, 72-5, 107, 113, 127, 134-5.
88 DD CIII 107-9 were issued at Regensburg in September 884 on the way to this meeting. D LG
96 for Regensburg's rights in the area. Charles had earlier visited the marches on campaign in
869: AF s.a.869, pp.68-9.
BUhrer-Thierry, 'Eveques', pp.38-9. This is largely true of all Charles's charters, which were
only in unusual circumstances issued outside the kingdom they concerned.
9° D CIII 127 reveals that Engihnar, abbot of Regensburg and bishop of Passau, was also present at
Waiblingen. This is a unique example in Charles's reign of a Bavarian churchman travelling
outside his home regnum to obtain a charter, and is presumably to be explained by his
participation in the planning of this campaign.
91 See above, c.6.2.
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which Charles's thinking was dominated by the resolution of the imperial
succession. It was surely intended to pre-empt any resistance Arnuif may have
mounted to the Bernard plan, which threatened his own hopes of a crown. Such
resistance was all the more likely to be forthcoming because, with the death of the
logical and intended successor Carloman II in December 884, the claims of
illegitimate Carolingians acquired a new credibility. Since Arnuif had already
shown himself willing to rebel over matters of considerably less import, another
visit to his heartland from the emperor and his army was a timely measure to take
in support of the controversial Bernard plan, and was justified by the fact that
Arnulf was still in a state of war with confirmed imperial vassals in the south-east.
We know that Charles had already arranged to meet Hadrian III at Worms
in early October to legitimise Bernard, so any campaign could not have proceeded
until after that date. Charles eventually spent Christmas and part of January at
Regensburg and, given the timescale and the general inaccessibility of Alpine
passes in the winter, it seems likely that this pause had been his intention from the
beginning.92 Here was a built-in opportunity for Arnulf to come to terms with the
situation: he took it, making peace with Zwentibald under the watchful eyes of the
Bavarian nobles.93 The Bavarian continuator, our source for this agreement,
places it at the very end of his annal for 885, after the blinding of Hugh, which
probably took place in September. 94 It is therefore quite likely that Arnulf
instigated the peace after hearing that Charles was planning to head east.
Ultimately, the emperor never made the crossing into Carinthia, travelling instead
to Italy to meet the new pope. We may assume that this was because, after ending
his quarrel with the Moravians, Arnulf appeared in Regensburg himself over the
festive period and gave satisfaction to his uncle. 95 He would have been all the
readier to do after the initial failure of the Bernard plan caused by the death of the
pope, which meant that his hopes of receiving some sort of royal designation
himself could be rekindled.
92 For itinerary details see AFC s.a.885, p.103; BC s.a.886, p.114; DD CIII 134-5.
BC s.a.885, p.114.
See below, c.6.4.
The Bavarian annalist's reference to the presence of the Bavarian nobles suggests that Arnuif
made this peace at court in Regensburg. See c.6.4 for more on this hypothetical encounter.
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It is clear, then, that Arnulf's position changed over time. Having tasted
actual royal power as his father's regent in the middle months of 879, he failed to
secure the succession but retained his position under Louis the Younger. Initially
well-placed under Charles the Fat's authority in a military role analagous to that
which had been enjoyed by Karlmann in his younger days, his part in the
Wilhelminer war of 882-4 lost him the favour of the emperor as well as large
stretches of territory in Lower Pannonia. His fall from grace had, by an unlucky
twist of fate, coincided with the deaths of the last legitimate Carolingian rulers: he
hit his political nadir just as his claim to share in the imperial succession might
have acquired new plausibility. Accordingly, Charles decided to put all his eggs
into Bernard's basket, not merely passing over Arnulf but taking active measures
to keep him in his place.
That the swift failure of the Bernard plan gave Arnulf new hopes of a
return to favour is probable, but Charles showed himself little inclined to satisfy
them. By the time Notker the Stammerer came to write his Gesta Karoli (885-6),
he had lost the cautious optimism he had expressed in 881 for Arnulf's chances of
succeeding the heirless Charles the Fat. Now it seemed to him that even Arnuif's
military responsibilities had been criminally reduced: 'Gladius vester in sanguine
Nordostranorum duratus obsistat, adiuncto sibi mucrone Karliomanni fratris
vestri, tincto quidem in eorundem cruore', he said, with an obvious reference to
Charles and Arnulf's cooperation at Asselt, 'sed nunc non propter ignaviam sed
propter inopiam rerum angustiamque terrarum fidelissimi vestri Arnoldi ita in
rubiginem versus, ut tamen iussu et voluntate potentiae vestrae haut difficulter
possit ad acumen et splendorem perduci. Hic enim solus ramusculus cum
tenuissima Bennolini [Bernard] astula de fecundissima Hiudowici radice sub
singulari cacumine protectionis vestrae pullulascit.' 96 Not only was Arnulf's
military involvement now limited, but Notker's words imply a perception on his
part that Arnulf's chances of succession had been ruled out by the emperor; he
exhorted Charles to remember that Arnulf was just as much of the line of Louis
the Pious as was Bernard. This point had also been implicit in his Continuatio,
which traced the descent of the Carolingians from Louis the Pious down to Louis
Notker, Gesta, 2.14, p.78.
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the Younger, Charles the Fat and Arnulf. Charles's determined preference for the
'tenuissima astula' (Bernard) over the 'ramusculus' (Arnulf) at a time when the
options were so limited exasperated the monk of St-Gall and filled him with great
trepidation for the line's continuance.97 Notker astutely saw, to continue with his
felicitous arboreal metaphor, that the Carolingian family tree was in danger of
being toppled unless all of its branches were included. As will become clear,
Charles's failure to listen to Notker's advice was his ultimate undoing. In the end,
it was his stubborn refusal to consider Arnulf's claims after 885 which would
drive his nephew back into rebellion and inspire the fateful coup of November
887.
6.4: The problem of Charles the Fat's consecration and the revolt of Hugh, Sept.
885
The analysis in c.6.2 of the Lorsch charter of August 885 as a weapon in
the ideological armoury deployed by Charles in support of the Bernard plan
illustrated how royal diplomas can give us valuable evidence for the political
agenda of the Carolingian court at particular moments. The prayer clauses by
which the Carolingians sought to harness the intercessory power of the church and
its martyrs to the worldly success of their own dynasty could also contain coded
political messages. The Lorsch charter, as well as providing a clear example of
this, also introduces us to another type of formula which, if anything, is even more
obviously political, namely that which demands the celebration of significant
anniversaries in the lifetime of a ruler. This type of provision, which was founded
on late Roman antecedents, achieved its greatest Carolingian currency in west
Francia between the reigns of Charles the Bald and Charles the Simple.98 Its most
striking form was the request for the annual liturgical commemoration of a king's
consecration, to be subsequently replaced with that of his death day. The memory
of the king's acquisition of his earthly kingdom, and later his entrance to its
heavenly counterpart, was thus preserved at major royal churches, and often
celebrated with a large-scale banquet provided for by the income from specially
See below, c.7.5.
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designated estates. 99 These developments represent an escalation in the intensity
of political praying in the later ninth century, powered by the Carolingians' desire
to imprint a heavier reminder of their presence and authority on the sacred
calendar.
Four of Charles the Fat's surviving charters, all from 885 or later, make
reference to such arrangements. Three were drawn up by and issued for the west
Frankish church of Langres, while the other was for the east Frankish royal
monastery of Fulda.'°° All four demand the celebration of the anniversary of
Charles's consecratio (and then death) with prayers and feasts, with the exception
of the middle Langres one which omits the feast. A fifth charter, also datable to
885, details the establishment of a similar commemoration and refectio at the
monastery of Reichenau, with Charles's approval, by bishop Chadolt of Novara.'°'
It should be pointed out that this charter was explicitly connected to an imperial
confirmation, and that the annual feast it specified was to be provided for from a
donated royal estate. It can therefore be read as the by-product of a fifth, now lost,
imperial diploma concerned with commemoration. This is entirely consistent with
what we know about Chadolt, who had been in the entourage of Charles since the
early 870s, and who was the brother of Liutward of Vercelli: he was just the kind
of man we would expect to be entrusted with the setting up of an anniversary
celebration at a key monastery in the emperor's heartlands.'° 2 Taken together,
these five documents, all of which survive as originals, are the first evidence for
the anointing of an east Frankish king and for its commemoration.
For the background see Kantorowicz, Laudes, pp.65-9; Stoclet, 'Dies'. Charles the Bald is the
most analysed anniversary celebrator; see for example Wallace-Hadrill, 'Prince', p.166.
See Nelson, 'Anointed', p.126 on feasts. A vivid literary desription of an episcopal feast is
provided by Notker, Gesta, 1.18, pp.23-4.
°° Langres: DD CIII 129 (28 August 885), 147 (29 October 886), 153 (15 January 887). Fulda: D
CIII 132 (23 September 885).
'°' Mabillon, Vetera Analecta, p.427. For the 885 dating see Hlawitschka, 'Diptychen', p.777.
Erdmann, 'Konig', p.316, placed it in 883, presumably on the basis of D AC 65, in which
Charles's confirmation of the Reichenau charter (now lost) is associated with another imperial
confirmation issued in 883 for Chadolt's brother Liutward (D CIII 92). Nothing in Arnuif's
charter forces us, however, to assume that the lost confirmation was also enacted in 883. The
similarities between the Reichenau charter and D CIII 132 for Fulda are more persuasive as
evidence that it too belongs in 885, and this dating fits better with the context outlined below.
102 For Chadolt in the young Charles's entourage see Liber Memorialis Romaricensis, fol.9r;
Fleckenstein, HoJkapelle, p.195; cf. Zettler, Kiosterbauten, p.1 06.
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Only two of them, however, those from Fulda and Reichenau, furnish us
with a date for this celebration: 'hoc est epiphania domini'.'° 3 The question of
exactly which consecration of Charles took place on the feast of epiphany (6
January) has exerted and divided scholars for decades.'°4 The only plausible
candidates are 877 (for the kingdom of Alemannia) and 880 (for the kingdom of
Italy): all of Charles's other accessions can be shown to have takn place definitely
not on this date. Neither possibility, however, is altogether satisfactory. The
existence of an east Frankish consecration tradition in which to place the
postulated 877 event, which is purely hypothetical, is disputable.'° 5 In any case,
since Louis the German's Sons were not crowned or anointed as kings during his
lifetime, it would be difficult to explain why Charles would wait over four months
after his father's death to have himself elevated to full royal status, and why this
event has left no trace in the sources. The more popular choice of 880 has a
slightly stronger case, but one which is still anything but conclusive.' 06 The only
major narrative source to directly mention Charles's assumption of the Italian
kingdom is Notker's Continuatio, which does not provide a date, but does tell us
that he was made king by the massed bishops and primores, including the pope, at
Ravenna. 107 There is no reason to doubt Notker, who wrote only a year after the
event and probably had an eyewitness report from his regular correspondent, the
imperial notary Waldo)°8 However, we cannot definitely place Charles at
Ravenna before 11 January, when he renewed a treaty with the Doge of Venice,
and the diplomas immediately preceding this seem to show he was still at Pavia on
8 January.'°9 On the face of it, Charles was not at Ravenna on epiphany. Scholars
have tried to resolve this inconvenient problem by claiming that the earlier
diplomas were drawn up at Pavia before 8 January, and then enacted in Ravenna
on that date."° However, this conjecture of so-called 'ununified dating' can be
103 D CIII 132. The Reichenau text says 'id est Epiphaniarum die'.
'° Bruhl, 'Kronungsbrauch', pp.298-9 discusses the prior historiography.
'° Ibid, esp. pp.299-303 is a clear discussion of the evidence, ultimately coming down cautiously
against.
106 Sierck, Festrag, pp.72-3 is the latest proponent of the 880 theory.
' °7 Notker, Continuatio, p.329.
lOB Von den Steinen, Darstellungs band, p.492.
109 DD CIII 15-7.
110 See Kehr's preambles to DD CIII 16, 17 and 132.
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played more than one way, and in any case seems only to have been deemed
necessary on the prior assumption that the later epiphany references must refer to
the Italian coronation of 880. The reasoning is circular: we only doubt the dating
clauses of the charters because we know Charles was at Ravenna on 6 January
880, but we can only place him there on that day if the dating clauses are wrong.
Even then, we cannot be absolutely sure that Charles was consecrated king of
Italy, although this would not have been out of keeping with Italian practice.
Notker only says that 'ab eis [ie. the pope, bishops and primores] rex constituitur',
whereas in the very next breath he does explicitly mention consecration when
Charles became emperor in February 881.111
Both 6 January 877 and 6 January 880 therefore look somewhat dubious as
the anniversary referred to in the later royal charters. An alternative approach to
this otherwise intractable problem is to focus our attention instead on the nature
and purpose of the commemoration charters themselves. One obvious question to
ask, whether 877 or 880 is one's preferred date, is why it was not until 885 that the
anniversary provisions made their first appearance in royal diplomatic. The
answer usually given is that the custom was directly imported after Charles
became king of west Francia in the early months of that year." 2 However, it
would be wrong to assume that ideas about rulership travelled around the
Carolingian Empire in such a determinedly mechanical fashion." 3 Charles had,
after all, been to the court of the arch-anniversary celebrator Charles the Bald
himself." 4 If the east Frankish court wanted to celebrate the king's consecration
in Alemannia or Italy, we must surely credit its members with enough intelligence
to do so without waiting several years for their king to annex west Francia. We
should look instead for a political explanation for this development in the form of
documents which, as we saw above, were designed to deliver pointed ideological
messages."5
The dating practices of Charles's chancery do not help, because his reign in Italy is habitually
dated back to Karlmann's abdication in November 879: Sierck, Festtag, pp.93-4.
112 Eg. Ewig, 'Gebetsdienst', p.76; Sierck, Festtag, p.79.
" For an example of this, see c. 6.6 for observations on how formulas of intercession entered the
diplomatic traditions of various regna at approximately the same time in Charles's reign.
114 AB s.a.871, p.181.
115 On this subject in general see also Wolfram, 'Theory' and Merta, 'Recht'.
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In search of such an explanation, there is a case to be made that historians
have been wrong in assuming that the five charters all refer to the same
consecration. The suspicion that they do not is raised by the fact that none of the
three Langres documents make specific mention of the date of the anniversary,
while both the east Frankish ones do. The second Langres charter, D 147, is
particularly interesting in this regard. This diploma is a restoration of properties
granted by Charles during the siege of Paris in October 886 for the upkeep of the
canons in Langres. In return, in addition to their habitual constant intercession on
Charles's behalf, the canons would offer up special prayers to commemorate the
'consecrationis nostrae diem, quod est ...[blank space'. Bishop Geilo, who was
the grant's petitioner and who had the charter drawn up by his staff, was, as
discussed in chapter 5, a close confidant of Charles in the later years of his reign,
and cannot have been ignorant of the date of the emperor's consecration. The
missing word must imply, therefore, that Geilo did not know which consecration
the emperor wanted celebrated, and had his scribes leave a gap to be filled in when
he brought the parchment to Charles outside Paris a few weeks later."6
What, then, were the options? D 129, which, as we have seen, was issued
at Lorsch for the church of Langres in August 885, displays no such ambivalence,
despite being the first charter to mention an anniversary celebration. By its terms,
the monks and congregation of Langres were to offer prayers and enjoy a refectio
laid on by the bishop, in the first instance on Charles's 'die consecrationis', for
which no date was specified, and then on the anniversary of his death. The factor
which caused doubts to enter Geilo's mind by the following October must have
been the intervening royal charter issued in September 885 for Fulda, which
specified epiphany as the anniversary date. This is explicable if the drafters of the
first Langres charter did not have epiphany in mind, but some other date.
The most likely explantion is that Geilo was here referring to Charles's
Lotharingian/west Frankish anointing on 20 May 885, over which, as argued
above, he had presided himself. 117 By establishing the annual commemoration of
this event at Langres, Geilo not only exalted the emperor's position there, but he
116 Kehr's introduction to D CIII 147 shows how the charter must have been drawn up in the
Langres scriptorium, and not during the actual siege.
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also sought to re-emphasise the role of himself and his church in Charles's
elevation to the Lotharingian/west Frankish kingship and to bask in the reflected
glory. D 129 represents a reference to this ceremony; here at least, then, we can
admit an infiltration of west Frankish practice into the court customs of the
emperor, not by some automatic process of induction, but in a specific reference to
a recent event made by one of its orchestrators." 8 However, D 132, the charter
issued for Fulda in Spetember 885, reveals that Charles himself had different ideas
about the date on which his consecration should be celebrated. The inauguration
in this document of a different commemoration on the feast of epiphany shows the
court taking a new lead in such matters, and provides the alternative date which
confused Geilo and forced him to leave a blank space in composing the charter for
the Langres canons in 886.
If, then, the Langres charters do not refer to the epiphany commemoration,
the appearance of this celebration in a grant to Fulda requires further explanation.
To help us with this, the timing and progress of the revolt of the Lotharingian
pretender Hugh is a crucial factor. Hugh (born 85 5/60), the illegitimate son of
Lothar II, had agitated for his paternal kingdom sporadically during the late 870s
and early 880s, but since 882 had been at peace with the ruling Carolingians.9
He chose to revolt again in 885, it would seem, because of the succession
situation. With Charles now the only adult male legitimate Carolingian, Hugh's
claim to a share of the succession was in theory at least as strong as those of his
bastard cousins Arnulf and Bernard. Moreover, his hopes were in imminent
danger if, as argued above, Charles intended to hand Lotharingia, the regnum
desired by Hugh and the source of his support, to Bernard.' 2° This not only gave
Hugh an immediate reason to rebel, but by the same token also gave Charles a
reason to dispose of him on a permanent basis. Hugh was captured, brought into
117 See c.5.2.
118 D CIII 153, enacted 15 January 887, copies the formulas of D 129 literally, and so offers no
further evidence on the establishment of imperial commemorations at Langres.
119 Parisot, Lorraine, pp.442-77 and Tellenbach, 'Grundlagen', pp.286-8 offer discussions of
Hugh's career. See also c.3.3 above.
° Above, c.6.2. Regmo, Chronicon, s.a.885, p.123 is clear that Hugh was after the 'regnum
paternum'. See Parisot, Lorraine, p.478 on his supporters.
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the presence of the emperor, blinded and then confined to a monastery.' 2 ' Two
aspects of the affair demonstrate Charles's particular anxiety to deal decisively
with Hugh. One is that, although the dux Henry had the main role in the capture
of both Hugh and his collaborator Godafrid, only the latter received summary
punishment (execution), while the former was brought alive to the emperor for
judgement.' 22 The other is that Hugh was blinded and confined to a monastery, a
penalty designed to exclude its victim definitively from the chance of succession.
It is significant that this punishment had not been inflicted on him after his
previous rebellions, but that it was in 885, at a pregnant moment in the
configuration of the politics of succession.
The sources are not explicit concerning the venue for the judicial
proceedings against Hugh, and disagree on the location of his imprisonment.
Regino states that Hugh was captured by Henry at Gondreville before being
blinded, imprisoned in St-Gall, and then moved, during the reign of Zwentibald, to
Prtim; he does not say where the blinding was carried out. The only other
authority to offer geographical details is the Mainz annalist, who tells us that
Hugh was blinded in the emperor's presence before being confined to the
monastery of St-Boniface at Fulda. These accounts, which, by no accident, come
from those authors best placed to know, are not mutually exclusive. Regino, who
met and tonsured Hugh when he was at PrUm, plays up the Lotharingian context
of his capture and exile, adding only that St-Gall was where he was immediately
prior to travelling to Prüm in the late 890s. This does not gainsay the information
that immediately after his blinding he had been sent to Fulda, a detail which we
would expect the Mainz annalist, a member of the entourage of the prelate in
whose geographical and jurisdictional hinterland that abbey lay, to know.
We can also reach a firm conclusion as to the venue for the trial. Justice of
this kind had to be seen to be done: the first general assembly convened after
Hugh's capture and the emperor's return from the west was held at Frankfurt in
September. This setting provided the necessary context for a public display ofjust
121 References in what follows will be to: Regino, Chronicon, s.a.885, pp.123-5; AFC s.a.885,
p.103; BC s.a.885, p.1 14; AV s.a.885, p.57, all of which provide reports of these events.
122 This information is given by Regino and the Annales Vedastini. The Mainz and Bavarian
annalists also report separate judgements, although with no mention of Henry's role.
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and legitimate rulership to be mobilised against the recalcitrant bastard.' 23 The
royal palace at Frankfurt was the logical choice in the west of the kingdom for the
trial of a usurper. It was a Carolingian site par excellence, with an unbroken
tradition as one of the key centres, along with Regensburg, of legitimate rulership
stretching back through the reign of Louis the German and beyond. The Mainz
continuator implies a connection between the trial of Hugh and this royal
assembly by placing them adjacent in his anna!, although he writes them up for
literary effect as two separate set-pieces.' 24 The same annalist was presumably in
attendance as part of the entourage of Archbishop Liutbert, which would explain
why he is the sole narrative source for both the assembly and for the details of
Hugh's trial.' 25 All this points to the conclusion that Hugh was dealt with at the
Frankfurt assembly.
In other words, D 132, the first east Frankish royal charter to establish the
commemoration of a king's consecration, was issued on the occasion of Hugh's
trial and in favour of the monastery where he would be imprisoned. It ought,
therefore, to be read as an ideological statement about royal legitimacy, designed,
ultimately, to boost the succession claims of Bernard. Hugh's very person was a
bad precedent, a living reminder of the failure of Lothar II to carry out a plan
almost identical to the one Charles was undertaking. This would not have gone
unnoticed by contemporaries, especially those who, like Liutbert, were inclined to
oppose the Bernard plan. Hugh had to be dealt with decisively, before an
audience of such people, in a location and manner that stressed the emperor's
legitimacy and his own lack of it. The charter must be considered in association
with the ceremony which had taken place at Lorsch on 28 August. It is possible
123 AFC s.a.885, p.103 mentions the assembly, where DD CIII 130-2 were issued between 6 and
23 September. AV s.a.885, p.57 implies Hugh was captured just before 25 July. D CIII 127,
issued at Waiblingen on 23 August, is the first evidence for Charles's return to the east.
124 AFC s.a.885, p.103. The section on Hugh is a self-contained story, the only one in the AFC
truly favourable to Charles, of the fitting fate of the rebellious bastard; by contrast, the Frankfurt
paragraph forms part of the story of divine scorn for Charles's plan to legitimise Bernard. The
stories' differing intentions, and indeed the desire of the author to set up a contrast making an
implicit point about the correct and wrong way to treat illegitimate Carolingians, is what forces
their separation.
125 The annalist provides the unique details that Hugh's uncle was also blinded, and that the rest of
their supporters 'equis et armis ac vestibus spoliati vix nudi evaserunt'. This punishment was
perhaps intended as a humiliating negation of their badges of nobility, on which see Nelson,
'Knighthood'.
173
that, as argued in section 6.2, the 'princeps tyrannica' mentioned in the charter
issued on that day was in fact Hugh, taken to Lorsch to help emphasise Bernard's
legitimacy and his own lack of it, before being hauled off to Frankfurt and his fate
a few days later.
The point could hardly have been emphasised any more clearly to the
primores gatherd at Lorsch and Frankfurt, before whom the charter's provisions
would have been announced: Bernard was a legitimate Carolingian, Hugh was
not.' 26 It was certainly understood by the Mainz annalist, who said that, with
Hugh's imprisonment in Fulda, 'finem suae habuit tyrannidis [i.e. illegitimate
claim to rule]'.' 27 Nor would it have been missed by Notker the Stammerer, who
in 881 had ended his Continuatio, a text detailing the descent of Carolingian
legitimacy through the generations after 840, with an anxious admonitory
reference to the tyranni, Hugh and Boso: 'Quos interim, humanae verecundiae
consulentes, silentio tegimus, donec vel ad principes terrestrium conversi, veniam
pro stultitia sua consequantur, vel, ut perturbatores reipublicae dignum est pati,
usque ad cinerem concremati, et in omnem ventum dispersi, cum nominibus ye!
potius ignominia et memoria sua condemnentur in secula." 28 Notker would have
been pleased when the prayers and celebrations of the monks of Fulda on the
anniversary of Charles the Fat's consecration drowned out the solitary protests and
pleas for recognition of the sightless tyrant Hugh. This is another case of the
clinical brutality which the Carolingians were occasionally given to inflict on their
opponents, taking care to to justify their actions with high-minded religious and
political rhetoric.'29
126 Presumably some form of court ceremonial took place on these occasions, although the nature
of this is now irretrievable.
127 AFC s.a.885, p.103. See 6.3 for the suggestion that Hugh was also at Lorsch in August.
' 28 Notker, Continuatio, p.330.
129 A comparable instance would be the show-trial of Tassilo of Bavaria in 788: see now Airlie,
'Narratives'. Warner, 'Ideals', pp.15-7 discusses a similar occasion from the reign of Otto III.
These examples all highlight the fact that very often ideological statements about authority were
made to impress specific audiences in quite specific circumstances, and should not necessarily be
strung together into a generalised image of ideologically-powered kingship. This is important to
keep in mind when studying Carolingian kingship. Even the commemorations established by
Charles the Bald were often related to particular points in time: Erkens, 'Esther', p.35 discusses
the wedding anniversary celebrations which were set up in 862 in response to developments in the
divorce case of Lothar II. As McCormick, 'Ceremonies', p.20 puts it: 'In a ruler's outlook, the
temporal horizon of the considerations which shaped an individual performance of a ceremony
was often limited to days, weeks, or months.'
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The court, therefore, decided to establish celebrations on the feast of
epiphany at this time for very specific reasons, as an adjunct to the public
punishment of Hugh and to make a clear statement about authority and legitimacy
to a particular audience. However, we may deduce from the Reichenau charter,
whose issuer Chadolt was also very close to the court, as well as from the
ambivalent Langres one, that these provisions were then intended to be propagated
around other important ecclesiastical foundations in the empire; Fulda was not to
be the only place where Charles's kingship was exalted. If this is so, one question
remains: why epiphany? If 6 January does not correspond with any actual
consecration of Charles the Fat, then it must represent a symbolic celebration
invoked for ideological or ceremonial reasons.'3°
By the ninth century, 6 January was firmly established in the west as the
festival of three key events from the life of Christ: his reception of the Magi, his
baptism, and his first miracle at Cana.' 3 ' The Magi had some interesting
associations in contemporary eyes which will detain us here. Since the fifth
century they had been interpreted in western thought as kings, and accordingly
Jesus, to whom they humbled themselves, was seen as a king over kings. This
reading obviously lent itself to ideological uses in connection with imperial
aspirations and ideas about Christological kingship; ideas which, as is well
known, achieved their fullest expression in Ottonian art. They were nonetheless
already present in the Carolingian period: images of empire and triumph
associated with the Christ and the Magi are visible in the Utrecht Psalter (c.820s),
the Stuttgart Psalter (c.830) and in Charles the Bald's Codex Aureus (870), while
the implicit identification between Christ and the earthly king also emerges from
works like Thegan's Gesta Hiudowici Imperatoris and the text of many a royal
130 Kehr, in his preamble to D CIII 132, was forced to a similar conclusion. Even if Charles's
celebration does refer to an Italian consecration, which, if it took place, was very near to epiphany,
and was Charles's first anointing, we still need to explain its appearance in 885, and why it was
chosen in preference to, say, the west Frankish consecration.
' Cross and Livingstone, Dictionary, pp.554, 1020. On the feast's earlier history see also Holl,
'Ursprung'.
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adventus ceremony: the Old Testament may well have dominated the Carolingian
Renaissance, but its architects had read the New as well.'32
Given these imperial associations, epiphany had specific relevance to
Charles the Fat in 885 as a symbol of, and a seal upon, his succession to a new
position: sole ruler of the entire territory of the empire of Charlemagne, a physical
confirmation and fulfilment of the imperial title he had acquired in 881. Epiphany
was not merely a feast of Christ's regality, but also had a confirmatory character,
celebrating his reappearance (to the Gentiles) in a new and divinely exalted form.
How exactly might these ideas have been intended to be read? In that he had
plans to insert Bernard as a subking in Lotharingia, and that he had established
client relationships with foreign leaders like Zwentibald of Moravia and Alan of
Brittany, Charles may have claimed quite literally to be a king over kings
(although admittedly the Carolingans did not usually like to acknowledge the
royal status of such rulers).' 33 There is good evidence, however, that his imperial
ideology went further than this. Notker the Stammerer's Gesta Karoli, written for
Charles at exactly this time (885-6) elaborates a theory of Carolingian power
based on the book of Daniel, in which the dynasty is interpreted as the head of a
new world empire, securely anchored to the masterplan of sacred history. Their
divinely-ordained superiority extended over Byzantium, Africa and the rest of the
known world, and it is clear that Notker expected Charles the Fat to identify
himself as the incumbent ruler of this notional 'empire' in succession to
Charlemagne. Charles, who commissioned the work and may well have
influenced its content, is elided with Charlemagne by Notker, and hence
designated as head of the world; there is evidence here, then, that the events of
885 inspired the court to pursue a new imperial rhetoric.'' It is therefore
interesting, and by no means purely coincidental, that the Gesta Karoli referred to
consecration as an ancient practice which, in east Frankish terms, it certainly was
132 Mayr-Harting, Illumination, p.68; Deshman, 'Christus rex', pp.375-7; idem, 'Servant', pp.393,
414; Trexier, Journey, p.54; Innes, 'Emperor'; Kantorowicz, 'Advent', pp.21 0-1; idem, Laudes,
pp.58, 92.
'' See above, cc.4.3 (Alan), 6.3 (Zwentibald).
's" On Notker's view of the Carolmgian world empire, see especially Siegrist, Herrscherbild,
pp. 109-44.
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not.' 35 Notker also ascribed God or Christ-like qualities to the Charlemagne he
depicted in this work.' 36 Moreover, a further product of the St-Gall scriptorium,
the Psalterium Aureum, may have been presented to Charles the Fat at exactly this
time. Its imperial imagery and depiction of a Carolingian ruler as the Old
Testament king David, who was presented as a forerunner of Christ, would also
have coincided with the set of ideas about imperial authority being expounded by
Charles's court in 885.'
There is also a context in which to place Charles's attempt to crystallise
these abstract ideas into the court ceremonial which must lie behind our charters'
epiphany references.' 38 An indirect influence came from the east, where
Byzantine imperial ritual accorded prominence to epiphany at this time: it was one
of the major feasts of the Byzantine liturgical year and was celebrated in
Constantinople (according to the Book of Ceremonies) with imperial processions
and acclamations.' 39 We know that Byzantine ceremonial was not only
understood but indeed imitated at the court of Louis the German after his
diplomatic contact with Basil I in the early 87Os.° However, epiphany was not
only the feast of the Magi, it was also the feast of Christ's baptism: to ninth-
century western minds he was not only revealed as a king over kings on that day,
he was also consecrated. A source for this idea lay much closer to home than
Constantinople, at the Alemarinic monastery of St-Gall, home to Notker the
Stammerer. In late 884 he had sent his famous sequence book, known as the Liber
Ymnorum, to Charles's archchaplain Liutward so that it could be used at court to
celebrate the liturgy on the high feast days of the church.' 4 ' In the hymn to be
sung on epiphany, the section on the baptism of Christ is shot through with the
135 Notker, Gesta, 1.10, p.13; Goetz, Strukturen, p.23, n.65.
136 Siegrist, Herrscherbild, pp.79-89; limes, 'Emperor'.
137 Eggenberger, Psalterium. I develop these points below, c.7.6.
138 Kantorowicz discusses the feast as an important focus for court ceremonial from the late Roman
Empire up to the late middle ages in two articles, 'Oriens Augusti' and 'Dante's "Two Suns", but
states that it fell into disuse in the early medieval west.
' Kantorowicz, 'Oriens Augusti', pp.149-62; Kazhdan, Dictionary, p.715. The Book of
Ceremonies, although a tenth-century text, reveals much about ninth-century practice: see
Cameron, 'Construction'. In the east, the reception of the Magi was celebrated on 25 December
rather than epiphany.
' 40 Notker, Gesta, 2.11, pp.68-70; Goldberg, 'Kingship', pp.71-2.
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language of consecration as it was used in Carolingian inauguration ceremonies:
he is 'consecrating baptism for us' (consecrans nobis baptisma) and is 'to be
anointed over all the saints' (uncturus sanctis prae omnibus).' 42 The use of these
words is striking. Notker was among the first western writers to lay particularly
heavy stress on the importance of the feast of epiphany: only three other hymns on
epiphany and its octave survive from east of the Rhine in the earlier middle ages,
and all come from a circle influenced by the Stammerer.' 43 It is therefore
significant that in his Liber Ymnorum, ideas about Christ as king of kings and the
association with the baptism on epiphany as consecration come together and can
be placed at the heart of the imperial court in the mid-88Os." Notker did not here
provide a coherent programme for imperial ideology, but his work nevertheless
contained the full range of associations which clustered around the 'imperial
interpretation' of epiphany. The charters in question, therefore, reveal not a
reference to an actual consecration, but an ideological statement about Charles's
authority inspired by the circumstances of 885.'
It is hence significant that Charles chose Regensburg, where he
overwintered in 885-6, as the first venue for whatever court ceremonies may have
accompanied the feast.' 46 It has already been argued that Arnulf, still on shaky
ground as far as his relationship with Charles went, was probably present at this
court to make good his faith with the emperor and ward off a potential imperial
invasion of Carinthia.' 47 Having marshalled the ideological and ceremonial
trappings of rulership to support his legitimation of Bernard's claim and his
destruction of Hugh's, we ought not to be surprised if Charles now sought to aim
such resources in the direction of Arnulf, the third would-be king.
That the book was intended for use in this way is suggested by the fact that Notker sent it to the
archchaplain, and by what seem to be quite practical directions for use in the text: eg. Notker,
Liber Ymnorum, p.10. Von den Steinen, Darstellungs band, pp.504-7 for the work's date.
142 Notker, Liber Ymnorum, pp.22-3.
143 Von den Steinen, Darstellungs band, pp.286-90. For an example see the anonymous In Octava
Theophaniae edited by von den Steinen, Editionsband, p.103.
For Christ as 'regnator' and 'rex regum', see also Notker, Liber Ymnorum, pp.42, 46, 88-9.
McCormick, 'Ceremonies', pp.9-10 discusses analogous examples from late antiquity in which
depictions of political rituals were 'meant to symbolise a conception of imperial victoriousness'
rather than refer to actual events. Charles's situation in 885 also bears some comparison with the
English king Edgar's 'imperial' consecration of 973: see Nelson, 'Rituals', pp.297-303.
146 AFC s.a.885, p.103; BC s.a.886, p.114 for Charles's Christmas 885 stay in Bavaria. He issued
D CIII 134 at Regensburg on 7 January 886.
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Interestingly, we know from one of the chronicles describing Arnuif's
successful coup against Charles in November 887 that Arnuif had previously
sworn fidelity to the emperor on a relic of the True Cross, an item which Charles
now sent back to his nephew in a last—ditch effort to remind him of his
obligations. 148 This relic had been at the east Frankish court since it was brought
to Louis the German by Byzantine ambassadors in 872, at his court in
Regensburg, on epiphany.' 49 Charles the Fat inherited the fragment, and kept it in
a most unusual reliquary of which the eleventh-century St-Gall house historian
Ekkehard IV provides a detailed description (he had seen it because Arnulf
donated the reliquary to the monastery after Charles's death). It was a container of
pure gold, decorated with precious stones and fashioned in the shape of a chapel.
It was inscribed with the words: 'See the cask of the cross and of holy Mary with
the saints. This Charles chose to have [as] his highest chapel." 5° ' Summa capella'
(highest chapel) was a term characteristically used to describe the royal chapels of
the Carolingian empire, located at Aachen, Regensburg and Frankfurt, and
dedicated to the Virgin Mary. The ar-chapel, Charlemagne's palace chapel at
Aachen, was sacked by Vikings in the early 880s (they used it as a stable), and we
have a subsequent charter relating how its relic collection was rescued by the
monks of nearby Stavelot-Malmedy and brought to the court of Charles the Fat,
who rewarded the industrious brethren with a generous gift of land.' 51 Might not
this reliquary, shaped like a chapel, called 'summa capella' and inscribed with a
' See above, c.6.3.
AFC s.a.887, p.106. Historians (such as Schieffer, 'Karl', p.138) have usually assumed that this
is a reference to an oath sworn by Arnuif when Charles inherited the Bavarian kingdom in 882.
However, our sources (AFC s.a.882, p.98 and BC s.a.882, p.107) do not mention Arnulf
specifically, saying only that Charles received the commendations of the leading men. Moreover,
if, as Goldberg, 'Kingship' plausibly argues, the relic of the True Cross was carried round with the
court, which would have been in keeping with the standard Carolingian use of portable chapels
and reliquaries, then it would probably not have come into Charles the Fat's possession until he
subsequently moved on to Franconia, where his predecessor Louis the Younger had died and was
buried. In addition, a loyalty oath sworn on such an important relic is more appropriate to
Arnulfs return to favour in 885-6 than to a simple commendation.
AF s.a.872, p.75.
150 Ekkehard, Casus, c.l0, p.34:'En crucis atque piae cum sanctis capsa Mariae, Hanc Karolus
summam delegit habere capellam'. The cask was described in similar terms by a later interpolator
of Notker's Gesta Karoli who (wrongly) attributed it to Charlemagne: Notker, Gesta, p.15, n.r..
' AF s.a.881, p.97; D CIII 64. The relics are described as 'pignora sanctonun'. Kehr's doubts
over the relevant section of this charter do not seem justified: see also Falkenstein, Karl, p.115,
n.357.
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dedication to the Mother of God have been created to house the Aachen chapel
relics along with the fragment of the True Cross?' 52 This looks to have been
intended as a miniature substitute Aachen, quite literally Carolingian legitimacy in
a box; and it was on this casket that Arnulf swore fealty to his uncle in
Regensburg, probably on epiphany 886.' The ideological connotations of this
are clear: the event highlighted Charles's legitimacy and his nephew's lack of it,
sending a clear message to the magnates of Bavaria and Carinthia who formed
Arnulf's potential constituency and who were no doubt gathered for the occasion.
In other words, the propagandistic trappings to the ordering of the imperial
succession which were concocted in late 885 were targetted at belittling the claims
of Amulf of Carinthia and his supporters as well as those of Hugh of Lotharingia
and his; and hence were designed to bolster the position of Bernard in the eyes of
the aristocratic community.
In conclusion, it is worth stressing two points and registering a caveat.
Firstly, if the 885-6 royal charters referring to the supposed consecration of
Charles the Fat are to be understood properly, they must be read in the context of
the very specific political circumstances which produced them and gave them
meaning: they are intricately bound up with the question of the imperial
succession. In a sense, this did represent the importing of a west Frankish
tradition into east Frankish politics, but also a reinterpretation and reuse of this
tradition in a quite different context. Secondly, this should be taken as evidence
for a lively interest in political ideas at Charles the Fat's court, at least at this one
point in time. Neither he nor any other east Frankish king exercised their
authority unthinkingly or in the bunkered fashion which has sometimes been
assumed.' 54 The absence of an east Frankish Hincmar, an annalist who was also
closely involved in actually orchestrating political rituals, is very significant. To
some extent, the unusually high 'ritual profile' of Charles the Bald's reign is down
152 On portable chapels in general, see Schramm and Müthench, Denkmale, p.32.
'"Charles seems never to have visited Aachen. However, he was of course aware of its symbolic
importance: D CIII 109, his only charter for the Mother of God chapel there (later 884), was,
significantly, issued while he was at the chapel in Regensburg. During the same visit Charles
began to foster his connections with Regensburg itself as a centre of legitimate power, having an
eternal flame lit for his own soul in the royal chapel: D 107.
' Goldberg, 'Kingship' also develops this theme, although it will be evident that I part company
from him on his view of Charles the Fat at p.73.
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to Hincmar: writers chronicling other reigns, from Charles the Great to Charles the
Fat, were simply not as interested.
One good reason for this lack of interest, and this is the caveat, is the fact
that rhetoric of this kind, whatever its claims, is not necessarily translated into real
authority. Often ideology was used to fill a gap in 'real' authority, and this, in the
final reckoning, is how it was with Charles the Fat. The events of 885, especially
the accession to the western kingdom, the plan to get the pope to help legitimise
Bernard and the clinical elimination of Hugh reveal a high point in the reign, and a
great confidence in the conception and exercise of Charles's kingship. In this
context, the self-association with the Christological feast of epiphany and the
imperial claims reflected in Notker's Gesta Karoli make perfect sense. However,
Charles's balloon was very quickly punctured by the unexpected death of Pope
Hadrian III in September as he made his way north towards his appointnment with
the emperor and his son. Bernard's position was thus seriously weakened. The
succession issue was once again thrown into doubt, and the more time that passed
without a credible solution, the greater the anxiety that would worm its way into
the minds of the aristocratic political community, priming them for Arnulf's bid
for power. However highly he may have conceptualised his own emperorship,
and however much effort he may have put into transmitting these ideological
messages about legitimacy to the aristocratic audiences at Lorsch, Frankfurt and
Regensburg, all the rhetoric came to look like so much empty bluster as long as
this fundamental problem remained. Indeed, to some hostile observers the death
of Hadrian III was a divine judgement on the unrighteousness of Charles's
intentions, an opinion which would surely have gained ground as time passed.'55
Moreover, Arnuif may only have been so willing to come to heel in 886 because
the Bernard plan had already failed and he envisaged new possibilities for himself.
The atmosphere of unease is nowhere better illustrated than in Book 2 of Notker's
Gesta Karoli, which is full of portentous warnings about the future of the
Carolingian line.'56
'"AFC s.a.885, p.103.
' On which see below, c.7.5.
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Charles and his advisers must, of course, have realised all this.
Accordingly, the ideas about dynastic legitimacy which had accompanied the
great optimism and bold plans of summer and autumn 885 were discarded.
Notker's Gesta was never finished, and as quickly as they had developed, the
circumstances which had produced the first east Frankish royal anniversary
celebrations disappeared. Lacking the impetus of the court, the commemorations
slid into dormancy almost immediately after they had been introduced, except at
Langres, where bishop Geilo still occasionally took the opportunity to remind the
emperor and his own entourage of the part he had played in consecrating Charles
to the western kingdom in 885. However, the fact that the blank space left by
Geilo for the consecration date in the October 886 charter for the canons of
Langres was never filled in stands as testimony to Charles's lapse of interest and
change of fortunes. The dynastic propaganda which had been invoked to support
the development of an exalted conception of the imperial role in summer 885 was
partly a means to an end; it was of limited use, and even counter-productive, as
long as the serious problems surrounding the imperial succession remained
unresolved.
6.5: Bernard and Louis of Provence, April-June 887
Hadrian III had met his unexpected end probably in September 885 and,
seemingly due to his unpopularity in Rome, was buried in the monastery of
Nonantola rather than being taken back to the Holy See.' 57 His successor Stephen
V was appointed quickly and without direct consultation with the emperor, whose
attempt to have him deposed on this technicality failed because Stephen had acted
with the cooperation of the imperial legate in Rome.' 58 Charles was surely still
preoccupied with the stalled plan to legitimate Bernard (who, as noted above,
remained in the prayer clauses of imperial charters in 886 and early 887) and had
doubtless hoped to influence the election to ensure that the new pontiff was
AFC s.a.885, p.103; Davis, Lives, pp.297, n.3, 298, n.8.
' AFC s.a.885, pp.103-4; Liber Pontflcalis, c.112, pp.191-2. Reuter, Annals, p.99, n.h and
Davis, Lives, p.299, n.9 for commentary.
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sympathetic to its resuscitation.' 59 With Stephen's accession afait accompli by
the end of 885, the emperor had no choice but to travel to Italy at the start of 886
and negotiate with him directly. The specific outcome of the talks during
Charles's five or six month stay south of the Alps is not known beyond the fact
that he extracted papal permission to translate bishops from devastated sees.
However, our source for this information, the Bavarian annalist, cryptically adds
that 'ibi multimodis rebus, prout conplacuit [i.e. Charles], dispositis." 6° With the
succession situation the way it was, and given the events of the preceding few
months, it is very likely that the Bernard plan was on the agenda.
Whatever general approval for the scheme may have been voiced by
Stephen V in early 886, Charles's attention for the second half of that year was
filly occupied by the siege of Paris, denying any opportunity to convene an
assembly north of the Alps which the pope might attend. The next developments
did not take place until the first few months of 887, when Charles decided to adopt
Louis of Provence ('the Blind'), the son of Boso.
Our main source for this event is the Bavarian continuator's comment in
his annal for 887, immediately after reporting Boso's death: 'obviam
[Hiudovicum] imperator ad Hrenum villa Chirihheim veniens honorifice ad
hominem sibi quasi adoptivum filium eum iniunxit." 6 ' This report is still often
taken to mean that Charles adopted Louis with the intention of making him heir to
the whole empire. The most developed statement of this view was made by
Hlawitschka in his 1968 book on Lotharingia, subsequently criticised by Penndorf
and Lowe, then defended and elaborated by Hlawitschka in an article in 1978,
since when it has been more or less accepted by historians.' 62 A brief overview of
the arguments and evidence is therefore necessary here to show that Hlawitschka's
case remains fatally flawed.
159 The prayer clause evidence discussed in c.6.2 shows Charles's continuing support for Bernard's
claims.
160 BC s.a.886, p.114.
161 BC s.a.887, p.115.
162 Respectively Hlawitschka, Lotharingien, pp.32-8; Penndorf, Problem, pp.1 33-4; Lowe,
'Karisbuch', p.144; Hlawitschka, 'Nachfolgeprojekt'. Hlawitschka's arguments as represented in
what follows can be found in these places; references will be given for direct quotes. It will be
evident that my argument differs from those of Penndorf and Lowe.
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The fact that Louis was adopted by Charles in some sense is not disputed:
adoption was a well-established political ritual in several early medieval
kingdoms. What is at stake is the significance which Hlawitschka reads into this
fact. He supports his central assertion, that inheritance 'was the logical
consequence of adoption', by reference to other adoptions, from the Roman,
Merovingian, Byzantine, Carolingian and central medieval periods.' 63 However,
apart from the chronological and geographical remoteness of many of these
examples, which draw their relevance into question, almost all of them can in fact
be used to prove the contrary case: while adoption was sometimes associated with
inheritance, when it was it had to be spelled out explicitly. Spiritual kinship ties
were conceived of quite loosely before the twelfth century, and did not have
identical status to biological ties: the two bonds were complementary, not
equivalent.' More often, spiritual adoption established a patron-client
relationship than a father-son one.' 65 A concrete contemporary example of this is
given by the Annales Fuldenses's report of an eternal peace made in 873 between
the Saxons and Danes which was sponsored by Louis the German. The Danish
legates asked 'ut rex dominos suos, supradictos scilicet reges, in loco filiorum
habere dignaretur, et illi eum quasi patrem venerari vellent cunctis diebus vitae
suae." The language of politics and peace thus frequently overlapped with the
language of kinship. At least in part, therefore, the adoption of 887 must be seen
in these terms, as symbolising the reconciliation of the line of Lothar to the
Carolingian fold after the aberration of the tyrannus Boso.'67
The second main source cited by Hlawitschka in support of the inheritance
idea, the record of Louis's election to kingship in 890 as recorded in the
Capitulary of Valence, can also support the counter-case that the adoption was
really about reconciliation.' 68 The relevant section reads: 'Praestantissimus
Carolus imperator iam regiam concesserat dignitatem et Arnulphus, qui successor
eius existit, per suum sceptrum perque suos sagacissimos legatos.. .fautor regni
163 Hlawitschka, 'Nachfolgeprojekt', p.26.
Lynch, Godparents, pp.179, 190-1.
165 Ibid, p.191; see also Fried, 'Boso', pp.194, n. 6 and 197-204.
AF s.a.873, pp.78-9.
167 Reuter, Annals, p.113, n.6.
168 1-fludowicus Regis Arelatensis Electio.
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auctorque in omnibus esse comprobatur.' Arnulf was Charles's successor, and
established himself as a supporter of the 'dignitas' which Charles's act had 'jam
concesserat'. In other words, the conjunction made by the text between Arnulf's
and Charles's support for Louis implies that they were of like kind, that one
confirmed the other. Arnuif, of course, did not name Louis as his heir. Rather, he
recognised his right to be considered royal, and granted him 'auctoritatis licentia';
by implication, this was also what Charles did. Nowhere does the text of Valence
say that Louis was considered as Charles's heir. By contrast, his relationships to
King Boso ('excellentissimi Bosonis regis filius') and to the middle Carolingian
line ('nepos quondam Ludovici gloriosissimi imperatoris', 'ex prosapia imperiali')
are both heavily stressed. In other words, Louis's supporters conceived of what
took place at Kirchen in 887 not as a royal designation, but rather as a readmission
to the royal family, a recognition that he shared in the charisma of the
Carolingians.
We also have a post-Kirchen charter issued by Charles for Louis's mother
Irmingarde, Louis himself and his sisters. This document, which survives in the
original from August 887, records a request made by Irmingarde to Charles to
confirm in charter form what he had granted them at Kirchen; this turns out to be a
general confirmation of Louis H's holdings and grants to his family, and no
mention at all is made of the adoption.' 69 Moreover, while Irmingarde's daughters
are referred to in the penalty clause as 'filiae dilectissimae nostrae' (i.e. of
Charles), a not unusual recasting of family ties in the spiritual-Christian language
of Carolingian political dialogue,' 70 Louis is named only twice, both times as
'filius suus [ie. Hermingardim], nepos scilicet noster." 7 ' This charter, together
with another issued for the Empress Engelberga on the same day, read like a
magna carta of general confirmations for the family of Louis II; although Charles
had issued confirmations for Louis II's family before, these ones are marked out
by the naming of Louis' granchildren, and by the fine in the penalty clause of
169 D CIII 165; Hlawitschka, 'Nachfolgeprojekt', pp.38-9.
'° Cf. references to Engelberga as Charles's 'soror'; DD CIII 22, 56, 156, 166.
'7' D CIII 165. Note also that the text itself was probably composed by a scribe of Irmingarde's,
which makes it doubly significant that the adoption is not mentioned.
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Engelberga's charter, which was double any previous threatened amount.' 72 They
thus fit in well with the view that the reception at Kirchen was primarily intended
to make a definitive peace with the Lotharingian branch of the family after the
death of Boso, backed by general confirmations of the rights and properties which
had accrued to all its surviving members.
It should be noted that the confirmations apply to whatever Louis II passed
on to his family 'hereditario iure': again, the context of the Lotharingian descent
of Louis is paramount. The same appeal to Lotharingian heredity is made by the
Visio Karoli, a vision text purportedly narrated by Charles the Fat himself.
Despite the various theories in existence about the dating of this text,
Hlawitschka's arguments for associating it with the election of 890 are, to my
mind, by far the most convincing.' 73 The text, composed at Rheims, was
presumably designed to enhance Louis's royal claims by emphasising his place in
a Lotharingian dynastic continuity, and to tempt him into a northwards expansion
into the kingdom of Odo, with whom Archbishop Fulk was at loggerheads. As
such it is a work of propaganda produced in the specific circumstances of Rheims
in 890 and cannot, as Hlawitschka also claims, be used to prove that Louis's
adoption in 887 (which it does not even allude to) was intended by Charles to be
an imperial designation.'74
All things considered, therefore, the evidence all points towards the
conclusion that the adoption was intended as a ritual of peacemaking between
Charles and the Lotharingian Carolingian line whose last male representative
Louis was. The fact that the Bavarian annalist reports the adoption of Louis in
association with his reference to the death of Boso (11 January 887) strongly
suggests that it was this event which inspired Charles to make peace with Louis.
Moreover, the idea that the plans for the reconciliation were conceived when the
news of Boso's death reached court in January would also explain why the
172 D CIII 166.
Hlawitschka, Lotharingien, PP.98-1 06. Space does not permit discussion of the different cases.
'' On this text, see also c.8. Note also that an entry in the Reichenau memorial book, made in the
second half of the century, is headed by Lothar I, whose name is written in large red letters, with
Engelberga, Irmingarde and Louis below. The list has a very dynastic feel and may well have
been entered as part of the ceremonial surrounding the adoption at Kirchen. See Geuenich,
'Zurzach', p.42 with n.95.
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Empress Engelberga was in Alemannia in February of that year.' 75 Her presence
at court should be seen as part of the preparatory negotiations for the imperial
adoption of her grandson and the restoration to favour of the whole Lotharingian
branch of the Carolingian family.'76
Another piece of evidence also has a bearing on the state of the succession
issue in the first half of 887. A letter sent by Stephen V to Charles the Fat reveals
that the emperor had requested the pope's presence at an assembly in Alemannia
on 30 April 887, a request which Stephen now turned down.' 77 Hlawitschka
reckoned that Stephen had been summoned to oversee the adoption of Louis by
Charles. 178 However, the fact that the April assembly was held at Waiblingen,
while Louis was received at Kirchen no earlier than the end of May, renders this
claim highly improbable.' 79 Almost certainly, Stephen had been asked to come
and legitimise Bernard to permit his designation as heir, perhaps something to
which he had been willing to agree in principle during his negotiations with
Charles in early 886.
This aborted meeting helps us put the adoption of Louis into perspective.
Both assemblies were long-planned: Louis's, as argued above, had been in the
offing since January, while the pope stated he had received the emperor's
invitation on 30 March, which was just about as early in the year as was possible
after the Alpine passes had cleared. The reception of Louis cannot therefore
simply have been a reaction to the failure of Stephen to appear at Waiblingen: he
was not made heir in Bernard's place. What part, then, might the adoption have
been intended to play in the resolution of the succession crisis? There are two
ways in which the reception could have helped O rkFirstly, it ought to be stressed
that Louis's formidable mother and grandmother, both political heavyweights in
the Carolingian middle kingdom, were closely involved in the negotiations
leading up to the Kirchen assembly. Peace and reconciliation with Louis was
actually a sign of reconciliation with, and a revival of, the whole Lotharingian
D CIII 156, issued at Rottweil. D C2 78 shows that she had been reconciled with the
Carolingian kings, her erstwhile captors, by August 884 at the latest.
176 Boso's death probably also motivated Charles to involve Geilo of Langres in these proceedings
as his go-between with the Provençal bishops: see above, c.5.3.3.
" Fragmenta, no.14.
' Hlawitschka, 'Nachfolgeprojekt', p.25; Tellenbach, 'Grundlagen', p.296.
187
branch of the Carolingian dynasty. Their cooperation was desirable if, as argued
earlier, Charles's plan was to install Bernard as subking in Lotharingia.'8°
Secondly, even if the emperor did not regard Louis as an immediate heir in June
887, or consider granting him a subkingdom, making peace with him at least
provided the safety net of another potential successor. 18 ' Louis was still a minor
(born c.880) but Charles was in no position to worry about hedging his bets.
The highly significant political nature of these assemblies at Waiblingen
and Kirchen accounts for the attendance of imperial aristocrats like Berengar of
Friuli, Odo of Paris and Geilo of Langres. Their consent, and that of their peers,
would be required to guarantee the designation of Bernard and the recognition of
Louis! 82 We do not need to resort, as have some historians, to the hindsight-
loaded view that their presence was part of an imperial plan to designate the reguli
as heirs in May-June 887.183 Hincmar's De Ordine Palatii gives a firm context for
the appearance of such magnates at royal courts and assemblies to discuss, among
other things, royal policy for the forthcoming year.' 84 One other clear reason for
the presence of Odo in particular was surely to accompany Bishop Askericus of
Paris to collect the ransom which had been promised to the Seine Vikings as the
price for lifting the siege of Paris in the previous year.' 85 That Viking matters
were on the agenda of these assemblies is also suggested by the privileges issued
at the same time to delegations from Toumus and Soissons, both of which
provided for their defence in case of attack.' 86 The fact that these men were
prepared to travel such a long way from west Francia to imperial assemblies in the
east is another sign that the emperor's favour was still seen as important, and that
the Carolingian system was still working.
' BC s.a. 887, p.'15 for the Waiblmgen assembly.
ISO See above, c.6.2.
Cf. Poupardin, Provence, p.147.
182 BC s.a.887, p.1 15 for Berengar at Waiblingen; DD CIII 160-2 for Odo and Geilo at Kirchen.
' Keller, 'Sturz', pp.3'79-84; Fried, Weg, pp.428-9; more tentatively Reuter, Germany, p.119.
Hincmar, De Ordine Palatii, c.30, pp.84-6.
AV s.a.887, pp.63-4. Since Odo had already received a general confirmation of the privileges
and properties of his abbey of St-Martin in Tours (D CIII 139), the comparatively minor charters
he received in 887 (DD 160-1) were unlikely to have been the main reason for his journey to east
Francia; they should be seen as by-products of his attendance at court.
186 DD CIII 162-3.
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However, whatever the exact role envisaged for Louis by Charles, it was
aired in the wake of yet another failure on the Bernard front. Stephen V's letter to
the emperor is largely a list of vague and unconvincing apologies excusing him
from attendance at Waiblingen, including the vileness of one of the legates and a
lack of time to get ready. He professed confusion over exactly what he was being
asked to do, yet his reference to Charles's 'necessitas' suggests that he was well
aware of the general purpose of his projected journey. His confusion may reflect
the vagueness and naïvety of Charles's request, and of the overall conception of
the Bernard plan: exactly what did he expect the pope to do? In all probability, we
must assume that he wanted approval for a dissolution of his barren marriage
which would leave him free to wed Bernard's mother. There was, however, no
specific ceremony which could be performed on Bernard himself to decisively
remove the stain on his legitimacy with which he had been born. Whereas the
issue at stake in the case of Lothar II had whether or not his first marriage (and the
legitimacy of Hugh, his son by it) should be canonically recognised, Bernard had
incontestably been born to a concubine outside marriage. Loose ends would
inevitably remain, and Stephen's mind cannot but have been drawn to reflect on
the political mess caused by the divorce politics of the 860s, a repeat performance
of which he was presumably keen to avoid being sucked into. Another
consideration was an unwillingness to turn his back on the fluid factional politics
of the late ninth-century Vatican.' 87 Whatever the exact line of the pope's
reasoning, from Charles's point of view this was another serious political setback
and threat to his credibility. Bernard remained illegitimate and unapproved,
Arnulf remained out in the cold, and Charles remained unable to resolve the
pressing problem of the succession. With doors slamming in his face at every
turn, Charles decided to try a new angle. As we shall see, however, even with his
options diminishing, he was still determined to keep his increasingly frustrated
nephew out of the picture.
187 For references to the often-deadly factional fighting in Rome, see AFC s.a.882, p.99; BC
s.a.883, p.109; Reuter, Annals, p.94, n.17 provides commentary.
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6.6: Liutward of Vercelli, the Empress Richgard and the governance of the empire
6.6.1: The royal divorce
The failure of the second attempt to get Bernard legitimised was a severe
setback for Charles. Although Louis of Provence was now back in the circle of
potential heirs and Boso was out of the way, Arnuif was recovering his balance
after the humiliation of 885-6 and, as we have seen, it was becoming increasingly
worrying to people like Notker that the succession issue was still not settled. To
lose one pope from the support of his pians may have been unlucky, but two
looked careless; Stephen V's thinly veiled rebuttal of Charles's request to come to
Waiblingen to legitimise Bernard showed that this possible solution was a dead
end for the foreseeable future. A new approach was most assuredly called for.
This brings us to Charles's divorce of Richgard and the expulsion from
court of the archchancellor Liutward in summer 887. Our only narrative source
for this story is Regino's Chronicon, and his description of the emperor's actions
are here worth repeating in full: 'Et primo quidem Liudwardum episcopum
Vercellensem, virum sibi percarum et in administrandis publicis utilitatibus
unicum consiliarium, obiecto adulterii crimine, eo quod reginae secretis
familiarius, quam oportebat, inmisceretur, a suo latere cum dedecore repulit.
Deinde paucis interpositis diebus coniugem Richgardem- sic enim augusta
vocabatur- pro eadem re in contionem vocat et, mirum dictu, publice protestatur
numquam se carnali coitu cum ea miscuisse, cum plus quam decennio legitimi
matrimonii foedere eius consortio esset sociata. lila econtra non solum ab eius,
sed etiam ab omni virili commixtione se inimunem esse profitetur ac de
virginitatis integritate gloriatur, idque se approbare Dei omnipotentis iudicio, si
marito placeret, aut singulari certamine aut ignitorum vomerum examine,
fiducialiter adfirmat; erat religiosa femina. Facto discidio in monasterio, quod in
proprietate sua construxerat, Deo famulatura recessit."88
Historians have by and large been happy to accept Regino's allegation of
adultery at face value, reading it as yet another case in the catalogue of disasters
which are presumed to pepper Charles's reign revealing his loss of control over
188 Regino, Chronicon, s.a.887, p.127.
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events.' 89 However, there is one glaring discrepancy in Regino's account. If
Richgard was a virgin, which is presented as the grounds for divorce, how could
Liutward have been guilty of adultery with her, the reason given for his expulsion
from court? At least one of these two elements in the story must be false.
Hlawitschka noticed this and concluded that Regino invented the story of the
imperial couple's chastity in order to highlight Charles as a perfect model of
Christian virtue, taking his material from the episode in 873 when the king had
reportedly tried to renounce the trappings of the world, including intercourse with
his wife.' 9° But Regino did not necessarily intend to portray Charles as a paragon
of virtue; the point of his version of the pious and stoical emperor's deposition
was more a lesson about how even the most conspicuous worldly success was
reliant on God-given fortuna and could be suddenly snatched away by the
shortcomings of human frailty.' 9 ' Moreover, and in keeping with this viewpoint,
the abbot of Prum was not beyond criticising Charles's actions as unworthy, as in
his negative judgement of the outcome of the siege of Paris, and in his accusation
that Boso had been wrongly persecuted by all the Carolingians, who thus showed
themselves to be perjurers.'92
A more obvious element in Regino's story is his use of precise canonical
language to describe the divorce; the phrase 'facto discidio', for instance, is also
used in the same author's famous compilation of canon law, the De Synodalibus
Causis.' 93 One would further note the judicial term 'contio' used to describe the
hearing, the mutual declarations of innocence and the ordeal used as proof.' 94 The
apparent reference to Charles's outburst of 873 (implied by the mentioning of a
ten year period of marriage) can be read as a device used by Regino to emphasise
the validity of the grounds for divorce by referring back to another well-known
point in the emperor's life when he had openly announced a desire to withdraw
189 Eg. Lowe, 'Karlsbuch', p.142; Stafford, Queens, p.95.
° Hlawitschka, 'Nachfolgeprojekt', pp.44-6. The 873 reference comes from the claim that the
marriage had lasted 'for more than ten years', which would be an odd thing to say in 887 when the
couple had been married in 862.
' Cf. KOrtum, 'Weltgeschichte'.
192 Regino, Chronicon, s.a.887, p.127; 879, p.114 respectively. On Regino and Boso see Staab,
'Jugement'.
Regino, De synodalibus causis, book II, cc.244-5, p. 309; cf. c.243, pp.308-9.
LOwe, 'Karlsbuch', pp.142-3; Buhrer-Thierry, 'Reine', pp.307-9.
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from the world.' 95 All this suggests that whether or not Richgard was actually a
virgin, this was the the claim made publicly by the emperor in order to ensure that
the divorce, or more properly annulment, could proceed canonically without
descending into the legal and political shambles experienced in the 860s by the
similarly-intentioned Lothar 11.196
This interpretation is supported by the evidence of the Vita Verenae, a
short hagiographical text surviving in manuscripts from Reichenau, St-Gall and
Einsiedeln and thought to have been written by Hatto, archbishop of Mainz and
abbot of Reichenau, for Richgard following her retirement to Andlau.' 97 Although
the dedicatee and recipient of the Vita is not named, she is said to be of high
nobility and to have taken a vow of chastity. This, together with the late-ninth
century southern German context of the manuscripts and the connection of the cult
with Richgard's abbey of Zurzach, has convinced historians that the empress was
the work's recipient.' 98 With this in mind, it is significant that the Vita is
expressly intended as an exemplum for a virginal life, and that its subject may well
have been married, perhaps chastely, before retiring to fulfil her monastic
vocation.' We know that Hatto was a member of Charles the Fat's entourage
while he himself was a mere monk at Reichenau. 20° It is therefore not entirely out
of the question that the emperor commissioned him to write the Vita on the
occasion of his wife's retreat in 887, rather than, as is usually supposed, Hatto
composing it spontaneously sometime after 888.201 This possibility is
strengthened by the fact that the monastery of Zurzach was intended to be
removed from Richgard's control once her husband died so that it could be
transferred to whichever church he was buried in. 202 Her links with the cult of
195 See above, c.l.2.
Stories circulated at the time of Charles's death relating his holiness and ascent to heaven, as
shown by the reports of Regino, Chronicon, s.a.888, pp.128-9; AV s.a.887, p.64; BC s.a.887,
p.1 16. These could point to a contemporary belief that the marriage had been chaste.
See Reinle, Verena, pp.26-31 for the text.
198 Ibid. pp.21-2; Geuenich, 'Zurzach', pp.38-9; KlUppel, Hagiographie, pp.60-4.
Reinle, Verena, c.2, p.26 (exemplum), c.5, p.27 (reference to a marriage); cf. Reinle's
comments at p.36.
200 Liber Memorialis Romaricensis, fol. 9r.
201 It is suggestive, though no more than suggestive, that the divorce was carried out in June 887,
shortly before Verena's feast day on September 1, which would have provided a suitable occasion
for a presentation of the Vita.
202 D Cu! 43.
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Verena would thus have been severed after January 888, a fact which argues for an
early date for the Vita and hence the involvement of Charles in the propagation of
the story that his marriage had been chaste.
Was Richgard really a virgin? Although we cannot know, this seems
unlikely. Charles, with a son to prove it, was not, and his anxious and repeated
attempts to solve his succession problems throughout the 880s make it improbable
that he would have tolerated a chaste marriage for over 25 years. Bernard was
apparently still a minor when Notker wrote the Gesta Karoli in the mid 880s, and
so is likely to have been born after 873, the year when Charles claimed a desire to
renounce sexual intercourse. 203 Notker, moreoever, expressed the belief in 881,
and again in 885-6, that there was yet a chance of Richgard and Charles
conceiving.204
If the divorce was not therefore the result of a genuine inclination for
renunciation on the part of the royal couple, it was probably political. Why would
Charles have wanted to orchestrate the expulsion of his wife? 205 Clearly, exactly
because they had failed to produce children together, and canonical separation on
the grounds of chastity cleared the way for a new marriage. Why now and not
before? Because previous succession plans, namely the Vienne deal made in 880
and the two attempts to legitimise Bernard, had proved fruitless, and so a new
tactic was necessary. After the failure of his partnerships with Hadrian III and
Stephen V, Charles decided (or was forced by circumstances) to abandon papal
sponsorship as the legitimating device for his plans, and to replace it with a public
ordeal.
Another change of tack is also identifiable: it is unlikely that the plan this
time round was for Charles to legitimise Bernard by marrying his mother, who,
given that we have no information about her, seems not to have been of noble
stock. For the likes of Notker, who in his Continuatio made a point of
approvingly stressing the nobility of the mothers of Arnulf and Louis the
Younger's illegitimate son Hugh, while neglecting to mention Bernard at all, this
203 Notker, Gesta, 2.12, p.74; 2.14, p.78 describes him in diminutive terms.
204 Notker, Continuatio, p.330; Notker, Gesta, 2.14, p.78.
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may have been seen as a barrier to this solution. 206 As well as this, the problem of
Bernard's illegitimate birth was thornier even than that of Lothar II's son Hugh in
the disputes of the 860s. Whereas Lothar had been able to argue that Hugh had
been born within wedlock, Bernard's birth was incontrovertibly extra-marital.
This meant that his legitimacy would always remain contestable. While Charles
may have believed that papal endorsement would be enough to counteract this
argument, he appears not to have been confident that he could succeed on his own
authority. It is surely no coincidence that Bernard was not included in imperial
charter prayer clauses in late 887 as he had been in 885, and indeed was
programmatically left out on at least one occasion.207
There must have been plenty of promising noble candidates for the
position of queen, well capable of bearing 'aliquem parvulum Ludowiculum ye!
Carolastrum' to the emperor.208 Either way, the divorce and remarriage scheme
was yet another clear sign that Arnulf of Carinthia was to have no part in the
succession plans of Charles the Fat. Since 885 Arnulf had been the second most
senior Carolingian, both in closeness to the main bloodline (outranking Bernard in
age) and in practical support. The second failure of the Bernard plan in early 887
made him the only realistic successor. The fact that the divorce of Charles was
actually carried through must, I suggest, have convinced Arnulf that the door was
closing on him forever unless he acted swiftly. It made obvious to him the
emperor's intransigence on the identity of his heir, and alerted him to the fact that
the remarriage which was surely imminent would strengthen Charles and weaken
his own position still further. Bernard no longer posed Arnulf a threat: but in the
divorce, finally, was a succession scheme which had the potential to succeed.
This was the decisive factor which set in motion the chain of events which
culminated in Charles's deposition in November.
205 It is worth stressing that Richgard seems to have been a willing participant in her own fate.
Keller, 'Sturz', p.354 n.63 presumes that her expulsion led her relatives to join Arnulfs coup in
outrage; I know of no evidence to support this assertion.
206 Notker, Continuatio, p.330. Assuming he was of age in 890-I, when he led revolts against
Arnulf, Bernard must have been born before Notker wrote this text, in 881.
207 D CIII 168 from September 887, in which there is no mention of proles, although the textual
model, which the charter otherwise followed faithfully, did include such a reference. See Ewig,
'Gebetsdienst', p.75.
208 Notker, Gesta, 2.11, p.68.
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This hypothesis leaves certain loose ends to be tidied up. What, for
instance, can be said of the role of Liutward of Vercelli in all this? If he had
actually committed adultery, which would be inconsistent with Charles's claim
that Richgard was a virgin, it is very striking that this was not mentioned by the
Mainz annalist in his litany of Biblically-inspired accusations against the
archchancellor in his annal for 887. The language of sexual impropriety was
particularly well suited to this author's purpose and he had a ready-made parallel
available to him in the book of Esther, which he utilised extensively to compose
this annal. 209 His silence is therefore deafening.
If, then, Liutward was not really an adulterer, why was he expelled from
court? A charter of late 887 refers back to the dispossession of the archchancellor,
relating that it had taken place 'quibusdam exortis occasionibus'. 21 ° This vague
clue is probably to be placed in the context of factionalism surrounding the
succession issue. That factions had formed around this point is clear. As we have
seen, Charles had tried to remove 'quidam episcopi' from office after objections
had been made to the 885 plan to legitimise Bernard. 21 ' Two years later in 887 the
continuators of the Annales Fuldenses attributed Liutward's ejection to Charles's
discussions with 'his men' and 'the Alemans'. 212 Both these latter reports imply
friction between parties at the court itself, although, since almost all of the men in
Charles's entourage were Alemans (including Liutward and Liutbert), we can say
little more about their makeup. 213 Most historians see the turning point of this
dispute as being concerned with the adoption of Louis of Provence and a
consequent argument over the principle of imperial unity, but, as argued earlier,
this explanation is methodologically unsatisfactory. 214 Moreover, the plan to
adopt Louis was conceived by Charles upon hearing of the death of Boso in
January 887, and was certainly well underway by the time the Empress
209 Buhrer-Thierry, 'Conseiller', p.122. I therefore reject Buhrer-Thierry's argument that the
adultery did take place but was somehow too sensitive to mention.
210 D CIII 170.
211 AFC s.a.885, p.103. It may be more than chance that this event coincided with the withdrawal
of Salomon, future bishop of Constance and abbot of St-Gall, from the imperial court. Cf. Zeller,
Salomo, pp.42-3.
212 AFC s.a.887, p.105; BC s.a.887, p.115.
213 Fleckenstein, HoJkapelle, pp.189-98.
214 See c.6.1.
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Engelberga made representations at the court in February. 215 If Liutward opposed
the plan, it is inexplicable that he should have remained in favour until at least the
end of May that year, and indeed possibly until after the adoption was effected.216
If the connection between the adoption and the fall of the archchancellor is
severed, and actual adultery is ruled out, then the relatively overlooked fact,
recorded by Regino, that Liutward was deposed in connection with the beginning
of the divorce proceedings takes on much greater significance. The particular
functions of the queen within the Carolingian court made her a potential
crystallising point for the formation of factions and her arrival or departure could
easily lead to the rise and fall of groups of prominent royal advisers; certainly, the
crises of Louis the Pious's reign had come to a head in large part over factional
politics surrounding his second wife Judith. 217 I would suggest that the fall of
Liutward is most likely, in the circumstances outlined above, to have been due to
his close association with the empress at the court of Charles the Fat. If it can be
shown that his position was intimately linked to hers, then we can understand why
he might have tried to oppose the divorce-succession plan and ended up out on his
ear. The rest of chapter 6.6 is an attempt to substantiate this assertion.
Before that, however, some discrepancies remain. Firstly, we have to
explain why Regino accused Liutward and Richgard of illicit extra-marital
activities if, as argued, the establishment of the empress's virginity was the real
issue at stake in the divorce. A possible answer lies in the fact that, certainly by
the late ninth century, the rhetoric of sexual impropriety was firmly established as
an effective weapon of political attack. The close relationship between a queen
and an adviser was liable to be transformed by accusation or rumour into a case of
215 See c.6.5.
216 BC s.a.887, p.115 shows him still in favour in May. The last charter he subscribed as
archchancellor was D CIII 159, dated 30 May, while Liutbert's first appearance was in D 160,
dated 16 June. Both of these were enacted at Kirchen, which is also where Louis was adopted.
However, we do not know the exact date on which this took place; it is entirely possible that it was
done while Liutward was still in place and, given his preeminence at court, the ceremony could
welil have been orchestrated by him. With this in mind, it is interesting to note that the feast of
Ascension, which offered a striking parallel of the reception of a son to emphasise the signficance
of the adoption, fell on May 25. For this suggestion and others about the sacred significance of
dates in May 887 for this assembly, and about Charles the Fat's penchant for associating the feast
of Ascension with important political statements, see Sierck, Festlag, pp.95, 103, 157.
217 Bilhrer-Thierry, 'Reine', pp.299-301, 3 11-2 offers apposite general comments. See also Ward,
'Agobard'; eadem, 'Caesar's Wife'.
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adultery. This is especially so for Regino, writing two decades after the event
from the perspective of an outsider and as someone with little regard for the
bishop of Vercelli, whom he depicted as an archetypal despiser of Christ's
command. 218 Elsewhere Regino lamented that the fall of the Carolingians was
down to the 'sterilitas coniugum', a statement which hints that, despite his
allegations about Liutward, he knew what had really been at stake in the events of
887.219
Secondly, the question arises of why the two continuations of the Annales
Fuldenses fail to mention the divorce at all. For the Mainz annalist this is not hard
to explain. His polemical and calculated deployment of facts to create an image of
bad kingship (or, as in the 887 annal, bad archchancellorship) necessitated, as we
saw most clearly in his account of the siege of Asselt, a tendency to pass over
actual circumstances in silence if they did not fit his purpose. In 887 this author,
now with a favourable attitude towards the emperor, chose to ignore various
events connected to the succession (such as the death of Boso, the adoption of
Louis, the invitation to Pope Stephen and the divorce of Richgard) which, had he
still been hostile to Charles, he might have used in an invective against court
policy. The divorce, if adultery was not involved, had no real value as a weapon
with which to criticise his main target, Liutward.22° The perspective of the
Bavarian continuator had also shifted: from his previous position as a provincial
chronicler generally favourable to Charles, in his 887 entry he wrote as an
apologist for Arnuif, casting his rise in terms of a realm-wide aristocratic
conspiratio against an inactive and mortally ill emperor. 22 ' If this change in
attitude is explained, as seems likely, by the fact that the author wrote this account
2I8 Regino, Chronicon, s.a.901, p.148; Sierck, Festtag, pp.240-i.
219 Regino, Chronicon, s.a.880, p.117.
220 On the other hand, the general theme of this anna!, Liutward's pride and consequent attempts to
usurp royal rights, could include his opposition to the emperor's decision to divorce his wife.
Moreover, the explicit parallel made by the annalist between Charles and King Ahasuerus from the
book of Esther in his account of the year 887 may have served as a sidelong reference to the
matter. Ahasuerus had, like Charles, decided to divorce his first wife, something which may have
influenced the annalist's choice of biblical reference: the criticism of the archchancellor which was
the text's primary purpose would (as Buhrer-Thierry, 'Conseiller', pp.114-5 points out) have been
better served by the selection of Jeroboam from the book of Kings. Moreover, the Esther model
was not chosen for its depiction of queenly adultery. However, the argument could be played
either way, and it is probably wise not to push the significance of the parallel too far.
221 Bowlus, 'Early History', p.557.
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up retrospectively, after Charles's death in January 888, which he refers to in his
887 annal, then it was clearly not in keeping with his representation of events to
include the emperor's divorce of Richgard. His Charles the Fat was inactive, ill
and at the mercy of others, while his Arnuif was responding to a general call for
his firm leadership, not to a new twist in the succession politics of the royal house.
The idea, which would be implied by the mention of the divorce, that Arnulf had
rebelled in response to a quite legitimate exclusion from power hardly cast him in
a flattering light.
The case for a political motivation for the divorce of the royal couple
connected to the succession, and the archchancellor's opposition to it for factional
reasons, has so far been made largely by a process of elimination. The evidence
does not allow us to accept that this was simply some scandal which was foisted
from nowhere upon the startled emperor222, nor that Liutward and Richgard were
engaged in a sinister conspiracy against Charles. 223 Likewise, ideological and
sexual motivations can be ruled out. What remains is actually quite a clever move
by the emperor to make a virtue out of a necessity. The declaration of the chastity
of his marriage was designed not only to get him out of a barren union with the
opportunity to find a new wife, but to sanctify the situation and eliminate grounds
for opposition. Clearly, Charles and his advisers had absorbed the lessons to be
learned from the problems of some of his predecessors, notably Lothar II.
Unfortunately, the details of what actually went on in June 887 are obscure,
despite the existence of several sources. The best way to add substance to the
presumed close political relationship between Richgard and Liutward is hence to
contextualise their respective positions in the governance of the empire.
6.6.2: The career of Liutward
A colunm in the memorial book of the monastery of Remiremont, very
probably entered before 876 and possibly connected with Charles the Fat's
journey to visit Charles the Bald in 872, shows that Liutward, at this time only a
Reichenau monk, was in the future ruler's entourage before he was raised to
222 Tellenbach, 'Grundlagen', p.248.
" Lowe, 'Karisbuch', p.142.
198
kingship. 224 If 872 is indeed the correct date, this demonstrates Liutward's
readiness to follow his lord even into rebellion against Louis the German.
Moreover, it appears on palaeographical grounds that both this and a similar
record left in the liber memorialis of Pfáffers in Rhaetia were actually written by
Liutward himself, a further indication of his importance to Charles even at this
early stage. 225 This evidence also adds weight to Paul Kehr's suggestion that
Charles had been developing a chancery and diplomatic style for some time before
876, accounting for the individualistic series of charters issued during his early
years as king. 226 After Charles had assumed full power in Alemannia, Liutward
was involved in the chancery's development both as scribe and, from 878 at the
latest, archchancellor. 227 On the occasion of his Italian coronation at Ravenna in
early 880, the king intervened in a local dispute between the churches of Rome
and Milan to impose Liutward on the see of Vercelli. 228 Sometime between then
and November 882 he added the title of archchaplain to his list of dignities.
Finally, at some point before 884 he also seems to have become abbot of
Bobbio.229
There is no doubting, therefore, the fact that the rise to power of Charles
was very much in tandem with that of his long-term associate Liutward.
However, historians, in keeping with the view of Charles as a sickly and weak
personality, have credited the bishop of Vercelli with having an overwhelming
control of the politics of the reign at the king's expense; Borgolte's view that it
was Liutward who really 'directed government' is not atypical. 23° There are three
main pieces of evidence which are taken to support this view. The first and
second are the accounts of the Mainz annalist and of Regino of PrUm, both of
224 Liber Memorialis Romaricensis, fol.9r. The terming of Charles as rex rather than imperator
rules out the date of 885 often ascribed to this entry.
223 Libri Confraternitatum, p.36!; Tellenbach, 'Gedenkbucher', pp.396-9.
226 Kehr, Kanzlei, p.6.
227 Ibid, p.7, noting also that the use of the term arch icancellarius was hitherto unknown in the
east; perhaps this denotes a more hierarchic organisation in Charles's chancery; pp.14-7 for the
personal connections between Liutward and individual notaries such as Inquirinus, who was also
present in the royal entourage at Remiremont.
228 Schmid, 'Liutbert', p.53.
229 Noflcer Liber Ymnorum, p.8; von den Steinen, Darstellungs band, p.505.
230 Borgolte, 'Karl', p.21; cf. Keller, 'Sturz', p.338 on the bishop's 'ruling influence over the
emperor'; Bund, Thronsturz, p.478 on him as 'the director of imperial policy'; Angenendt,
Kaiserherrschafl, p.261 describing him as 'all-powerful'.
199
whom characterise Liutward in such terms. However, it has already been argued
that both these authorities were hostile to the archchancellor for other reasons, and
deployed the image of the unique counsellor as a polemical motif to discredit him
as an obstacle to consensus and consilium.23 ' Their opinions are therefore not to
be accepted at face value. We have already encountered several other individuals
who figured prominently among the close advisers of the emperor, men such as
Odo of Paris, Geilo of Langres, Theoderic of Vermandois and the unnamed
'Alemans' consulted about the downfall of Liutward. 232 The roles of these men
give the lie to the assertion that the latter enjoyed exclusive access to the throne.
The Bavarian annalist probably comes closest to characterising his position
accurately when he refers to Liutward as 'maximus consiliator regis palatii'; this is
by no means an unusual or sinister way of defining the power of the
archchancellor at any Carolingian court of the ninth century.233
The third piece of evidence for Liutward's alleged supremacy is the great
number of times he is mentioned as intercessor in royal diplomas of Charles the
Fat; according to Fleckenstein, these 'demonstrate that it was he who actually
shared out governmental favour'. 234 Certainly, Liutward was named as intervener
considerably more often than any other individual, and it is valid to use this sort of
evidence as an indication of who was 'in' and 'out' of favour at court.235
However, closer analysis of these documents casts some doubt on Fleckenstein's
(and others') interpretation. Of the 34 known interventions for third parties which
he made between February 880 and February 887 (our first and last examples), no
fewer than 25 concerned Italian affairs. Of the rest, 4 were for the western
231 AFC: above, c.2. Regmo: above, c.6.6.1. On this rhetorical device see Buhrer-Thierry,
'Conseiller', pp.1 15-7, 119-21.
232 Note that as well as Liutward, Odo and Hugh the Abbot are also granted the rare privilege of
featuring in the prayer clauses of an imperial charter, a provision normally reserved for members
of the royal family; DD CIII 92, 145, 160. All three are, strictly speaking, confirmations of prayer
provisions originally made by the charters' recipients.
BC s.a.887, p.115. Cf. Hincmar, De Ordine Palatii, c.12, p.54 on Adalhard as 'inter primos
consilianos priumum'; c.16, pp.62-4 on the co-supremacy of the archchancellor in the palace;
c.30, p.84 on the small assembly held by the king 'cum senioribus tantum et praecipuis
consiliariis'.
Fleckenstein, HoJkapelle, p.191; also stressed by Keller, 'Sturz', pp.338-40.
For a literary depiction of intervention at court, see Notker, Gesta, 1.4, pp.5-6; Goetz,
Strukturen, p.26.
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kingdom, 3 for Lotharingia and only 2 for Alemannia. 236 The well-known
diversity of style in Charles the Fat's charters, due to the fact that many of them
were drafted by scribes of the beneficiary, does not account for this bias in the
figures, as the main formulas were standardised and supervised by an imperial
notary and the archchancellor before being enacted. 237 That this included the
formulas for intercession, which became fairly standard from the reign of Charles
onwards, is indicated by the fact that they appeared for the first time in different
regna (with different chancery traditions) more or less simultaneously. 238 The
implication, therefore, is that Liutward's influence was limited primarily to
Italy.239
Even here, however, his power was not omnipresent. The geographical
spread of beneficiaries on whose behalf the bishop is known to have petitioned the
emperor is essentially confined to the western half of Lombardy, stretching in a
loop west from Brescia through Bergamo and Milan to Asti, and then back east as
far as Reggio by way of Pavia and Piacenza. 24° There are four exceptions to this
observation. Three charters from June 883, which were intended to strengthen the
relationship between the emperor and the churches of Casauria, Farfa and Fermo
in and around the duchy of Spoleto, were issued at the request of Liutward.24'
These documents stand alone as diplomatic evidence for Charles's intervention in
the affairs of the duchy, and presumably represent an opportunistic attempt to
establish control while the dux Guy was out of royal favour in summer 883.242
236 Italy: DD CIII 18, 21, 23, 26-9, 33, 36, 39, 44-8, 78, 82-4, 87, 111, 114-5, 126, 156. West: DD
123, 129, 151, 153. Lotharingia: DD 94, 104, 121. Alemannia: DD 38, 99. DD 54 (for the
church of Vercelli) and 92 (for Liutward and Reichenau) are disqualified as the bishop was also a
recipient. Buhrer-Thierry, 'Evéques', p.35 somehow reaches figures of 25-1-3-5 respectively.
237 Kehr, Kanzlei, pp.36-7, 43, 49.
238 D CIII 18 of February 880 for the Italian priest Leo is the first true example, while DD 24 and
38 from July 880 and May 881 respectively, are early examples from Alsace and Alemannia.
BUhrer-Thierry, 'Evéques', p.35.
240 See Map 6.
241 DD CIII 82-4. Farfa was extended full imperial protection. The Fermo charter, D 84, is not a
direct extension of royal protection, but it does represent an escalation of Charles's interests in the
area by increasing the church's jurisdiction, granting it royal properties, and making provisions
that gifts made for the benefit of Carolingian souls should be inalienable. For the prime
importance of Casauria for Carolingian influence in this region, see Feller, 'Aristocratie', pp.326-
8, 342-3.
242 AFC s.a.883, p.100; BC s.a.883, pp.109-10 states that Guy was accused of treason, presumably
in absentia, at Nonantola, where these two charters were issued. Note that D CIII 83 mentions
Guy, but tellingly without his title dux. D 81 reveals that Pope Marinus was present at Nonantola.
Lechner, 'Verlorene Urkunden', no.539 for the church of Teramo in Spoleto probably also
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The fourth exception is the intervention of Liutward in February 882 for the
church of Belluno in Friuli. Here, the archchancellor was named only as the
grant's co-petitioner, in the illustrious company of the marchio Berengar. 243 It is
striking that Liutward, despite his obvious influence in the west of Italy, was not
involved in the distribution of royal favour in Friuli and eastern Lombardy on any
other occasion. 2 This suggests that from Verona eastwards the shots were being
called by Berengar and his allies, whom we have already encountered as vigorous
royal representatives in this important region, and explains why Liutward could
not intercede alone in Belluno. 245 Berengar and his associate Waltfred of Verona,
conversely, were on at least one occasion involved in the securing of royal
patronage for a west Lombard recipient while they were at court. 246 We might add
the prominent participation of these men in royal judicial hearings, something
which cannot be said of Liutward.247 It is also worth remembering that even
Liutward's involvement in the attempt to secure imperial influence in Spoleto
could only be accomplished in the wake of an initially-successful military
invasion led by Berengar. 248 These observations are paralleled by the fact that of
the nine times Liutward is known to have intervened for beneficiaries north of the
Alps, four were in conjunction with other powerful figures from the relevant area,
while two others make mention of associated, though less significant, petitions.249
From the intervention evidence, therefore, the archchancellor's influence over the
distribution of imperial patronage appears to have been comparatively weak
outside north-west Italy.
There is a further case to be made that Liutward's power differed from
Berengar's qualitatively, and not just in its sphere of influence. Six men are given
the title consiliarius in the charters of Charles the Fat, of whom Liutward is easily
belongs in 883. The other known lost Italian charters of Charles are all for recipients no further
south or south-east than Florence.
243 D CIII 48.
244 DD CIII 37, 49, 76, 80, 110.
245 See c.4.3. For the importance of Verona to Berengar, see Rosenwein, 'Politics', pp.259-61.
246 D CIII 32, issued at Pavia for bishop Wibod and the church of Parma.
247 DD CIII 25 and 31, concerning rights and properties in Novalese, Sienna and Arezzo.
BC s.a.883, p.110.
249 D CIII 38 in Alemannia with Richgard; DD 94 and 104 in Lotharingia with Hugh of
Lotharingia and Richgard; Dl 23 in Lyon with the marchio Bernard Plantevelue. DD 99 and 153
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the most frequently mentioned. 25° The meaning of this word, which (in charters)
is largely confined to Italian sources and at all times denoted a magnate or official
of unusual proximity to the throne, is argued by Keller to have undergone a subtle
transformation in Italy in the course of the ninth century. At first a simple
auxiliary epithet to describe a magnate high in royal favour, under Louis II it came
to refer more specifically to men in court positions who were sent out by the king
to represent him in different roles in the localities while remaining outside the
ranks of the entrenched local aristocracy. After 875, claims Keller, the bearers of
the title were in fact these very aristocrats, men without whom kings could not do,
and who had an unavoidably high share in royal government, a role
institutionalised by the carrying of the name consiliarius. 25 ' Of the six consiliarii
of Charles the Fat, three, Wibod, Berengar and Waltfred, seem to fit Keller's post-
875 model most approximately. Wibod, bishop of Parma since before 860, was a
major player in Italian politics under all the late Carolingian kings, acting for
example as ambassador for both Louis II and the Empress Engelberga. 252 The
landed power of the church under his control was monumental, comprising key
properties throughout northern Italy, partly thanks to the heavy patronage he
attracted from the Carolingians. 253 Charles the Fat continued this patronage,254
referred to Wibod as his 'summus consiliarius',255 and brought him along to attend
his west Frankish coronation in 885.256 Berengar and Waltfred also fit the Keller
scheme, as the evidence discussed in chapter 4.3 implies. Their position as long-
established magnates in the eastern half of Lombardy meant that they too had a
pre-existing practical authority which was recognised and institutionalised by
Charles the Fat, manifest in his conferment on them of titles like consiliarius and
marchio. The circumstances of men like these meant that they had to be
refer to approaches made by abbot Rothoh of Reichenau and Geilo of Langres respectively. Of
Liutward's 25 Italian mtercessions, only four were co-petitioned.
250 DD CIII 21, 23, 29, 33, 36, 47, 78, 111, 114, 115, 126 (Liutward); D 16 (Waltfred of Verona
and Berthold, count of the palace); D 32 (Berengar of Friuli and Waltfred of Verona); D 47
(Wibod of Panna); D 86 (Otulfl.
251 Keller, 'Strukur'. Kasten, Konigssohne, pp.410-S is a recent supporter of Keller's arguments.
252 AB s.a.870, p.175, 872, p.188.
253 See Keller, 'Struktur', p.221; Benassi, Codice, nos.25 and 25bis.
254 DDC111 15,32,33,36, 115, 126, 171.
255 D CIII 47, when he intervened for the church of Reggio along with Liutward.
256 D CIII 126 was issued at Etrepy in June 885.
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considered in the running of the Italian kingdom; but Charles the Fat, like every
other king of the early middle ages (and not just those after 875), ruled through
such people, not in spite of them.
The same was not true, however, for the other three consiliarii. Liutward
was not from a family with deep roots in Italy; rather, as we have seen, he was an
Aleman who had been parachuted (so to speak) into the see of Vercelli by the new
king in 880. His position was achieved thanks to a longstanding personal
association with Charles the Fat. He was not a major beneficiary of royal largess.
The gift of a decent array of curtes to the church of Vercelli in March 882 looks
like an attempt to create a more solid base for the bishopric out of imperial
properties in the area. 257 Even so, it was nothing compared to the far-reaching
properties under the control of the likes of Wibod and Berengar. 258 The
archchancellor's lack of deep roots in Lombardy is well illustrated by his
discordia with Berengar, in which the former was accused of forcibly removing
the marchio's niece from a nunnery in Brescia in order to marry her off to a
member of his family, and suffered a retaliatory raid on his own civitas for his
trouble.259 This looks like a clear case of the parvenu seeking to establish his kin
by engineering a marriage into a local family with a more prestigious pedigree
which, in this case, contained a strain of imperial blood. 260 Berengar was held to
be the aggressor by the emperor, lending some weight to Schmid's suggestion that
Charles and Engelberga, the convent's proprietor, may actually have consented to
Liutward's actions. 26 ' Ultimately, however, the marchio's opposition to the union
seems to have prevailed, backed by his undeniably significant military following.
To advance his relatives step by step was thus a painstaking business for the
archchancellor, who had to rely on Konigsnahe rather than any great political
presence in Italy. 262 He is always encountered in the sources at the emperor's side
257 D CIII 54. D 0111 323 mentions further gifts by Charles to the church, but may well be suspect;
see Kehr's preface to D 54.
258 See also c.6.6.5.
259 AFC s.a.887, pp.105-6; BC s.a.886, p.1 14, 887, p.1 15.
° See Schmid, 'Liutbert', pp.45-8 for discussion of the feud. Berengar was a descendant of Louis
the Pious. It is worth noting that, as in 883, he was seemingly the main military power in northern
Italy.
261 BC s.a.887, p.115; Schmid, 'Liutbert', p.47.
262 Other members of his family did find some success in this regard; his brother Chadolt became
bishop of Novara in August 882 but he, as another of the Reichenau monks who had been in
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or on imperial business. He travelled with the court, and did not depend on his
position as bishop of Vercelli to further his career in any independent way. 263 He
certainly did not somehow rule Italy as regent when the king was north of the
Alps. This almost constant attendance at the side of the emperor must help
explain why Liutward is found intervening in charters so much more often than
the likes of Berengar and Wibod, who were more liable to stay in their own
centres of power; he was more often at court. To some extent, in other words, his
great prominence in clauses of intercession has been misread by historians; it
cannot be translated directly into a proportionately superior role in the actual
governance of the realm.2M
Liutward's position in Italy, therefore, seems to conform more to Keller's
model of the role of the consiliarius during the reign of Louis II than to that which
he proposes for the period after 875; a man without top-rank landed and local
official credentials but with great influence based primarily on a prestigious court
job and privileged access to the king, and used as a sort of general royal
representative sent into the localities to undertake a variety of tasks. Hence we
encounter him as a conspicuous mediator of royal patronage in western Lombardy,
as an agent of the attempt to intervene in Spoleto, and also as an occasional
ambassador of Charles at the papal curia. 265 We might say that while a man like
Wibod became a consiliarius because he was bishop of Parma, Liutward became
bishop of Vercelli because he was a consiliarius. Similar conclusions apply to the
other two Alemans entitled consiliarii during the reign, whose power likewise
relied on court positions; Berthold as count of the palace and Otulf as royal
chaplain. 266 Men like these tend to loom large in our sources as a result, and must
be seen, especially in the case of Liutward, as particularly enjoying the confidence
of the king. However, we should not let their prominence obscure the authority
undeniably wielded by the bishops and marchiones who resided away from court.
The two types of aristocrat identified by Keller thus coexisted in post-875 Italy,
Charles's entourage before 876, had access to Konigsnahe independent of Liutward. For
Chadolt's dates see Hlawitschka, 'Diptychen'. Another Liutward, probably a relative of the pair,
was subsequently bishop of Como; Keller, 'Struktur', p.215.
263 Although episcopal rank may have been considered a prerequisite for the post of archchaplain.
264 See Bougard, 'Cour', pp.257-9 for similar criticisms of the Keller model.
265 For the latter, Registrum, no.263; AB s.a.882, p.249; AFC s.a.885, pp.103-4.
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just as they always had done in Carolingian politics: it is tidy but overly schematic
to postulate a simple 'rise' of the territorial aristocracy to eclipse those whose
positions relied more on royal favour. Nevertheless, while Konigsnahe could be a
spectacular maker of men, as the archchancellor was eventually to find out it could
also be dangerously ephemeral.
6.6.3: Richgard and Liutward
Some connections between the careers of the archchancellor and the
empress are immediately apparent. For one thing, they were related. 267 Although
there is no direct evidence, it can thus be speculated that the rise of Richgard,
married to Charles since 86 1/2, was linked to the early presence of Liutward and
Chadolt in the future king's entourage. This would not be out of keeping with the
pattern of the advancement of queens' relatives at various Carolingian courts;
Bishop Witgar of Augsburg, for instance, a relative of Queen Emma, was a
chaplain in Louis the German's palace in the late 850s before becoming the first
archchaplain of Charles the Fat.268
Two types of source already mentioned imply further links between the
two. Firstly, the letters of John VIII reveal that the pope, when particularly keen
to exert influence over the emperor, would write exhortatory missives to both
empress and archchancellor: significantly, Richgard only appears in John Viii's
letters in association with Liutward. 269 Secondly, the pair intervened together
three times in Charles's charters. 27° The significance of this is emphasised by the
facts that they are the only major duo which appears more than once in the
diplomas, and that the empress only interceded for third parties without Liutward
on two occasions. 27 ' The geographical and institutional variety in these three
grants, for the priest Ruodbert in Alemannia, the canons of St-John in Monza, and
266 Fleckenstein, Hoftapelle, p.! 94; Keller, 'Struktur', p.217.
267 Buhrer-Thierry, 'Evéques', p.36.
268 thid, p.33. The classic example is Judith and the rise of the Welfs.
269 Regism, nos.291, 309.
270 DD CIII 38, 46 and 104.
271 DD CIII 109 (for the Marienkapelle at Aachen, with Liutbert of Mainz as co-petitioner) and
154 (for the royal fidelis Dodo and the church of Langres). DD 116 and 137 both mention as
mterveners Rudolf and his son Pippin, but they seem to be counted as a single 'unit', Pippin
presumably being a minor.
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the episcopal church of Liege, further highlights the unusual importance of the
role that the two played together in mediating access to the royal throne while they
resided at court.
It is not surprising to find a Carolingian empress and an archchancellor
figuring prominently in the sources for the distribution of royal favour. That they
are frequently found together (Richgard more often than not) in such a context is
more suggestive. This implication of political closeness becomes more solid after
a consideration of Charles the Fat's methods of rule in Alemannia and Alsace.
8.6.4: Alemannia: the emperor's kingdom
It will be clear from the foregoing discussion, as well as from previous
chapters, that different parts of the sprawling empire were governed in different
ways. The marchiones were members of the Reichsaristokratie entrenched in
various localities, recognised by Charles and utilised as his representatives. Some,
like Bernard and Berengar, were already in place when he took over their
kingdoms, while Rudolf rose in tandem with him and Odo was installed by him.
The episcopal conduits of authority in Bavaria have also already been mentioned
(chapter 6.3). In that regnum Charles was a hands-off ruler, choosing to establish
his presence by occasional well-timed personal appearances, and by dealing
directly with its bishops. His charters for Bavarian recipients record no
interventions made by any petitioner for third parties; the likes of the bishop of
Vercelli had no direct relationship with the men of substance there. Similarly,
Bavarians tended not to interfere in affairs outside their borders. The Bavarian
episcopate thus seems to have presented itself as a quite self-contained group who
accessed the royal ear directly.272
This could perhaps be seen as one of Charles's solutions to what has often
been thought of as one of his main problems; that he was very much an Aleman.
Due to links established during the period of his 'subkingship' and the first three
years of his reign proper, the Alemannic regnum (including, in the broader sense,
Alsace and Rhaetia) was a major focus of his attention, manifested most
importantly in his heavy reliance on Alemans to fill court positions. This signified
272 BUhrer-Thierry, 'Evéques', pp.Y7-9, 4 1-4, 48-9.
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a real shift from the reigns of the three previous east Frankish kings, each of
whom had ruled in large part from, and with men drawn from, Bavaria and
Franconia. The resentment that this could cause is evident from the invective of
the Mainz annalist on behalf of Archbishop Liutbert, one of those who lost out by
this new situation.
Buhrer-Thierry, noting the conspicuous absence of Alemannic bishops in
the charters of Charles the Fat, assumes that they were simply eclipsed by the
supposedly over-mighty archchancellor.273 However, as was mentioned above,
Liutward is only found intervening twice for third parties in Alemannia, including
only once on his own, and even that was for his former monastery of Reichenau.
Given the roots of Charles's power, it is surely more likely that what Bührer-
Thierry observed can be explained by the fact that the emperor simply sought
different methods of imposing himself in Alemaimia from those applied in regna
like Bavaria. His more direct involvement in the governance of this kingdom can
be illustrated with reference to three different modes of royal authority.
Firstly, Charles maintained a high personal presence here, staying more
often in Alemannia than in other regna. The region served as a central junction
point on his wide-ranging itinerary, offering access to Bavaria, Italy, Franconia
and Lotharingia. Favoured palaces like Bodman on the shores of Lake Constance
not only provided hospitality for the imperial entourage, but also served as
permanent representations of royal power while the ruler was absent. 274 The way
that Charles actively worked to establish such close personal links with individual
royal sites is visible in at least one case, for which we are fortunate to have good
evidence. Michael Borgolte has shown that land focused on the estate centre at
Neudingen, between the sources of the Danube and the Neckar, was of special
significance to the emperor. 275 Gifts in this area were made to the custodian of the
royal chapel Ruodbert on two occasions, and the court scrutiny established by
these grants was enhanced in 883 by a swap of adjacent lands with the abbey of
St-Gall. 276 Charters from 882 and 887 record in their dating clauses that Ruodbert
273 Ibid, p.34.
274 See now Airlie, 'Palace'. See Map 7.
275 Borgolte, 'Karl', pp.39-49; idem, Graftn, p.164.
276 DD CIII 19, 38 and 68 respectively.
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was seen as 'missus imperatoris in vicem comitis' and 'vicarius' in the region,
revealing that this was a place administered with peculiarly close attention from
the royal court. 2 Charles the Fat had spent some of his pre-kingship days in
control of this particular locality; and it is no coincidence that it was Neudingen to
which he retreated after being dislodged by the coup in 887.278 It is possible, then,
to characterise this keeping of the county around Neudingen free of outside
influences as part of a personal politics pursued by Charles the Fat in this area of
Alemannia throughout his reign. In view of this, it is significant for our purposes
that the charter which tranferred control of some of this region to Ruodbert was
interceded for by Liutward in conjunction with Richgard, highlighting their close
association with the emperor in this matter.279
Secondly, Charles also seems to have maintained particularly close links
with the monasteries of St-Gall and Reichenau, both powerful landholders in
Alemannia and the main academies for the recruitment of his court personnel. His
gift of the curtis of Stammheim in late 879 to St. Otmar, one of the two major
cults centred at St-Gall, seems to have represented a kind of symbolic atonement
for the persecutions suffered by Otmar at that site in the mid-eighth century. 28° Up
until 879 Charles appears, on the evidence of Ekkehard, to have ordered that a
feast should be provided for the brothers of St-Gall out of the income from his
Stammheim property during the festival of Otmar, a celebration in which the king
himself was in the habit of participating as 'frater conscriptus'. The transfer of
this land in that year was intended to put this arrangement on a firmer footing,
setting out that it was to be used to support eight men to be in the permanent
service of Otmar, and to pray daily for the king. From now on Charles,
increasingly distracted by the affairs of the newly-acquired Italian kingdom, was
277 DD SG 620 and 657.
278 D SG 551 reveals his presence as rector in 870. Herman of Reichenau, Chronicon, p.109 for
the retreat.
279 D CIII 38. Two other elements of the grant mark it out. Firstly, it was to revert after
Ruodbert's death 'ad regiam potestatem', and secondly it was enacted in Pavia, making it
exceptional as a document issued outside the regnum with which it was concerned; both of these
facets highlight the political importance of the transaction in the eyes of the court. Neither of the
other royal charters in question name a petitioner. It is interesting to note in passing that D 38 is
one of only two charters of Charles the Fat known to survive in the form of twin original copies (D
65 is the other).
° D CIII 13. Borst, 'Pfalz', p.200 presents all the evidence.
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usually only represented in the festal period by royal nuntii.28 ' He thus established
a close affinity with St. Otmar, to whom Notker referred as 'patronus vester',282
creating a solemn and permanent bond between the cult and the commemoration
of his own kingship.
Something similar took place at Reichenau. As we saw earlier, an annual
commemoration feast, to be provisioned from the curtis of Erchingen which had
been given by Charles to Chadolt of Novara, was established there by that bishop
in the mid-880s.283 It is not implausible, therefore, that the archchancellor's
acquisition of a cell 'infra monasterium', with the emperor's approval, was
designed as a means of supervising the commemoration of Charles's rule in that
abbey.2M Here again we encounter Liutward at the heart of the personal politics of
the king in Alemannia.
A third means used by Charles to promote his authority in his home
regnum is visible in his relationship with local counts. At Bodman on May 1 879,
a certain Palding passed on land which he had received from Louis the German to
the monastery of St-Gall for the memoria of that king.285 Three counts, Adalbert,
Udairich and Hildebold, were present, and the transaction was carried out 'ex
permissio quoque ipsius domni regis Karoli'. The use of the royal palace as the
venue for the proceedings, and the subsidiary condition that the fisc would reclaim
the land should the memorial provisions fall short of requirements, were among
the reasons why Charles the Fat's name was invoked in the charter. 286 However,
we should not regard these as exceptional circumstances. Already in 876 the same
Count Adalbert had acted as Charles's representative in a swap of lands involving
the abbey of Rheinau, in which the king had rights. 287 A charter of 878 identifies
him as a royal missus288 , while another of 884 endows him with the exalted title of
281 Ekkehard, Casus, c.6, p.28; Schmid, 'Bruderschaften'; Zotz, 'Grundlagen', p.290. In general
see Schmid, 'Fratres conscripti'.
282 Notker, Gesta, 2.8, p.61.
233 Mabillon, Vetera Analecta, p.427. Its veracity is confirmed by a reference to it in D AC 35.
Cf. above, c.6.4.
284 D CIII 92; Schniid, 'Bruderschaften', pp.185-7.
285 D SG vol.3 Anhang 8.
286 Borst, 'Pfalz', p.199; Walther, 'Fiskus', pp.255-6; Airlie, 'Palace'.
287 D CIII I; see Schmid, 'Konigtum', esp. pp.23 I-2, 260-3.
288 D Zur 132.
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dilectus comes. 289 Hildebold was named as royal missus on another occasion
under Charles the Fat, and also served Louis the Gennan and Arnuif in this
capacity.29° Udalrich was associated with him in the charter of Louis the German
just cited, and was later referred to by Charles as 'fidelissimus foster nepos'. 29 ' A
letter of bishop Salomon H of Constance surviving from the late 870s refers to a
journey he was about to undertake to the see of Strasbourg in the company of
Count Udairich and the abbot of Reichenau. 292 It is not specified that this was a
royal mission; the letter is only a rather brisk missive to a lesser functionary.
However, the high status of the legates suggest that it was; and we also know that
Salomon had had cause to depend on the bishop of Strasbourg's hospitality while
on the king's business on at least one other occasion. 293 The three men present as
royal representatives at Bodman in May 879 were thus by no means strangers to
that role.
Men such as these were holders of multiple counties in the Alemannic
regnum. Udairich, for instance, as count of the Linzgau, Rheingau and Argengau
(this list is not exhaustive) had interests spreading right across the south of the
region. 294 Large configurations of honores such as these are sometimes considered
by scholars, when encountered in the late Carolingian period, to have existed as
obstacles to the effective exercise of royal power. 295 However, the decision to
empower these aristocrats in this way was taken by a strong king, Louis the
German, as Borgolte's work clearly shows. 296 Louis pursued a policy of
intensifying the government of the south-west of his kingdom in the 850s, two
main prongs of which were the concentration of multiple counties in the hands of
individual nobles, and the setting up over them of his son Charles as rector. The
strengthening of comital power was part and parcel of strengthening royal power.
Royal fiscal lands passed into comital control not because the aristocracy
289 D CIII 101. Borgolte, Grafen, p.27 expresses some doubts about this identification.
290 D SG 656 (Charles); D SG 557 and D LG 124 (Louis); D Zur 159 (Arnulf). For commentary
see Borgolte, Grafen, p.143.
291 D CIII 57; see Borgolte, Grafen, pp.255-66.
292 Collectio San gallensis, no.36.
293 thid, no.33.
294 Borgolte, Grafen, pp.255-66 is the most convenient summary; this is Borgolte's Udairich IV.
295 Borgolte, Geschichte, pp.204-7, 256-8 implies this, as does Borst, 'Pfalz', p.200.
296 Borgolte, Geschichte, pp.245-58 for his findings in summary form.
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channelled their acquisitiveness and aggression into anti-royal activities, but
because the Carolingians perceived this as a more effective way of exercising
authority than dealing directly with the running of estates scattered throughout the
regnum.297 Thus, according to the same train of thought, the fisc near Lake
Constance at Untersee was placed in the hands of Count Adalbert during the reign
proper of Charles the Fat.298 Men like Adalbert and Udairich, as we have seen,
represented the emperor in his home kingdom in a manner analogous to that of
other powerful local figures like Odo in Neustria. As we argued in the case of
Odo, it is misleading to imagine Carolingian power structures in terms of the
mutual exclusivity of royal and aristocratic interests, and to evaluate such interests
purely by the measurement of direct control of land. A later dispute involving
Conrad I over Charles's gift of Stammheim to St-Gall is a good example of how
royal, aristocratic and monastic concerns could coincide in a single locality.299
Our analysis should rather be expressed in terms of authority, and our
evidence, although sparse, indicates that strong local aristocrats such as these were
happy to invoke royal authority in carrying out their affairs in Alemannia. This is
no small measure of success; the most spectacular achievement of the
Carolingians was that they managed for so long to perpetuate the idea that their
power was natural and rightful, not that they successfully interfered in every
matter of political significance within the empire. 30° That some of these
aristocrats' sons controlled duchies effectively outside royal authority in the tenth
century does not justify backdating this situation to the period before 888.°'
Indeed, the fact that the region around Neudingen formed the kernel of tenth-
century Alemannic ducal authority is testament more to the endurance of the
297 See ibid, pp.93-6 for an example of how a fisc could be transferred more or less intact to form a
new count's ex officio holdings, in this case in the Zurichgau.
298DSG96
299 Aithoff, 'Breisach', p.469. This observation holds true even for such an apparently 'royal'
location as St-Denis; see Brown, 'Politics'.
°° This is the argument of Airlie, 'Semper'.
°' As does Borgolte, Geschichte, p.207 in a discussion of the absorption of the western Lake
Constance area into the duchy of Alemannia early in the tenth century. In fact, the three
protagonists in the struggle for control he talks about were the brothers Burchard and Adalbert III,
and Erchangar. The fathers of these men were Adalbert II and the count of the palace Berthold
respectively, both of whom we have already met as servants of Charles the Fat in the 870s and
880s, very much on the same side. This reveals the flaw in Borgolte's argument that their struggle
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power structures established by Charles the Fat than to their frailty. 302 Where we
catch glimpses of Charles's relationships with the prominent Alemannic counts,
then, we see a channel of authority which allowed him to intervene effectively in
local politics when he thought it necessary. 303 This channel, moreover, was one
which had been opened up by Louis the German in the 850s, when he had set up
his youngest son as rector over a relatively small number of interrelated and
multi-beneficed aristocrats.
6.6.5: The 'monastic empire' of the Empress Richgard
From the above discussion it will hopefully be clear that Charles's
methods of government in Alemannia included a number of different forms of
what may be termed personal politics, involving links between his court and
various individuals and institutions. The lack of prescriptive sources makes it
difficult at times to excavate the roles of court figures in all this, but both the
archchancellor and the empress have emerged as crucial links at various points in
the chain. That Richgard was considered to be involved at the very highest level
of decision making is emphasised by a reference to her in an imperial charter as
'consors regni'. 304 This term, which is applied to no other person during Charles's
reign, was used in the ninth century to denote an individual who was party to the
prerogatives of the ruler. 305 This is illuminated by an allusive story of Notker,
portraying Charlemagne's wife Hildegard acting as the custodian of royal power
while the king was off fighting the Avars, which can be read as a veiled reference
to the position of Richgard in the time Notker was writing. 306 In Notker's
can be traced back to party antagonisms built up in Charles's reign, for which there is no direct
evidence.
302 Borgolte, 'Karl', pp.'F7-8; Zotz, 'Grundlagen', p.292.
Note also the case of Gozbert II, named in 886 as an imperial missus (D SG 656), for whom
Charles intervened to consolidate as count around Rheinau; Schmid, 'Konigtum', p.278; Borgolte,
Geschichte, p.255.
304 D CIII 42 from October 881, unfortunately not an original.
Rosenwein, 'Family Politics', p.257 with n.41 for further references. See also Erkens, 'Esther'.
AFC s.a.882 p.99 says that Charles made the Viking leader Godafrid into his consors regni,
which, in the polemical context of this annal, can be taken as a negative example reinforcing the
point. Cf. Nelson, 'Rites'.
306 Notker, Gesta, 1.17, pp.21-2; Lowe, 'Karlsbuch', p.140. LOwe thought that Notker was here
hinting darkly at Richgard stepping outside the limits of her position, but the story is not at all
critical of the queen, who is depicted as defending royal authority against the unseemly ambition
of a recalcitrant bishop. Notker, Continuatio, p.330 understood Richgard's imperial consecration
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vignette, the control of royal authority is symbolised by access to Charlemagne's
golden sceptre; but we are further entitled to ask what resources the historical
Richgard had at her disposal to help exercise this share in sovereign power.
A striking answer to this question is provided by the number of abbeys
which were placed in her hands by her husband, which amounted, in the words of
Arno Borst, to 'virtually an Alemannic monastic empire'. 307 By the end of 881 she
had been put in control of the convents of Sackingen, SS Felix and Regula in
Zurich, St-Marinus in Pavia and her own foundation of Andlau in Alsace, as well
as the male monastery of Zurzach. 308 She also seems to have spent an unknown
length of time as abbess of St-Stephen in Strasbourg, probably before marrying
Charles. 309 These institutions were all placed in her hands in order to cement their
special ties with the royal house; it is no coincidence, surely, that the allusion to
her as consors regni appears in the charter of one of these grants. This aim is
further illustrated by the terms of the gifts; Sackingen and Zurich, for example,
were to revert after Richgard's death 'ad regiam potestatem', while St-Marinus
was to be ruled by Charles himself if he outlived his wife. 31° While it was
standard Carolingian practice for female members of the family to be placed at the
heads of such religious institutions, the Empress Richgard's holdings are
distinguished in their number and scale, and help give the lie to the idea that the
dynasty was losing control of its monasteries in the 880s. 3 " The landed power of
some of these houses was formidable. Andlau, for instance, controlled extensive
resources both in Alsace and across the Rhine in the Breisgau, including lands
which had belonged to Richgard's family, and hence which were not previously
under the sway of the Carolingians. 312 Its dependencies included institutions as
prestigious as Bonmoutier and Etival, both of which were Carolingian royal
of 881 to have raised her to the position of consors regni. On Notker's allusions to contemporary
events, see below, c.7.
307 Borst, 'Pfalz', p.200.
308 DD CIII 7 (Feb.878, Sackmgen and Zurich), 42 (Oct.881, Pavia), 96 (Feb. 884, Andlau), 43
(Oct. 881, Zurzach) are the key charters. On the status of Zurzach see Geuenich, 'Zurzach'. For
the following, see Map 8.
309 Geuenich, 'Richkart'.
310 Cf. Zotz, 'Grundlagen', p.283 on how royal monasteries formed a distinct group which could
act as a special focus for the gifts of the aristocracy.
' De Jong, 'Monasticism', pp.627, 651. See also above, c.3.4.
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monasteries. 313 Zurzach, meanwhile, commanded access to an important bridge
over the upper Rhine on a route which led north into the heart of Alemannia and
west into Transjurane Burgundy, two regions of great importance in the reign of
Charles the Fat.314
The empress's control of SS Felix and Regula in Zurich is worthy of note
for more than simply the extent of its properties. The convent had been
effectively founded by Louis the German in 853 as a means of controlling royal
lands in the Zürichsee area in place of part of the fiscal network which he
dismantled at around this time, and more generally as part of his intensification of
government in the south-west during the 850s. 315 The abbacy was held in turn by
Louis' eldest daughter Hildegard until her death in 856 and then, after a short
period when the incumbent was none other than Lothar II's infamous first wife
Waidrada, his youngest, Bertha. 316 Under Bertha the convent acquired royal
immunity and protection in a charter of 863 co-signed by the newly-wed rector of
the region, Charles the Fat. 317 Its Carolingian credentials were thus impeccable.
To begin with, the convent's properties were focused in the immediate
vicinity of Zurich, and were almost exclusively donations of the king and his
family; the local nobility tended to patronise the nearby male foundations at
Rheinau and St-Gall instead. 318 However, the scope of the abbey's influence took
a new turn when it acquired new properties in Alsace in March 877 at the gift of
its abbess Bertha: an examination of this gift provides some interesting insights.319
Bertha's grant was made only eight days before her death (d.26 March 877), and
312 See Büttner, Geschichte, pp.139-4!, 295-301. Andlau was thus helpful in binding Alsace and
Alemannia together.
313 D CIII 96 (interestingly, a charter quite possibly drafted by Liutward himself) and D Rich I for
their association with Andlau. Their appearance in the list of royal resources in the Treaty of
Meersen (AB s.a.870, pp.172-4) is evidence of their royal status. Later documents reveal that
Richgard also had relationships with the houses of Ebersheimmtinster, Eschau and Gengebach: see
Kehr's preamble to D Rich 1.
314 See Reinle, Verena, pp.11-2; Schmid, 'Konigtum', pp.225-8, 231-2 (discussing also the
neighbouring nodal point and royal estate at Eschenz); Geuenich, 'Zurzach', pp.30-i (noting the
important market).
D LG 67. A count was also installed as part of the same policy; see Borgolte, Geschichte,
pp.78-101, esp. 92-6.
316 Geuenich, 'Anfángen'.
317 D LG 110. Louis the German maintained a degree of direct influence over the area: D 82 from
857 grants the church of St-Peter's in Zurich to the royal fidelis Berold.
318 A glance through the Zurich Urkundenbuch makes this clear.
D Zur 131.
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one of its conditions was that her brother Charles the Fat would issue a royal
confirmation charter to enhance it. This Charles did, but not until March 878, a
full year later. 32° Why the delay? The answer, I suggest, lies in the fact that
Queen Richgard was not installed as proprietor of the abbey until February 878.321
Charles was withholding his confirmation until his wife could be put in office,
ensuring that the Alsatian possessions donated by Bertha would end up in her
hands.322 The scale of these properties (12 manses with appurtenances) was not
especially impressive. However, an analysis of their history reveals that their
political significance was greater than it may appear at first sight, and helps
explain why the king was so keen that they came into the control of his wife.
The lands in question had been given to Bertha personally and 'in
proprietatem' by Lothar II in 869 to thank her for intervening with her parents on
his behalf during his divorce case. 323 They lay in the villae of Schlettstadt,
Kienzheim, Kinzheim, Altheim, Karsbach and Ammerschwihr, all in Alsace, and
primarily in the northern half of that regn urn.324 We know that at least three of
these villae had earlier been foci for the holdings of Erchangar, a prominent count
based in northern Alsace (d.865/6) who also happened to be the father of
Richgard. 325 He had received Kinzheim from Emperor Lothar I in 843, probably
as the price for his support during the civil wars, and subsequently used it as a
320 D CIII 8. D 71 from 883 is a general (this time imperial) confirmation of the house's privileges
and properties.
321 D CIII 7. Although the documents do not clearly spell out her role, Richgard was probably the
rectrix rather than the abbess of her nunneries: this situation allowed her influence over the lands
and political involvement of the houses, while freeing her from the liturgical obligations required
of an active abbess; see Becher, 'Frauenkloster', pp.308-10 on this kind of division of labour.
Charles's charter grants her the abbey 'sub usufructario'; see Fischer, 'Monasterium', pp.165-6.
322 In the meantime he seems to have taken over the running of the convent himself: the advocate
Willehar presided over the dispute recorded in D Zur 140 (876X880) explicitly on the authority of
Charles. In D 130 (Dec. 876) the same man was described as Bertha's advocate. D 140 should
therefore probably be dated to the interregnum between the death of Bertha and the appointment
of Richgard.
3DZur131;DL234.
324 D L2 34 only mentions Schlettstadt and Ammerschwihr by name, but Bertha's charter D Zur
131 is clear that all the properties she donates to SS Felix and Regula were given her personally by
Lothar, presumably on the same occasion. The latter document omits Ammerschwthr, but we
know from the former that this was one of the villae in question. The omission was probably
accidental, which would explain why it was thought necessary to concoct the subsequent forgery
D CIII 174, which records Zurich's right to Ammerschwihr.
See Borgolte, 'Karl', pp.36-9 on his identity. 	 -
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base from which to expand his influence.326 In addition, we know from Lothar II's
original gift to Bertha in 869 that the king dispossessed a certain 'Ercengarius
puer', presumably the count's son, in order to make the grant of Schlettstadt and
Ammerschwihr. 327 We may further assume that the other goods held by Bertha
were also originally in the hands of Erchangar's family. 328 What the 869 deed
reveals, therefore, is a major political setback for Erchangar's family in the wake
of his death, with Lothar taking advantage of the minority of the count's son to
dispossess him and use his properties to curry favour with the family of Louis the
German at a crucial point in his controversial divorce case. The fate of the family
was then sealed in the aftermath of Lothar's death in August 869, when the
count's nephew Bernard jumped the wrong way in the Carolingian scramble for
Lotharingia, unluckily for him backing Charles the Bald against the eventual ruler
of Alsace, Louis the German.329
In other words, the Alsatian locations which Richgard's nunnery in Zurich
received from the dying princess Bertha in 877 were properties with a
longstanding connection to the queen's immediate family, a connection which had
been severed by Lothar II's diplomatic machinations at the end of the 860s.
Richgard thus had a double claim on them, partly as family property, and partly as
an element of the property subject to her as rectrix of the royal convent of SS
Felix and Regula in Zurich, as it were ex officio. To put it another way, the
properties represented a convergence of her public and private jurisdictions. This
explains why Charles delayed his confirmation of Bertha's endowment until
Richgard was in charge of that institution: he was making absolutely sure that his
wife would be the ultimate recipient and would make good this double claim,
reasserting her control over properties which had earlier been dragged away from
326 D L 69. Geuenich, 'Richkart', p.lO'7, and Borgolte, 'Grafengewalt', p.29 claim, on the basis of
D L 133 from 854, that Erchangar lost this property in a dispute and fell out of favour with Lothar.
However, the text only says that the dispute, which was with the cell at Leberau, was resolved by
the count returning a wood he had usurped, not by having Kinzheim removed from him by the
emperor.
327 D L2 34.
328 Borgolte, 'Grafengewalt', p.33. The fact that this is certainly the case for all those properties
we can trace strenghtens this assumption; the following passage provides a context for this
assertion.
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her family by the ebb and flow of dynastic politics, and thus reactivating the
standing of her family in northern Alsace. It is possible that he himself persuaded
his sick sister Bertha to make the gift to the abbey with this very plan in mind: as
we saw, his confirmation charter was issued at her request, and we do know of
royal agents with close connections to the Zurich foundation under Bertha.33°
The ways in which this 'double claim' was manifested in the politics of the
reign of Charles the Fat are instructive. It is worth highlighting the fact that
Richgard is not actually visible as active in Zurich itself at all: all the nunnery's
business was carried out by advocates. 33 ' Her attentions were focused instead at
Andlau, the abbey in Alsace which she had founded on lands which she received
as a morning gift from Louis the German on the occasion of her marriage in
86 1/2.332 Here she took care to gather and preserve all the documents relating to
the holdings of her family, and not just those concerning Andlau. 333 It was hence
Andlau which formed the focus for her commemoration of her family's control of
its restored power base, including those parts of it which she commanded as
rectrix of SS Felix and Regula in Zurich. However, it must be stressed that after
876 she ruled Andlau not purely as proprietor of an Eigenkloster, but also as a
queen. An imperial charter of 884 indicates that the empress perceived clearly the
coincidence of authorities invested in her position in Alsace. In this document, the
emperor's fidelis Otbert was granted mansi in the villa of Marlenheim in
recognition of the assiduousness of his obedience for one lifetime, after which the
goods were to revert to Andlau. 334 This villa, interestingly, had probably been in
the possession of Richgard's father from the later 820s onwards. 335 In addition, it
was the site of a royal palace used by both the Merovingians and the Carolingians,
329 AB s.a.869, p.168. Hincmar's anna! implies that he had little choice. See Borgolte,
'Grafengewalt', p.33 for this identification of the Bernard mentioned here and passim for the
context.
330 Such as the chaplain Perihtilo and perhaps the notary Liutfred: DD Zur 139 and 219;
Fleckenstein, HoJkapelle, p.195.
' Eg. D Zur 145 from 883; cf. the general comments of Steinmann, Benediktinerinnenabtei, p.18.
332 D LG 108. Andlau's foundation narrative is given by D CIII 96.
" These are the so-called Statutes of Andlau: Bruckner, Regesta, no.656.
3 D CIII 95.
" Bruckner, Regesta, no.470.
218
and had been used as such by as recent a ruler as Lothar 11.336 This charter
therefore strengthens our appreciation of the political significance of the
landholdings of Erchangar and his family in the region. More importantly,
however, it reveals that Richgard's use of the monastery as a focus for the
preservation of the memory of her family's rights and the reestablishment of its
prominence in Alsace was mirrored by a recognition of her husband's right to use
it as a focus for the rewards of royal fideles. Her family lands were clearly
acknowledged to be integrated into royal politics.337
A final element of this discussion brings the archchancellor Liutward back
into view. In January 881, while en route to receive his imperial coronation,
Charles engineered a swap of lands between Liutward and the episcopal church of
Chur in Rhaetia. Liutward handed over a selection of churches in Vorarlberg and
south Tirol, which he held as life benefices from the king, and received in return
an enormous grant of 150 mansi in Alsace, in the villae of Schlettstadt, Kinzheim,
Breitenheim and Winzenheim. 338 Zotz has convincingly placed this document into
the context of royal palace policy: Schlettstadt was Charles's only palatium in
Alsace, the prime focus of his authority there, and Zotz shows that his reign is the
most likely time for the construction of an Aachen-style rotunda, 22 metres in
diameter, the foundations of which were discovered at the turn of the last century
under the church of St.George. This gift of land to Liutward can thus be seen as a
measure taken by the king to reclaim the locus regius and church of Schlettstadt
and allow the creation of a palace reminiscent of Aachen at a time when the latter
was still in the hands of Louis the Younger. 339 The very deliberate nature of this
project is highlighted by the unusual nature of the charter concerned: rather than
336 D L2 28. Theudenc II was brought up at Marlenheun: Zotz, 'Elsal3', p.51. See also
Astronomer, Vita, c.48, p.478 for a visit by Lothar I after taking his father captive in 833. On the
importance of the villa as the centre of a network of lands see Büttner, Geschichte, p.300.
" D CIII 41 from 881 is an analogous case in which property ordinarily used for the upkeep of
the canons in Zurich (see D Zur 37 for this information) was given to a royalfidelis, after whose
death they would revert to SS Felix and Regula. Richgard's grant of the royal monastery of Etival
to Andlau was expressly made at Charles's 'ortatu et consilio': D Rich 1. D CIII 24 from 880
shows Charles adding royal confirmation to a distribution of Andlau's properties made by
Richgard. This interplay between family property and royal authority is also visible in the
relationship between the Empress Englelberga and her abbeys: see La Rocca, 'Reine', pp.281-3.
Cf. Stafford, 'Queens', pp.19-20.
D CIII 30; cf. D BUnd 75.
" Zotz, 'Tradition', pp.81-4.
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taking the form of a royal confirmation of a swap already agreed, the king,
probably taking advantage of an episcopal vacancy, simply stated that he wished
the swap to take place. 34° In a fashion similar to that which we saw with regards to
the royal estate of Neudingen, Charles included Liutward in the close control of
specific areas which were of special importance to him.
But Richgard must also have played a part here, as she had done in
Neudingen. As we saw, Schlettstadt and Kinzheim at least were villae with which
she had intimate connections through both family and institutional relationships.
Charles was here making northern Alsace, and especially the area around
Schlettstadt, into his place through the medium of both his wife and his chief
counsellor. The gift to Liutward must have consolidated him and Richgard
together as a force to be reckoned with in the region; in a sense it added more
pieces to the jigsaw of royal presence in northern Alsace. It was made as the royal
couple journeyed to Italy to receive the imperial dignity, an occasion at which
Andlau's position would be sealed by being placed in the protection of St. Peter.34'
The timing thus implies a connection between these events and the gift of lands to
Liutward; it ensured king, queen and archchancellor would stand together at the
centre of a web of property and power relations which articulated itself in the
construction of the imperial palace at Schlettstadt.
The palace was of special importance in 881 because Aachen itself was in
the kingdom of Louis the Younger (as was Lorsch, another key site of Carolingian
legitimacy), and Alsace was on the frontier of Charles's kingdom. However, the
region's importance did not diminish once these circumstances changed. Charles
never visited Aachen: Schlettstadt remained the main physical focus of his power
in the regnum Hlotharii throughout his reign, sustaining his entourage there while
he was present, and standing as a monument to his authority when he was not.
The palace and its hinterland, founded on properties controlled by the king
through his wife and archchancellor, continued to articulate Charles's rule in
340 D CIII 30 is, unfortunately, a late cartulary copy. However, the confirmation charter D AC 9
refers to the original document in exactly these terms, stressing the agency of Charles in
engineering the swap.
" D CIII 96 gives some details.
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Alsace, control of which remained as vital as it had throughout the Carolingian
period.342
These arrangements would not, however, have been destroyed by the
events of summer 887, when both empress and archchancellor left court. In the
case of Liutward, we can infer from an imperial charter of 887 issued for his nepos
that the disgraced archchancellor had lost lands in the wake of his deposition: the
nepos had lost out as well and was now being compensated. 343 Probably included
among the bishop's losses were the Alsatian possessions which he had swapped
with the church of Chur in 881. These may have reverted to the direct control of
the emperor himself: this measure would have been fairly simple if the see was
still vacant at this time. 3 Moreover, the properties were certainly part of the
royal fisc when Otto the Great decided to return them to Chur in
For her part, Richgard remained at Andlau, which was built on her
morning gift, a set of lands therefore specifically intended to support a single
woman (usually a widow). The empress seems to have colluded in her divorce,
and so was presumably quite able to continue exercising her functions as
proprietor of her abbeys: there is no evidence that she lost control of any of these
before Charles's death. 346 After his death, however, her monastic empire began to
fragment. Amulf had installed count Eberhard as 'dominus' of SS Felix and
Regula in Zurich by 889, depriving Richgard of the part of her family's Alsatian
lands which were attached to that institution. 347 Eberhard belonged to a prominent
Alsatian aristocratic family, and his association with the Zurich abbey shows
Arnulf's appreciation of its significance for control of Alsace, which now formed
342 On palaces as mediums of royal authority, see Airlie, 'Palace'; on the political importance of
Alsace, see Zotz, 'Elsal3', esp. pp.57-64. On the spiritual bonds between Alemannia and Alsace in
Charles's reign see Geuemch, 'Elsaflbeziehungen'.
D CIII 170.
As it had been in 881. Unfortunately the evidence does not allow certainty on this question,
beyond the fact that there was a bishop of Chur installed by early 888: see the commentary in DD
BUnd, p.498.
D OG 157. D 167 from 953 confirms the restoration and adds to the list another set of
properties in the Strasbourg and Schlettstadt areas which were therefore perhaps also included in
the original transfer of Chur lands to Liutward. D AC 9 from 888 confirms the Rhaetian lands of
Chur but is tellingly silent on the Alsace properties, which had clearly not reverted to the bishopric
in the meantime.
46 Similarly, the Empress Engelberga was able to maintain a very high political profile after Louis
II's death, partly by virtue of her own monastic empire. Cf. also Hyam, 'Ermentrude', pp.163-4.
347 D Zur 153: 'sub dominatione Eberharti comitis'.
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a crucial frontier zone in his struggle against Rudolf I, the former march jo.348 The
community at Andlau, meanwhile, took to tampering with charters in an attempt
to reestablish its hold over the lost Alsatian lands, while the nuns at Zurich
produced a counter-forgery to close a documentary loophole in their own claim.349
Ultimately the abbey of SS Felix and Regula, backed by a series of royal patrons,
won the day: Otto the Great confirmed its possession of the north Alsatian
properties in 952.° The powerful family of Erchangar and Richgard, having been
dispossessed once in the aftermath of the death of Lothar II, therefore lost out
again after that of Charles the Fat.
6.6.6: Conclusion
The blunt nature of the sources can be a hindrance to the study of the
governance of late Carolingian east Francia, and forces us to infer scraps of
information from the course of events. From these it is clear that both Richgard
and Liutward were extremely important in the 'policy-making' of Charles the Fat,
and that frequently they acted together in the execution of these policies. The
emperor, the empress and the archchancellor can be said to have sat together at the
centre of a kind of network of personal politics reaching out in various directions
to carry out projects closely related to the court and the maintenance of royal
power.
This conclusion provides us with a context for accepting the connection
made by Regino between Liutward's expulsion from court and the royal divorce in
summer 887. We have seen that the archchancellor's influence was built more or
less exclusively on his position at court and his personal relationship with the
imperial couple. He was no vice-regent of Italy, but rather a man without any
deep roots who was sent out to represent Charles in various different contexts.
348 On Eberhard see Voilmer, 'Etichonen', pp.176-8; Borgolte, 'Grafengewalt', pp.39-41 (although
I see no basis for his assertion that Eberhard was in position by 886); Rappmarin and Zettler,
Monchsgemeinschaft, p.470. Eberhard married into the ducal house of Alemannia: once more, the
structures established in the reign of Charles the Fat were crucial in the shaping of tenth-century
political geography.
Andlau: see the interpolated D L2 34; cf. Bruckner, Regesta, no.656. Zurich: D CIII 174, and
see above, n2f.
D OG 146. On the other hand, the hold of Richgard and her family on Andlau itself was
strengthened by D LC 68 and D CS 125.
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While he enjoyed the ruler's favour, his position was secure; as soon as he lost it,
he had nothing to fall back on. It is evidently untrue to say that Charles 'could not
do without this man', because after summer 887 this is exactly what he did do.35'
Rather, it was Liutward who could not do without Charles. The emperor was in
control of these events, they were not foisted upon him.352
So, although the details escape us, the evidence permits us to conclude that
somehow Liutward's influence at court, which was indeed privileged, had by 887
become closely linked to the position of the empress. When Charles hatched a
plan to divorce his wife and remarry in the hope of producing a legitimate heir, a
plan to which Richgard seems to have acquiesced, Liutward saw his position
threatened and opposed him. Charles, who had little time for such politicking
when issues of much greater import, like the continuation of the Carolingian line,
were at stake, proceeded to relieve him of his duties and hand them over to the
obvious replacement, Liutbert of Mainz. The Mainz annalist, clearly not one to be
gracious in victory, attempted to blacken Liutward's name further by claiming that
he fled to Arnuif and helped plot Charles's downfall. 353 This seems, on the whole,
to be more invective than fact. 354 The fallen archchancellor does not figure at all
in Arnulf's reign as a man of distinction, and presumably retired to Vercelli;
certainly, he was later killed in Lombardy during a Magyar attack. 355 There is
therefore no justification for seeing the removal of Liutward as the spur for the
coup; he did not engineer it, nor was he so important that his fall rendered the
emperor vulnerable. We must look elsewhere to explain where the impetus came
from. Charles, and not his fallen archchancellor, was the key figure in deciding
the course of events in 887.
The contrasting fates of the empress and the archchancellor are instructive.
An indication of how Charles sought to remove all trace of his wife from court is
given by the fact that she was henceforth purged from the prayer provisions of
"' Keller, 'Sturz', p.340.
352 Cf. Reuter, Germany, p.119.
" AFC s.a.887, p.106.
"4 Buhrer-Thierry, 'Conseiller', p.121.
" Regino, Chronicon, s.a.901, p.148; cf. Sierck, Festtag, pp.240-I
223
imperial charters, a measure designed to reinforce the annulling of the marriage.356
Nevertheless, her retreat was seen, on the evidence of the Vita Verenae, as
honourable and virtuous. Liutward, on the other hand, was subjected to a much
more virulent form of damnatio memoriae. While Richgard was buried (c.900) in
her own church at Andlau, and was recognised as a saint by Pope Leo IX in 1049,
Liutward's obituary was not even entered into the memorial book of Reichenau,
the monastery where he had been brought up and where other members of his
family were commemorated along with the Carolingians and their deceased
fideles. His long career in service to Charles the Fat ended abruptly and bitterly,
and stands as eloquent testimony to the precarious position of those aristocrats
whose power rested too much on the changeable favour of Carolingian kings.
6.7: The deposition of Charles the Fat, November 887
Historians have, therefore, been too willingly seduced into crediting the
protagonists of the events of the year 887 with great ideological agendas and with
the foreknowledge that the Carolingian empire's fate was sealed. The traditional
and still-accepted versions of this fate, which rely on the postulation of assumed
long-term trends like the rise of the aristocracy and the demise of royal authority,
all stress that it could not have been different, that the outcome of 887 was
inevitable and had been coming for a long time. However, this chapter has
attempted to show that by stripping away the Verfassungsgechichtliche baggage
which customarily attends accounts of the events of 887, and by eliminating our
own knowledge of their consequences for the rise of France, Germany and
'feudalism', we can understand them as the outcome of a very specific set of
political circumstances and decisions, and see quite clearly that things could
indeed have been different.
In this case the key circumstance was the unravelling of the Carolingian
family settlement of 880 due to the unpredictable deaths of the heirless Louis the
Younger, Louis III and Carloman II; only these events made Charles the Fat's
succession plans so vitally significant. The key decision, in light of this, was
356 D CIII 168 is especially interesting since the charter from which it was almost totally copied did
include the king's coniunx in the prayer clause; see Ewig, 'Gebetsdienst', p.75.
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Charles's determined obstruction of Arnuif's hopes of sharing in the succession
after his acts of rebellion during the Wilhelminer war: Charles's obduracy led
ultimately to his deposition. Of course, Arnulf was still not a legitimate
Carolingian but, had he taken over as an approved imperial heir rather than as a
usurper, would the reguli have had the same justification and confidence in
ascending their own thrones? At a stage prior to this, if Hadrian III had not died in
885 and Bernard had been publicly designated as an heir, would Arnulf have had
the same justification in revolting? What if the emperor had turned to Charles the
Simple? We cannot answer any of these questions, but simply posing them
highlights the fact that the outcome was not inevitable. Chance and the course of
events played their part in bringing about the end of the Carolingian empire, just
as they had in determining every other turn in the course of its history.
It was the divorce and remarriage plan, as the first of Charles's schemes to
show any signs of success, which must have finally convinced Arnulf that an open
rebellion was his best realistic chance of acquiring a throne. If the emperor could
watch the Bernard plan fail twice and still leave him out in the cold, surely his
way was definitively blocked. Motive coincided with opportunity. Two years of
peace with Zwentibald had allowed him to recover his strength after the setbacks
of the Wilhelminer war. The Moravians, moreover, were always fickle friends of
Carolingian rulers, and alliances on and across the eastern frontier
characteristically shifted with great speed. In the same way that a coincidence of
interests had made Zwentibald a natural ally of Charles against Arnulf in 884, by
late 887 the latter's proximity may have given the ambitious dux cause to reassess
his priorities: it is significant that a large force of Sla ys, presumably including
Moravians, figured prominently in the rising against the emperor.357
We can surmise that Arnuif's other supporters in his coup likewise came
from the south-eastern corner of the empire. Evidence for this comes from the
high number of charters, including those to an unprecedented number of
individual laymen, which he made in that region during the earliest phase of his
" AFC s.a.887, p.106; Bowlus, 'Early History', p.564.
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reign. 358 Several of these make an explicit connection between Arnuif's accession
and the fact that the new king felt himself in such men's debt. For example, a
grant to the miles Engilger was issued 'recordantes crebri servicii nobis per ilium
facti, priusquam regium nomen acciperemus.' 359 Arnulf, left by and large to his
own devices in the south east after Christmas 885, had had time to cement his
relationship with men like these. They, moreover, stood to suffer the same
exclusion as he did if Bavaria and its marches remained a neglected Fernzone
under the rule of another Alemannic king. 36° Regional aristocracies such as these
had become accustomed to having kings close at hand, in Bavaria since the reign
of Louis the German, and the reunification of the empire under Charles had made
Konigsnahe a scarce resource. 36 ' These tensions and circumstances were not
unique to the position of Arnulf in 885-7: they are the hallmarks of the classic
generational (and geographical) rivalries which had been an endemic feature of
Frankish politics since at least the sixth century. Arnulf rebelled for substantially
the same reasons as had, say, Pippin the Hunchback or Charles the Bald's son
Carloman, and he found an aristocratic constituency in much the same way as
them. He was not, nor did he consider himself to be, the representative of a
particular class or the standard bearer of a new age in European history.
As for the actual course of events, our sources are difficult to resolve.362
Four narratives provide specific dates and places. The Mainz and Hildesheim
annalists, along with Regino, place the arrival of Arnulf and the defection of the
nobles at a general assembly convened at Tribur around the time of the feast of St.
Martin (11 November). 363 The Bavarian annalist, on the other hand, states that the
deed was done at Frankfurt. 3M Charles's last known imperial charter, although
badly corrupted by later forgers, seems to have been issued at Frankfurt on 17
For example: DD AC 5, 8, 15-7, 20-2, 32, 42-4. See Reindel, 'Arnuif', p.205; Bowlus, Franks,
pp.230-2; Schieffer, 'Karl', p.140 (and passirn on the longer-term process of installation of
Arnulfs old allies, like the relatives of William and Engelschalk, into key honores). Von Gladil3,
'Schenkungen', p.84 provides comparative statistics.
359 DAC 17.
° The same consideration, the desire for accessible kingship, also motivated some Alemans to
support Bernard in a counter-revolt against Arnuif in 890-1.
361 Innes, State, pp.221-4.
362 See BM 1765 for full references to the contemporary and later sources.
363 AFC s.a.887, p.106; AH s.a.887, p.19; Regino, Chronicon, s.a.887, pp.127-8.
BC s.a.887, p.1 15.
226
November, while Amuif issued his first royal one ten days later in the same
place.365 Charles subsequently retired to Alemannia, either on a pension
generously provided by Arnuif, or to rally his supporters to mount resistance.366
Either way, the emperor was not long for this world, expiring of unknown natural
causes on 13 January 888.367
Much scholarly effort has been expended on trying to coax precision from
these sources in order to build a clear narrative of events between the key dates of
11 and 27 November. Most attempts, from Keller's comprehensive and influential
1966 article 'Zum Sturz Karls III.' onwards, have focused on resolving the
apparent doubts in contemporary minds about where, when and how Charles was
actually deposed: was it Tribur or Frankfurt, and what transpired there?368
However, the very fact that equally plausible but mutually contradictory answers
to these questions have been suggested by historians leads one to suspect that, as
Reuter has pointed out, the sources available will not bear the pressure which has
to be laid upon them in order to make the attempt. 369 Accordingly, only some
general points will be made here.
The partisan character of the Mainz and Bavarian annalists has already
been stressed. The Mainz author presented the rising as a sudden coup, in keeping
with his view of Arnulf as a usurper, while his Bavarian counterpart played up
Charles's illness as the spark to a supposedly realm-wide magnate conspiracy in
order to justify the deposition. Regino, on the other hand, took a more equivocal
line. Although he was writing for the court of Arnulf's son Louis the Child, he
was also, as we have seen, not without sympathy for Charles the Fat. Moreover,
he regarded the coup and consequent shattering of the Carolingian hegemony as a
tragedy. This willingness to see both sides of the situation lends Regino's
testimony an extra credibility. Two things are clear from his version: firstly that
365 DCIII 172; D AC 1.
With Arnuif's permission: Regmo, Chronicon, s.a.887, p.128; BC s.a.887, p.115 (after failing
to start a resistance war). AFC s.a.887, p.106 simply says that Charles 'in Alamanniam repedavit.'
367 BC s.a.887, p.116 gives the date. Cf. BM 1765d. AV s.a.887, p.64 mentions a rumour that his
own men strangled him.
368 Keller, 'Sturz', pp.347-73. For critiques of Keller, see Hlawitschka, Lotharingien, pp.38-48;
Bund, Thronsturz, pp.417-89; Reuter, Germany, pp.119-20. Kehr, 'Tagen' is the most significant
pre-Keller article.
369 Reuter, Annals, p.103, n.8.
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the deposition of Charles and the elevation of Arnulf took place at a single
assembly, and secondly that the defection of the leading men was spurred by their
observation of the gravity of the emperor's illness."° Tellingly, even the Bavarian
annals, despite their author's elaboration of a long-term conspiracy theory, also
back up the single assembly point: 'veniente Karolo imperatore Franconofurt isti
[the nobles] invitaverunt Arnolfum filium Karlmanni regis ipsumque ad seniorem
eligerunt, sine mora statuerunt ad regem extolli.' 37 ' As Regino made out, Arnulf
and his retinue must already have been present at the assembly. The abbot of
PrUm's emphasis on Charles's illness at this point is also believable: after all, he
was dead of natural causes, at the age of only 48, within two months.372
All this backs up Regino's implication of a somewhat on-the-spot decision
made by the nobles to invite Arnulf to take over the throne, and jars with the long-
term conspiracy depicted by the Bavarian annalist. The account of the latter is
further discredited by the charter evidence for Arnulf's supporters discussed
earlier: it was not Thuringian, Saxon or even Franconian nobles whose help he
rewarded after his succession, but rather men from the south east and the marches.
In light of this, the Mainz continuator's report of the rising as a sudden coup
pushed through by surprise and a display of force begins to look more plausible.
A likely reconstruction, taking into account all these elements of the narrative
sources, begins with Charles summoning an assembly for magnates from
throughout the east Frankish kingdom, perhaps to make a further announcement
on the succession issue. Arnulf, ready to press his claims by force since hearing
of the emperor's divorce in the summer, turned up unexpectedly with a large
armed retinue. Seeing Charles's poor state of health and considering the uncertain
status of the succession, the assembled magnates were mentally primed to be
sympathetic to the claims of his nephew, especially given his military backing.
An analogy with the Field of Lies in 833 suggests itself, as another occasion on
which rival Carolingians had stood face to face with each other while the short-
term calculations of aristocratic opinion decided the outcome. Like Louis the
370 Regino, Chronicon, s.a.887, p.127.371 BC s.a.887, p.1 15.372 AV s.a.887, p.64 supports Regmo's interpretation of the single assembly and the emperor's
illness.
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Pious's on that occasion, Charles's support melted away almost to nothing,
including his closest advisers: 'concussis timore Alamannis, quibus maxime
negotium sui regni habebat commissum, omnes penitus ab eo defecerunt.'373
Both continuations of the Annales Fuldenses tell us that Charles sent
Arnuif an embassy: the Bavarian author said it carried gifts symbolic of
submission, while the Mainz author stated it bore the fragment of the True Cross
on which Arnulf had sworn loyalty to Charles, to persuade him to remember his
faith.374 Either way, there is nothing in any source to suggest a formal deposition
ceremony or tonsuring. 375 Even when such a procedure had been attempted,
against Louis the Pious in 833, it proved ultimately unsuccessful: Carolingian
politics were not governed by such rigid norms and laws, and moments of tension
were often resolved with a fair degree of improvisation. As long as Charles lived
there was always a chance that the pendulum could swing back in his favour, as it
had in Louis's in 834. This ambiguity is highlighted by the fact that Regino refers
to Arnulf as rex after the coup, yet continues to call Charles imperator until his
death. 376 The sources disagree as to whether Charles retired to Alemannia on
Arnull's authority or on his own, to raise support. The fact that he went to
Neudingen, a place which, as we have seen, had been of particular importance to
him since 870, may suggest the latter is more likely. 377 However, we may
speculate that Charles seemed so ill to Arnulf that the latter was confident his days
were numbered, removing the need for him to bloody his hands or to engage in
proceedings against his sick uncle which might in time come to be seen as
dishonourable. The new king also had Bernard commended to him, presumably in
BC s.a.887, p.1 15. 1 take this to be a reference to Charles's palace staff, most of whom were
Alemans and were taken over en masse by Amulf see Fleckenstem, HoJkapelle, pp.198-202.
AFC s.a.887, p.106; BC s.a.887, p.115. Regmo, Chronicon, s.a.887, p.128 mentions gifts and
the commendation of Bernard to Arnuif. The unspecifed gifts may have included the so-called
Eliwangen Casket: see Schramm, 'Bildnisse', pp.114-S with n.19a.
" Reuter, Germany, p.120.
376 Regino, Chronicon, s.a.887, 888, pp.128-9. AFC s.a.887, p.106 does the same, although it
never refers to Arnulf directly as rex.
ni See c.6.6.4. Regino, Chronicon, s.a.887, p.128 caricatures the emperor's poverty for literary
effect, the feast-giver turned into a man who cannot even feed himself.
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order to neutralise his claims.378 His fate was sealed in 891 when he was killed
leading a rebellion against Arnulf.379
As noted above, any attempt to reconstruct the course of events must
remain tentative. The hypothesis just presented, that the deposition came about
due to a confluence of Arnulfs motives (resentment at exclusion from royal
power) and opportunity (a stand-off with the emperor won by a display of force,
and with the nobility swayed by continuing doubts over the succession and
Charles's illness), does however make sense as an outcome of the situation created
by the course of royal politics since 885. The character of this situation shows
how the widely-accepted 'strong aristocracy' model promoted by Schlesinger and
his adherents is misconceived. The aristocracy had always played a prominent
role in determining the resolution of succession struggles and the election of new
kings: this was not a novelty in 887. They were only one element in the course of
events bringing about the fateful denouement, along with the respective agendas
and priorities of Charles and Arnuif. Arnulf's succession was not necessary or
inevitable. He could simply have failed, had, say, Charles done a Louis the Pious
and recovered, just as the risings of Hugh of Lotharingia in 885 or Bernard in 891
could have succeeded. The cliché that history is written by the victors is rarely so
obviously true as when applied to Carolingian historiography, but this is often
overlooked by s modern commentators. The 'rise of the aristocracy' theory is
largely based on the Bavarian annalist's account of 887, but this text was written
with a propagandistic purpose in mind. It is dangerous to build on it a grand
theory of a great historical process inexorably sweeping individuals and events out
of their path on the way to 'feudalism', France and Germany. Similarly,
Tellenbach's view of a weak Charles and strong Arnulf, although more rooted in
contemporary politics, still pays too little attention to the context of events and the
changing positions of the protagonists. The problem is not one of institutional
relationships or of necessarily antagonistic individuals holding static positions.
378 Regino, Chronicon, s.a.887, p.128. Similarly, Hugh of Lotharingia had been commended to
Louis the German in 867, and Amuif to Louis the Younger in 879: AB s.a.867, p.137; AF s.a.879,
p.93.
" AA s.a.890, 891, p.182.
230
Rather, the coup of 887 must be understood in light of the fluctuating relationships
between particular individuals over a relatively short space of time.
Nevertheless, the revolt of 887 was indeed a significant event, due to the
fact that no adult male legitimate Carolingians remained: the dynastic monopoly
on royal power which had endured since 751 was shattered. It is this, rather than a
shift in the nature of the 'German constitution' for which the deposition of Charles
the Fat is truly notable. With royal legitimacy now up for grabs and power
vacuums appearing all over the empire, the way was clear for the likes of Odo of
Paris and Rudolf of Burgundy to make their claims and establish a form of
kingship which was hard-won by numerous concessions to the aristocracy. 380 The
struggle between Charles and Arnuif had not, however, been fought over these
issues. If the aftermath of Arnuif's coup saw the development of important
changes in the shape of Frankish politics, the motivations and actions of its
protagonists were not revolutionary, but entirely traditional.
380 See c.8.
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7: CHARLES THE FAT AND NOTKER THE STAMMERER
7.1: Introduction
Notker the Stammerer's unorthodox work on Charlemagne, the Gesta
Karoli (the title is not contemporary), stands as one of the more interesting and
unusual examples of ninth-century historiography. Earlier generations of
historians looked unfavourably upon its anecdotal, humorous, moralising and, by
positivist standards, historically inaccurate approach, dismissing it as a laughably
gauche imitation of the more stately Carolingian biographies penned by the likes
of Einhard, Thegan and the Astronomer. Halphen summed up this evaluation
when he declared, in a frequently-quoted phrase, that Notker's Gesta Karoli was
as useful a source for the reign of Charlemagne as was Dumas's The Three
Musketeers for that of Louis )(III.' More recent commentators have come at the
Gesta from different angles. In particular, Ganz has shown that the very mangling
of historical sources which Halphen saw as the most reprehensible aspect of the
Gesta is in fact its central structural element. Far from being a naively-recorded
collection of bizarre anecdotes he had picked up in cloistered conversations,
Notker's work was actually a carefully-constructed exposition of Einhard's Vita
Karoli, designed to invert its secular values and place God back at the centre of
the reader's understanding of history. 2 The evident distance between Einhard and
Notker was, therefore, consciously established. Ganz's favourable assessment of
the value of the Gesta complements the researches of other scholars, most notably
Siegrist, who traced the influence of Notker's monastic training and outlook on his
writings, and Goetz, who read the text as a mirror reflecting manifold aspects of
late ninth-century society and thought.3
However, for all that Notker has been vindicated as a major thinker and
writer of the Carolingian period, his relevance to the study of contemporary
politics has been disproportionately neglected. Lowe had just about the first and
seemingly also last word on this subject in 1970, in a single article which looks
rather isolated when placed next to the numerous works dedicated to the possible
'Haiphen, Etudes, p.142.
2 Ganz, 'Humour'; cf. now Innes, 'Memory'.
Siegrist, Herrscherbild; Goetz, Strukturen.
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political agendas of Einhard. 4 In large part this is because, as has been repeatedly
stressed in this thesis, while Notker has been rehabilitated, his age has not. Its
politics are still seen as self-explanatory and stagnant in contrast to the dynamic
intrigues riddling the court circle of Louis the Pious on which Einhard may well
have been passing comment; even Lowe was party to these assumptions, and they
govern his interpretation of the text.
Accordingly, even the basic question of why the work was written in the
first place remains without a satisfactory answer, and seems, remarkably,
sometimes to have been regarded as unimportant: Goetz, in the most recent major
study of the Gesta, does not address the issue at all. The most common
interpretation of Notker's compendium of idealised vignettes about Charlemagne
is, not unreasonably, that they constitute a kind of Furstenspiegel, one of the genre
of exhortatory texts intended to guide the behaviour of rulers (in this case Charles
the Fat) which pepper the literary output of the ninth century. 5 There is much to
commend this view, in as much as the Gesta consistently stresses some of the
classic ideals of Christian kingship (justice, wisdom, prudence), as well as
reinforcing the importance of primary monastic virtues such as humility and
charity. 6 In the broad sense of the term, it is indeed reasonable to class it as a
mirror for princes. However, certain passages in the text, especially those which
address Charles the Fat directly, invite a more specific interpretation (as indeed do
certain passages in other ninth-century specula principum). For example, we
know from one such section that Charles himself had commissioned the work: 7 the
so far unanswered question is, why? This chapter will seek to substantiate the
assertion that there is more to be made of the political content of the Gesta Karoli
than has been previously allowed. This will not entail a comprehensive
reinterpretation of the whole text, but rather only of parts of it, although certain
significant implications for the whole text will emerge. The conclusions offered
are intended largely to complement, rather than replace, those of previous studies.
Lowe, 'Karisbuch'.
Siegrist, Herrscherbild is the most comprehensive and influential exponent of this view.
6 Siegrist and Goetz discuss these themes throughout their books.
7 Notker, Gesta, 1.18, p.22
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7.2: The date of the Gesta Karoli
Any assessment of the political content of a work like the Gesta must
begin with its dates. The text is usually dated to between December 883 and
November 887, but neither of the termini are entirely satisfactory. 8 To begin at
the end, the terminus ad quem of November 887 is drawn from the date of
Charles's deposition. One factor adduced in support of this date is that the work
as we have it is incomplete, lacking a promised third book and actually breaking
off mid-sentence in book 2; the fall of Charles, it follows, caused Notker to
abandon his commission. This hypothesis, although plausible, can be refuted. In
book 2 of the Gesta, as part of a brief digression concerning Louis the German's
virtuous character, Notker makes reference to two privileges granted by that king
to the, in his view, impoverished community of St-Gall in 873. As the
Stammerer pointed out, these had been granted in collaboration with the young
Charles the Fat himself, and were clear evidence that Louis was a 'Dei cultor
eximius, servorum Christi socius, tutor et defensor indefessus.' Notker's aim was,
clearly, to exhort Charles to issue imperial confirmations of these charters, which
served to place St-Gall on an equal footing with its near neighbour Reichenau.'°
His point was all the more obvious in that he himself had been instrumental in
drafting and cataloguing the original documents, and he echoed their wording in
the Gesta." Charles did ultimately satisfy Notker's wishes on 30 May 887.12 That
his charter of this date had not yet been issued when the Gesta Karoli was written
supplies us with a new terminus ad quem for the work.'3
The 883 date, on the other hand, is taken from reports in the St-Gall house
histories by Ratpert and Ekkehard IV, which reveal that Charles met and talked
8 For instance, Lowe, 'Karisbuch', pp.123, 136; Penndorf Problem, pp.150-i; Eggert,
'Reichsgedanken', p.74. See Haefele's introduction, pp. xxiii-xliv, on the manuscript traditions.
9 Notker, Gesta, 2.10, pp.66-7; DD LG 145-6.
'°As hinted at in the Gesta: St-Gall enjoyed 'nullum privilegium aliorum monasteriorum.'
' Haefele, 'Studien', pp.385-9. The reference here to arms and marriage in same chapter may also
be intended to call 873 to Charles's mind: see below, c.7.5.
12 D CIII 159. The date was significant as a day of commemoration at St-Gall: Innes, 'Memory',
pp.20-i.
13 J therefore reject the argument of Lowe, 'Karisbuch', p.1 35, who acknowledged the significance
of this chapter in relation to the 887 charter, but claimed that Notker pretended it had not yet been
issued to maintain the fiction that he was writing in December 883: why Notker would have
wanted to do this is neither obvious nor explained.
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with Notker during a three-day visit to the monastery.' 4 That this meeting took
place is not in doubt, yet there is no compelling reason to ascribe, as historians
have tended to do, Charles's commissioning of the Gesta to this particular
occasion. Charles's presence in the precincts of the monastery at this time
receives special prominence in the house chronicles due to the fact that while he
was there a change of abbots was effected with imperial confirmation, and ever
since then there has been a tendency for historians to attach significant events to
the visit.' 5 In any case, we do not lack for other evidence for very close relations
between Charles the Fat and St-Gall. We have already seen that he was probably
present there every year during the annual festival of St. Otmar until 879, after
which he was represented by legates.' 6 We also know that Charles was a keen
borrower of books from the monastic library, as were his queen Richgard and his
archchancellor Liutward, all at a time when Notker was librarian: it was the
Stammerer himself who entered the details of their withdrawals into the library
catalogue.' 7 Liutward was also the dedicatee of another of Notker's works, the
Liber Ymnorum of 884.18 There is every reason, then, to suppose that Charles and
other members of his entourage met and had dealings with Notker on other
occasions, both before and after late 883.19 In any case, we need not assume that
he commissioned the Gesta in person, let alone during his famous visit.20
Therefore, although a reference in the text to the retirement of Abbot Hartmut
means we must indeed date it after December 883, nothing forces us to date it in
December 883.21
' Ratpert, De Casibus, col.1077-80; Ekkehard, Casus, c.9, p.32, c.38, p.86.
Schmid, 'Bruderschaften', pp.176-7.
16 See above, c.6.6.4.
' Lehmann, Bibliothekskaraloge, pp.72-3, 77, 88. Duft, 'Katalogisierug', pp.12-3; Rankin, 'Ego',
pp.292-5.
18 Notker, Liber Ymnorum, p.8; von den Steinen, Darstellungsband, pp.504-7.
He was also at St-Gall in the years before becoming king, as shown by existence of at least one
reception poem written for him, perhaps by Notker himself: Buist, 'Susceptacula', pp.135-8. His
dealings with and one visit to the monastery in this period were also referred to in the Gesta, 1.34,
p47; 2.10, pp.66-7.
20 Only Siegrist, Herrscherbild, p.9 entertains the possibility of an epistolary commission.
21 Notker, Gesta, 2.10, pp.66-7. The conversation could, for the sake of argument, have been
about church song, a subject in which both men were interested: Ekkehard, Casus, c.46, p.1 04. It
may be no coincidence that the Liber Ymnorum was prepared and sent to court only months later.
Ekkehard's wording at c.38, p.86 does not sound like a literary commission: Notker 'Karolo multa
querenti pridie quesita resolveret'.
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Certain sections of the work appear, moreover, to include references to
contemporary events which can help us to pare down this dating frame still
further. Firstly, in his discussion of the palace of Aachen, Notker proffers his
monastic seclusion as an excuse for not being able to give a physical description
of the actual structures, saying that he would leave this task to Charles's
'cancellarii'.22 This is the only time this word appears in the work to describe
imperial representatives, who nonetheless figure frequently under different terms
like 'fideles' and 'primores'. 23 Notker, who was himself a redactor of charters at
St-Gall, probably therefore used the term 'cancellarii' in its specific sense, to
denote members of the royal chancery. Only one charter was issued by Charles
the Fat for the royal chapel at Aachen, in the final months of 884.24 Charles was in
Regensburg at the time, and indeed seems, as Notker implied, never to have
visited Aachen. Some of his cancellarii must therefore either have visited the
palace or talked to chapel representatives in 884 to gain the detailed knowledge
with which to compose the ensuing document: it was probably this to which
Notker was referring in his comment on the description of the palace buildings.
Secondly, Notker's account of the raids of the Viking leader Godafrid I
(d.810) displays an interesting anomaly. Although he knew from his readings of
Einhard and the Annales Regni Francorum that this dux's activities had been
focused on Frisia, Saxony and the lands of the Abodrites, Notker places him
instead in the Moselle region. 25 This shift strongly suggests that the Stammerer
had merged Godafrid I with Godafrid III, who was active in the Moselle just
before his death in mid-885. 26 Thirdly, Haefele, following a suggestion of Sabbe,
has pointed out that Notker's description of the destruction of the bridge at Mainz
in 813, incorporates details which suggest an elision with the fire in the same city
in early 886.27
22 Notker, Gesta, 1.30, p.41.
See Haefele's wordlist for examples.
24 D CIII 109.
23 Notker, Gesta, 2.13, pp.75-6. See also below, c.7.4.
26 Regino, Chronicon, s.a.885, p.123. Haefele's introduction, p.xv.
27 Notker, Gesta, 1.30, pp.40-i; cf. AFC s.a.886, p.104; Haefele's introduction, pp.xv-xvi.
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We know that book 2 of the Gesta was begun on a 30 May. 28 Since the
Mainz fire, which Notker refers to at the end of book 1, occurred in March 886, it
is likely that book 1 was completed in March, April or May of that same year.
From all this evidence we may conclude that Notker started book 1 no earlier than
late 884 (the Aachen charter allusion) and finished it around May 886, and went
on to finish book 2 as far as we have it before the end of May 887 (the issuing of
the imperial confirmation of St-Gall's privileges). Assuming that he did not stop
working on the text for any prolonged period of time (and this was, after all, an
imperial commission) it is likely that he began writing closer to the end than to the
beginning of the year 885. This hypothetical dating of c.late 885-late 886/early
887 for the Gesta Karoli is circumstantially supported by another of Notker's
works, the Notatio. This text, which is an annotated bibliography of texts
appropriate for a bishop to know, complements one of the fundamental themes of
the Gesta, namely the exposition, based on the Book of Daniel, of the Carolingian
empire as a new world empire. 29 It is reasonable to suppose that Notker composed
these works in tandem, so it is significant that the Notatio is dated to 885.°
The issue of when a text was composed is obviously very closely related to
that of why it was written. With the Gesta Karoli we are at a disadvantage
because of the loss of the preface to book 1, which might well have answered the
relevant questions. 3 ' The following discussion attempts to identify an implicit
political agenda in the work which, although masked by Notker's circumspect
approach, would nevertheless have been clear to a contemporary audience. This
agenda, it will be argued, makes most sense as a commentary on some of the
important events of late 885 and 886, and hence supports the evidence for these
dates as marking the period of the Gesta's composition.
28 Notker, Gesta, 2.pref., p.48.
29 Siegrist, Herrscherbild, pp.1 33-8 shows the interdependence of the two works.
° Von den Steinen, Darstellungs band, p.494.
' The existence of a preface is mentioned in Notker, Gesta, 2.pref., p.48.
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7.3: Notker's bishops
Book 1 of the Gesta Karoli is concerned, in its author's own words, 'de
religiositate et ecciesiastica donmi Karoli cura.' 32 A brief synopsis of its contents
and themes is in order here. Chapters 1-10 are linked together by the broad theme
of education and learning, first discussing its Carolingian foundations with Alcuin
and the Irish (cc.1-2), then schools (c.3), the worthiness of episcopal candidates
(cc.4-7), and Charlemagne's insistence on strict standards of learning from his
clergy (cc.8-10). The next group of chapters, 11-25, contains the most memorable
theme of the book, with colourful anecdotes about Charlemagne's dealings with
both unworthy and virtuous bishops. Chapter 26 is the imperial coronation of
800, while the stories in cc.27-33 describe the building projects at Aachen and
some of the events which took place within its walls. Finally, chapter 34 concerns
the emperor's battle dress, in preparation for book 2's projected discussion of
military matters.
The stories work on a variety of levels. Most of them have individual
didactic points to make, the most frequently recurring of which are the humbling
of the proud and the rewarding of the humble. 33 Kingly virtues such as constant
vigilance and the inspiration of fear are consistently stressed. 34 Stepping back and
taking a broader view, however, implicit messages can also be read into Notker's
overall structure. For example, the decision to begin his work with
Charlemagne's ecclesiastical care contrasts sharply with Einhard's opening
discussion of the secular rise of the Carolingians and reinforces Notker's
prioritising of the sacred in history. 35 Book 1 can also be read as a schematisation
of the Carolingians' achievement of their world empire, a progression from their
acquisition of God's favour and learning, the way this was incorporated into their
church, and finally the assumption of empire by Charlemagne. 36 The extent of
Notker's artifice cannot be doubted: this was an extremely carefully structured
32 Ibid.
" See esp. Siegrist, Herrscherbild, pp.55-70. This is recorded by Ekkehard, Casus, c.38, pp.86-8
as one of Notker's main personal concerns.
See Siegnst, Herrscherbild, pp.71-108; Goetz, Strukturen, pp.98-1 13.
"This is the argument of Ganz, 'Humour'.
36 Haefele's introduction, pp.xvii-xxi; Berschin, Biographie, pp.390-4.
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work full of forceful points at first sight concealed but working on a number of
different levels.
Our best direct clue to the reason for the involvement of Charles the Fat in
the whole procedure comes in a remarkably overlooked group of chapters at the
heart of book 1. Chapters 16-19 all concern the same bishop, who thus features
more prominently in the work than any other protagonist outside the royal family.
He was one of Notker's bad bishops, a man of great pride who constantly
overreached his position and had to be repeatedly chastised and humbled by
Charlemagne. The bishop is described as holding 'prima Germaniae sedes', an
unambiguous reference to Mainz. 37 It was very unusual for Notker to come this
close to naming an actual bishop in his work; most of his stories give the
impression of being purely typological and didactic, and indeed on another
occasion he stated explicitly that he preferred not to identify his subjects. 38 This
bishop (who, more correctly, would have been an archbishop) of Mainz was
clearly a special case. 39 Notker goes on immediately after naming the man's see to
sound a note of caution: 'Nimium pertimesco, o domine imperator Karole, ne,
dum iussionem vestram implere cupio, omnium professionum et maxime
summorum sacerdotum offensionem incurram. Sed tamen de his omnibus non
grandis mihi cura est, si tantum vestra defensione non destituar.' 4° The
conjunction of Notker's expression of fear and his extended criticism of the bishop
of Mainz lead to the conclusion that these negative stories were intended to have a
more contemporary resonance than the focus on Charlemagne seems to suggest: if
this was merely an abstract mirror for princes, why would he be worried? The
bishop who was so severely criticised in these chapters was surely supposed to be
identified with a living figure, Archbishop Liutbert of Mainz, the most important
churchman in east Francia from the 860s until the 880s.4'
" Notker, Gesta, 1.17, p.22.
Ibid, 1.25, p.33.
The terms were sometimes interchanged: Regino, Chronicon, s.a.887, p.128 referred to Liutbert
of Mainz as 'episcopus'.
40 Ibid, 1.18, p.22.
Lowe, 'Karisbuch', pp.140-2 entertained this possibility before eventually identifying the bishop
with Liutward of Vercelli, a conclusion which was based on his prior assumption that the latter
and the empress were engaged in an anti-imperial conspiracy.
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It is also evident from Notker's wording that this implicit criticism of
Liutbert was incorporated into the text on the orders of Charles the Fat: why
would Charles have done this? Liutbert had been a potential thorn in the imperial
side ever since 882, when Charles had succeeded Louis the Younger and thereby
deprived the archbishop of his long-cherished position as archchaplain and main
court adviser. The Mainz continuation of the Annales Fuldenses stands testament
to the resentment the jilted Liutbert felt towards Charles and his preferred
archchaplain, Liutward of Vercelli. Nevertheless, the offending text does not
seem to have become known at court, and the rivalry was not fought out in public.
Liutbert's continued high standing (he was, after all, in control of 'prima
Germaniae sedes') is reflected by his appearance as petitioner in royal charters
before 885.42 He also led a successful campaign against the Vikings in the
Hesbaye in early 885 in the company of the emperor's leading commander Henry,
hence presumably with imperial sanction. 43 Open criticism of Liutbert would not
have been in Charles's interest up to this point: he may not even have been aware
of the extent of the archbishop's resentment towards him.
However, the cordial relations between the two did break down in late 885
over the main political issue of the day, the proposed legitimation of Bernard as
the emperor's heir. As we have seen, Charles enlisted the pope to his cause,
planning presumably to get him to sanction the annulment of his marriage to the
Empress Richgard and clear the way for a blessing of his union with Bernard's
mother, a concubine whose identity is now unknown. The Mainz annalist added
that Charles 'voluit enim, Ut fama vulgabat, quosdam episcopos inrationabiliter
deponere' in order to smooth the passage of the Bernard plan. The bishops'
support for the scheme would have been almost as important as the pope's, as the
case of Lothar II had shown, and domestic episcopal opposition would have been
a difficult hurdle for Charles to overcome. That our only evidence for such
opposition comes in the Mainz annals is very significant: this text served as the
mouthpiece of Liutbert himself, expressing his personal views even when they had
42 D CIII 109. See also DD 64-5.
AFC s.a.885, p.102; cf. 883, p.100.
"AFC s.a.885, p.103. See above, c.6.2.
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diverged from the official line of his master Louis the German. 45 We may
therefore take it that Liutbert was opposed to the legitimation of Bernard, one
potential outcome of which would have been the perpetuation of the primacy of
Alemannia in the political geography of the east Frankish kingdom, the vely
situation which had caused him to lose his court job in the first place. 46 If Charles
was thinking of trying to depose his opponents (Liutbert and his nameless
associates) or impose other papally-enforced ecclesiastical sanctions on them, then
he must have become aware of the archbishop's opinions: his opposition must
have been public. In addition, this was perhaps the first event of Charles's reign
where Liutbert's dormant opposition could be brought into the open and justified
with legitimate ecclesiastical arguments: the precedent of Lothar II was still fresh
in the mind. In the event, the pope's unexpected demise made the whole affair a
dead letter, and relations between emperor and archbishop reverted to the uneasy
cold war situation which had obtained during the preceding years. In late 885,
however, in anticipation of, or in the wake of, Liutbert's defiance, Charles had a
motive to want to see the archbishop criticised. Notker also had reason to fear
Liutbert in particular: Mainz was the metropolitan with jurisdiction over St-Gall,
and the Stammerer had already had cautious dealings with him.47
My hypothesis, then, is that Charles the Fat asked Notker to incorporate
into the Gesta Karoli a thinly-veiled criticism of the behaviour of Archbishop
Liutbert in the wake of his opposition to the Bernard plan in late 885, a
commission only carried out by the monk with reluctance and the promise of the
emperor's protection. A survey of the criticisms levelled against the offending
prelate in the Gesta supports this reading. Pride is the sin which dominates the
image of the bishop of Mainz in Notker's work. He cuts a ludicrous figure in
chapter 16. Charlemagne, having observed that he was 'episcopus vanae gloriae
et inanium rerum valde cupidus' sets a trap for him, persuading a Jewish merchant
to stuff and spice a dead mouse and sell it to him as an exotic luxury. The
acquisitive churchman naturally falls for this cunning subterfuge and is exposed
by the emperor at an assembly in terms which draw the moral of the story.
See above, c.2.2.
Reuter, Annals, p.99, n.7 also infers this from the Mainz annals.
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Bishops today, says Charles, are too covetous and prone to indulgence in luxuries,
behaviour which is 'in contrarium cuncta' to the charitable pastoral work which
they should be doing with the poor instead. The lesson is, it should be noted,
couched in the language of ideal and appropriate behaviour.48
The kingly aspirations of the man are the subject of the subsequent
chapter. In it, while Charlemagne was engaged elsewhere with war against the
Avars, the bishop tried to get the empress to let him borrow the imperial sceptre to
use in church processions. The empress stalled him and shared a laugh over the
matter with her husband when he returned, before Charlemagne again upbraided
the man in public, before an assembly of 'cuncta pene Europa'. This time the
contrast between ideal and reality was couched in terms of ambition: where
unworldliness was the proper stock of a bishop, this one had tried to seize the
sceptre, which 'pro significatione regiminis nostri ferre solemus.' 49 As before, the
bishop begged forgiveness and left in humiliation.50
Chapter 18 continues the theme of inappropriate royal pretensions at
length. Charlemagne decrees that all bishops must deliver a sermon in person in
their cathedrals before a set date, on pain of dismissal. This of course greatly
worries our episcopal anti-hero, terrified of losing his office and the high living
that goes along with it. Forced to mount the pulpit (to the amazement of his
congregation, unused to such an event) in the presence of two royal legates, an
absurd scene develops in which the incompetent bishop preaches a mighty and
lofty sermon against a poor man who has entered the church with a boot on his
head, due to his embarrassment at being ginger-haired. This dubious triumph
accomplished, he then proceeds to wine and dine the royal legates with great
lavishness. With every luxury at his disposal and surrounded by troops of military
retainers, 'ita ut nihil illi nisi sceptrum illud et nomen regium deesset.' 'Qualis
numquam cena magno composita est Karolo.' Finally, worried about the
impression he had given the legates, he bribed them with 'regiis muneribus.'
Collectio Sangallensis, no.43.
Notker, Gesta, 1.16, pp.19-21.
The transfer of such regalia could signify the transfer of actual authority in Carolingian politics:
see now Airlie, 'Narratives'.
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Unable to lie, they told everything to the emperor, who magnanimously let the
bishop off after deciding he had acted ultimately through fear of him, as was
proper.5'
Finally, chapter 19 underlines the bishop's stupidity and arrogance.
Charlemagne strikes him to the ground after he rather tactlessly opines that a
chorister relative of the emperor sings the Alleluja like a country bumpkin
ploughing the fields.52
Certainly, the points made by Notker about correct episcopal behaviour in
these four stories can be read as expressions of timeless Christian ideals.
Nonetheless, the fact that they all concern the same bishop should encourage the
reader to look for common threads linking the various criticisms. One such theme
is the way in which the criticisms are couched in terms of failed ideals. Each time
he exhibits an aspect of his sinful nature, the moral is explicitly drawn in terms of
how he ought to have behaved: he was worldly and ambitious, for example, where
a bishop should have been a humble servant of the poor. This establishment of
ideal types was a staple rhetorical strategy for authors wishing to express criticism
in the early middle ages: we have already seen it at work, for instance, in the
Mainz continuation of the Anna/es Fuldenses. Notker, moreover, had also
expressed firm views on correct episcopal behaviour in his guidebook for
Salomon of Constance, the Notatio. In some ways, indeed, these four chapters
form the centrepiece of everything Notker wrote about bishops. In this bishop's
galaxy of sins, notably arrogance, vainglory, worldliness, ambition and stupidity,
we find a compendium of everything which the Stammerer found reprehensible in
episcopal behaviour. Where previous chapters focused on individual bishops
epitomising individual virtues or sins, the bishop of Mainz had a comprehensive
set of faults. Whereas the earlier chapters established typologies of right and
wrong in Notker's evaluation of the demeanour of prelates in general, in chapters
16-19 he presented an example of a man who personified all the problems he had
° Ibid, 1.17, PP.21-2. See also above, c.6.6.5, where! interpret the role of the queen here as an
allegorical reference to Richgard. Notker's choice of Hildegard as the wife of Charlemagne to
figure in his work was in part due to his personal connections: limes, 'Memory', pp.24-5.
Ibid, 1.18, pp.22-5.
52 thid, 1.19, p.25. See Haefele, 'Studien', pp.381-5 for an exposition of this story's Allelujah
motif.
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been discussing. The bishop of Mainz was the climax of the story, the punchline
of the joke. This structuring is even made explicit by Notker. Chapters 14 and 15
are positive examples of humble and obedient bishops who are rewarded by
Charlemagne with estates. The Stammerer makes clear the contrast between these
men and the bishop of Mainz at the beginning of chapter 16: 'Quia retulimus
quomodo sapientissimus Karolus humiles exaltaverit, referamus etiam, qualiter
superbos humiliaverit.' 53 Their virtuous behaviour serves to throw the actions of
the bishop of Mainz into sharper focus. As Siegrist showed, a form of pride
designated by the term 'cenodoxia' (literally 'emptiness of doctrine') was for
Notker the ultimate sin. 54 His paragons were humble and obedient, the bishop of
Mainz was precisely the opposite. He was, as Charlemagne observed, unworthy
of the rank of bishop.55
This man is, then, revealed by the context of the stories about him in
Notker's typology as an anti-ideal, an anti-bishop. Siegrist, in his exposition of
the idea of 'cenodoxia' in the Gesta, attributed Notker's obsession with this vice
to his monastic training and outlook. 56 However this may be, we should also note
that there is a distinct theme in Notker's discussion which may also be related to
the state of contemporary politics, namely that concerning the need for bishops to
be obedient to the king. This is why the good bishops of chapters 14 and 15 are
rewarded: their obedience is unquestioning and even causes them distress, but,
nevertheless, they obey Charlemagne. In contrast, the bishop of chapters 16-19
deliberately disregards and tries to deceive the royal will. His attempts to go a
stage further and actually behave like a king, or even usurp royal powers, are
stressed repeatedly by Notker in chapter 17 and 18, as we saw above. This
behaviour corresponds neatly to Liutbert of Mainz's opposition to royal policy in
late 885. In particular his attempt to usurp Charlemagne's sceptre, which Notker
understands as standing 'pro significatione regiminis nostri' can be read as a
fairly direct reference to Liutbert's defiance.
Notker, Gesta, 1.16, p.19.
Siegrist, Herrscherbild, pp.55-70.
" Notker, Gesta, 1.18, p.25.
Siegrist, Herrscherbild, pp.55-70.
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Conversely, the king's right to appoint and depose bishops, one of the
issues of contention in 885, is stridently asserted in the Gesta Karoli. 57 The right
to appoint is most clearly expressed in chapter 4, where Charlemagne makes two
wise choices of bishop in the face of disapproval and opposition from a variety of
sources. The king's decision is seen as the manifestation of divine will, and his
authority over appointments is described to him by one of the protagonists as
'potestam a Deo tibi collatem.' 58 Chapter 5 goes even further, ascribing to the
ruler the ability to depose bishops as well. Removing an incumbent who had been
seduced by the worldly accoutrements of his position, Charlemagne explains his
actions thus: 'superbus ille, qui nec Deum nec praecipuum illius amicum [the
king] timuit vel honoravit. . .divino et meo iudicio careat episcopatu.' 59 Where the
haughty bishop wanted to act like a king, Charlemagne, 'episcopus
episcoporum',6° was able to effortlessly exhibit episcopal qualities. 6 ' The power
to appoint and depose was, therefore, the king's by divine approval, while the
obligation of obedience fell upon the bishop. The obedience of the episcopate and
the potential need to depose some of their number were, as we have seen, issues of
great relevance to Charles the Fat as he tried to implement his plan to legitimise
Bernard. Notker was telling Charles just what he would have wanted to hear in
the autunm of 885, sanctioning his own attempts to assert his authority over the
situation by anchoring them to the divinely-approved powers enjoyed by his
illustrious ancestor Charlemagne.
Notker's portrait of the 'bishop' of Mainz also makes sense in the context
of the debate over church hierarchy which was building up in in east Francia at
precisely this time. The collection of canons known to historians as Pseudo-
Isidore found one of its earliest east Frankish outlets in Mainz in the 880s, where
Archbishop Liutbert was well aware of its content. 62 Pseudo-Isidore's insistence
on the emancipation of prelates from secular power, especially their immunity
from lay accusation and punishment, would have bolstered the opposition of
See Goetz, Strukturen, pp.45-51.
Notker, Gesta, 1.4, p.6.
59 Ibid, l.5,p.9.
60 Ibid, 1.25, p.33.
61 Ibid, 1.11, p.16.
62 John, Collectio, pp.120-i; Fuhrmann, Einflufl, pp.225-6; Carroll, 'Archbishops', pp.111-2.
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Liutbert to Charles in 885, and also provides a firm context for the Mainz
annalist's fury at the emperor's attempt to remove his episcopal opponents. 63 The
text was also known at St-Gall, where an abbreviated but essentially similar
version (Pseudo-Remedius) was produced in the early 880s.M If, as seems certain
given his prominence in the monastery's intellectual activity, Notker was familiar
with the collection, then the Gesta can also be interpreted as a response to its
claims. Notker's attempts to provide a justification for lay (royal) interference in
episcopal appointments are no more extreme or one-sided than Pseudo-
Isidore/Remedius's attempts to put the opposite case. The consistency and
savagery of the Gesta's attack on bishops' independence was, in other words,
appropriate to the stridency of the counter-assertions which some prelates were
coming to express at this time. It was appropriate also that a refutation of Pseudo-
Isidorean ideas, which were legitimised historically by reference to a series of
allegedly authentic papal letters, should be founded on the idealisation of an
antithetical historical lay figure (i.e. Charlemagne). More specifically, in the
Gesta's attribution of episcopal and even God-like qualities to Charlemagne,
'episcopus episcoporum', we might read an attempt to shortcircuit the legal
collections' claims for bishops' immunity from lay authority. 65 Notker's
insistence on the traditional biblical sin of pride as the ultimate vice also provides
an antidote to the Pseudo-Remedian claim that this distinction belonged to
sacrilegium, in the form of usurping the church hierarchy by infringing episcopal
independence.
The discussion of bishops which dominates book 1 of the Gesta Karoli
from chapter 4 to chapter 20 thus climaxes with the implicit criticism of Liutbert
of Mainz incorporated into chapters 1619.67 This was much more than simply
63 For a summary of Pseuso-Isidore's themes, see John, Collectio, pp.24-6.
Ibid, pp.! 19-24 ascertains the date and place.
65 See for example chapters 4, 18 and 19 of Pseuso-Remedius which concern obedience to bishops
and a forbidding of their removal; ibid, pp.140, 146-7.
Ibid, c.34, p.155. We do not know if these canon law collections were known at court, but
Ekkehard, Casus, c.46, p.102 does tell us that Liutward of Vercelli had 'epistolas canonicas
Grecas' which he gave to St-Gall. The good relationship between Liutward and St-Gall may also
have informed Notker's criticism of Liutbert.
67 Chapter 20 (Notker, Gesta, pp.26-'7) concerns the criticism of a certain bishop called Recho, the
only other named bishop in the work. His significance is not clear: perhaps he was meant to
represent one of Liutbert's allies. This ends Notker's main discussion of bishops. Chapters 21-26,
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monastic gossip.68 The traits elliptically attributed to him in these stories are not
supposed to provide an accurate description of his character. Rather, they make
sense as the exposition of a typological scheme: Liutbert is unworthy of his
position in every way, and the absolute wrongness of his opposition to the verbum
regis in the designation of Bernard is shown. More than this, however, the bishop
of Mainz cuts a ridiculous figure in these four chapters, clearly intended to be
laughed at. His behaviour is not merely sinful or inappropriate, but indeed
completely risible. The purchase of the stuffed mouse, the misdirected 'sermon'
against the red-haired man wearing a boot on his head and his attempt at a
humorous put-down of the young chorister are all ludicrous, and deliberately
portrayed as such. The most laughable action of all is his attempt to usurp the
symbols of royalty and to defy the king: Charlemagne and Hildegard themselves
find it 'highly amusing' when the bishop tries to lay his hands on the royal
sceptre.69 Ganz has shown how Notker used humour as one of the Gesta's central
rhetorical devices, designed to help make clear the points contained in his multi-
layered anecdotes. If the audience got the joke and smiled 'the smile of
understanding', they showed their comprehension of the author's purpose. 7° In
chapters 16-19 of book 1, the joke was on Archbishop Liutbert of Mainz.
7.4: Contemporary references in the Gesta Karoli
Notker's text worked, therefore, on a multiplicity of levels. As well as
embedding didactic messages in his anecdotes, he also historicised current events
in order to please the most important member of his audience, namely the
emperor. The resonances of the section on the bishop of Mainz would not have
been missed by a contemporary reader at court conversant with the high political
situation of the day. Just as obvious to this audience as the satirising of Liutbert,
moreover, would have been the corresponding elision of Charlemagne and Charles
the Fat. If Liutbert was equated with the archetypally-bad bishop of Mainz, then
although ostensibly continuing with the same theme, are presented as a digression by the author.
Closer examination of these stories reveals that they are more abstract than those preceding, and
that they are also distinguished by their principal concern with the actions of the devil in the world
and not with the emperor, who does not feature.
68 Innes, 'Memory', p.19.
69 Notker, Gesta, 1.17, p.21.
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the king who had bested and humiliated him in those four stories must have been
intended, at one level, to be identified with the current ruler. This was, needless to
say, a high compliment to pay to Charles the Fat. Several more references to
contemporary people and events can be identified in the Gesta, some of which
continue to flatter the emperor, while others reveal a nervy and fearful Notker, full
of concern about the Viking threat and Charles's inability to settle his succession
definitively.
Some of these references have already been mentioned in the context of
dating the text as a whole. One of them, the story of the invasion of Godafrid 11111
in 8 10/885 is here worth examining in more detail. Notker's version is that
Northmen invaded the empire while Charlemagne was away campaigning against
the Avars. Receiving a surrender, the emperor returned immediately to invade the
Vikings' homeland. However, a cattle disease crippled the army and forced its
retreat, perhaps, thought Notker, a sign of God's displeasure at the sins of the
Franks. Later, when the emperor was again absent somewhere in the empire,
Godafrid invaded and settled the Moselle region. He was then killed by his own
son, incensed by his mother's recent repudiation, causing his army to lose courage
and depart. Charlemagne's victory was thus accomplished without the use of
force and was hence a sign of God's favour, although the bellicose emperor did
express some regret that he had not had the opportunity to shed any Danish
blood.7 ' Almost all of these details correspond to what Notker had read in Einhard
and the Annales Regni Francorum. However, as we mentioned earlier, the
historical Godafrid I invaded Frisia, not the Moselle region. 72 The latter had, on
the other hand, been the target of the Viking leader Godafrid III in 885 when he
launched a raid on centres around the Rhine-Moselle confluence.73 Notker's
'error' was deliberate: he intended his audience to identif' the figure of Godafrid I
with that of Godafrid III.
70 Ganz, 'Humour', pp.18 I-3.
' Notker, Gesta, 2.13, pp.75-6.
72 ARF s.a.810, p.131; Einhard, Vita, c.14, p.77. Saxony and Frisia had always been the focus of
Godafnd's ambitions: cf. ARF s.a.804, pp.118-9; 808, pp.125-6; 809, pp.128-9.
Regmo, Chronicon, s.a.885, p.123 identifies Coblenz, Andernach and Srnzig as Godafrid's
principal targets.
Haefele accepted this elision in his introduction, p.xv, but thought it was unconscious on
Notker's part.
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If the two Godafrids were elided by Notker in this chapter, the parallels
between the two Charleses were also clear. In 885 Charles the Fat, like
Charlemagne in 810, had been absent within the empire when the invaders struck,
ordering affairs in his newly-acquired western kingdom. Another parallel with
810 was that again the emperor prevailed without having to intervene personally:
the dux Henry tricked Godafrid into a meeting and slaughtered him and his
retainers. 75 Notker's historical inexactitude was, therefore, a symptom neither of
incompetence nor of an unquestioning adherence to his sources, oral or written:
rather, it was intended to draw the reader's attention to the parallels between the
effortless imperial victories of 810 and 885.76 The Stammerer, moreover, went
beyond the laconic reports of the Annales Regni Francorum and Einhard in his
version of Godafrid's demise by reading into it an expression of divine will. 77 The
chapter has an internal balance. The attempt of Charlemagne to invade the
homelands of the Northmen fails, a sign of God's disfavour; but this failure is
counterpointed by the effortless death of Godafrid, for which Charlemagne
acknowledges God's beneficence. The implied comparison, which would have
been obvious to a contemporary reader, is a flattering one for the current emperor:
while the sins of the Franks had initially obstructed the success of Charlemagne,
God was unambiguously on the side of Charles the Fat in his easy triumph of 885.
Given that Notker was writing for Charles, his expression of this sentiment is not
particularly surprising. It echoes the comparison he had expounded more
explicitly in the Continuatio, another text presumably designed for imperial ears,
in 881: 'Clementissimus Carolus [the Fat] magnum imperatorem at avuum suum,
Carolum, omni sapientia Ct industria et bellorum successibus coaequans,
tranquillitate vero pacis et rerum prosperitate superans.' 78 The Gesta Karoli's
account of Godafrid's invasion thus includes an exposition of this idea, that
" Regino, Chronicon, s.a.885, pp.123-4.
76 A similar elision was incorporated into AF s.a.881, p.97, where the Vikings' using Aachen as a
stable may have been intended as an exposition of the promise of Godafrid I to sack the palace:
Einhard, Vita, c.14, p.77.
" This is in keeping with Notker's view of sacred history and his Christian recasting of Einhard as
identified by Ganz, 'Humour'.
78 Notker, Continuatio, pp.329-30.
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Charles the Fat was more successful than Charlemagne in achieving peaceful
victories.79
It is clear, therefore, that one of Notker's historical devices in the Gesta
was to elide present and past in order to make comments on the course of current
events. However, not all of these contemporary references were, like the
discussion of Godafrid, intended to purely flatter the emperor. Often the author
allowed his own personal interests to take centre stage, most notably in his
frequent discussions of and assertions about liturgical chanting and church
singing, subjects close to his heart. 8° As was mentioned earlier, he also used the
Gesta to try to persuade Charles the Fat to confer favours on his monastery:
chapter 10 of book 2 contains a clear attempt to persuade the emperor to reissue
the privileges his father had conferred on St-Gall in 873.81 This form of
exhortation on specific contemporary issues, rather than on universal ideals of
Christian kingship, also underlies the story in book 1 chapter 13.82 Here Notker
claims to be describing the extraordinary prudence of Charlemagne in not granting
more than one county to any individual (other than frontier counts), nor any royal
church or abbey to any bishop (except in unusual circumstances). As far as we
know Charlemagne followed no such policy of honor distribution, and so it seems
certain that Notker made these remarks because they were of particular concern to
the community of St-Gall in the later ninth century. The holding of multiple
counties by single counts was, as we discussed in chapter 6.6.4, characteristic of
the distribution of power in Alemannia under Louis the German and Charles the
Fat, who sought by this measure to streamline their authority. St-Gall itself
benefited from the accompanying policy of strengthening selected religious
institutions in the area, but the focusing of comital power was also a potential
threat to its autonomy. 83 The most spectacular outbreak of the resulting tension
occurred a few years later after Conrad I, following the example set by Charles the
Fat, gave property at Stammheim to the monastery, much to the annoyance of the
19 The virtue of bloodless success in war and politics is extolled by Regino, Chronicon, s.a.887,
p.128, 888, p.129 (in reference to Charles the Fat's family politics); and Notker, Gesta, 2.17,
pp.81, 85 (Charlemagne's defeat of the Lombards).
° Eg. Notker, Gesta, 1.10, pp.12-5.
81 See above, c.7.2.
82 Notker, Gesta, 1.13, p.17.
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counts Erchangar and Bertold, who had built a fortress on the estate. 84 Likewise,
St-Gall was one of the royal abbeys which ended up in episcopal hands at various
points in its history, at times coming under the influence or even direct control of
the bishop of Constance. In this chapter, therefore, Notker probably hoped to
draw Charles's attention to the episcopal and comital threats to St-Gall's
independence at a time when he had as yet refrained from confirming its claim to
the same extensive freedoms and privileges as Reichenau. It stands as an
optimistic attempt to get the emperor to reverse his policies by offering him the
incentive of thus emulating Charlemagne, and therefore provides a classic
example of an early medieval ecclesiastical author turning a specific complaint
into a general rule in order to address a ruler.
Interestingly, however, Notker makes an exception of one man, count
Udalrich. He cites 'special reasons' for Charlemagne's decision to allow Udalrich
to be the only multiple-county holder in his empire, but does not spell out what
they were. 85 It is surely no coincidence, therefore, that the most prominent
controller of multiple counties in Notker's own day was also called Udalrich.
This Udairich, known to historians as Udairich IV, was a descendant of the count
of the same name from Charlemagne's reign, and could boast among his honores
the Linz-, Argen-, Rhein- and Alpgaus, which made himone of the most important
royal representatives in the Lake Constance area. 86 He had authority in regions
where St-Gall had lands, and he had the emperor's ear. He was clearly not a man
to be trifled with, and may indeed have been a political ally of Abbot Bernard of
St-Gall. 87 The mention of Udalrich as the exception to the ideals Notker proposed
here was thus surely intended to have a contemporary resonance, one which was
expedient given the circumstances of St-Gall at the time. He was trying to avoid
giving offence to the current count Udalrich, expressing approval at his
preeminence. Once again we can see that Notker expected his audience to see
themselves in the Gesta Karoli; and we also appreciate that he envisaged a wider
83 Borgolte, Geschichte, pp.187-208.
Ekkehard, Casus, c.16, pp.42-4; see Schmid, 'BrUderschaften', pp.179-81.
He mentions that Udairich was Queen Hildegard's brother, but does not equate this with the
'special reasons'. Udairich IV was a 'nepos' of Charles the Fat: D LG 124, D CIII 57.
See Borgolte, Grafen, pp.255-66; and above, c.6.6.4.
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audience than simply the emperor alone, one which included court figures like
Udairich.
This audience would also have been able to derive contemporary
significance in Notker's story about Charlemagne's hunting injury in book 2
chapter 8.88 A certain Isembard killed a beast which had hurt the emperor's leg,
bringing its heart back as a trophy for Charlemagne. He had formerly been
'odibilis et cunctis honoribus exspoliatus', and his actions restored his good
reputation. As a reward for his actions he received back all the lands he had
previously lost, and a cash sum to boot. A version of the story of Isembard's
reconciliation was in fact already known to Charles the Fat and formed a central
plank of his relationship with St-Gall. The reason for the man's dispossession and
exclusion was that he was the son of count Warm, 'persecutor patroni vestri
Othmari.' The gift to St-Gall of land at Stammheim, whence Warm and his
associates had operated in the mid-eighth century, was made by Charles in 879 as
an act of symbolic reconciliation with Otmar for the nefarious deeds of his
predecessors. 89 The atonement of Charles the Fat was a reinforcement of the
atonement of the historical Isembard, which had also taken the form of gifts to the
monastery.9° Notker's story in this chapter can thus be read as a knowing
reference to and affirmation of this aspect of Charles the Fat's relationship with
St-Gall, recast and relocated at the centre of the court rituals of Charlemagne. The
rift between the successors of Warm, including Charles, and Otmar had, Notker
asserted, been completely healed.
Certain stories in the Gesta were intended, then, to flatter and exhort
Charles the Fat by turns, doing so in allegorical fashion, by taking aspects of the
current political situation and overlaying them with resonant events, real or fictive,
from the reign of Charlemagne. This elision of time, people and places running
through the Gesta is entirely in keeping with Notker's conception of history as a
flat canvas on which to demonstrate the points he was trying to convey; for
authors like him, history was typological, a tool to be used to pass comment on the
87 The two men were certainly allies in 890 when they supported the revolt of Charles's son
Bernard: Borgolte, Grafen, p.263.
88 Notker, Gesta, 2.8, pp.60-2.
89 See above, c.6.6.4.
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present, not a question of striving after chronological accuracy or even of
faithfulness to his sources.9 ' His didactic purpose was furthered if his readers
could read themselves represented in the pages of the Gesta. Moreover, as we saw
in the case of the historicising of Liutbert of Mainz, the audience was primed to
understand the Gesta as a commentary on current events: Charles the Fat had
known this when he commissioned the work. Whether or not the Charlemagne
references were based on confirmable facts from sources oral or written, as some
were, is therefore not really the point. Notker's work ought to be read as a whole,
a coherent artifice with a specific audience in mind, an audience which understood
the intention of his apparent historical 'errors'.
7.5: Notker and the imnerial succession
Alongside these elliptical allusions to events in contemporary politics, the
Gesta Karoli also contains a number of direct addresses to the emperor expressing
Notker's fears about the way his schemes to solve the imperial succession were
going. The plan to have Bernard legitimised took shape in the late summer and
autumn of 885, and was to have taken the form of a dissolution of the royal
marriage and a subsequent papal sanction for the union which had produced the
emperor's bastard son. Notker included in the Gesta the story of Charlemagne's
repudiation of the daughter of the Lombard king Desiderius, which he did 'quia
esset clinica et ad propagandam prolem inhabilis, iudicio sanctissimorum
sacerdotum.' 92 The course of events confirmed that that the opposition to this act
mounted by Desiderius was wrongful and contrary to the will of God as
Charlemagne peremptorily crushed him in dramatic fashion. With this story
Notker provided an apology by analogy for Charles the Fat's projected annulment
of his marriage: it was an acceptable procedure if the union was barren, as was
9° DD SG 31 and 190; Waither, 'Fiskus', pp.263-4.
' Notker's historical outlook is discussed by Siegrist, Herrscherbild, pp.! 09-44 and Ganz,
'Humour'.
92 Notker, Gesta, 2.17, pp.81-2. Cf. the story of Godafrid's divorce, 2.13, p.76.
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Charles the Fat's, and it had been approved of by Charlemagne himself, not to
mention by his devout clergy and the will of God.93
However, the projected 885 divorce for which Notker here provided a form
of historical justification did not actually take place, prevented by the premature
death of the cooperative Pope Hadrian III. As we argued earlier, Charles's
response, before his change of tack in mid-887, was to continue trying for a son by
Richgard, something which was increasingly unlikely after more than two decades
of marriage, and to keep open negotiations with the new pope in the hope of
obtaining his help for a revival of the Bernard plan.94 Meanwhile, the claims of
the other possible contenders for the throne, principally Arnulf of Carinthia, were
persistently disregarded by the emperor.
This policy, which was becoming clear as book 1 of the Gesta was
completed in early 886, did not meet with the approval of Notker the Stammerer.
In his description of Louis the German's character, Notker describes the king's
reputation for subduing rebellions quickly and terrifying his heathen enemies
beyond the frontiers: 'et merito, quippe qui numquam linguam suam iudicio aut
manus suas effusione sanguinis christiani commacularet praeter unam et ultimam
necessitatem. Quam prius enarrare non audeo quam aliquem parvulum
Ludowiculum vel Carolastrum vobis astantem video.' 95 The story which Notker
here recoiled from telling was that of the battle of Fontenoy (841), a conflict
which was still remembered with dread in Carolingian political circles. Fontenoy
was the culmination of the bloody civil war which had been fought by Louis the
Pious's sons and grandson for the throne and, as such, was hitherto the most
infamous succession crisis in Carolingian history. 96 By here juxtaposing it with a
reminder of Charles the Fat's lack of a legitimate heir, Notker pointedly expressed
to the emperor his fear that this disaster was about to be superseded by one even
greater: if Charles died without an heir, the outcome would be the final extinction
of the legitimate Carolingian male line. That this heir had to be legitimate (and
Lowe, 'Karisbuch', pp.143-4 drew a similar conclusion, but thought the passage related to the
actual divorce of 887. On that occasion, however, virginity and not barrenness was the
justification offered by Charles for his actions; see above, c.6.6. 1.
' See above, c.6.5.
Notker, Gesta, 2.11, p.68.
Hmcmar, Instructio, col.986 also demonstrates the enduring impact of Fontenoy.
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that, by implication, Bernard would not do) is stressed by Notker's use of the
main-line Carolingian names Louis and Charles. As long as such an heir was
lacking, the Stammerer also implied that a repeat of the intra-family warfare of
Fontenoy was imminent, as the claims of illegitimate Carolingians such as Arnulf,
who were at least the sons of kings, reached boiling point. His pessimism about
the production of such an heir was palpable.97
Notker was similarly pessimistic about the chances of Bernard succeeding
in the wake of Hadrian III's death. Describing in the very next chapter the
destruction of 'monasterium tunc nobilissimum', in other words Prum, the monk
lamented: 'nunc autem, non incertum de qua causa, destructum. Quam antea non
absolvam quam Berhardulum vestrum spata femur accinctum conspiciam.' 98 This
is a reference, as argued in chapter 6.2, to Charles's intention to establish Bernard
as subking of Lotharingia when he was old enough. But, and this was Notker's
emphasis, Bernard was not old enough. His trepidation here and in the previous
chapter derived from the fact that at the time he was writing Charles's succession
plans remained conditional and unresolved, a situation which could only increase
tension in a political community beset by external attack and desperate to know
who would replace the ageing emperorY
Notker emphasised this point by referring in the same chapter to an earlier
occasion when the lack of a Carolingian boy as tall as a sword had led to the
attempt by certain 'gigantes' to try to seize control of the kingdom. This passage
contains no obvious historical reference, and seems to work as another dire
warning to Charles the Fat that his succession had to be resolved soon or the
Notker must have doubted the probability of the marriage producing an heir after such a long
barren period: even in the Continuatio of 881 he had laid more stress on the wisdom of
designating Arnulf; see above, c.6.3. Notker, Gesta, 2.10, pp.65-7 also stressed the example of
Louis the German, whose saintly lifestyle had been tempered by a realisation that there were 'eis
rebus et negociis, sine quibus res publica terrena non subsistit, coniugio videlicet usuque
armorum.' This passage is immediately followed by the section discussed earlier, in which Notker
refers to the privileges granted to St-Gall in 873 by Louis and Charles. The issuing of these
charters formed part of Charles's reintroduction to secular affairs after the famous episode early in
that year when he had attempted to renounce those very things, arms and marriage, which Notker
had singled out as important to Louis. His emphasis on these practical aspects of Louis's
behaviour may, it follows, show that he feared Charles had not given up the desire for
renunciation which he had expressed in 873.
Notker, Gesta, 2.12, p.74.
Ibid. 2.14, pp.77-8 is a good example of Notker's warnings about the imminence of the Viking
threat.
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Franks would lose God's favour; an heir as tall as a sword (i.e. at the age of
majority) was exactly what was missing in 885-6.'°° The identification of the
giants with female-line Carolingians, who were by the standards of 'legitimists'
like Notker ineligible for kingship, is a distinct possibility and is implied by
Notker's description of them as '[whom] filios Seth de fihiabus Cain narrat
scriptura procreatos."°' It was this kind of man who stood to benefit if Charles
did fail to make a viable succession plan. If, Notker implied, Charles died and left
the way clear to royal claims based on female-derived Carolingian descent,
Pandora's Box would be opened, as the number of candidates would be multiplied
exponentially.'°2
These expressions of unease in chapters 11 and 12 of book 2 were
contrasted implicitly by Notker with the precocity of Louis the German described
in chapter 10, in which Louis's greatness and royal destiny were revealed as
certain while he was still a child at the court of his grandfather. For Charlemagne,
Louis guaranteed the future for at least two generations.'° 3 Charles the Fat had no
such assurances. Notker also described Louis's visit to St-Gall in 857 or 859 with
two of his sons in such terms of stability. He depicts the sons as two flowers
growing from the king's trunk, which 'summa gloria decoravit et transcendendo
contexit."°4 The idealised family image presented by Charlemagne to Greek
envoys is also striking in this context. He stood before them surrounded by his
three sons, 'iuvenes flu eius, jam regni participes effecti', his daughters and their
mother, followed by the hierarchy of the court, all posed in great splendour and
dignity.'°5 Interestingly, this Greek embassy visited the Frankish court in 812, at a
time when Charlemagne had no wife and only one surviving son. Notker would
have known this from even a cursory glance at the Anna/es Regni Francorum.
'°°The reference to divine favour is implied by the allusion to the giants in Genesis 6.4.
'°' Notker's comparison of them to 'qui dixerunt: quae nobis pars in David aut quae hereditas in
fihio Isai?' may imply the same thing, men rejecting the authority of the main Carolingian
(Davidic) line.
102 take the giants to be all potential female-line Carolingian claimants and not, as is sometimes
said, the reguli themselves. Cf. Lowe, 'Karlsbuch', p.146. Arnulf, Bernard and Charles the
Simple were the only male-line possibilities: female-line descent opened the door to the likes of
Berengar, Louis of Provence, Baldwin of Flanders and numerous others.
'° Notker, Gesta, 2.10, pp.65-7.
'° Ibid, 1.34, p.47.
105 Ibid, 2.6, pp.55-7.
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Here, as in the other examples, historical accuracy was not the point. The
Stammerer sought in these vignettes to create idealised images of family solidarity
and continuity, fixing them at points in the Carolingian past which would make
clear how sharply they contrasted with the current state of affairs. A resolution of
the problem was essential, Notker was saying, to the maintenance of political
stability, to close the door on the 'giants'. The urgency of his message would not
have been lost on Charles the Fat.
Notker did not, however, stop there: he also proposed a solution to the
problems he outlined in chapters 11 and 12 of book 2. In chapter 14, Notker
reports a dire prophecy of Charlemagne, moved to tears at the thought of what
terrible damage the Vikings might do to his descendants. He continues in the
second person: 'Gladius vester in sanguine Nordostranorum duratus obsistat,
adiuncto sibi mucrone Karllomanni fratris vestri, tincto quidem in eorundem
cruore sed nunc non propter ignaviam sed propter inopiam rerum angustiamque
terrarum fidelissimi vestri Arnoldi ita in rubiginem versus, ut tamen iussu et
voluntate potentiae vestrae haut difficulter possit ad acumen et splendorem
perduci. Hic enim solus ramusculus cum tenuissima Bennolini Bernard] astula
de fecundissima Hludowici radice sub singulari cacumine protectionis vestrae
pullulascit."°6 For Notker, Arnuif was the answer. Charles, as we discussed
earlier, had brought his nephew to his knees by the end of 885 as a response to his
unwanted interference in the so-called Wilhelminer War.'° 7 Notker appealed to
the emperor's necessity, reminding him of the imminence of the Viking danger
and recalling allusively the help Arnulf had given him at the siege of Asselt in
882. The recurring sword metaphor itself is also instructive. Louis the German's
interest in swords in preference to gold had marked him out for greatness in
Notker's eyes.'°8 It was for want of a Carolingian as tall as a sword that the
'giants' had infested the land, and Bernard's minority had been defined in terms of
being too young to have a 'spata femur accinctum'. Arnulf, by contrast, was
himself 'the sword of Karlmann', the only potential male-line heir old and
experienced enough to be a success. Arnulf was the emperor's best bet for
106 Ibid, 2.14, p.78.
107 See c.6.3.
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keeping out the claims of the 'giants', and it was in Charles's power to make his
rusty sword new again. To drive the point home, the author described Bernard in
the same passage as a 'tenuissima astula' 'de fecundissima Hiudowici radice' and
reminded Charles again that the 'futurus Karolaster aut Ludowiculus' which he so
desired was yet unborn.
Book 2's depiction of long Carolingian family continuity about to come to
an abrupt end culminated in chapter 14. As he had in the Continuatio, Notker
urged the admission of Arnuif to the position of official heir (or co-heir, with
Bernard) as a man able to combat the forces threatening the empire as he wrote.'°9
He combined allusions to an invented 'good old days' of united Carolingian
solidarity and continuity with direct pleas to the emperor. That, as we have seen,
Notker's fears about Arnulf's reaction to continued exclusion were ultimately
realised confirms that the Gesta Karoli reveals the author as not merely an
important writer and historian, but also an astute political commentator.
7.6: Charles the Fat and Charles the Great
The foregoing discussion suggests that the identifiable political concerns
expressed in the Gesta Karoli, as well as the specific contemporary references,
support the dates of composition argued for at the start of this chapter. Notker's
fears about the state of the imperial succession, with which book 2 is shot through,
only became relevant in 8 85-6, after the death of Carloman II, the fall from favour
of Arnulf and the failure of the first attempt to legitimise Bernard. One final
aspect of this political situation brings us back to the question of why Charles the
Fat might have commissioned Notker's work.
We have already seen how Charles wanted to hear stories lampooning the
Archbishop of Mainz and how, in this as in the other allusive stories discussed
above, the emperor was implicitly elided with his great-grandfather Charlemagne.
The grandest aspect of this comparison, however, is contained within Notker's
historical outlook. The Gesta expounds throughout a novel and unique
interpretation of the Carolingians' place in world history. Jerome's commentary
108 Notker, Gesta, 2.18, pp.88-9.
'° Notker, Continuatio, p.330.
258
on the book of Daniel had explained the four parts of the dream of
Nebuchadnezzar as representing four world empires, the last of which, Rome,
would last until the end of history. Notker revised this (in hindsight evidently
mistaken) interpretation by putting forward the idea, in the very first chapter of
book one, that Charlemagne represented 'alterius non minus admirabilis statuae
caput aureum': God had destroyed the statue which symbolised the first four
world empires and had created a second, with the Carolingians at its head."° This
was a concept of renovatio imperii which pitched its claim neither as a purely
Christian nor a Roman empire: the Frankish empire of Charlemagne was
universal, and stood at the pinnacle of world and sacred history." Book 1, as
noted earlier, then proceeded to expand on this theme by demonstrating the rise of
Charlemagne and an empire built on learning and wisdom which became the
foundation of its church, finally leading to his assumption of the imperial title."2
The more secular aspects of this theme are further developed in book 2,
beginning with Rome's loss of God's favour manifest in the death of Julian the
Apostate." 3 A series of chapters follow which lampoon the lazy and decadent
rulers of previous world empires in Africa, Persia and Byzantium, establishing
their moral inferiority to Charlemagne and their status as tribute-paying client
princes of the Franks." 4 Significantly, Notker ends this section with a prophetic
quotation from Virgil, which he thought was fulfilled by the rise of the
Carolingian world empire: 'Aut Ararim Parthus bibet aut Germania Tigrim'. The
Arar, he hastily adds, is to be identified with the Aare and not, as some
'gramrnatici ignari' have it, the Saône. The proof of this is that in the reign of
Louis the German a tax was raised from land towards the freeing of Christians in
the Holy Land: 'hoc pro antiqua dominatione atavi vestri Karoli avique vestri
Hiudowici ab eo miserabiliter implorantes." 5 In other words it was Louis the
German and the eastern Carolingians (in whose kingdom, of course, the Aare
flowed) who had truly inherited the mantle of world leadership from
"°Notker, Gesta, l.l,p.l.
" Läwe, 'Theoderich', pp.73-4; Siegrist, Herrscherbild, pp.109-44; Goetz, Strukturen, pp.69-85.
"2 Haefele's introduction, pp.xvii-xxiii.
" Notker, Gesta, 2.1, p.49.
" Ibid, 2.6-9, pp.53-65; see Siegrist, Herrscherbild, pp.! 14-27.
' Notker, Gesta, 2.9, p.65.
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Charlemagne. Louis, in succession to Charlemagne, was the new 'caput
Francorum."16
Notker proceeds immediately, in chapter 10, to discuss Louis the
German's personal qualities, his precociousness and his early designation as ruler
by Charlemagne." 7 Therefore ('itaque') Louis was 'rex ye! imperator totius
Germaniae, Rhetiarumque et antiquae Franciae nec non Saxoniae, Turingiae,
Norici, Pannoniarum atque omnium septentrionalium nationum." 8 The use of the
word 'itaque' in this context is significant, as is the phrase 'rex vel imperator':
both usages explicitly identify Louis the German as the heir of Charlemagne,
marking out his family as the superior Carolingian family branch. This reading of
Notker's political ideas is supported by the work of Eggert, who showed that the
Gesta's focus on the east Frankish line was also reflected in St-Gall's charter
formulas. Some of these were penned by Notker himself, and propound a view of
history in which Charles the Fat was the second emperor Charles (Charles the
Bald was ignored), and in which he, like Louis the German before him, ruled a
multi-regnal imperium which had east Francia at its centre."9
Notker went on to quote Isaiah 51,1: 'Adtendite ad petram, unde excisi
estis." 2° The message for Charles the Fat was clear: he was the heir of Louis as
Louis was of Charlemagne, the ruler of a divinely ordained world empire whose
centre was, in Notker's eyes, east Francia. The message was also deliberately
obvious: the relevant chapters come in sequence, and their overall impact is
unmistakable, quite apart from any individual didactic point each might make.
The assertion was all the easier to make with the benefit of hindsight, since in
885-6 it had become undeniable that Charles was indeed the heir of Charlemagne,
as his only surviving adult male legitimate descendant. One of Notker's aims in
the Gesta was thus to fix this known outcome in the context of ninth-century
history, explaining and legitimising the success of Charles in claiming the mantle
of his great-grandfather in terms of the divine masterplan.
116 Ibid, 1.34, p.47. 'Caput' refers to the head of the new symbolic statue and thus of the new
world empire: cf. ibid, 1.1, p.1; 1.24, p.32; 2.3, p.52.
" Ibid, 2.10, pp.65-7.
118 Thid, 2.11, p.67.
" Eggert, 'Reichsgedanken'; cf. idem, 'Franken', pp.518-9. Cf. Penndorf, Problem, pp.149-58.
120 Notker, Gesta, 2.18, p.89. Louis is described here as 'vere Caesar.'
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The connection between the two rulers was all the clearer given the
coincidence that they had the same name, something which is of course much
more obvious in Latin than in English translation. The elision of Charles (the
Great) and Charles (the Fat) has already been discussed as one of the principal
narrative strategies of the Gesta Karoli; the same implicit point can hardly have
been missed by a contemporary court audience reading Notker's explanation of
the Carolingian world empire. The link had already occurred to Notker in 881
when he wrote his Continuatio, a text which culminated in and celebrated the
anointing of Charles as emperor in that same year.' 2 ' It was even more appropriate
to the year 885, when Charles's assumption of the west Frankish kingdom
reunited the entire Carolingian Empire in the hands of one man for the first time
since 840 and gave territorial substance to his imperial title. The Gesta Karoli is,
therefore, a product of that same strand of ideology which we have already noted
as present in the thinking of Charles the Fat in the year 885, when he began to
think of himself as consecrated to the whole empire.'22
Notker also reveals that it had been Charlemagne whom Charles the Fat
was really interested in hearing about, and that his chapters on other kings were
digressions.' 23 It is therefore eminently possible that Charles himself, who, as we
have seen, had been in direct and indirect contact with Notker on several
occasions, was involved in the elaboration of these ideas, or at least that he was
aware of them before he commissioned them to be written up into a coherent text.
This is made more plausible by another famous product of the St-Gall scriptorium
which belongs to this period. The so-called Psalterium Aureum contains
illustrations accompanying twelve of the psalms which, although they concern
scenes from the life of King David, were executed in a style which suggests an
iconographic representation of the Old Testament ruler as a Carolingian, most
probably Charles the Fat.' 24 The various scenes point in two directions, both back
121 Notker, Continuatio, pp.329-30.
122 See above, c.6.4. Notker, Gesta, 1.10, p.13 refers to anointing as an ancient practice, which in
late ninth-century east Frankish terms it was not; Goetz, Strukturen, p.23 and n.65. This reference
to, presumably, the Old Testament, may nevertheless reflect the court's preoccupation with
consecration ideas in 885.
123 Notker, Gesta, 2.16, pp.80-1.
124 The work is often dated to 880x890: Reinle, Kunstgeschichte, p.285. Eggenberger, Psalterium,
pp.1 3-4 identifies the recipient as either Charles the Fat or Conrad I. The objections of Schaab,
261
to the Old Testament and to the present day, a concept which was common to
Carolingian political thought. David and the current ruler were consciously elided
by the artist and installed into the picture cycle as a royal archetype, rising to
kingship, defeating enemies and ultimately achieving Christ-like status.' 25 Its
individual elements, moreover, may refer to actual events in the current king's
lifetime; the illustration of Psalm 26 (Samuel anointing David), for instance, to an
actual consecration.' 26 This particular example was, as has already been
explained, especially relevant to the reign of Charles the Fat, in the year 885.127
Notker and Charles both knew that Charlemagne had had himself compared with
David.' 28 Notker had also compared himself to Idithun, David's singer, and
Charles the Fat to Charlemagne.' 29 An elision of Charles the Fat with David (a
typical Carolingian conceit) such as that found in the Golden Psalter would thus fit
this complex of associations and give support to the notion that Charles identified
himself with his great-grandfather.' 3° The Psalterium Aureum may therefore also
have been inspired by the ideological statements of the year 885: it is surely no
coincidence that its images have a distinctly imperial, rather than royal,
character.' 3 ' That this idea should be reflected in the Gesta Karoli as well
therefore comes as little surprise. In 885 Charles already had the title and the
empire: now the Gesta provided him with an appropriate ideology, rooting his
power in the course of sacred and secular history.
Notker was, however, no mindless mouthpiece of imperial propaganda.
His admonitory chapters on the succession situation (11-14) come immediately
after his explication of the greatness of the world empire (6-11). The implication
'Hofschule', that the codex was conceived and begun at the court school of Charles the Bald, are
convincing, but do not negate Eggenberger's argument that it was presented in its existing form as
a gift for a later ruler. It was probably at St-Gall, where it was completed and reworked, by
Charles the Fat's time.
125 Eggenberger, Psalterium, esp. pp.168-77.
126 Ibid, pp.82-3.
127 Other images refer to the king as adulterer, besieger and hunter. The God- or Christ-like king
(which makes sense in a Davidic context too) is also a principal theme of the Gesta Karoli:
Siegrist, Herrscherbi!d, pp.'79-89; hines, 'Emperor'.
128 Notker, Gesta, 2.19, p.89. Cf. 2.6, p.57; 2.12, p.71. This came from a reading of Alcuin's
letters: Ganz, 'Humour', pp.180-I.
129 Collectio Sangallensis, additamenta no.6; Notker, Continuatio, pp.329-30 respectively.
130 I.e. if Notker = Idithun, then Charles = David. Notker's musical sequences, the Liber
Ymnorum, had been sent for use at Charles's court in 884.
131 Eggenberger, Psalterium, pp.168, 173.
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of this structuring is that, in Notker's eyes, the continuation of Carolingian world
domination was conditional, dependent not only on the moral integrity of its
people but also on Charles the Fat's successful handling of the succession
situation. The dangerous implication of the 'second statue' ideology was that
there were, if the Franks lost God's favour, three more world empires to come.
Charles was the heir to world power, but its continuation was not yet assured:
indeed, Notker feared the worst. He told Charles the Fat what he wanted to hear,
but he also told him what he thought he ought to hear.
In this circumspection, Notker also reflects the political circumstances of
885-6. We have already seen how the optimistic grand rhetoric of the late summer
and autumn of 885 quickly lost its meaning and was dropped as the failure of the
Bernard plan and the humbling of Arnuif cast a shadow of doubt into the minds of
the Carolingian political community.' 32 The Gesta Karoli was conceived and
composed in the midst of this rapidly declining situation. It is no coincidence that
the confident assertion of Carolingian world power contained in the structure of
book 1, planned in mid-late 885, was infiltrated by the exhortatory digressions and
nervous second person addresses of book 2, written in 886.' The change in
Notker's outlook reflected the change in the state of the emperor's political
situation. Notker feared that Charles's grip on the world empire was becoming
ever weaker as time passed. Time ultimately proved the accuracy of Notker's
comments, for it was the excluded Arnuif who finally broke that grip in November
887 and inaugurated the age of the reguli, in whose number were included some
of the very female-line Carolingians against whom the Stammerer had warned.
7.7: Conclusion
The Gesta Karoli may be read, then, as much more of a political document
than has previously been allowed. Under its veneer of general moral and didactic
exhortation runs a substratum of contemporary political commentary, by turns
allusive and direct, expressed in the contents of the anecdotes and reinforced by
132 See above, c.6.4.
133 This contrast was noted, but not explained, by Haefele in his introduction, pp.xiv-xv.
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their ordering. It may be regarded as a mirror for princes, but it is also more than
simply that.
Some aspects remain to be discussed. Firstly, if we are to believe that
Charles the Fat and members of his entourage understood the implicit points being
made by Notker, they would have to have been conversant with events from the
actual reign of Charlemagne. For instance, the implied parallel between the two
emperors in the story about Godafrid's occupation of the Moselle region only
achieves its impact if its readers are familiar with the real actions of Godafrid I in
810, presumably from Einhard and/or the Annales Regni Francorum. Fortunately,
this is demonstrable. Einhard's Vita was one of the bestsellers of the ninth century
and copies were present at the court of Louis the German.' 34 It had been a text
used in the education of the young Charles the Bald, and may well have played a
similar role in the upbringing of Charles the Fat.' 35 In fact, Notker virtually tells
us as much in book 2 of the Gesta when he refers to 'proavus vester Karolus,
omnia vobis scientibus quaecumque fecit."36
Moreover, Notker's explication of the Carolingian world empire, a theme
which runs right through his work, was ultimately reliant on Jerome's
commentary on Daniel. We have a St-Gall library catalogue from c.880 which
reveals (in Notker's own hand) that Charles and his associates were accustomed to
borrowing some of its volumes.' 37 They are not recorded as having consulted the
exegesis on Daniel, but the list is only a snapshot of a particular moment in the
library's history, so it is entirely plausible that they did just that. Moreover, we do
know that Queen Richgard borrowed a volume of four of Jerome's other
commentaries, and that Liutward of Vercelli had read his letters. 138 These
Hieronymian interests make their acquaintance with the Daniel text even more
likely. In any case, we have already seen that Charles himself had had many
Bischoff, 'Bücher', pp. 173, 199.
'"Wallace-Hadrill, 'Prince', p.156; Ganz, 'Humour', p.173.
136 Notker, Gesta, 2.16, p.80. Thid, 2.17, p.85 may be a reference to professional historians at
court, from Notker is quick to distance himself: 'illis scribendum reliquo, qui non aliquo amore
sed questus tantum gratia vestram celsitudinem comitantur.' Cf. Lowe, 'Karlsbuch', p.1 36.
' 37 Rankin, 'Ego', pp.292-S.
Lehmann, Bibliothekskataloge, p.73: 'De lib. Hieronimi. In Jonam, Naum, Sophoniam et
Aggeum libri III! in voluniine I habet Rickart.' 'Epistolarum Hieronimi ad diversos, volumina 1111,
duo Liut-wardus habet'.
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opportunities to meet Notker, and that one definite conversation in 883 is
recorded. Charles and his court were familiar with Notker's ideas and intentions
and would certainly have understood even the most allusive of his comments.
Secondly, what was the intended use of the Gesta?	 Previous
commentators have rightly pointed out that it was supposed to amuse the court,
the anecdotal form providing an aid to its easy digestion. Whatever their more
serious points, the lampoons of the idiotic bishop of Mainz, the vacuous foreign
rulers and the ludicrous Vikings misunderstanding the point of baptism must have
been designed to elicit laughter. As a text with a small but prestigious court
audience it stands along with many of the other works of political theory and
commentary produced by the so-called Carolingian Renaissance. The Gesta
represents a quite traditional mingling of exaltation of the ruler on the one hand
and, on the other, exhortations to better Christian kingship in general as well as to
the accomplishment of specific goals.
Ultimately, however, Notker's messages never reached the court.
Although there is no way to determine absolutely whether the sudden mid-
sentence break in book 2 was the point at which Notker stopped working or is the
result of a corruption in the manuscript tradition, the former seems more likely.
Evidence for contemporary circulation is totally lacking, while the upsurge of
interest in the text in the twelfth century seems to have been associated with the
growth of the cult of Charlemagne. 139 We need not, as explained above, ascribe
the breaking off of the text to the deposition of Charles the Fat, as it must have
been written before the end of May 887.'° A more likely cause of its non-delivery
to its commissioner is the expulsion of Liutward of Vercelli from court and his
replacement by Liutbert of Mainz, which took place in that very month. The
emperor would not have looked favourably on criticism of Liutbert now that he
had become his archchancellor, archchaplain and chief adviser. Accordingly, it is
at this point that Liutbert's mouthpiece, the Mainz annalist, ended his diatribe
against the emperor and shifted to a pro-Charles outlook.
Haefele's introduction, pp.xxiii-xxvii.
'° Charles did confirm St-Gall's privileges on 30 May 887, a date highlighted by Notker, Gesta,
2.pref, p.48, as reserved by the monks for commemoration of his friend Werinbert: Innes,
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Moreover, the political rhetoric that informed the content and structure of
the Gesta Karoli had by this time come to seem redundant. The high-minded
imperial claims and Charlemagne associations which had been appropriate to the
political situation at the time of commissioning in 885 were consciously toned
down by the emperor in 886.'' As Notker wrote the second part of the Gesta in
that year it was becoming increasingly clear that Charles the Fat's persistent
failure to solve his succession problem was a major threat to political stability.
While Notker's astute political commentary remained relevant, by early 887 the
flattering rhetoric looked like bluster and was hopelessly out of date. The gap
between ideal and reality had become too wide for the propaganda to be
convincing. If Charles the Fat did ever read a version of the Gesta Karoli, he may
well have considered himself appropriately flattered and morally edified.
However, he is unlikely to have found its anecdotes terribly amusing as the
accuracy of Notker's dire predictions in book 2 was proved by the sequence of
events which brought his reign to a disastrous and premature end.
'Memory', pp.20-I. This need not mean that Charles had read the work: he was, it is clear, well-
enough acquainted with St-Gall traditions and observances long before 887.
141 See above, c.6.4.
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8: CONCLUSION: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE YEAR 888
It should here be stressed again that the intention of this thesis has not been to
argue that Charles the Fat was a 'great king'. Clearly, his record against the Vikings
was not unequivocally impressive, even if it was no worse than that of similarly-
placed rulers, while his stubborn attempts at solving the succession problem after 885
were, with the benefit of hindsight, misjudged, and ultimately the cause of his
downfall. Nevertheless, those very attempts were implemented with no small degree
of imagination and political savvy, as seen most clearly in the staged ideological
claims of late 885 and early 886. Moreover, the situation had only become so critical
because of the vagaries of chance which had so depleted the ranks of the dynasty in
the early 880s and caused the unravelling of the Vienne agreement which had been
concluded during the war against Boso. That agreement, in the conception of which
Charles had played a leading role, was remarkable both for its farsightedness and
effectiveness; its ultimate collapse was a result only of the unexpected deaths of three
of its participants. Charles's response to the challenges of governing the whole
empire, which he had been forced to face because of the way events had transpired,
was nothing if not positive. His itinerary reveals him to have been exceptionally
mobile, while his establishment of the marchiones shows practicality and,
unsurprisingly, a willingness to adhere to traditional Carolingian methods of ruling
through the aristocracy. Charles has been judged on the wrong criteria. He may not
have been a great or particularly innovative king, but he was surely by no means a
bad or failed one.
In view of this, Charles can no longer be allowed to stand as an emblem for a
general 'decline' of Carolingian power in the later ninth century. The problems he
faced, and the solutions he tried, were broadly similar to those which had
characterised every other reign of the period. Another recurring theme of this thesis
has been to stress the need for historians to inject more of a short-term perspective
into accounts of the empire's later years. Too many scholars still rely on teleological
models of long-term change in interpreting the evidence from this period, ignoring the
sources' more specific contexts. Only when the political narrative for these decades
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is more satisfactorily and critically worked out will it be valid to generalise about
their place in the overall course of Carolingian history. As it stands at the moment,
the accepted grand narrative of decline and fall is clearly not founded on an
assimilation of all (or even most of) the available evidence. The historiographical
constructs of a 'decline in royal authority' and consonant 'rise of the aristocracy'
before 888 must at best be readdressed and reproven, and at worst they must be
nuanced to the point where they are valueless.
It has been implicit in my argument that a powerful territorial aristocracy was
an underlying feature of the early medieval world, and that it remained firmly cast in
a traditional mould during the 880s.' The political structures of tenth-century
kingdoms were, however, undeniably different in detail from those which had existed
even half a century earlier. Given that, as Reynolds has stressed, our appreciation of
structural change ought not to be divorced from the course of events, it is worth
reflecting by way of conclusion on the broader significance of Charles the Fat's
deposition for the development of the post-Carolingian kingdoms. 2 This can be
assessed most clearly in west Francia, where the accession of Odo marked a decisive
political turning point. It is undeniable that in the tenth century the
Robertian/Capetian house was able to dominate the west Frankish kingdom at the
expense of the authority of the last Carolingian kings. However, the crucial factor in
allowing this situation to develop was the decision made by Odo as king to grant the
key honores and fiscal lands which he had held since 886 to his brother, the marchio
Robert. 3 By doing so, he transformed one of the crucial heartlands of Carolingian
power into a Robertian stronghold. The relative political weakness of Charles the
Simple and his successors in the tenth century, as well as the rise to power of the
Capetians, can in large part be traced back to this event. 4 It could only take place,
however, because Odo became king in 888: it was not a determining factor in his
acquisition of that kingship. In this perspective, then, the consolidation of high
'Cf. Fouracre, 'Justice'.
2 Reynolds, 'Historiography', p.133.
DD CS 45, 50.
Cf. Dunbabm, France, pp.30-I; Schneidmuller, Tradition, p.106.
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magnate power at the king's expense in west Francia postdates the collapse of
Carolingian hegemony caused by the death of the heirless Charles the Fat.
The very substance of this hegemony had also been altered. As Airlie has
argued, an overlooked achievement and fundamental basis of Carolingian rule up
until 888 was the establishment and maintenance of the political myth that its
existence was normal and natural. 5 This myth was expressed in the language of
legitimacy of birth: legitimate Carolingians were perceived to be rightful candidates
for kingship throughout the ninth century, which is why aristocratic rebellions usually
coalesced round a member of the royal house. Even the usurper Boso tried to
legitimise his actions by ascribing to himself a form of 'Carolingianness' based on his
relationship to the imperial family via his wife. 6 The effect was not to brainwash the
aristocracy into blind loyalty towards their kings: indeed, at points of tension
alternative allegiances, such as those relating to family, or even simple opportunism,
could cut across the demands made by rulers and surface as expressions of disloyalty.
This is why an opportunist like Boso, reacting to the power-vacuum created by the
dispute over the succession to Louis the Stammerer, was able to conceive of seizing a
crown for himself in the first place, and why he was able to win over eminent
supporters to his cause.
However, we must also take account of the reason for Boso's failure. As we
saw in chapter 3, the Carolingians used his rebellion as an opportunity to reassert their
authority. Because of the superior force they were able to command on this occasion,
the Carolingians' assertion that Boso was a tyrannus, an illegitimate ruler, prevailed.
In other words, the 'myth' of Carolingian legitimacy only survived because it was
backed up by the threat of force against those who challenged it. Only the fact that
Carolingian rule was still perceived as 'natural' after Boso's revolt can explain why
Charles the Fat was invited to ascend the west Frankish throne in 885: had the
aristocracy of that regnum lost confidence in the dynasty, they could easily have
For this paragraph see Airlie, 'Semper'.
6 Airlie, 'Behaviour', pp.275-86, 289-90.
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turned to one of their own number at that point. 7 By contrast, when Charles died in
888 leaving behind no adult legitimate male to take his place, there was no longer any
basis for solidarity between the new rulers, the reguli: each belonged to a different
family and none was a legitimate Carolingian. 8 The Carolingian monopoly on royal
legitimacy was broken. As Regino of Prum famously put it: 'Post cuius [Charles's]
mortem regna, que eius ditioni paruerant, veluti legitimo destituta herede, in partes a
sua compage resolvuntur et iam non naturalem dominum prestolantur, sed
unumquodque de suis visceribus regem sibi creari disponit. Quae causa magnos
bellorum motus excitavit; non quia principes Francorum deessent, qui nobilitate,
fortitudine et sapientia regnis imperare possent, sed quia inter ipsos aequalitas
generositatis, dignitatis ac potentiae discordiam augebat, nemine tantum ceteros
precellente, Ut eius dominio reliqui se submittere dignarentur.' 9 The principes, Odo,
Berengar and the others, were opportunists trying to take advantage of a power
vacuum in just the same way as Boso had been. The reason for their success, as
opposed to Boso's failure, was that the opportunity in 888 coincided with the absence
of any ruler who was strong enough to sustain an uncontested claim to Carolingian
legitimacy. The 'myth' of Carolingian legitimacy had survived the traumatic events
of 879-80, but it could not exist independently of legitimate Carolingians able to lay
claim to it.'° The events of 888 therefore necessarily altered the terms in which royal
legitimacy, the right to rule, was perceived.
Two texts associated with the rise of the reguli help to demonstrate how the
shattering of the Carolingian monopoly on royal authority was perceived as such by
contemporaries, and how it manifested itself in an altered rhetoric of royal legitimacy.
Abbo of St-Germain-des-Prés was, as we have seen, an apologist for the new kingship
of Odo of Paris." He passed an implicit comment on Odo's succession, stressing his
place as the immediate successor of Charles the Fat, and leaving unmentioned the
I therefore disagree with Airlie's conclusion that Boso's revolt had a shattering effect on the
dynasty's credibility.
The term 'reguli' is used by BC s.a.888, p.1 16.
Regino, Chron icon, s.a.888, p.129.
10 Cf. BrUhl, Deutschland, p.373.
See above, c.4.2.2.
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overt opposition faced by the king after his accession.' 2 However, Abbo's
justification for this succession is blunt, and tellingly similar to the rhetoric of
Einhard, another apologist for a new dynasty: Odo received the name and power of
king, and the crown and sceptre, thanks to the grace and favour of the 'populus
Francorum." 3 Abbo then goes on to stress the approval of each of the regna of
Neustria, Francia and Burgundy. The terms of Odo's kingship, which find an echo in
his coronation Promissio, are therefore stark: Abbo makes no attempt to build up his
legitimacy either by claiming the Carolingians were effete, or by seeking to attach
him artificially to the charisma of the old line.' 4 The poet's view of Odo's legitimacy
is hence already strikingly in a post-Carolingian mould at the end of the 880s.
Carolingian royal charisma simply had nothing to do with Abbo's definition of Odo's
kingship, whereas it had been absolutely central to the definition of Boso's right to
rule in 879. For kings like Odo, self-justification was no longer about whether or not
you were a Carolingian.
Similar conclusions can be drawn from the capitulary record of Louis of
Provence's election to kingship in 89O.' This text reveals that Louis claimed
legitimacy from a variety of sources, including not only the approval of the pope and
of Arnulf, but also appeals to both his Carolingian descent (he was 'ex prosapia
imperiali') and his relationship to King Boso ('excellentissimi Bosonis regis fihius').
The reference to the kingship of Boso, the anti-Carolingian lyrannus par excellence,
would have been unthinkable before 888, especially alongside a claim to Carolingian
blood. After all, Louis's adoption by Charles in 887 was, as we have seen, an attempt
to have him recategorised as a legitimate Carolingian, and to eliminate his connection
with his 'tyrant' father. By contrast, the Capitulary of Valence demonstrates how, in
the post-888 world, Carolingian blood was no longer the whole picture, but had
become simply one piece of the jigsaw. For Boso, the key had been to make himself
look as Carolingian as possible to justify his claim to kingship: before 888, to be royal
12 Abbo, Bella, pp.98-100; Guillot, 'Etapes', p.218.
Abbo, Bella, p.98; Guillot, 'Etapes', pp.2 I8-9.
" D OP 54 for the Promissio, with Bautier's cautionary remarks.
Hiudowicus Regis Arelatensis Electio. See also above, c.6.5.
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was to be Carolingian. For post-888 rulers like his son Louis, there was a need to use
every possible qualification to convince the political community that they were
indeed worthy of being considered kings.
Abbo's poem and the Capitulary of Valence thus reveal how the rhetorical
terms in which kingship was claimed and justified were changed by the breaking of
Carolingian hegemony in 888. This change also had the potential to affect the
practical relationship between kings and aristocrats, as the career of Boso's brother
Richard the Justiciar shows. Richard was a man who, geographically favourably
placed between vying royal competitors, was able to sit on the fence politically,
building up an independent power base by playing off one against another. His
command over a group of lesser counts was not sanctioned by any king, and by
standing his ground he seems to have been able to compel Odo and Charles the
Simple to buy his neutrality and acknowledge his independence by granting him
important honores such as the monastery of St-Germain in Auxerre.' 6 The existence
of such more or less autonomous territorial lordships was not, as this thesis has
already argued, a new phenomenon in the late ninth century. March jones like Odo
operated with a great deal of independence in their delegated commands. What is
remarkable about Richard, however, is that we can observe his acquisition of rights
and properties from kings in such detail: we actually see him building up his lordship
by wringing concessions from competing rulers. Odo, Charles the Simple and their
successors had to more or less acknowledge that men like Richard and, further south,
William the Pious, were beyond their reach.' 7 These figures flourished in a situation
where kings were competing for legitimacy and recognition, and their greater
visibility after 888 is significant. Although territorial aristocratic power was not a
novelty, the rise of the reguli created a situation in which it was able to coalesce into
forms approximating the principalities and duchies of the tenth century. By contrast,
as Boso's fate had demonstrated, before 888 aristocratic freedom of manoeuvre would
never extend to kings' toleration for power which asserted itself outside the hierarchy
16 See Sassier, Recherches, pp.6-li.
Il Lauranson-Rosaz, 'Roi', pp.425-34.
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of royal delegation. In Italy, where several figures fought it out for the crown, a
similar situation developed, as summed up by Liudprand of Cremona: 'semper
Italienses geminis uti dominis volunt, quatinus alterum alterius terrore coherceant.'
All this serves to show how, after the shattering of the Carolingian monopoly,
royal legitimacy was a quality which was up for grabs and available for redefinition.
However, in the east Frankish kingdom, authors associated with Arnulf of Carinthia
were not so ready to admit that things had changed. The Bavarian continuator of the
Annales Fuldenses referred only to Arnuif as 'rex', and denigrated the other new
rulers with the term 'reguli'. The annalist claimed that each of the reguli had made
themselves into kings (while Arnulf had received nobles from all over the realm), and
cast further aspersions on their legitimacy by listing the names of their non-
Carolingian fathers.' 9 This author was also quick to point out that each of the reguli
came to Arnuif, implying that the latter exercised an overlordship which applied to all
the kingdoms of the empire. Similarly, Regino, writing some 20 years later for
figures at the court of Arnulfs son Louis the Child, cast Arnulf in the role of a
legitimate Carolingian emperor, referring to him as the 'naturalis dominus' of the
reguli, and placing heavy emphasis on his name, with its implicit identification with
the legendaiy Carolingian progenitor St. Arnulf of Metz. 2° Clearly, then, Arnulf
harboured hopes that he could maintain the myth of Carolingian hegemony and use it
to serve his own ambitions. As the example of Abbo of St-Germain shows, however,
it is unlikely that the reguli themselves saw things in quite the same way.
If open apologists for Arnulf tried to deny the rupture in Carolingian politics
which had been caused by the events of 887-8, the attitude to the new situation of
another prominent figure, Archbishop Fulk of Rheims, is equally instructive. The
Visio Karoli was produced in Fulk's circle in 890 and was, as we have seen, probably
conceived as a pamphlet associated with the accession of Louis of Provence intended
to encourage the young king into a northwards expansion against Odo, whom Fulk
' Liudprand, Antapodosis, 1.37, p.27.
' BC s.a.888, p.116.
20 Regmo, Chronicon, s.a.888, p.129, 880, p.'16.
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opposed.2 ' The strident Carolingian 'legitimism' of this text, in which Louis is
connected to the main imperiallLotharingian bloodline of the dynasty, contrasts
sharply with the official record of proceedings at Valence in which, as we have seen,
Carolingian connections were but one reference point among several. The difference
in outlook can be explained by Fulk's specific intentions: by tempting Louis to see
himself as a legitimate Carolingian he was dangling before him the carrot of imperial
status, with all the implications for an exalted authority which that entailed. His own
motives were, however, quite self-interested. Moreover, Louis was aware that the
proposition was unrealistic, and was not won over by Fulk's ambitious rhetoric.
The archbishop had clearly not been motivated by an unchanging and
principled conviction that Louis was the rightful Carolingian emperor. Two years
earlier, in the aftermath of Charles's death and of the failed bid of Guy of Spoleto to
acquire the west Frankish crown with Fulk's help, the archbishop had led a faction
which appealed to Arnulf to come and take over from Odo. 22 In view of this, it may
be significant that our only other major source for Arnulf's supposed Oberherrschafl
is the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, which states that the reguli ruled only with his consent,
and that they acknowledged the superior quality of his kingship. 23 This text's
information on Carolingian politics becomes significantly more substantial in the
880s, suggesting that the compiler had a source with good continental connections.
The church of Rheims, and Fulk in particular, had strong connections with the West
Saxon court, where the Chronicle was being produced at this time. 24 Moreover, the
most likely source of the continental information is Grimbald of St-Bertin, the scholar
who had been commended into King Alfred's patronage in the later 880s by Fulk
himself. 25 It is therefore possible that the Chronicle's claims about the position of the
reguli actually reflect a perspective from Rheims in the years 888-9.
In other words, both the Visio Karoli and the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, the two
texts which make the most conspicuous statements about the survival of Carolingian
21 See above, c.6.5. On Fulk's position at this time, see Schneider, Fulco, pp.68-89.
AV s.a.888, pp.64-5; Schneider, Fulco, pp.43-62.
23 ASC s.a.887, p.80; Asser, De Rebus, c.85, pp.7 I-2 elaborates the Chronicle's report.
24 See Nelson, 'Franks', pp.148-9. On the Chronicle and the court, see Scharer, 'Writing'.
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legitimacy after 888 and which do not come from an Arnulfian connection, can be
placed quite specifically into context as the products of the desperate politicking of
Fulk of Rheims in his ongoing struggle to rid himself of the unwanted rule of Odo. If
anything, therefore, they stand as evidence not for an unbroken continuation of the
myth of Carolingian hegemony, as Arnuif's apologists wished to believe, but for the
very destruction of that belief. The appeal to Carolingian legitimacy was simply a
rhetorical position adopted by the archbishop for quite specific political ends, rather
than a still-vital ruling idea. In reality, as the Valence capitulary shows, possession of
'Carolingianness' was no longer the central claim for aspirant kings to make. Its
appeal was fresh in the memory, but it was fading fast: Fulk's was a voice in the
wilderness. Even Regino, who had paid lip service to the legitimacy of Arnuif's
coup, recognised this: it was his famous analysis that the charisma of the new rulers
was too equal to avoid wars breaking out between them.26
In the east as in the west, therefore, the concept of Carolingian legitimacy was
seriously damaged by the events of 887-8, and the door was opened to a redefinition
of royal authority. If Amulf had maintained at least a fictive continuity, the minority
of Louis the Child accentuated the dynamic by allowing the identities and territories
of the emergent ducal houses to be shaped and entrenched by a series of fractious
feuds. The distance that had been travelled was exposed by the reign of Conrad I,
whose attempts to rule Carolingian-style through, rather than with, the duces were
shown up as spectacularly misjudged and anachronistic. 27 His successor Henry I
recognised Conrad's mistake and, after negotiations with the leading aristocrats,
founded his kingship on bonds of amicitia with the most important nobles of the
realm. This amounted to a formalisation, or even institutionalisation, of the new
relationship of the king, primus inter pares, to the high aristocracy which was to
characterise the history of the German Reich under the Ottonians.28
25 Whitelock, Brett and Brooke, Councils, pp.8-li for the text of Fulk's letter.
26 Arnuif did send Odo a crown, perhaps underlining his perception of his superiority. It may be
doubted that Odo saw this in quite the same way, however: AV s.a.888, p.66 only says that the kings
'facti amici'.
27 Renter, Germany, pp.136-7.
28 Leyser, Rule; Reuter, 'Sonderweg'.
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The Carolingian empire had always been something of an intellectual
construct, its unity articulated more through dynastic and regnal ideas than through
strong institutional centralisation. 29 It was only the end of the political dominance of
the Carolingian family caused by the death of Charles the Fat and the accession of the
reguli which loosened the grip of these ideas and brought about the fragmentation of
royal power in Europe. As an overall conclusion to this thesis, it is therefore
important to stress that the political crisis caused by the lack of a satisfactory solution
to the succession problems of 885-7 preceded, and hence was not caused by, the
disappearance of Carolingian hegemony. The empire did not fall apart on the death
of Charles the Bald, the revolt of Boso or the death of Carloman II. It was only the
splintering of royal legitimacy in 888 which allowed changes in the rhetoric and,
ultimately, structure of politics to develop, giving new opportunities to the high
aristocracy to entrench their positions by wresting concessions from competing kings.
Regino's much-quoted analysis of the equality of the new rulers was astute: in
contrast to 751, no family was strong enough in 888 to take over the Carolingian
family business wholesale. What is less frequently stressed is Regino's opening
phrase: the rise of the new order took place, he tells us, 'after Charles's death'. 3° The
families of the high aristocracy did not 'rise' slowly to their royal and ducal positions:
they emerged from the shadow of the Carolingians after the fizzling out of the
legitimate royal line to consolidate their power and enhance the coherence of their
principalities. If anything, the 'rise of the aristocracy' was not a cause but a
consequence of the fall of the Carolingians. It was the death without heir of Charles
the Fat which opened the door to these new dynamics in the nature of royal and
aristocratic authority: in this sense, the year 888 can be said to have marked the
beginning of a long tenth century.
29 See Wallace-Hadrill, 'Prince', pp.178-9; Rosenwein, 'Politics', p.249.
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